ORDER: Gannamaneni Ramakrishna Prasad, J. Heard Sri O. Manohar Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel brief by M/s. OMR Law Firm and Sri Y. Balaji, Learned Government Pleader assisted by Sri K. Arjun Chowdhary, Learned Assistant Government Pleader for Prohibition and Excise. In view of the urgency expressed by the Learned Senior Counsel, with the consent of both the parties, this matter is taken-up for final hearing at the admission stage itself. 2. The prayer sought in the present Writ Petition is as follows: “It is prayed that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction declaring the order of the 3rdrespondent issued in Rc.No.313/2022/B2 dated 06.09.2024 as illegal, arbitrary and in violation of principles of natural justice without jurisdiction and consequently direct the 3rdrespondent to permit the petitioner to conduct the business and pass such other or further orders as the Hon’ble Court feels deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. The facts as emerged from the Affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition are that the Writ Petitioner herein was granted a Form-2B License to run a Bar & Restaurant under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right of Selling by Bar, Grant and Conditions of License) Rules, 2022 in the name and style of M/s. Island Bistro Bar and Restaurant in East Point Colony, Beach Road, Visakhapatnam aka QUBBAA PUB. It is further stated in the Affidavit that the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise (Respondent No.3) has issued Show Cause Notice bearing Rc.No.313/2022/B2, dated 20.08.2024 (Ex.P.2), in which, it is alleged that the District Prohibition and Excise Officer, Visakhapatnam has submitted a Report stating that the Inspector of Police, III town Police Station has submitted a Report stating that on reliable information, on 17.08.2024 night, the Joint Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatnam City conducted a surprise raid on the premises and found that the Bar & Restaurant run by the Writ Petitioner was conducting its business beyond the business hours which is in violation of the terms and conditions of license. It is also pointed out that the Report of the Joint Commissioner of Police indicated certain other irregularities. The Respondent No.3 issued Show Cause Notice on 20.08.2024 (Ex.P.2) to the Writ Petitioner. The Writ Petitioner has submitted detailed Explanation on 04.09.2024 (Ex.P.3). It is also pointed out that the Report of the Joint Commissioner of Police indicated certain other irregularities. The Respondent No.3 issued Show Cause Notice on 20.08.2024 (Ex.P.2) to the Writ Petitioner. The Writ Petitioner has submitted detailed Explanation on 04.09.2024 (Ex.P.3). Being dissatisfied with the Explanation submitted by the Writ Petitioner, the impugned Proceedings came to be passed by the Respondent No.3 suspending the license of M/s. Island Bistro Bar and Restaurant with immediate effect vide Order dated 06.09.2024 (Ex.P.1). 4. It transpires from the impugned Order that the Respondent No.3 had considered three incidents as the reason for passing the impugned Order and such reasons are as under: i. 1st incident 16.03.2024 Crime No.55/2024 under Section 353 IPC; ii. 2nd incident 23.06.2024 Crime No.157/2024 under Section 188 IPC; and, iii. 3rd incident 19.08.2024 Crime No.184/2024 under Section 31(1)(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right of Selling by Bar, Grant and Conditions of License) Rules, 2022. 5. Sri O. Manohar Reddy, Learned Senior Counsel has assailed the Order of Suspension dated 06.09.2024 (Ex.P.1), essentially, on the following three grounds: a. That the impugned Order is vitiated due to the reasons that it is bereft of reasons amount to non-adherence to the Principles of Natural Justice; b. That the impugned Order is perverse inasmuch as the impugned Order does not prescribe the period of suspension and therefore, it is in the nature of revocation of license which is in the guise of a Suspension Order for an indefinite period of time; and, c. That the Deputy Commissioner ought not to have relied on a Report dated 05.09.2024 submitted by the District Prohibition and Excise Officer, because, in response his Letter dated 05.09.2024, that the Report was also received on the same date from the District Prohibition and Excise Officer, Visakhapatnam bearing Rc.No.639/2022/A. 6. Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the following Judgments: i. Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall Vs. Howrah GanatantrikNagrik Samity and Ors: (2010) 3 SCC 732 . The Hon’ble Apex Court, in paragraph Nos.40 to 42 of its Judgment, held as under: “40. It is a settled legal proposition that not only an administrative but also a judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in paragraph Nos.40 to 42 of its Judgment, held as under: “40. It is a settled legal proposition that not only an administrative but also a judicial order must be supported by reasons, recorded in it. Thus, while deciding an issue, the court is bound to give reasons for its conclusion. It is the duty and obligation on the part of the court to record reasons while disposing of the case. The hallmark of an order and exercise of judicial power by a judicial forum is to disclose its reasons by itself and giving of reasons has always been insisted upon as one of the fundamentals of sound administration of justice-delivery system, to make known that there had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before the court and also as an essential requisite of the principles of natural justice. “The giving of reasons for a decision is an essential attribute of judicial and judicious disposal of a matter before courts, and which is the only indication to know about the manner and quality of exercise undertaken, as also the fact that the court concerned had really applied its mind.” (Vide State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar [ (2004) 5 SCC 568 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 49 : AIR 2004 SC 1794 ] and State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal [ (2004) 5 SCC 573 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 53] ) 41.Reason is the heartbeat of every conclusion. