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2024 DIGILAW 1337 (RAJ)

State v. Sohan Lal

2024-09-26

MUNNURI LAXMAN, PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

body2024
ORDER : 1. This Criminal Appeal under Section 378 (iii) & (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the appellant-State laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 16.02.2001 passed by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Jodpur in Sessions Case No.38/99 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Sohan Lal & Ors.), whereby the accused-respondents were acquitted of the charges against them under Sections 498-A, 304-B & 302 of IPC. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 1999 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 2001. 3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by Mr. Sameer Pareek, learned AGA appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are that on 29.01.1999, at about 11.45 A.M, a report was lodged by one Harlal Vishnoi at concerned Police Station (Ex.P-8) wherein it was alleged that five years ago, his daughter Pista was married to the accused Sohan Lal, and after about two years of marriage, his daughter was harassed and physically abused by her husband. It was also alleged in the report that after being subjected to continuous harassment, four months ago, his daughter Pista came to his house and on the night of the incident, at about 9.00 P.M., her husband came there. Next day when the mother of the deceased and sister-in-law (Bhabhi) went to her room in the morning, she was lying dead while accused Sohan Lal had disappeared from the site. 4. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR was registered and the investigation commenced accordingly. After investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the accused respondents. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court framed the charges against accused Mangilal for the offence under Section 498-A and 304-B of IPC and Sohan Lal for the offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B in alternative 302 of IPC; the said charges were read over and explained to the accused respondents, which they denied and claimed to stand due trial and trial commenced accordingly. 5. During the course of trial, the evidence of 14 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 25 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution and 4 documents were exhibited on behalf of the accused-respondents; whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused respondents pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 6. During the course of trial, the evidence of 14 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 25 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution and 4 documents were exhibited on behalf of the accused-respondents; whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused respondents pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondents, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 16.02.2001, against which the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State. 7. Mr. Sameer Pareek, learned AGA submits that there are presumptions, which have to be drawn because the marriage was solemnized five years ago and she has also been subjected to harassment, and thus, the burden of proof in the criminal jurisprudence involving Section 304-B of IPC requires a stricter view to be taken by the learned trial court. 7.1 Learned AGA further submits that the poison might have been administered by the husband, as he was there with the deceased at the night preceding the death. He also submits that the evidence of harassment by the father-in-law and the son (husband of the deceased) was brought on record, and thus, it is a clear case where the conviction ought to have been arrived at by the learned trial court. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Suresh Kumbhat along with Mr. Sheetal Kumbhat and Mr. Naman Bhansali, learned counsel representing the accused-respondents, while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that while the date of incident is 28.01.1999, it was reported on 29.01.1999 in the intervening night, it is clear from the post-mortem report as well as description of the crime scene that the deceased Pista did not have any kind of physical injuries on her body or nor was there any sign of physical resistance on her part, if in case the poison was administered forcibly by her husband. 8.1 Learned counsel further submits that the incident is of 1994 and about 25 years have passed since the incident whereas Sohan Lal and his father Mangi Lal would have acquired the age. 8.1 Learned counsel further submits that the incident is of 1994 and about 25 years have passed since the incident whereas Sohan Lal and his father Mangi Lal would have acquired the age. 8.2 Learned counsel also submits that 14 witnesses were examined, but the critical examination is of PW-4 Sugni (mother of the deceased), PW-5 Papudi, who is sister-in-law (Bhabhi) of the deceased, both have categorically stated that about 4-5 months ago, the deceased Pista had come to her parents’ house and had been living there making it unlikely for any kind of distress or apparent harassment to occur, and it appears as if the presence of the husband has been fabricated by the witnesses. 8.3 Learned counsel further submits that there are neither any sign of injury nor any external mark/sign that shows resistance on part of deceased in case the poison was forcibly administered. He further submits that the post-mortem report read with the FSL report only indicates that an insecticide had been consumed, resulting in death. 8.4 Learned counsel further submits that on conjoint consideration of the Ex.P-9 and Ex.P-10, it becomes clear that it was a voluntary act of the deceased, which resulted into her unfortunate death. He further submits that the case of harassment and dowry demand has been made out with a help of certain prosecution witnesses, which has been disbelieved by the learned Trial Court, as the natural course of events regarding the primary cause of death itself has failed. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 10. This Court finds that the Trial Court has rightly arrived at the conclusion that it was not a case of homicide, but a case of suicide, because the deceased lady had been staying in her parents' house for the last 4-5 months, as per the version of her mother, along with other family members too. The period of 4-5 months, in the opinion of this Court, is sufficient time where if the husband's family had used their influence to cause serious harassment by making some overt act that would have been reflected in the evidence rendered by family members. The period of 4-5 months, in the opinion of this Court, is sufficient time where if the husband's family had used their influence to cause serious harassment by making some overt act that would have been reflected in the evidence rendered by family members. 10.1 This Court further finds that as per Ex.P-1 Fard Halat Mauka, Ex.P-5 Fard Surtahal Lash and Ex.P-9 Post-mortem report of deceased, there was no sign of any kind of resistance on the part of the deceased in case the insecticide would have been forcibly administered. The post-mortem report clearly indicates that there are no injuries and the FSL report indicates only that the cause of death was insecticide, and thus, the prosecution has not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Even if the version of prosecution is believed that Sohan Lal was at the house of the deceased, then also there were surrounded with the family members and any kind of resistance or any kind of physical use of force, could not have escaped the attention of the family members and particularly would have shown on the place of incident or in the medical report, post-portem report or in the FSL report. 11. Thus, in the overall factual matrix and the circumstances surrounding the case, the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 16.02.2001 passed by the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be anything, which would call for intervention of this Court to reverse the same. 12. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondents under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 302 of IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witness at a considerable length and duly analyzed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 14. 14. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 15. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 16. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 17. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/-each and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as she would be called upon to do so. 18. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.