JUDGMENT : Birendra Kumar, J. 1. Heard the Parties. 2. The appellants faced trial in Sessions Case No.30/2019 for offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC. By the impugned judgment dated 04.03.2024, they were found guilty for offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC. The learned trial Judge awarded ten years’ rigorous imprisonment against the appellants for offence under Section 304-B IPC along with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, six months’ simple imprisonment was ordered. For offence under Section 498-A IPC, the appellants were convicted with three years’ rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, three months’ simple imprisonment was directed. The sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. 3. The prosecution case as disclosed in FIR No.229/2019 registered with Police Station Bhirani (Ex.P/1) is that the victim was married with appellant No.1-Ashok Kumar on 09.11.2018. Though, marriage gift were given by the family members of the girl. However, there was persistent demand of dowry of rupees one lack in cash. This demand was being made continuously after the marriage. The informant-Nathu Ram (PW-1), who is father of the victim has stated that out of the aforesaid demand, he had paid Rs.11,000/- to appellant No.2. PW-2 Mukesh Kumar, son of PW-1 Nathhu Ram stated that the said amount was paid in the month of March 2019. However, the demand continued and for non-fulfillment of the demand, torture was persisting. The victim used to inform her parents and brother, whenever, she visited her parents house or even on telephone that she was assaulted by the family members for non-fulfillment of the demand. 4. According to PW-1, PW-2 and PW-6 Maya Devi, the mother of the victim, on the occasion of Rakshabhandan, the victim along with her husband had come to their house on 15.08.2019 and the victim had complained about the demand and torture, but the family members consoled her that whenever they would be capable, would pay the money. On the same day, the victim and her husband returned back to the matrimonial house. On 18.08.2019, the incident of unnatural death of the victim took place and the FIR was lodged on 19.08.2019. 5. During trial, the prosecution examined altogether 15 witnesses. PW-1 Nathu Ram has categorically supported about the demand of dowry and torture for the same soon before death. On 18.08.2019, the incident of unnatural death of the victim took place and the FIR was lodged on 19.08.2019. 5. During trial, the prosecution examined altogether 15 witnesses. PW-1 Nathu Ram has categorically supported about the demand of dowry and torture for the same soon before death. PW-2 Mukesh Kumar is also specific that the deceased used to convey him about demand and torture whenever she visited his house or even on telephone from her matrimonial house. This witness is specific that even appellant No.1 had demanded dowry from him. PW-3 Jagir Singh is witness of inquest, PW-4 Balbir was mediator in the marriage, which has been admitted by DW-1 appellant Ashok Kumar. The prosecution witnesses PW-1, PW-2 and PW-6 had reported the demand and torture to PW-4 also, but in Court, PW-4 has turned hostile. The reason may be that he was relation of both the parties since prior to marriage of the deceased. PW-7 Doctor Sunita Sharma had examined the external injury on the person of the deceased and has reported some injuries on the upper portion of body of the deceased. PW-8 Sanjay Kumar is a formal witness. She had carried the viscera for FSL examination. PW-9 Doctor Satbir Singh had performed post-mortem on 19.08.2019 itself. He reported that the death was within 48 hours. Blood was oozing out from the mouth of the deceased. 6. On the basis of FSL report vide (Ex.P-12) and Pathological report vide (EX.P-13), it was opined that oregano-phosphorous, a pesticides was found in the viscera of the deceased. PW-10 Mahendra Singh and PW-12 Chandra Bhan are formal witnesses, who have proved documents. PW-11 Atar Kumar is Investigating Officer of the case, who has supported the prosecution case. 7. PW-13 Doctor Sujata had deposed that when the victim was brought to the hospital, she was already dead. The attendant accompanying her, disclosed that the victim had vomited prior to death. PW-14 Navdeep Singh and PW-15 Subhash are formal witnesses. 8. The defence version is that deceased was a nurse in the referred hospital. She was not happy with the appellant No.1, who was a farmer and under depression, she might have swallowed the poison. 9. PW-6 Maya Devi, mother of the deceased stated that the deceased was not working in any hospital. To counter her statement, DW-1 has produced documents from Ex.D-2 to Ex.D-9. She was not happy with the appellant No.1, who was a farmer and under depression, she might have swallowed the poison. 9. PW-6 Maya Devi, mother of the deceased stated that the deceased was not working in any hospital. To counter her statement, DW-1 has produced documents from Ex.D-2 to Ex.D-9. Those documents goes to shows that the deceased was 10th/12th pass. She had undergone training of nursing and thereafter, she joined a hospital in Punjab. The certificate issued by Haryana Nurses and Midwives Council dated 09.05.2019 (Ex.D-5) shows that in October 2018, the deceased was admitted as nurse. However, there is no document to prove the date of joining of the deceased in the hospital or the fact that she was attending the hospital regularly even till her death. 