ORDER : V. SUJATHA, J. This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short “Cr.P.C.”) to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.699 of 2018 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, West Godavari District, registered for the offence punishable under Sections 409, 420, 506, 323, 441 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code (for short “I.P.C.”). 2. Petitioners herein are accused Nos.2 and 3. Respondent No.2 is the complainant. On 29.09.2015, respondent No.2 filed a private complaint under Section 190 (1a) of Cr.P.C. before the II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Eluru alleging that he is the son of late Chalamalasetti Subrahmanyeswara Rao, who retired from service as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Accused No.1 is Sri Vijaya Sowbhagya Properties Private Limited, Hyderabad, represented by Directors and Partners-accused Nos.2 and 3. Accused No.2 is the husband of accused No.3 and they are doing Real Estate business. On 10.09.2007, accused Nos.2 and 3 approached late Chalamalasetti Subrahmanyeswara Rao, who is the father of the complainant and the complainant at their residence and induced them with a false promise that if Rs.25,00,000/- is invested by them in their company for doing Real Estate Business, the same will be repaid with interest at 24% p.a. The complainant and his father bonafidely believed the said false promise made by the accused Nos. 2 and 3 and in pursuance of the said promise, the complainant and his father have paid an amount of Rs.25,00,000/- (Twenty five lakhs only) to the accused by way of cheque dated 10.09.2007 drawn on State Bank of India, Eluru bearing cheque No.095132 in the name of Sri Vijaya Sowbhagya Properties Private Limited having account in ICICI Bank bearing No.020205001449. The said cheque was encashed by the accused Nos. 2 and 3 and misappropriated the said amount for their personal use. At the instance of the complainant and his father, a Memo of understanding by naming as 'VYAPARA BHAGASAMYA ANGIKARA PATRAM" was also entered in between late Sri Subrahmanyeswara Rao and accused No.2 on behalf of accused No.1 on 10.09.2007 endorsing payment of Rs.25,00,000/- by the complainant and his father to accused Nos.2 and 3. An amount of Rs.25,00,000/- was entrusted to accused Nos.2 and 3 on behalf of accused No.1 for doing a lawful business. An amount of Rs.25,00,000/- was entrusted to accused Nos.2 and 3 on behalf of accused No.1 for doing a lawful business. Thus, responsibility of accused Nos.2 and 3 is very high and any breach of trust on their part leads to serious calamity. Right from the beginning, accused Nos.2 and 3 are having criminal intention to misappropriate the said amount for personal use and thereby to cheat the father of the complainant and the complainant. Memorandum of understanding was entered between the father of the complainant and accused Nos.1 and 2 only on the promise made by accused Nos.2 and 3 that they will pay interest besides profit. 3. Accused Nos.1 and 2 deceived the complainant and his father. The above inducement of accused Nos.2 and 3 was fraudulent and dishonest. The complainant and his father under the said inducement delivered Rs.25,00,000/- to accused Nos.2 and 3. Therefore, there is criminal breach of trust besides cheating on the part of the accused Nos. 2 and 3 towards the complainant and his father. 4. Sri Subrahmanyeswara Rao, during his life time, along with the complainant and after his demise, the complainant personally demanded accused Nos.2 and 3 on various occasions, for repayment of the said amount entrusted by them to the accused. Yet accused Nos.2 and 3 simply postponed the same on one pretext or other without there being any just cause and reason. Thus, the liability of the accused Nos. 2 and 3 for offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a continuous one. On 31.07.2015 at about 09.00 p.m. accused No.2 and 3 went to the house of the complainant and threatened him with dire consequences and caused hurt to the complainant. Thus, the liability of the accused Nos. 2 and 3 for offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a continuous one. On 31.07.2015 at about 09.00 p.m. accused No.2 and 3 went to the house of the complainant and threatened him with dire consequences and caused hurt to the complainant. The accused has intentionally deceived the complainant and dishonestly induced the complainant to pay the amount for doing Real Estate Business, for which the accused did not intend to do any business or repay the amount received from the complainant and requested the Court to take cognizance against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 506, 323 and 441 of I.P.C. The learned Magistrate has referred the same to the police under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C. Police registered the same as FIR No.485 of 2015 and after completion of investigation, police filed final report on 22.11.2018 and the same was registered as C.C.No.699 of 2018 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge – cum – Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, West Godavari District. The present petition has been filed to quash the said C.C.No.699 of 2018. 5. On 19.11.2019, when the present petition came up for admission, this Court passed the following interim order. “......... This Court is of opinion that the learned counsel has made out a point. The personal appearance of A2 and A3 is dispensed with for all routine and normal adjournments. They shall however appear, when their presence is deemed to be necessary before the lower Court as when ordered to do so by the Court.”