JUDGMENT : Vaibhavi D. Nanavati, J. 1. The petitioner herein is a Co-operative Housing Society in which the respondent owns 11 shops and the amount of maintenance is not paid by the respondent. In view thereof, the petitioner herein has filed Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 under Section 99(4) of the Act. Upon issuance of summons on 07.03.2012 and 16.03.2012, the appearance of learned advocate appearing for the respondent came to be filed. The respondent did not file any application for leave to defend as contemplated under Section 99(4) of the Act read with Rule 41A of the Rules of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Rules, 1965 (for short ‘the Rules) and preferred an application to decide the preliminary issue with respect to jurisdiction. The said application came to be rejected by the learned Board of Nominees, against which a Revision Application No.95 of 2015 came to be filed before the Tribunal which also came to be rejected by order dated 18.01.2018. 1.1 The respondent herein filed an application seeking leave to defend in Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 on 06.07.2017 i.e. after almost 5 years, on appearing before the Board of Nominees. The said application came to be filed with an application seeking condonation of delay. The petitioner objected to the same. The learned Board of Nominees condoned the delay of more than 5 years by order dated 05.03.2018; duly produced at Annexure – G. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred Revision Application No.25 of 2018 before the Tribunal. By order dated 14.02.2022, the Tribunal rejected the said Revision Application No.25 of 2018 filed by the petitioner herein. The learned Board of Nominees condoned the delay of more than 5 years by order dated 05.03.2018; duly produced at Annexure – G. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred Revision Application No.25 of 2018 before the Tribunal. By order dated 14.02.2022, the Tribunal rejected the said Revision Application No.25 of 2018 filed by the petitioner herein. 1.2 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the learned Board of Nominees, Surat, condoning the delay as also, the order dated 14.02.2022 passed by the Tribunal in Revision Application No.25 of 2018 confirming the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the learned Board of Nominees, the petitioner herein has preferred the present petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and has prayed for the following reliefs: “(A) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus and/or writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the order dated 5.3.2018 passed by the learned Board of Nominees Court, Surat condoning the delay as also the order dated 14.2.2022 passed by the Tribunal in Revision Application No.25 of 2018 confirming the order dated 5.3.2018 passed by the learned Board of Nominees Court, (B) During the pendency hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to stay the implementation, execution and operation of the order dated 5.3.2018 passed by the learned Board of Nominees Court, Surat condoning the delay as also the order dated 14.2.2022 passed by the Tribunal in Revision Application No.25 of 2018 confirming the order dated 5.3.2018 passed by the learned Board of Nominees Court and further be pleased to stay the further proceedings of Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 pending before the learned Board of Nominees Court, Surat. (C) Any other and further reliefs as deemed just and proper looking to the facts of this case, may kindly be granted in favour of the petitioner, in the interest of justice.” 2. Heard Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Bomi H. Sethna, learned advocate appearing for the respondent. 3. Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 came to be filed by the petitioner society seeking outstanding amount of maintenance, due and payable from the respondent. Heard Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Bomi H. Sethna, learned advocate appearing for the respondent. 3. Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 came to be filed by the petitioner society seeking outstanding amount of maintenance, due and payable from the respondent. It is submitted that the respondent entered appearance upon issuance of summons in the said proceedings. The respondent did not file an application for leave to defend as provided under Section 99(4) of the Act read with Rule 41A of the Rules. However, preferred an application to decide preliminary issue with respect to jurisdiction below Exh.17. It is submitted that while the application below Exh.17 came to be rejected by the learned Board of Nominees which was challenged before the Tribunal being Revision Application No.95 of 2015, the said Revision Application also came to be rejected on 18.01.2018. 3.1 Mr. Baiju Joshi, learned advocate, submitted that the Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 is kept for orders on 28.07.2017 by the learned Board of Nominees. At the said point of time, after almost four months, the respondent preferred application for condonation of delay to file leave to defend under Section 99(4) of the Act read with Rule 41A of the Rules. It is submitted that both the authorities i.e. the learned Board of Nominees and the Tribunal, erred in allowing the application seeking condonation of delay. It is submitted that the reasons given by the learned Board of Nominees are against the object and purpose of Section 99(4) of the Act read with Rule 41A of the Rules. It is also submitted that an opportunity is given to the respondent, which was not availed by the respondent for a period of almost 5 years and 10 months. It is submitted that the reason for condonation of delay does not fall within the ambit of Section 99(4) of the Act read with Rule 41A of the Rules and it is clear violation of principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of K.B. Lal vs. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors. reported in 2024 (4) SCR 616 . 4. Per contra, Mr. reported in 2024 (4) SCR 616 . 