JUDGMENT : HASMUKH D. SUTHAR, J. 1. Mr. Darsh P. Desai, learned advocate for the applicant has argued at length for about 25 minutes, as he is repeating arguments even after being requested not to do so. While concluding, he referred to citations, but instead of highlighting relevant facts and ratio, he began to read them in entirety. So, the Court asked to the learned advocate first to show the relevancy of the judgment and how it is applicable to the fact of the case on hand, attention drawn towards the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rashmi Metaliks Limited vs. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, 2013 (10) SCC 95 . Despite time and again efforts to avoid unnecessary time consumption, he continued to do so. Such attitude on the part of the learned advocate is nothing but to waste the precious time of the Court and any how to prolong the matter. 1.1 However, due to lunch break and considering the time consumed by the learned counsel for the petitioner to ward off apprehension of injustice caused on the part of the Court and the petitioner is denied fair and impartial hearing, the learned advocate for the petitioner is once again directed to sum up and conclude his submission within a maximum of 30 minutes. Then the Court has considered only relevant aspects to decide present petitions and ignored irrelevant arguments like execution of sale of agreement, execution of of sale deed and cancellation of deed, etc. 2. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties. 3. Rule. Learned APP waives service of notice of Rule for the respondent-State. 4. By these applications, under Section 482 of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the applicant seeks to invoke the inherent powers of this Court, praying for quashing of the Criminal Case No. 17789 of 2022 and Criminal Case No. 17805 of 2022 pending before the 2nd Additional Civil Judge & JMFC Mirzapur Court Rural NIA Court No. 39, Ahmedabad and all the proceedings arising thereto. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 2 and applicant both were engaged in real estate business and they had good terms. The present applicant is a farmer and respondent No. 2 used to invest his money in partnership with the present applicant, purchasing land, plots, etc. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 2 and applicant both were engaged in real estate business and they had good terms. The present applicant is a farmer and respondent No. 2 used to invest his money in partnership with the present applicant, purchasing land, plots, etc. They used to sell the property, earning a profit from the business. Maintaining good business relations, the applicant provided a complete cheque book bearing his own signature on the said cheques from Central Bank of India Naranpura Branch in 2011 to respondent No. 2. Unfortunately, the cheque books were kept somewhere by the respondent No. 2's father and were subsequently not traceable by him. Despite the applicant's repeated requests, the cheque books were not returned, to him with the claim that they were untraceable. Regrettably, the same cheque was misused by respondent No. 2. 6. Learned advocate for the applicant has mainly submitted that the present applicant has nothing to do with the offence and he is falsely implicated in it. The learned advocate primarily raised two grounds: (i) the absence of a legally enforceable debt or liability and time barred debt and (ii) the lack of any dues when the applicant closed the account earlier in the year 2021, followed by the presentation of a cheque dated 21.08.2022 for clearance. 7. Further, it is argued that in the year 2022, there was an IFC Code and a MICR cheque book system in the bank, and prima-facie, the cheque seemed relevant and misused by respondent No. 2. The alleged transactions occurred in 2012, with the record showing a certain amount reflected in the account also. Prima facie, considering the transaction date of 2012 and the cheque's presentation for clearance in 2022, it appears to be time-barred debt which is legally not enforceable. Hence, the complaint is not maintainable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (referred to as the “NI Act”) 1881. To buttress his arguments, the learned advocate for the applicant has relied on the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Dilipkumar Manharlal Vyas vs. Girdharlal Hirajibhai, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 2009. 8. Hence, the complaint is not maintainable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (referred to as the “NI Act”) 1881. To buttress his arguments, the learned advocate for the applicant has relied on the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Dilipkumar Manharlal Vyas vs. Girdharlal Hirajibhai, passed in Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 2009. 8. Per contra, Nandish Thackar, learned advocate appearing for the complainant submits that the legality of the enforceable debt or time barred debt is a disputed question of fact, and it cannot be gone into within the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Furthermore, he argues that since the applicant has admitted his signatures on the cheques, the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act needs to be drawn unless and until he proves to the contrary that the enforced debt does not exist and till then, the petitioner is not entitled to get the present proceedings quashed. Hence, he requests that there is no need to exercise power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In support of his submission he has also relied on the judgment Gimpex Private Limited vs. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705 . 9. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the documents on record, it appears that the applicant/petitioner has admitted his signatures and disputed his signatures on the cheques. The present application is filed only on two grounds: (i) the absence of a legally enforceable debt i.e. time barred debt and (ii) the lack of any dues when the applicant closed the account, followed by the presentation of a cheque dated 21.08.2022 for clearance. In support of his contentions, the learned advocate for the applicant has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Dilipkumar Manharlal Vyas (supra). 10. At the outset, it is worth to mention that as the only point was argued at length qua only time barred debt. In support of his contentions, the learned advocate for the applicant has also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Dilipkumar Manharlal Vyas (supra). 