. 6. During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the complainant and his father issued cheque for Rs.25,00,000/- on 10.09.2007 in favour of accused No.1 company, which is not a party before this Court, but not in favour of the petitioners herein/accused Nos.2 and 3 and the amount was credited to the account of the company. The petitioners herein are not directors of accused No.1 as on the date of issuance of the cheque by the complainant. Further, cheque was issued by the complainant on 10.09.2007, F.I.R. was registered on 06.11.2015, charge sheet was filed on 22.11.2018. Hence, there is delay of 8 years in lodging the F.I.R., as such the proceedings in C.C.No.699 of 2018 have to be quashed. 7. Further, cheque was issued by the complainant on 10.09.2007, F.I.R. was registered on 06.11.2015, charge sheet was filed on 22.11.2018. Hence, there is delay of 8 years in lodging the F.I.R., as such the proceedings in C.C.No.699 of 2018 have to be quashed. 7. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 contended that the petitioners herein/accused Nos.2 and 3 induced the complainant and his father with a false promise that if Rs.25,00,000/- is invested in accused No.1 company, they would repay the said amount with interest 24% p.a., believing the said promise, complainant and his father paid an amount of Rs.25,00,000/- to the accused by way of cheque dated 10.09.2007 and the said cheque was encashed by accused No.1 company. When the complainant insisted accused Nos.2 and 3 for repayment of the above said amount, accused No.2 abused the complainant in filthy language. Having waited for long time for repayment of the amount, the complainant lodged the present complaint and requested to dismiss the present petition. 8. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that as the petitioners herein/accused Nos.2 and 3 cheated the complainant and extracted money on the pretext of doing Real Estate Business and they would repay the same with interest at 24% p.a., but have failed to do so, hence, the complainant lodged the complaint against the petitioners, and requested to dismiss the present petition. 9. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the point that arises for consideration is as follows : “Whether the proceedings against the petitioners in C.C.No.699 of 2018 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, West Godavari District, are liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?” POINT: 10. The petitioners filed the present petitions under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 11. Section 482 of Cr.P.C saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. 12. Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were highlighted by the Apex Court in long line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows: 13. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in “Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, AIR 1990 SC 494 ” 14. In that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in “Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, AIR 1990 SC 494 ” 14. In “State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335” the Apex Court considered in detail the powers of High Court under Section 482 and the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR. The Apex Court summarized the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by High Courts in exercise of their inherent powers to quash a criminal complaint : (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 15. Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine the case on hand. 16. The complainant issued cheque on 10.09.2007 in favour of accused No.1 company. The main contention of the petitioners is that they are not the directors of accused No.1 company as on the date of issuance of cheque. The petitioners were neither the directors nor authorised signatories to encash the cheque issued in favour of accused No.1. On 31.03.2008 petitioner No.1/accused No.2 was appointed as director of accused No.1 company and resigned to the said post on 09.09.2023. To prove the same, the petitioners filed Form 32. But, respondent No.2 has not filed any document to show that the petitioners herein/accused Nos.2 and 3 are the directors of accused No.1-company as on the date of issuance and encashment of the cheque issued by him. 17. Further, respondent No.2 contended that accused No.2 entered into MoU on 10.09.2007, he cannot go back from the same. On perusal of the said MoU, in condition No.1, it is mentioned that accused No.2 entered into the MoU on behalf of accused No.1 company, but not in the capacity of a director of the company as alleged by the defacto complainant. But, in the absence of any proof to show that the petitioners were worked as directors of accused No.1 company as on the date of issuance of cheque, it can be said that the petitioners are no way concerned with the affairs of accused No.1 company. Therefore, the present complaint against the petitioners is not maintainable. 18. In “Kunti Vs. But, in the absence of any proof to show that the petitioners were worked as directors of accused No.1 company as on the date of issuance of cheque, it can be said that the petitioners are no way concerned with the affairs of accused No.1 company. Therefore, the present complaint against the petitioners is not maintainable. 18. In “Kunti Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 6 SCC 109 ”, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Apex Court held that breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise, the criminal proceedings will not be initiated. 19. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgment is squarely applicable to the present facts of the case as in the present case also, the complainant contended that the petitioners failed to keep up the promise made by them. As per the law laid down in the said judgment, merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise, the criminal proceedings will not be initiated. 20. Even otherwise, there is inordinate delay in lodging the complaint against the petitioners. 21. Admittedly, in the present case, the complainant issued cheque on 10.09.2007 for an amount of Rs.25,00,000/- in favour of accused No.1 company believing the promise made by accused Nos.2 and 3 that they would repay the same with interest at 24% p.a. However, accused No.1 company did not repay the same to the complainant. Complainant filed complaint before the learned Magistrate, and the same was forwarded to the police for investigation. The said complaint was numbered as F.I.R. No.485 of 2015 on 06.11.2015. After completion of investigation, police filed charge sheet on 22.11.2018. Therefore, there is delay of 8 years in lodging the complaint against the petitioners herein. There is no plausible explanation for such delay. 22. Prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by the informant with all its vivid details gives an assurance regarding truth of its version. In case, there is some delay in filing the FIR, the complainant must give explanation for the same. Undoubtedly, delay in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant's case improbable when such delay is properly explained. However, deliberate delay in lodging the complaint is always fatal. In case, there is some delay in filing the FIR, the complainant must give explanation for the same. Undoubtedly, delay in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant's case improbable when such delay is properly explained. However, deliberate delay in lodging the complaint is always fatal. (Vide: Sahib Singh Vs. State of Haryana ( AIR 1997 SC 3247 )). 23. In “Chandralekha Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2013) 14 SCC 374 ” there is delay of six years in lodging the F.I.R. The Apex Court quashed the same on the ground of extra ordinary delay and held as follows : “We must, at the outset, state that the High Court's view on jurisdiction meets with our approval and we confirm the view. However, after a careful perusal of the FIR and after taking into consideration the attendant circumstances, we are of the opinion that the FIR lodged by Respondent 2 insofar as it relates to Appellants 1, 2 and 3 deserves to be quashed. The allegations are extremely general in nature. No specific role is attributed to each of the Appellants. Respondent 2 has stated that after the marriage, she resided with her husband at Ahmedabad. It is not clear whether Appellants 1, 2 and 3 were residing with them at Ahmedabad. The marriage took place on 9/7/2002 and Respondent 2 left her matrimonial home on 15/2/2003 i.e. within a period of seven months. Thereafter, Respondent 2 took no steps to file any complaint against the Appellants. Six years after she left the house, the present FIR is lodged making extremely vague and general allegations against Appellants 1, 2 and 3. It is important to remember that Appellant 2 is a married sister-in-law. In our opinion, such extra ordinary delay in lodging the FIR raises grave doubt about the truthfulness of allegations made by Respondent 2 against Appellants 1, 2 and 3, which are, in any case, general in nature. We have no doubt that by making such reckless and vague allegations, Respondent 2 has tried to rope them in this case along with her husband. We are of the confirmed opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against Appellants 1, 2 and 3 pursuant to this FIR is an abuse of process of law. In the interest of justice, therefore, the FIR deserves to be quashed insofar as it relates to Appellants 1, 2 and 3.” 24. We are of the confirmed opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against Appellants 1, 2 and 3 pursuant to this FIR is an abuse of process of law. In the interest of justice, therefore, the FIR deserves to be quashed insofar as it relates to Appellants 1, 2 and 3.” 24. In the present case also, the cheque was issued by the complaint in favour of accused No.1 company on 10.09.2007, and the complaint was lodged on 06.11.2015 i.e. after 8 years after the issuance of cheque. The complainant did not take any steps to initiate complaint against the petitioners for a long period of eight years. For the reasons best known to the complainant, he has initiated criminal proceedings after 8 years from the date on which the cheque was issued. 25. In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. Further, the court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, the criminal petition deserves to be allowed. 26. Accordingly, the criminal petition is allowed. The proceedings against the petitioners herein in C.C.No.699 of 2018 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge – cum – Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Eluru, West Godavari District are hereby quashed. 27. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand closed.