4. Per contra, Mr. Bomi H. Sethna, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, submitted that liberal approach is required to be taken by this Court in such cases and that, no interference is called for in the impugned orders passed by the learned Board of Nominees, Surat whereby, the delay has been condoned upon condition to deposit Rs.3000/- before the petitioner within 20 days of the said order. While passing the impugned order, the learned Board of Nominees has also held that the delay is required to be condoned in the interest of the parties and for substantial justice. The learned Tribunal has rightly confirmed the order passed by the learned Board of Nominees taking into consideration the established position of law. 4.1 In light of the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Bomi Sethna, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, placed reliance on the ratio as laid down in case of O.P. Kathpalia vs. Lakhmir Singh reported in AIR 1984 SC 1744 and in case of Hansa Govindbhai Patel vs. Shree Vidhyadham Co-operative Housing Society Limited reported in 2018 (3) GLR 2279 . 5. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. The petitioner herein approached the learned Board of Nominees by filing Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 against the respondent. The respondent herein is a member of the petitioner society having shops Nos.G-31 to 33, 38, 42, 43, 103, 104 and 113 to 116. Upon issuance of summons on 07.03.2012 and 16.03.2012, the respondent entered appearance and has been part of the said proceedings thereafter. An application came to be filed below Exh.17 with respect to maintainability, which came to be rejected by the Board of Nominees, which was taken in Revision being Revision Application No.95 of 2015 before the Tribunal which came to be rejected on 18.01.2018. It is pertinent to note that pending the said Revision Application, there was no stay granted by the Tribunal and the Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 kept for orders on 28.07.2017. Thereafter, an application seeking condonation of delay for seeking leave to defend came to be filed by the respondent on 6.11.2017 i.e. after a period of 2 months. 6. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to Section 99(4) and 99(6) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, which reads thus: “99(4). Thereafter, an application seeking condonation of delay for seeking leave to defend came to be filed by the respondent on 6.11.2017 i.e. after a period of 2 months. 6. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to Section 99(4) and 99(6) of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, which reads thus: “99(4). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), the following disputes or class of disputes, if the plaintiff so desires, shall be decided summarily by the Registrar, or his nominee or board of nominees, in such manner as may be prescribed, namely :— (a) any dispute for recovery of debt upon promissory note, hundi, bill of exchange or bond, with or without interest, whether agreed upon under such instruments or under the bye-laws; (b) any dispute for recovery of a fixed sum of money or in the nature of debt, with or without interest, arising on a written contract; (c) any dispute for recovery of price of goods sold and delivered, where the rate, quality and quantity are admitted in writing; (d) any dispute for recovery of dues payable by a member of a housing society towards contribution for construction of the house, or any dispute in respect or repayment of any loan, interest on loan, ground rent, local authority taxes, sinking fund, water charges, electrical charges, maintenance and upkeep charges or charges for other services rendered by the society and the interest on such arrears, payable under the written agreement or under the bye-laws. 99(6). The Registrar his nominee of, as there case may be, board of nominees may under special circumstances set aside the award passed by him or it and if necessary, stay or set aside the execution, and may grant leave to the defendant to appear and defend the disputes, if it seems reasonable so to do and on such terms as he or it links fit. 7. 7. It is also apposite to refer to Rule 41A of the Gujarat Co- operative Societies Rules, 1965, which reads thus: "Rule 41-A. Summary procedure for deciding disputes : (1) In dispute referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 99, the disputant shall in addition to the normal averment in Form K make the following averment namely :- (a) that the claim of the disputant is for recovery of liquidated sum of money only and no other relief beyond the scope of this rule is claimed in the dispute; (b) that the disputant believes that there is no valid or bona fide defence to his claim. (2)(i) Within ten days from the service of a notice calling upon the opponent to obtain leave from the Registrar to appear and defend the claim, the opponent or such of the opponents as are interested in defending the claim shall apply to the Registrar by an affidavit or a declaration for the leave setting out the facts on which he relies, and what triable issues are likely to arise. The opponent shall in such application disclose all the documents which he considers important from his point of view. A copy of such application shall be served on the disputant and he shall have a right to file a rejoinder in the form of an affidavit or declaration and place before the deciding authority. Such material as in his opinion supports his contentions. (ii) The Registrar, on reading the affidavits and declarations and on hearing the parties and their pleadings and considering the documents relied on and produced by them, may pass an award or grants leave to defend to such of the opponents, subject to the condition that the opponent shall deposit thirty three and half percent amount of the claim of the dispute or such less amount as may be fixed by the Registrar after taking into consideration the circumstances and facts of the case.” 8. In light of the aforesaid, the respondent herein was required to prefer an application under Section 99(4) of the Act read with Rule 41A of the Rules, within a period of 10 days from the service of notice to obtain leave from the Registrar to appear and defend the claim. In light of the aforesaid, the respondent herein was required to prefer an application under Section 99(4) of the Act read with Rule 41A of the Rules, within a period of 10 days from the service of notice to obtain leave from the Registrar to appear and defend the claim. The respondent or such as the respondents as are interested in defending the claim, are required to apply to the Registrar by an affidavit or a declaration for the leave setting out the facts, which the applicant relies on, and that triable issues are likely to arise. 