10. At the outset, it is worth to mention that as the only point was argued at length qua only time barred debt. Hence, this Court raised a query to the learned advocate regarding as to whether the disputed question of fact concerning the legal enforceable debt or time barred debt gone into Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. In this regard, his attention was also drawn towards the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of A.V. Murthy vs. B.S. Nagabasavanna, (2002) 2 SCC 642 and in the case of K. Hymavathi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2023) SCC Online SC 1128. Subsequently, learned counsel for the applicant responded that these cases are not applicable here, but failed to show why are not applicable. 11. Herein case on hand prior to filing the complaint, statutory Notice came to be issued under Section 138(b) of the NI Act, a reply to the notice was given to the original complainant, but no dispute was raised regarding the legally enforceable debt, or a probable defense raised qua the time-barred debt. In the absence of any probable defense in the reply to the notice, such a ground or probable defense is being raised for the first time before this Court by the petitioner, which is a disputed question of fact. Even, as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of K. Hymavathi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2023) SCC Online SC 1128 and Natarajan vs. Sama Dharman, (2021) 6 SCC 413 and A.V. Murthy (supra) held that the question of limitation in a legal enforceable debt is not a subject matter of Section 482. 12. In the case of K. Hymavathi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2023) SCC Online SC 1128, the Apex Court has held as under: “10. 12. In the case of K. Hymavathi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2023) SCC Online SC 1128, the Apex Court has held as under: “10. From a perusal of the legal position enunciated, it is crystal clear that this Court keeping in perspective the nature of the proceedings arising under the NI Act and also keeping in view that the cheque itself is a promise to pay even if the debt is barred by time has in that circumstance kept in view the provision contained in Section 25(3) of the Contract Act and has indicated that if the question as to whether the debt or liability being barred by limitation was an issue to be considered in such proceedings, the same is to be decided based on the evidence to be adduced by the parties since the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. It is only in cases wherein an amount which is out and out non-recoverable, towards which a cheque is issued, dishonoured and for recovery of which a criminal action is initiated, the question of threshold jurisdiction will arise. In such cases, the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. will be justified in interfering but not otherwise. In that light, this Court was of the view that entertaining a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings at the stage earlier to the evidence would not be justified. 11. Notwithstanding the above, the learned Amicus Curiae would submit that the decisions referred to hereinabove would have to be viewed differently keeping in view the subsequent decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of the Expeditious trial of Cases under Section 138 of NI Act, 2021 SCC Online SC 325 to contend that in the said decision the power of the Magistrate under Section 322 of Cr.P.C. being an aspect to be taken into consideration was considered. In a case where the Trial Court is informed that it lacks jurisdiction to issue process for complaints under Section 138 of the Act the proceedings will have to be stayed in such cases. Hence, it is contended that the power of the Trial Court to decide with regard to its jurisdiction is not taken away and in that circumstance exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the High Court would be justified. Hence, it is contended that the power of the Trial Court to decide with regard to its jurisdiction is not taken away and in that circumstance exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the High Court would be justified. It is further contended by the learned Amicus Curiae that even the position under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act being applicable to criminal proceedings for dishonour of cheque will have to be examined in the background of the provision contained in the Explanation to Section 138 of NI Act which specifies that the debt or other liability enforceable would be only a legally enforceable debt or other liability. In such circumstances if the cheque is issued in respect of the debt which is not enforceable or a liability which cannot be recovered, in such event, the presumption under Section 139 of NI Act would not be available. 12. Having referred to the judgments cited, prima facie we are of the opinion that the decision in S. Natarajan and A.V. Murthy (supra) has taken into consideration all aspects. No other elaboration is required even if the observations contained in the case of Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of NI Act (supra) is taken note, since, whether the debt in question is a legally enforceable debt or other liability would arise on the facts and circumstance of each case and in that light the question as to whether the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised or not will also arise in the facts of such case. Even otherwise we do not see the need to tread that path to undertake an academic exercise on that aspect of the matter, since from the very facts involved in the case on hand ex facie it indicates that the claim which was made in the complaint before the Trial Court based on the cheque which was dishonoured cannot be construed as time-barred and as such it cannot be classified as a debt which was not legally recoverable, the details of which we would advert to here below. In that view, we have chosen not to refer to the cases provided as a compilation as it would be unnecessary to refer to the same.” 13. Herein, in the complaint, it is clearly stated that the transaction took place between the complainant and the accused-applicant in the year 2012-13. In that view, we have chosen not to refer to the cases provided as a compilation as it would be unnecessary to refer to the same.” 13. Herein, in the complaint, it is clearly stated that the transaction took place between the complainant and the accused-applicant in the year 2012-13. The dispute regarding the execution of the sale deed and agreement arose during that time, leading to the issuance of a legal notice on 8th March 2022. Following the notice, a settlement took place, and as part of the settlement, two cheques, each amounting to rupees eight lakh, totaling sixteen lakh, were received on 21st August 2021. These are the impugned cheques. 14. Considering the aforesaid specific averments made in the compliant and argument canvassed by learned advocate for the applicant qua legally enforceable debt or a probable defense raised by the accused and on the contrary, in the complaint, in paragraph 3, it is clearly stated that a settlement took place, and then the cheques were issued in the year 2022, subsequently cheques dishonoured 15. Considering the aforesaid facts and the legal precedent set by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, reported in (2022) 11 SCC 705 , wherein the Hon’ble Court held that in such a case, a new liability operation of presumptions under Sections 139 and 118 of the NI Act stand rebutted or not and as a new liability has been crated fresh cause of action or not which is explained and such fresh liability or cause of action itself subject matter of trial and proof and it cannot be decided at the Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. stage. 16. Further, herein, the applicant/petitioner has not disputed his signatures on the cheques. This implies that he has admitted his signatures on the cheques and has not raised any dispute. Even, in the reply to the notice, a probable defense has been raised by the accused. Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, reported in (2022) 6 SCC 735 and Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 283 , the effect of admission regarding the signature on the cheque is explained. Hence, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, reported in (2022) 6 SCC 735 and Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, reported in (2021) 5 SCC 283 , the effect of admission regarding the signature on the cheque is explained. Once the signature is admitted, it is required to be presumed that the cheque was issued towards consideration for a legally enforceable debt. Further once, signature is accepted then cheques were issued towards the security and it was signed, but blank papers were itself the matter of evidence. As per explanation of legal position on how to rebuts the presumption under Section 139 NI Act and to raise the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the Hon’ble Apex court has clearly explained in the case of Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh reported in (2023) 10 SCC 148 . 17. Considering the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as the cheque was issued on 21st August, 2022 and as per Section 118 of the NI Act, as to date that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date. Thus, prima facie, this Court has considered view that the instrument is drawn on 21st August 2022 and the presumption referred to under Section 118 of the NI Act and the legal concern referred to under Section 139 of the NI Act constitute a disputed question of fact. The accused is required to rebut this presumption during the trial by presenting evidence, and the trial court has to consider this evidence with the principle of preponderance in mind for the enforcement of the cheque. Even in the aforementioned background, as the Coordinate Bench of this Court concluded in its judgment passed in Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 2009, the court reaches the conclusion that there was no legal enforceable debt, i.e. time barred wherein evidence was recorded and after fulfledge trial come to conclusion and herein, in case on hand evidence is yet to be recorded. Hence, Judgment passed by this Court in the case of Dilipkumar Manharlal Vyas, (supra) upon which the learned advocate has relied upon would not avail any assistance to the applicant at this stage. 18. Hence, Judgment passed by this Court in the case of Dilipkumar Manharlal Vyas, (supra) upon which the learned advocate has relied upon would not avail any assistance to the applicant at this stage. 18. The second contention regarding the closure of the account and issuance of an old cheque is concerned, the cheque is issued in the year 2022 involves the existence of a MICR cheque system. It is needless to say that after the issuance of the cheque, if the account is closed, and even if the account is being closed, the said endorsement would attract proceedings for dishonour of the cheque under Section 138 of the NI Act. “The account is closed” is not a sufficient ground to quash the proceedings or the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. 19. The question of the issuance of the old cheque/cheque not being MICR is also relevant because, once the cheque is presented for the collection and the bank collects and accepts the cheque/instrument, it shall be presumed to be a valid instrument. The bank sends it for clearing, or accepting only a valid instrument is tendered once the bank accepts it, then provides a reason for the non-clearance of the cheque; and issue return memo if on the date of presumption of the cheque if there was a sufficient balance to honor the cheque, then obviously, the complainant would get it cleared, and the cheque would be honored. Hence, it may be presumed that the instrument was a valid one, as the banker has accepted it, and then a reason is assigned for dishonour the cheques were not valid; and it was an old one and not MICR. Hence the argument of the learned advocate for the applicant is not sustainable. Even, this is not a case wherein the instrument was invalid and not presented within time and learned trial court has committed an error in taking cognizance even though no cause of action arises. 20. Hence the argument of the learned advocate for the applicant is not sustainable. Even, this is not a case wherein the instrument was invalid and not presented within time and learned trial court has committed an error in taking cognizance even though no cause of action arises. 20. In the aforesaid conspectus fact, it appears that as per the cases of A.V. Murthy (supra) and K. Hymavathi (supra), no case is made out to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. as the learned Magistrate has taken the cognizance keeping in mind the case of law laid down by the Honb’ble Apex Court in the case of Indian Bank Association v. Union of India, reported in (2014) 5 SCC 590 , in view of the above, no case is made out to quash and set aside the proceedings pending before the trial Court. 21. Before parting, it is worth mentioning that under Section 138 of the NI Act, it is required to be concluded within six months from the date of filing of the proceedings. In view thereof, the learned trial court is directed to expedite the matter and conclude it preferably within six months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order, without being influenced by the observations made in this order. 22. In view of the above, the present applications stand dismissed. No order as to costs. Rule is discharged.