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2024 DIGILAW 1338 (AP)

Tirupathipriya v. Sub-Inspector of Police

2024-09-23

V.SUJATHA

body2024
ORDER : 1. This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short “Cr.P.C.”) to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 183 of 2018 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Parchur, registered for the offence punishable under Sections 494, 506, 509, 109 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code (for short “I.P.C.”). 2. Petitioners herein are accused Nos.4, 8 and 9. Respondent No. 3 is the complainant. On 11.01.2018 respondent No. 3 filed a complaint before the police alleging that her marriage was performed with accused No. 1 on 14.08.2014 according to Christian Marriage Act in the presence of elders and parents. As her husband, father-in-law and sister-in-laws harassed her, she gave report to the Karamchedue police. Thereafter, while the marriage of the complainant and accused No. 1 is in force, her husband-accused No. 1 married petitioner No. 1 herein, and started living with her at Coimbatore. When the complainant, her mother question accused No. 1 about his second marriage, he abused the complainant and threatened her with dire consequences. Basing on the said report, a case in Crime No. 3 of 2018 on the file of Karamchedu Police Station was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 494, 509, 506, 109 read with 34 of I.P.C. After completion of investigation, police filed charge sheet and the same was registered as C.C. No. 183 of 2018 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Parchur. Petitioner No. 1 herein is accused No. 4. Petitioner No. 1-accused No. 4 is the daughter of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, who are arrayed as accused No. 8 and 9. The present petition has been filed to quash the said C.C. No. 183 of 2018. 3. During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that petitioner No. 1 did not marry accused No. 1 and except a fabricated photograph, no other material is filed by the complainant in support of the averments made in her complaint. Neither the averments of the complaint lodged by the complainant and charge sheet disclose the role of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 in the commission of alleged crime either directly or indirectly, and requested to allow the present petition. 4. Neither the averments of the complaint lodged by the complainant and charge sheet disclose the role of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 in the commission of alleged crime either directly or indirectly, and requested to allow the present petition. 4. Learned counsel for respondent No. 3 and Assistant Public Prosecutor representing respondent Nos.1 and 2 contended that while the marriage of accused No. 1 with the defacto complainant is in force, he married petitioner No. 1-accused No. 4, therefore, the petitioner No. 1-accused No. 4 along with her parents-accused Nos.8 and 9 are liable to be punished, and requested to dismiss the present petition. 5. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is as follows: “Whether the proceedings against the petitioners in C.C. No. 183 of 2018 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Parchur, are liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?” POINT: 6. The petitioners filed the present petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 7. Section 482 of Cr.P.C. saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C. confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. 8. Section 482 of Cr.P.C. confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. 8. Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. was highlighted by the Apex Court in long line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows. 9. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, AIR 1990 SC 494 . 10. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 the Apex Court considered in detail the powers of High Court under Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 11. Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine the case on hand. 12. The specific allegation levelled in the complaint lodged by respondent No. 3-defacto complainant is that while her marriage with accused No. 1 is in force, he married petitioner No. 1 herein-accused No. 4. Therefore, petitioner No. 1 is liable to be punished under Section 494 of I.P.C. 13. 12. The specific allegation levelled in the complaint lodged by respondent No. 3-defacto complainant is that while her marriage with accused No. 1 is in force, he married petitioner No. 1 herein-accused No. 4. Therefore, petitioner No. 1 is liable to be punished under Section 494 of I.P.C. 13. Section 494 of IPC deals with bigamy, which reads as follows: “Marrying again during life-time of husband or wife: Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 14. The essential ingredients of offence under Section 494 IPC, as explained by the Apex Court in the case of Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (1979) 2 SCC 170 are as follows: “3. The essential ingredients of this offence are: (1) that the accused spouse must have contracted the first marriage. (2) that while the first marriage was subsisting the spouse concerned must have contracted a second marriage. (3) that both the marriages must be valid in the sense that the necessary ceremonies required by the personal law governing the parties had been duly performed.” 15. While referring to the above ingredients, the Apex Court in S. Nitheen v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC Online SC 939 held as follows: “A bare perusal of the penal provision would indicate that the order framing charge is erroneous on the face of the record because no person other than the spouse to the second marriage could have been charged for the offence punishable under Section 494 IPC simplicitor.” 16. As per the contents of Section 494 of IPC, it is evident that it attracts to a person who has married during the life time of wife or husband. Therefore, the said offence attracts only to the husband and not to the second wife or her family members. Therefore, continuation of proceedings against the petitioners herein for the offence punishable under Section 494 of I.P.C. would amount to abuse of process of law. Similar view was expressed by the learned Single Judge of High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad in Shaheed Naaz v. State of Telangana, 2023 SCC Online TS 3536 17. Therefore, continuation of proceedings against the petitioners herein for the offence punishable under Section 494 of I.P.C. would amount to abuse of process of law. Similar view was expressed by the learned Single Judge of High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad in Shaheed Naaz v. State of Telangana, 2023 SCC Online TS 3536 17. The other offences registered against the petitioners herein are punishable under Sections 509, 506, 109 read with 34 of I.P.C. Section 506 of I.P.C. deals with punishment for criminal intimidation. Section 509 of I.P.C. deals with Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman. Section 109 of I.P.C. deals with punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in consequence and where no express provision is made for its punishment. 18. As the offence punishable under Section 494 of I.P.C. is not made out against the petitioners, the allegations made in the complaint do not prima facie constitute offence punishable under Sections 506, 509 and 109 read with 34 of I.P.C. Further, no specific allegations are made against petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 herein/accused Nos. 8 and 9 in the complaint. According to guideline No. 1 of guidelines formulated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (referred supra), if the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the Court can exercise power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and quash the proceedings. Applying the said principle to the present facts of the case, I find that it is a fit case to quash the proceedings. 19. Accordingly, the criminal petition is allowed. The proceedings against the petitioners herein/accused Nos. 4, 8 and 9 in C.C. No. 183 of 2018 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Parchur are hereby quashed. 20. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand closed.