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, it becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. Absence of reasons renders the order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. It introduces clarity in an order and without the same, it becomes lifeless. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. Absence of reasons renders the order indefensible/unsustainable particularly when the order is subject to further challenge before a higher forum. (Vide Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar [ (2003) 11 SCC 519 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 212 : AIR 2003 SC 4664 ] , SCC p. 527, para 19; Vishnu Dev Sharma v. State of U.P. [ (2008) 3 SCC 172 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 596] , SAIL v. STO [ (2008) 9 SCC 407 ] , State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Singh Negi [ (2008) 11 SCC 205 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 1093 : AIR 2008 SC 2026 ] , U.P. SRTC v. Jagdish Prasad Gupta [ (2009) 12 SCC 609 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 156 : AIR 2009 SC 2328 ] , Ram Phal v. State of Haryana [ (2009) 3 SCC 258 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 645 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 72] , Mohd. Yusuf v. Faij Mohammad [ (2009) 3 SCC 513 ] and State of H.P. v. Sada Ram [ (2009) 4 SCC 422 ] .) 42. Thus, it is evident that the recording of reasons is a principle of natural justice and every judicial order must be supported by reasons recorded in writing. It ensures transparency and fairness in decision making. The person who is adversely affected may know, as to why his application has been rejected.” ii. Teja Bar and Restaurant, YSR Kadapa District Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh : 2024 (4) ALT 188.This Court, in paragraph No.15 of its Judgment, held as under: “15. Thus, as seen from the suspension order dated 29.04.2024, no reasons are assigned except mentioning that the explanation is not satisfactory. Apart from that, the suspension order, impugned does not indicate period of suspension. The authority shall mention period of suspension also in the order. On both counts i.e. violation of principles of natural justice as also non mentioning of period of suspension the order cannot withstand the legal scrutiny.” 7. The above Judgments have been relied upon by the Learned Senior Counsel to state that the Impugned Order is vitiated due to non-providing of reasons for placing the Petitioner’s bar license under suspension. On both counts i.e. violation of principles of natural justice as also non mentioning of period of suspension the order cannot withstand the legal scrutiny.” 7. The above Judgments have been relied upon by the Learned Senior Counsel to state that the Impugned Order is vitiated due to non-providing of reasons for placing the Petitioner’s bar license under suspension. In the light of the above contentions and the citations relied on by the Learned Senior Counsel, this Court is required to examine whether the Principles of Natural Justice have been followed by the Respondent Authorities by giving proper reasons or not and whether the Impugned Order is perverse since the period of suspension has not been stated and whether it is proper on the part of the Respondent Authorities to have placed reliance on a Report which has been obtained subsequently and not furnished to the Writ Petitioner, due to which the Writ Petitioner did not have an occasion to respond. 8. In order to answer the above questions, firstly, this Court is required to examine the impugned Order to see whether the Respondent Authority – Respondent No.3 has considered the incidents of violation and whether the said Authority has justified with reasons for taking the final decision of suspension license. Photocopy of the original Order of Suspension, which is impugned in this Writ Petition has been filed as Ex.P.1. At the outset, this Court has to point out that the Respondent Authority namely the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise has printed the Order in such a small sized font that it would cause strain in reading it for any reader. DISCUSSION 9. Coming to the facts of the case, as indicated above, the Respondent Authorities have found three violations of the license conditions on three different occasions i.e., on 16.03.2024, 20.03.2024 and 19.08.2024. Basing on these instances, a Show Cause Notice was issued on 20.08.2024, duly served on the Writ Petitioner on 23.08.2024 (Ex.P.2). Gleaning the said Show Cause Notice, it is noticed that the Respondent Authority (Respondent No.3) has mentioned all the three instances of violation namely on 16.03.2024, 20.03.2024 and 19.08.2024. In response to the said Show Cause Notice, the Writ Petitioner has submitted an Explanation dated 04.09.2024 (Ex.P.3). Gleaning the said Show Cause Notice, it is noticed that the Respondent Authority (Respondent No.3) has mentioned all the three instances of violation namely on 16.03.2024, 20.03.2024 and 19.08.2024. In response to the said Show Cause Notice, the Writ Petitioner has submitted an Explanation dated 04.09.2024 (Ex.P.3). After submitting of the Explanation on 04.09.2024, it transpires from record that the Respondent No.3, vide Letter dated 05.09.2024, had forwarded the Explanation of the Writ Petitioner (dated 04.09.2024) to the District Prohibition & Excise Officer, Visakhapatnam (Respondent No.4) for this response with a further direction to enquire and submit a detailed Report along with his remarks for taking further action in the matter. It also transpires from the record that the District Prohibition & Excise Officer has submitted his remarks on the same day i.e., on 05.09.2024 stating that the Explanation submitted by the Writ Petitioner is baseless. The District Prohibition & Excise Officer has once again placed reliance on the earlier Reports submitted by the Joint Commissioner of Police, Visakhapatnam qua the crime that were already registered by him against the Writ Petitioner and had stated that the Writ Petitioner has violated the conditions of license. 10. Sri Y. Balaji, Learned Government Pleader would contend that the Respondent Authorities have scrupulously followed all the procedures and the Principles of Natural Justice have been strictly adhered to by mentioning all the instances of violation in the Show Cause Notice dated 20.08.2024. Through the Show Cause Notice, it was indicated to the Writ Petitioner that the Writ Petitioner has violated the license conditions on all the occasions. Writ Petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to reply since the Show Cause Notice dated 20.08.2024 was served on the Writ Petitioner on 23.08.2024 and the Writ Petitioner has submitted the Explanation on 04.09.2024. He would submit that the Explanation submitted by the Writ Petitioner on 04.09.2024 was also forwarded to the District Prohibition & Excise Officer only to seek his response. He would also submit that the District Prohibition & Excise Officer has not furnished any fresh material before the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise and therefore, there is no occasion for the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise (Respondent No.3) to have considered any fresh material that was never put to the Writ Petitioner. He would also submit that the District Prohibition & Excise Officer has not furnished any fresh material before the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise and therefore, there is no occasion for the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise (Respondent No.3) to have considered any fresh material that was never put to the Writ Petitioner. In this view of the matter, it is submitted by Learned Government Pleader that it cannot be said that the Respondents have considered fresh material for inflicting the punishment of suspension of license without furnishing the same to the Writ Petitioner. Therefore, he would submit that no extraneous material was considered in taking the present decision. He has also placed reliance on the Common Judgment of this Court rendered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.17737 of 2019 and batch dated 15.11.2019 (Cause Title is not provided). 11. Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel in his Re-joinder has once again pressed on the issue that the suspension is not limited to a particular period and the Respondent Authorities could not have passed an Order of Suspension of license without mentioning the period inasmuch as the same cannot be for an indefinite period. Learned Senior Counsel had also stated that the Writ Petitioner has obtained license by paying huge amount and closing down of the bar due to the Order of Suspension would cause enormous loss to the Writ Petitioner which is in violation of the fundamental right of the Writ Petitioner under 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India. He would submit that it is the fundamental right of every citizen to carry-on with trade or avocation of one’s choice without any interruption and interference. 12. This Court has bestowed its attention on the impugned Order. Following facts are noticed by this Court from the impugned Order: (a) Insofar as the content of the impugned Order, this Court has sifted through the impugned Order minutely in order to test it on the touchstone of violation of the Principles of Natural Justice and also whether the impugned Order has been passed by giving cogent reasons. At this stage, it must be stated that this Court is cautious in not dealing with every issue minutely since the impugned Order is only the suspension of license and that the final order/determination is yet to be passed by the Respondent Authorities. At this stage, it must be stated that this Court is cautious in not dealing with every issue minutely since the impugned Order is only the suspension of license and that the final order/determination is yet to be passed by the Respondent Authorities. (b) Insofar as the first incident is concerned i.e., on 16.03.2024 that lead to registration of Crime No.55/2024 under Section 353 IPC by the Police, the impugned Suspension Order had dealt with the issue with regard to the night patrolling by the Police where it was found that the Writ Petitioner was continuing to sell liquor beyond the hours permitted. Apart from the violation of the business hours, the Respondent Authorities have also taken into account another incident that had happened on 16.03.2024 where the driver of a car bearing Registered No.AP 37 BD 5177 has rashly driven his vehicle without obeying signals of the Police Staff to stop the vehicle for the purpose of checking the drivers as regards the consumption of liquor and engaging in driving. The impugned Order has also dealt with the incident that happened on 23.06.2024 where the night patrolling Police Staff once again found selling of liquor and serving of food beyond the permitted business hours that lead to registration of Crime No.157/2024 under Section 188 IPC. The impugned Order has also dealt with the incident that happened finally on 19.08.2024 that lead to registration of Crime No.184/2024 under Section 31(1)(b) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 by the SHO, Special Enforcement Bureau, Maharanipeta. 13. While dealing with the fundamental right of a citizen to carry-on trade or business under Article 19 (1) (g), it must be stated that the said right is not an absolute right and it is subject to reasonable restrictions. Law has drawn a distinction between the liquor as a trade and the other trades/business and avocations because of the inherent nature of the very product of trade of liquor which has its own inevitable consequential psychotropic effect on its consumers that may lead to law and order situations if let unchecked. Differential Approach is called for regarding Liquor Trade 14. In Amar Chandra Chakraborthy Vs. The Collector of Excise, Government of Tripura and Ors: (1972) 2 SCC 442 , the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para Nos.10 & 13 of its Judgment, held as under: “10. Differential Approach is called for regarding Liquor Trade 14. In Amar Chandra Chakraborthy Vs. The Collector of Excise, Government of Tripura and Ors: (1972) 2 SCC 442 , the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para Nos.10 & 13 of its Judgment, held as under: “10. Trade or business in country liquor has from its inherent nature been treated by the State and the society as a special category requiring legislative control which has been in force in the whole of India since several decades. In view of the injurious effect of excessive consumption of liquor on health this trade or business must be treated as a class by itself and it cannot be treated on the same basis as other trades while considering Article 14. This classification is founded on an intelligible differentia having a rational relation to the object to be achieved by the control imposed on the trade or business in country liquor. Article 14, it may be pointed out, only forbids class legislation but reasonable classification does not come within the prohibition. Nothing convincing was urged at the bar to attract the prohibition embodied in Article 14. 13. According to Shri Sen the business of selling liquor is protected by Article 19 of the Constitution as a fundamental right and reliance for this submission has been placed on K.K. Narula v. State of J&K. [ AIR 1967 SC 1368 : (1967) 3 SCR 50 : (1967) 2 SCJ 373 ] This fundamental right has been illegally infringed, said the counsel. It is no doubt true that this Court in the case cited held that dealing in liquor is business and a citizen has a right to do business in that commodity but it was added that the State can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the said right in public interest. In dealing with reasonable restrictions no abstract standard or general pattern is possible to lay down. In each case, regard has to be had to the nature of trade or business, the conditions prevailing in such trade or business, the nature of the infringement alleged, and the underlying purpose of the restriction, the imposition of which is alleged to constitute an infringement.” 15. In Cooverjee B. Bharucha Vs. Excise Commissioner and the chief Commissioner, Ajmer and Ors: (1954) 1 SCC 18,the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para No.7 of its Judgment, held as under: “7. In Cooverjee B. Bharucha Vs. Excise Commissioner and the chief Commissioner, Ajmer and Ors: (1954) 1 SCC 18,the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Para No.7 of its Judgment, held as under: “7. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees that all citizens have the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation or trade or business, and sub-section (6) of the Article authorises legislation which imposes reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of the general public. It was not disputed that in order to determine the reasonableness of the restriction regard must be had to the nature of the business and the conditions prevailing in that trade. It is obvious that these factors must differ from trade to trade and no hard-and-fast rules concerning all trades can be laid down. It can also not be denied that the State has the power to prohibit trades which are illegal or immoral or injurious to the health and welfare of the public. Laws prohibiting trades in noxious or dangerous goods or trafficking in women cannot be held to be illegal as enacting a prohibition and not a mere regulation. The nature of the business is, therefore, an important element in deciding the reasonableness of the restrictions. The right of every citizen to pursue any lawful trade or business is obviously subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, order and morals of the community. Some occupations by the noise made in their pursuit, some by the odours they engender, and some by the dangers accompanying them, require regulations as to the locality in which they may be conducted. Some, by the dangerous character of the articles used, manufactured or sold, require also special qualifications in the parties permitted to use, manufacture or sell them. These propositions were not disputed, but it was urged that there was something wrong in principle and objectionable in similar restrictions being applied to the business of selling by retail, in small quantities, spirituous and intoxicating liquors. It was urged that their sale should be without restriction, that every person has a right which inheres in him, a natural right to carry on trade in intoxicating liquors and that the State had no right to create a monopoly in them. It was urged that their sale should be without restriction, that every person has a right which inheres in him, a natural right to carry on trade in intoxicating liquors and that the State had no right to create a monopoly in them. This