10. Other evidences including of the hostile witness shows that the deceased was residing in her matrimonial house after her marriage and off an on was visiting to her parents house. There is no evidence that she had ever visited elsewhere. 11. Now, the point for consideration is whether the prosecution has proved that there was demand of dowry by the appellants and for non-fulfillment of the same, there was torture to the deceased soon before death within seven years of marriage. Point No.2- If the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled, the presumption would be there against the appellants under Section 13-B. Hence, whether the appellants have discharged their burden to repel the presumption. 12. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in between marriage and death, no Panchayat was held for settlement of dispute. No information or complaint was made to any of the authorities as admitted by PW-1 and PW-2, rather the FIR was lodged only after death of the victim, which creates doubt that infact there was any demand or torture for the same. 13. PW-6, the mother of the victim has deposed that her family members wanted to save the maternal life of the victim, therefore, they did not make any official complaint against the conduct of the appellants, rather were expecting that the matter would be resolved and would not go to the extent of unnatural death. The tendency of the family members to save the matrimonial life in Indian society till any drop of hope survives, is general experience of the society. 14. The tendency of the family members to save the matrimonial life in Indian society till any drop of hope survives, is general experience of the society. 14. The marriage was solemnized on 09.11.2018 and death took place within a year on 18.08.2019 within a short span of time, therefore, the prosecution version cannot be thrown away only for non-panchayat or non-institution of any criminal case of demand of dowry and torture for the same especially when the prosecution witnesses are consistent and trustworthy in material particular. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants next contends that PW-4 Balbir to whom the demand of dowry and torture was disclosed has not supported the allegation. PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 are interested and partisan witnesses. Nothing was recovered from the place of incident to connect involvement of the appellants in the crime alleged. Husband had took the deceased to the hospital, hence intention was evident. 16. Non-support of the prosecution case by PW-4 Balbir, who was declared hostile by the prosecution would not make any difference in the facts and circumstances of this case because Balbir was relation of both sides, rather he had arranged the marriage from the appellants side being relative of the appellants. Only for PW-4 turning hostile, testimony of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-4 cannot be disbelieved. In such type of offences of demand of dowry and torture, mostly the family members are witnesses from whom demand was made. Therefore, their testimony cannot be disbelieved for their being family members. 17. If the Investigating Officer did not find any sign of offence at the place of incident, that would not make the prosecution version doubtful. In a case of dowry death, unlike a case of murder, evidence of crime may not be available at the place of incident. It is not a case with only allegation that the appellants had committed the murder, but whole allegation is that the appellants created a torturous situation against the deceased for non-fulfillment of dowry demand, which forced the deceased to decide to finish her life. Even a suicidal act of the deceased, which was result of demand and torture soon before death would be enough to prove the charge under Section 304-B IPC. There is no evidence that husband had carried the deceased to the hospital, except the statement of the husband as DW-1. Even a suicidal act of the deceased, which was result of demand and torture soon before death would be enough to prove the charge under Section 304-B IPC. There is no evidence that husband had carried the deceased to the hospital, except the statement of the husband as DW-1. Assuming that husband had carried the deceased to the hospital would not lead to the conclusion that offence under Section 304-B IPC is not made out because to constitute the offence of un-natural death preceded by demand of dowry and torture for the same soon before death is the only requirement of law. Causing of intentional death is not necessary. 18. Learned counsel for the appellants next contends that there is delay in lodging of the FIR. 19. This Court does not find any merit in the aforesaid submission for the reason that incident took place on 18.08.2019 and FIR was lodged on 19.08.2019 only after the informant returned from the hospital and got confirmation of unnatural death of his daughter. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent-State vehemently supports the judgment of conviction on the ground that the ingredients of the offences proved are prima facie made out by the consistent and trustworthy testimony of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-6. These witnesses are corroborated by medical evidence. The doctor has found cause of death due to swallowing of pesticides, which goes to show that it was a case of unnatural death in the matrimonial house of the appellants within a year of marriage. It is evident that the prosecution witnesses have deposed that the deceased used to complain them about demand of rupees one lack as further dowry and torture for the same mentally and physically. PW-2 stated that demand was made from him as well by the appellant No.1. 