9. On perusal of the aforesaid provisions, the said provisions are given a go-bye by the respondent; having preferred an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for leave to defend under Section 99(4) of the Act read with Rule 41A of the Rules of the summary procedure for deciding the dispute, after a period of more than 5 years of the Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 and after the two months of the said suit was kept for orders. 10. At this stage, it is apposite to refer to the ratio as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of K.B. Lal vs. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors. reported in 2024 (4) SCR 616 . Paragraph 10 of the said decision reads thus: “10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384 ). The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556 ). Thus, it is apparent that the words ‘sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81 ). Thus, it is apparent that the words ‘sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81 ). The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649 , and are reproduced as under: “21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.” Having perused the application under Order IX, Rule 7 of the CPC dated 23.11.2020, filed by the appellant, and the accompanying affidavit, wherein the appellant had sought the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of a delay of almost 14 years, we find there was no satisfactory or reasonable ground given by the appellant explaining the delay. We say this for two reasons. First, it is an admitted position by the appellant himself that upon an inspection of the case file in the year 2011, he came to know about the order dated 06.09.2006, by which the Trial Court had decided to proceed ex-parte against him. What prevented the appellant from filing the application under Order IX, Rule 7 that year itself has not been satisfactorily explained at all, as the first application was only filed in the year 2017. Secondly, the explanation offered by the appellant, which is that the advocate appointed by him did not pursue the matter diligently, and then another advocate was appointed by him who inadvertently forgot to file the application does not find support from the records. What is clear is that the appellant has been grossly negligent in pursuing the matter before the trial court. Thus, the trial court, the revisional court as well as the High Court, were correct in dismissing the belated claim of the appellant. We find no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 19.05.2022 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.” 11. Thus, the trial court, the revisional court as well as the High Court, were correct in dismissing the belated claim of the appellant. We find no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 19.05.2022 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.” 11. In light of the aforesaid ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which in the opinion of this Court, is applicable to the facts of the present wherein, though the respondent has been party to proceedings right from the year 2012 and an application seeking condonation of delay for leave to defend has been filed in the month of November, 2017 i.e after a lapse of more than 5 years on 06.11.2017. The conduct of the respondent is such that it lacks bona fide. Further, the Board of Nominees while allowing the delay of more than 5 years, erred in not taking into consideration the period for which, the Summary Lavad Case No.14 of 2012 is pending and has been kept for orders by the same Court on 28.07.2017 and thereafter, after a period of two months i.e. on 06.11.2017, the respondent filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing an application for leave to defend. The Tribunal confirmed the said order which is an unreasoned order and condones the delay of more than 5 years. 11.1 At the relevant point of time also, the Revision Application No.95 of 2015 which was filed by the respondents challenging the order passed below Exh.17, was rejected on 18.01.2018. In view thereof, it also cannot be inferred that the respondent herein waited till the order passed in the Revision Application No.25 of 2018. 12. Considering the aforesaid, in the opinion of this Court, the application seeking condonation of delay of 5 years in preferring an application for leave to defend is barred by inordinate delay and the same is required to be considered strictly. For such a delay, this Court is not inclined to take a liberal view more particularly, in view of the fact that the respondent is a party to the proceedings since 2012 and having waited for the Board of Nominees till the matter is heard and kept for orders. For such a delay, this Court is not inclined to take a liberal view more particularly, in view of the fact that the respondent is a party to the proceedings since 2012 and having waited for the Board of Nominees till the matter is heard and kept for orders. In absence of any sufficient cause shown by the respondent for seeking such indulgence, the impugned orders passed by the respondent authorities are required to be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. For the foregoing reasons, this is a fit case to exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the interest of justice. The impugned order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the Board of Nominees, Surat, condoning the delay as also the order dated 14.02.2022 passed by the Tribunal in Revision Application No.25 of 2018 confirming the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the Board of Nominees, are hereby quashed and set aside. The present petition stands allowed accordingly. 14. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted.