JUDGMENT : 1. This criminal appeal under Section 378 (iii) and (i) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant-State laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 23.03.2002, passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.3, Jodhpur in Sessions Case No.03/2002 (State Vs. Dr. Sunderlal Goplani), whereby the accused-respondent was acquitted of the offences under Sections 302, 307 & 309 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred on 03.12.2001 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 2002. 3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by Mr. Deepak Choudhary, learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant-State are that on 03.12.2001, a complaint was lodged on the Parcha Bayan by Ms. Anjori (complainant and PW-1) for an incident which was happened on 03.12.2001. In the said Parcha Bayan, the complainant – Anjori alleged that on 02.12.2001, she was sleeping with her parents in the same room. At about 5:00 am, she heard cries of her mother and when she switched on the light, she saw her mother lying on the floor in the pool of blood. Then her father took her to another room and tried to put her to sleep. Suddenly, her father inflicted knife injuries to her and she got frightened. When her father left that room, she closed the door of the room and went to the balcony of the house and called the neighbours for help, then three neighbours came there to whom she narrated the whole incident. They all went to the room where her mother was lying dead. 4. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR bearing No.359/2001 was lodged on the Parcha Bayan of complainant Anjori (PW-1) at 10.40 am on 03.12.2001 before P.S. Shastrinagar, Jodhpur. After completion of investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the accused for the offences under Sections 302, 307 & 309 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4/25 of the Arms Act and the trial commenced accordingly. 5. During the course of trial, the evidence of 20 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 59 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution. 1 defence witness was examined and 1 document was exhibited on behalf of the accused-respondent. 5. During the course of trial, the evidence of 20 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 59 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution. 1 defence witness was examined and 1 document was exhibited on behalf of the accused-respondent. The accused-respondent was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which he pleaded innocence and his false implication in the criminal case in question. 6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as after considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondent, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 23.03.2002, against which the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State. 7. Mr. Deepak Choudhary, learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant-State submits that the FSL report indicates matching of the blood stains on the clothes of the accused as well as of the deceased with the blood group of the deceased. 7.1 Learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General further submits that other documents i.e. site plan, medical report, postmortem report and Panchnama of the dead body are also supporting the prosecution story completely. 7.2 Learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General also submits that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that when the circumstantial evidence is clearly pointing towards the accused-husband then merely because PW-1 Anjori (the daughter of the deceased and eye witness) turned hostile, it would not be appropriate to arrive at a conclusion. The learned Trial Court has completely failed to appreciate that there were serious injuries on the body of the accused himself lending influence to the version that after killing his wife he tried to commit suicide. 7.3 Learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General further submits that the Parcha Bayan was corroborating the incident and thus, the acquittal order is bad in the eyes of law. 8. On the other hand Ms. Yogita Mohnani, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondent while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that accused-respondent is innocent as reliance cannot be placed on the testimonies of PW-1, PW-4, PW-5, PW-6 and PW-12 as they have turned hostile during the trial. 8. On the other hand Ms. Yogita Mohnani, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondent while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that accused-respondent is innocent as reliance cannot be placed on the testimonies of PW-1, PW-4, PW-5, PW-6 and PW-12 as they have turned hostile during the trial. 8.1 Learned counsel for the accused-respondent further submits that in the statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., a plea of alibi has been raised by the accused stating therein that he was not present on the spot at the time of incident and it was also recorded in the statement of DW-1 Bhagwandas that accused was there in the marriage function. The marriage card has also been placed on record as Ex.-D/1. 8.2 Learned counsel for the accused-respondent also submits that the main eye witness is PW-1 Anjori (daughter of the deceased and the accused), who has turned hostile and the learned Trial Court has passed the judgment after considering the testimonies of 20 prosecution witnesses and 59 documents, which were exhibited during the course of trial. 8.3 Learned counsel for the accused-respondent argued that once eye witness – PW-1 Anjori does not support the incident, then the complete prosecution story has to proceed in a particular manner resulting in acquittal of the accused-respondent. 8.4 Learned counsel for the accused-respondent also submits that blood group was matching as per the FSL report (Ex.P-56), but arriving of the husband on the spot and taking his wife in his lap was an incident which if accepted, does not leave any scope for the FSL report to come into operation to help the conviction. 8.5 Learned counsel for the accused-respondent further submits that the order passed by the learned trial Court is a well reasoned order and the same does not call for any interference by this Court. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the material available on record. 10. This Court after examining the peculiar factual matrix and testimonies of 20 prosecution witnesses; after seeing 59 Exhibits finds that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 11. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the material available on record. 10. This Court after examining the peculiar factual matrix and testimonies of 20 prosecution witnesses; after seeing 59 Exhibits finds that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 11. This Court also finds that the most critical testimony is of PW-1 –Anjori, who has completely back dropped on her statement in Parcha Bayan and in fact had attributed the crime to one “Nandu uncle” and has given a completely different version which includes explanation for the knife injuries having been caused upon her father by the same person. The testimony of PW-1 - Anjori cannot be deemed either ways but her wavering stand casts serious doubts upon her version. 12. This Court finds that the learned Trial Court has dealt with the statement of PW-1 in her Parcha Bayan, statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., statements of certain prosecution witnesses, at the same time, the learned Trial Court is right in not relying upon prosecution case completely unless there is a corroborating evidence. 13. The contradictions are clear writ large, the other witnesses are not trustworthy, the FSL report has failed, there is explanation in the statement of accused-respondent under Section 313 Cr.P.C. which is on record and in overall consideration of the facts, this Court does not find any reason to interfere in the impugned judgment. 14. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 15. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondent for the offences under Sections 302, 307 & 309 of the Indian Penal Code, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witness at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 16. 16. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 17. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 18. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 19. However, while keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the accused-respondent is directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondent, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as he would be called upon to do so. 20. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.