21. Now the question is whether statement of the deceased made to PW-1, PW-2 and PW-6 regarding cause of her death is admissible in evidence. 22. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act and stated that “Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, provided the statement related to the cause of death or exhibits circumstances leading to the death”. 23. In the present case, the prosecution witnesses PW-1, PW-2 and PW-6 have categorically stated that whenever deceased met to them she disclosed about demand of rupees one lack by the appellants and for non-fulfillment of the same, mental and physical torture meted to her soon before death. The last incident of report of demand and torture was on the occasion of Rakshabandhan on 15.08.2019 and death was caused within few days on 18.08.2019. Therefore, statement of the victim to the prosecution witnesses aforesaid would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. 24. In Satbir Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2021) 6 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the legislative intent of the term “soon before death” appearing in Section 304-B IPC and held that soon before death does not mean immediately before death. Para No.36 of the judgment is being reproduced below :- “36. At the cost of repetition, the law Under Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act can be summarized below : i. Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand. ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence Under Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided Under Section 113-B, Evidence Act operates against the Accused. iii. The phrase "soon before" as appearing in Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code cannot be construed to mean 'immediately before'. The prosecution must establish existence of "proximate and live link" between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives. iv. Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code does not take a pigeonhole approach in. categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring "otherwise than under normal circumstances" can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code read with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial. vi. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring "otherwise than under normal circumstances" can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code read with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial. vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement Under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the Accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an Accused Under Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice "audi alteram partem" as it enables the Accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the Accused fairly, with care and caution. vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the Accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the Accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act. viii. Section 232, Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, "If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the Accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the Accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal". Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts. ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the Accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, Code of Criminal Procedure, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for 'defence evidence', calling upon the Accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided Under Section 233, Code of Criminal Procedure, which is also an invaluable right provided to the Accused. x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics. xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment. xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.” 25. Considering the cogent and trustworthy material on the record, this Court is of the view that it is a case of conviction for offence under Section 304-B and 498-A IPC. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the judgment of conviction. 26. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand (Criminal Appeal No.447/2012 decided on 20.04.2023). The said judgment is distinguishable and not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. In Charan Singh’s case (supra), the named witness in FIR was not produced in Court and no appeal was preferred against acquittal of mother and brother of the husband and death of appellant’s wife was not unnatural as she was suffering from ailment of fits. 27. The learned trial Judge has not considered the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case while awarding the sentence nor has assigned any reason for awarding sentence of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for offence under Section 304-B IPC. 28. Appellants are in jail since last five years. Considering the age of the appellants and other circumstances of the case, the sentence awarded is reduced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 304-B IPC. Other sentences awarded by the learned trial Judge are hereby affirmed. 29. With the aforesaid modification in sentence, the instant criminal appeal stands dismissed.