contention stands answered by what Field, J. said in Crowley v. Christensen [Crowley v. Christensen, 1890 SCC OnLine US SC 226 : 34 L Ed 620 : 137 US 86 (1890)] : (L Ed pp. 623-24) “There is in this position an assumption of a fact which does not exist, that when the liquors are taken in excess the injuries are confined to the party offending. The injury, it is true, first falls upon him in his health, which the habit undermines; in his morals, which it weakens; and in the selfabasement which it creates. But, as it leads to neglect of business and waste of property and general demoralisation, it affects those who are immediately connected with and dependent upon him. By the general concurrence of opinion of every civilised and Christian community, there are few sources of crime and misery to society equal to the dram shop, where intoxicating liquors, in small quantities, to be drunk at the time, are sold indiscriminately to all parties applying. The statistics of every State show a greater amount of crime and misery attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained at these retail liquor saloons than to any other source. The sale of such liquors in this way has therefore, been, at all times, by the courts of every State, considered as the proper subject of legislative regulation. Not only may a licence be exacted from the keeper of the saloon before a glass of his liquors can be thus disposed of, but restrictions may be imposed as to the class of persons to whom they may be sold, and the hours of the day, and the days of the week, on which the saloons may be opened. Their sale in that form may be absolutely prohibited. It is a question of public expediency and public morality, and not of federal law. The police power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business—to mitigate its evils or to suppress it entirely. Their sale in that form may be absolutely prohibited. It is a question of public expediency and public morality, and not of federal law. The police power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business—to mitigate its evils or to suppress it entirely. There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. That authority may vest in such officers as it may deem proper the power of passing upon applications for permission to carry it on, and to issue licences for that purpose. It is a matter of legislative will only.” These observations have our entire concurrence and they completely negative the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. The provisions of the regulation purport to regulate trade in liquor in all its different spheres and are valid.” Natural Justice – Whether there is any strait-jacket formula? 16. Law is well established on this issue to the effect that there is no straitjacket formula in evaluating whether the Executive have adhered to the Principles of Natural Justice. 17. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited Vs. Union of India and Others : (1966) 1 SCR 466 , at Para No.10, the Hon’ble Apex Court had clearly held that there is no strait-jacket formula to see whether the Principles of Natural Justice have been observed or not. 18. In Maharashtra State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s Suvarna Board Mills and Another : (1994) 5 SCC 566 . The Hon’ble Apex Court at Para No.3 held as under : “3. It has been contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that principles of natural justice were satisfied before taking action under Section 29, assuming that it was necessary to do so. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a strait-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. Let it be seen whether it was so. It is well settled that natural justice cannot be placed in a strait-jacket; its rules are not embodied and they do vary from case to case and from one fact-situation to another. All that has to be seen is that no adverse civil consequences are allowed to ensue before one is put on notice that the consequence would follow if he would not take care of the lapse, because of which the action as made known is contemplated. No particular form of notice is the demand of law. All will depend on facts and circumstances of the case.” 19. While dealing with the issue of non-furnishing of a Report, as in this case, the Report which was obtained by the Respondent No.3 from Respondent No.4 on 05.09.2024, the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others Vs. B. Karunakar and Others : (1993) 4 SCC 727 , at Para Nos.30 & 31, held as under: “30. Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows: (i)xxxxxxx (ii)xxxxxx (iii)xxxxxx (iv)xxxxxxx [v] The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the enquiry officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with back-wages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an “unnatural expansion of natural justice” which in itself is antithetical to justice. 31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment……………………………………………………………. ………………………………………………….......position of law.” 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment……………………………………………………………. ………………………………………………….......position of law.” 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Others : (2021) 19 SCC 706 , had dealt with various nuances as regards the “adequate opportunity” and “no opportunity at all” and had held that the “prejudice” exception operates more especially in the latter case. The Hon’ble Apex Court had also dealt with other subjects falling under “no notice”, “no opportunity” and “no hearing” categories. In Para No.37, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, if no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In the same Judgment namely State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Others : (2021) 19 SCC 706 , the three Judges of Hon’ble Supreme Court, have summarized the concept of Principles of Natural Justice in the following manner: “42. An analysis of the aforesaid judgments thus reveals: 42.1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused. 42.2. Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest. 42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice. 42.4. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice. 42.4. In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person. 42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.” 21. One of the contention raised by the Writ Petitioner is that the Respondent No.3 has obtained a Report from Respondent No.4 on 05.09.2024 i.e., after the Writ Petitioner has submitted the explanation. It is noticed that the Respondent No.3 has merely called for a response from Respondent No.4 by supplying a copy of the explanation submitted by the Writ Petitioner. This Court has noticed that the Respondent No.3, in all fairness, has mentioned in the Impugned Order that he had called for the response from the Respondent No.4 to the explanation (04.09.2024 – Ex.P.3) submitted by the Writ Petitioner and that the Respondent No.4 has merely placed reliance on the Reports of the police, vide the incidents dated 16.03.2024 and 23.06.2024. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the non-furnishing of the response of Respondent No.4 dated 05.09.2024 would not vitiate the Impugned Order in any manner inasmuch as neither the Authority has placed reliance on such Report dated 05.09.2024, nor that it has caused any prejudice to the Writ Petitioner. 22. Having considered the above Judgments, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned Order has been passed by giving cogent reasons which are sufficient to ‘suspend’ the license of the Writ Petitioner. This apart, there is no violation of Principles of Natural Justice at any stage insofar as the Letter addressed by the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise dated 05.09.2024. This apart, there is no violation of Principles of Natural Justice at any stage insofar as the Letter addressed by the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise dated 05.09.2024. The response of the District Prohibition & Excise Officer on the same date is concerned, the impugned Order itself would indicate that the Explanation submitted by the Writ Petitioner on 04.09.2024 was just forwarded to the District Prohibition & Excise Officer to submit a detailed Report considering the Explanation given by the Writ Petitioner. It is noticed in the impugned Order that the response of the District Prohibition & Excise Officer dated 05.09.2024 also did not bring on record anything new that ought to have been put to the Writ Petitioner. Therefore, the decision taken by the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise under the impugned Order does not suffer from the vice of the consideration of any extraneous material behind the back of the Writ Petitioner. 23. One contention which is canvassed by the Learned Senior Counsel merits discussion namely that the impugned Order is an Order of Suspension whereas, the period of suspension has not been mentioned. Section 31 of the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 empowers the Authority to suspend the license and/or cancel the license as the case may be. This provision should be understood to mean that the suspension is the initial step that should be succeeded by either lifting of suspension or permitting the licensee to run the business on certain conditions or to permanently cancel the license. However, the ‘suspension’ cannot partake the effect of “cancellation of the license” since the suspension is temporary, whereas, the cancellation is permanent. In the guise of suspension, effect of cancellation cannot be given through an executive act. In this view of the matter, this Court finds merit in the submission made by the Learned Senior Counsel that the Order of Suspension does not indicate any period for which the suspension is to operate. Consequently, the Respondent Authorities are directed to pass the final order by treating the present Order of Suspension as temporary. The Respondent Authorities are directed to pass the final order within a period of three weeks from the date of uploading of this Order on the website of this Court. Consequently, the Respondent Authorities are directed to pass the final order by treating the present Order of Suspension as temporary. The Respondent Authorities are directed to pass the final order within a period of three weeks from the date of uploading of this Order on the website of this Court. Needless to state that the Respondent Authority is obligated to adhere to the Principles of Natural Justice by permitting the Petitioner to place its defense before passing of the final order under Section 31 of the Act. If the final order is not passed within the time stipulated, it shall be deemed that the suspension is revoked. 24. It is clarified that this Court is constrained to make certain observations that fell necessary in addressing the contentions raised by the Writ Petitioner inasmuch as the Court is bound to answer such contentions. It is therefore clarified that, the observations that are made herein shall not have any bearing on the Respondent Authorities in considering the case of the Writ Petitioner on merits during its’ proceedings for passing the Final Order under Section 31 of the Act. 25. In the above premise, this Court is of the opinion that the present Writ Petition is devoid of any merit. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed with the observations and directions given hereinabove. No order as to costs. 26. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand closed in terms of this order.