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2024 DIGILAW 1321 (RAJ)

State Of Rajasthan v. Badrilal, S/o. Ramchandra

2024-09-24

MUNNURI LAXMAN, PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 378 (3) & (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the appellant-State laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 23.03.1995 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Nimbahera in Sessions Case No. 13/94 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Badrilal & Ors.), whereby the accused-respondents were acquitted of the charges against them under Sections 302 & 302/34 IPC. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 1993 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 1995. 3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are that on 30.10.1993, Smt. Shakku Bai was admitted in Government Hospital at Nimbahera in a burnt condition. At around 7:30 AM, one Shri Satyanarayan, the then A.S.I., Police Station Nimbahera recorded her statement. In her statement, Smt. Shakku Bai W/o Badrilal, resident of Nimbahera initially claimed that she, of her own free will, poured kerosene and burnt herself. She cited the reason therefor that her mother-in-law Nani Bai, brother-in-law Kishan and other family members had severely beaten her. In the night at 11:00 PM, she was talking to a boy named Manoj, who worked at their place making sweets. Her mother-in-law witnessed this interaction and proceeded to beat her severely with a broom. At that time, her husband was also present on the spot. Following this, in the presence of her husband, Smt. Shakku Bai poured kerosene on herself and her husband lit the match from behind, thereby setting her on fire. As per the statement of Smt. Shakku Bai, she had not mentioned using the matchstick herself. She also revealed that two years prior, her husband had poured kerosene on her. According to the statement given by Smt. Shakku, the said act was committed by her husband, while saying that he had been threatened several times by her, that she would commit suicide, and thus, her husband set her on fire, while saying that he himself would burn Smt. Shakku, and lit the match and set her on fire. At that time, her father-in-law, brother-in-law, mother-in-law and other family members were present at the site. At that time, her father-in-law, brother-in-law, mother-in-law and other family members were present at the site. It was not known that the neighbors did not come at that time and she was beaten up from 11:00 PM to 5:00 AM, due to which, she got upset. 4. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR was registered and the investigation commenced accordingly. After investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the accused persons, and the trial commenced accordingly. 5. During the course of trial, the evidence of 15 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 17 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused respondents pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondents namely Badrilal, Nanibai and Kishanlal, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 23.03.1995, against which the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State. 7. Mr. Sameer Pareek, learned Public Prosecutor submits that the incident occurred late at night when Manoj, a worker in the house, was talking to deceased Smt. Shakku, which led to an altercation between deceased and her mother-in-law, when her husband Badrilal was also standing nearby. 7.1. Learned Public Prosecutor admits that there are no eyewitnesses or any other circumstantial evidence in the present case, but principally the prosecution case rests upon the dying declaration of the deceased Smt. Shakku Bai. 7.2. Learned Public Prosecutor has taken this Court to Exhibit P-14, which is attested by a Junior Specialist, Referral Hospital Nimbahera on 30.10.1993 at 7:30 am in the hospital. He further submits that in the said dying declaration, the deceased deposed that she voluntarily poured kerosene and has burnt herself. The document further reflects that the mother-in-law of the deceased was in altercation with her and was beating her because of a boy named Manoj, who worked at the house and was talking to the deceased. The deceased Smt. Shakku Bai subsequently deposed in her first dying declaration that she poured kerosene on her body, upon which, her husband lit the match. 7.3. The deceased Smt. Shakku Bai subsequently deposed in her first dying declaration that she poured kerosene on her body, upon which, her husband lit the match. 7.3. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that it is apparent on the face of the dying declaration, that the same cannot be considered as a dying declaration supporting the voluntary suicide by the deceased. 7.4. Learned Public Prosecutor has further taken this Court to Exhibit P-2, the second dying declaration, which was made before the Magistrate, in which, the deceased, at the relevant time, has deposed that she was burnt by her husband. Learned Public Prosecutor also submits that the allegation in this dying declaration is that kerosene was poured upon the deceased by her husband, who thereafter, lit the match. The motive behind the incident in question remains consistent with the first dying declaration i.e. she was talking to a boy named Manoj. 7.5. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that there might be some improvements in the dying declaration, but the original story of altercation being raised by the mother-in-law and the fire having been facilitated by her husband is reflected in both the dying declarations. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Bhagat Dadhich, learned counsel representing the accused-respondents, while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that there are three conflicting versions of events presented in two dying declarations of the deceased, marked as Exhibit P-2 and Exhibit P-14. He further submits that Exhibit P-14 begins with the statement that the deceased voluntarily poured kerosene on herself and set herself on fire. In the later version, in the same dying declaration, the deceased, at the relevant time, deposed that while she poured the kerosene on herself, it was her husband who lit the match. In the second dying declaration, the stand of the deceased was that her husband poured the kerosene on her as well as lit the match, thereby setting her on fire. 8.1. Learned counsel further submits that since the dying declaration is the sole evidence presented by the prosecution, therefore, in these circumstances, unless a sterling worth of dying declaration is brought on record, the same cannot be given credit that the prosecution is trying to do. 8.2. 8.1. Learned counsel further submits that since the dying declaration is the sole evidence presented by the prosecution, therefore, in these circumstances, unless a sterling worth of dying declaration is brought on record, the same cannot be given credit that the prosecution is trying to do. 8.2. Learned counsel also submits that the prosecution’s failure is writ large on the face of the record to the effect that Sohan Singh, the investigating officer, was not brought in as a prosecution witness. Learned counsel further submits that the burn injuries sustained by the accused-husband reflect an attempt on his part to save his wife, i.e. the deceased. Learned counsel also submits that the deceased Smt. Shakku Bai was immediately hospitalized by the husband’s family and at best it was a suicidal attempt, and thus, the learned Trial Court has rightly arrived at a conclusion of acquittal, vide the impugned judgment. 8.3. In support of such submissions, learned counsel relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Uttam Vs. The State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No.485 of 2012) decided on 02.06.2022. The relevant excerpt of the said judgment is reproduced, in verbatim, as hereunder: “36. We are of the opinion that once the High Court had disagreed with the Session Court and discarded the two written dying declarations of the deceased due to several glaring lacunae in the procedure adopted by the SEM (PW-9) and the I.O. (PW-14) in recording the said statement, then the appellant could not have been indicted on the oral testimony of PW-2, father of the deceased and PW-12, family friend, both of who were interested witnesses and whose evidence runs contrary to the versions of the deceased recorded by PW-9 and PW-14. It must be remembered that all the four dying declarations, two in writing and the other two oral, were based on the statements given by the deceased at different times on the very same day, i.e., 27th March, 1995, when she had suffered 93% burn injuries and there are serious doubt about her being mentally and physically fit to give her statement. The IO (PW-14) had recorded the first dying declaration at 3.20 p.m. this was followed by the SEM (PW-9) having recorded the second dying declaration between 4.30p.m. and 5.00 p.m. It was on the very same day that PW-2 and PW-12 had also met the deceased at the hospital and claimed that she had informed them as to how she had received the burn injuries and named the appellant as the culprit.” 38. In the light of the evidence discussed above and being mindful of the principles governing appreciation of the evidence related to multiple dying declarations, we find it difficult to endorse the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. The evidence of PW-2 and PW-12 cannot be treated as stellar enough to hold the appellant guilty for the offence of murdering his wife. Hence, he is entitled to being granted benefit of doubt.” 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case along with the precedent law cited at the Bar. 10. This Court observes that the principal evidence relied upon by the prosecution consists of two dying declarations, marked as Exhibit P-14 and Exhibit P-2 respectively. Exhibit P-14 is supported by Senior Medical Officer and Exhibit P-2 is supported by subsequent dying declaration attested by the learned Magistrate. 11. This Court is conscious that though it is not a clear case of contradiction, but there is certainly an improvement in the depositions which has to be noted and undermines the credibility of the dying declarations. The version of the first dying declaration was that she voluntarily poured kerosene on herself and set her on fire. In middle portion of the same statement, the deceased has deposed that, while she poured the kerosene on herself, it was her husband, who lit the match. The third version, which was in the second dying declaration Exhibit P-2, as noted, was to the effect that the deceased completely changed and attributed both pouring of kerosene and the ignition of fire, to her husband itself. The basic context though regarding one boy named Manoj, who was working in the house, conversing with the deceased, which apparently annoyed her mother-in-law and husband. The basic context though regarding one boy named Manoj, who was working in the house, conversing with the deceased, which apparently annoyed her mother-in-law and husband. If there was other corroborative evidence, this Court could have gone through the same, but the version as considered by the learned Trial Court is correct in the present circumstances, particularly, when the sole dependence of prosecution’s case is upon the dying declarations. 12. This Court is also conscious of the fact that the husband sustained burn injuries as evident by the medical report on record, while attempting to save the deceased i.e. his wife. Furthermore, the husband and his family members also facilitated the transportation of the deceased to the hospital. Even if there could have been two opinions, it is not sufficient to interfere in the judgment of acquittal. Thus, considering the overall perspective, particularly, the inconsistencies in the dying declarations and the lack of corroborative evidence regarding husband’s (accused-respondent) role, coupled with the fact that he himself sustained injuries while attempting to save the deceased and that, he and his family members facilitated admission of the deceased in the hospital. 13. Thus, in the overall factual matrix and the circumstances surrounding the case, the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 23.03.1995 passed by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be anything, which would call for intervention of this Court to reverse the same. 14. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 15. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondents under Sections 302, 302/34 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analyzed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 16. 16. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 17. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 18. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 18.1.Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (B.N.S.S.), 2023, the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as she would be called upon to do so. 19. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.