JUDGMENT : Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J. 1. This writ petition has been preferred by Raj Bhardwaj, a disqualified candidate for the post of a Technician Grade-II (Fitter), who applied for the said post in response to advertisement No. U-37/UPRVUSA/2019 issued by the Uttar Pradesh Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Sewa Ayog, Lucknow (for short, 'the Service Commission'). He questions an office order dated 16.01.2014 issued by the Service Commission to the extent it excludes from consideration candidates, who have earned their High School Certificate or equivalent qualification from the National Institute of Open Schooling (for short, 'NIOS'). The petitioner further prays that a mandamus be issued to the Service Commission to treat the petitioner a duly qualified candidate for the post of Technician Grade-II (Fitter), without objection to his High School Certificate being one earned from the NIOS. The petitioner also prays for a mandamus, commanding the respondents to appoint him on the post of Technician Grade-II (Fitter) on the basis of selection held pursuant to Advertisement No. U-37/UPRVUSA/2019, within a period to be stipulated by this Court. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition are these: An advertisement bearing No. U-37/UPRVUSA/2019 was issued by the Service Commission, inviting applications for various categories of Group-C and Group-D posts in the Establishment. The Service Commission advertised, amongst others, post of Technician Grade-II (Fitter). According to the petitioner's case, the qualifications advertised in the advertisement for the post of Technician Grade-II (Fitter) (for short, 'the post in question') are as follows: ^^VsDuhf'k;u Js.kh&f}rh; ¼fQVj½ in gsrq& ek/;fed f'k{kk ifj"kn mŸkj izns'k dh gkbZ Ldwy foKku ,oa xf.kr fo"k; ds lkFk ;k led{k ijh{kk mŸkh.kZ rFkk fQVVj VªsM esa vf[ky Hkkjrh; jkT; O;ko'kkbd izek.ki=A DOEACC ( orZeku es NIELIT) }kjk iznŸk 80 ?kaVs dk dkslZ vkWu dEI;qVj dkUlsIV (CCC) dk izek.ki= vfHkys[kh; ijh{k.k ds le; izLrqr djuk vfuok;Z gksxkA^^ 3. The petitioner says that he belongs to the unreserved category and is qualified for the post in question. He was eligible to apply. The petitioner has passed his Secondary School Certificate Examination, earning that certificate from the NIOS with Science and Mathematics as his subjects. He also holds a National Trade Certificate in the Fitter's Trade. Apart from these, the petitioner also holds a Course on Computer Concepts Certificate (for short, 'CCC Certificate') awarded by the National Institute of Electronics & Information Technology (for short, 'the NIELIT'). He also holds a National Trade Certificate in the Fitter's Trade. Apart from these, the petitioner also holds a Course on Computer Concepts Certificate (for short, 'CCC Certificate') awarded by the National Institute of Electronics & Information Technology (for short, 'the NIELIT'). The petitioner applied for the post in question, appending copies of his mark-sheets and certificates. The petitioner's application, being found in order, he was allotted Roll No. 11412010252. He was issued with an Admit Card for participating in the Computer Based Test. The Computer Based Test was held on 05.04.2021. The petitioner appeared in the said Test from an Examination Centre at Ghaziabad. The result of the Computer Based Test, declared on 09.09.2021, showed the petitioner as qualified. He was, therefore, called to participate in the document verification scheduled for 18.09.2021. The petitioner was also issued a separate call letter for participating in the document verification to be held on 18.09.2021. The petitioner says that in accordance with the notice, calling him for participation in the document verification, he appeared for the verification of his documents on the scheduled date, time and venue. At the time of verification, the Trade Certificate held by the petitioner, issued by the Industrial Training Institute (for short, ‘the ITI’) and the CCC Certificate possessed by him, granted by the NIELIT, were accepted, without objection. However, there was objection to the High School Certificate held by the petitioner on ground that the said certificate had been earned by the petitioner from the NIOS, which was a certificate granted under a system of distance learning. It rendered the petitioner ineligible. The respondents, accordingly, proceeded to reject the petitioner's candidature, despite the 164 marks out of 200, that he had secured in the Computer Based Test. No order in writing was made by the respondents in this regard. However, the list of selected candidates, prepared after document verification, did not find the petitioner's name included. The petitioner was excluded as ineligible. 4. The petitioner, aggrieved by the aforesaid exclusion, moved the Lucknow Bench of this Court through a writ petition, being Service Single No. 21919 of 2021. The writ petition, however, carried a mistake in the array of parties. In view of the said mistake, the Court permitted the writ petition to be dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to file afresh. 4. The petitioner, aggrieved by the aforesaid exclusion, moved the Lucknow Bench of this Court through a writ petition, being Service Single No. 21919 of 2021. The writ petition, however, carried a mistake in the array of parties. In view of the said mistake, the Court permitted the writ petition to be dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty to file afresh. Availing that liberty, the present writ petition has been instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution, impugning the petitioner's exclusion from consideration on ground of his ineligibility as aforesaid, cited by the respondents. 5. A notice of motion was issued on 13.12.2021. The case was taken up again on 05.01.2022, when it was adjourned for parties to complete pleadings. It was again adjourned for the purpose on 15.02.2022. In course of time, parties exchanged affidavits. 6. There is a counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Service Commission, who have held the recruitment for the post in question. This counter affidavit was filed on 21.02.2022, to which a rejoinder was filed on 15.03.2022. There is a counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, Lucknow (for short, 'the Corporation'), represented by respondents Nos.3 and 4, on 17.09.2022, to which the petitioner has filed a rejoinder on 29.09.2022. A supplementary rejoinder affidavit has been filed on the petitioner's behalf on 14.10.2022. 7. On the aforesaid pleadings, this Court admitted the petition to hearing on 31.10.2023, which proceeded forthwith. The hearing was adjourned to 09.11.2023, but it could not be taken up on that day. It was then adjourned to 30.11.2023. On 30.11.2023, learned Counsel appearing for parties concluded their submissions and judgment was reserved. 8. Heard Mr. Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Kauntey Singh, Advocate appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Abhishek Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation, Mr. Aditya Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Service Commission and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State. 9. 8. Heard Mr. Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Kauntey Singh, Advocate appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Abhishek Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation, Mr. Aditya Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Service Commission and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State. 9. Since the petitioner has been disqualified, on account of his High School Certificate being one earned through the system of NIOS, he has challenged the office order dated 16.01.2014 issued by the Service Commission, which has directed the addition of an explanation to all service rules for various categories of posts in the Establishment of the Corporation, whether ones to be filled up by direct recruitment or promotion, to the effect that degrees/diplomas/certificates earned through distance learning will not be valid. All other reliefs, that the petitioner claims, would be forthcoming if the petitioner is successful in challenging the aforesaid office order passed by the Service Commission. 10. It is submitted by Mr. Ashok Khare, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Kauntey Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned office order has been issued in the context of a controversy in the State with regard to validity of diploma/degree in different Engineering Courses, earned through Distance Education Mode. It is submitted that such technical qualifications, earned through Distance Education Mode, has been held by the Supreme Court to be invalid in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited v. Rabi Sankar Patro and others, (2018) 1 SCC 468 . The same reasoning has been followed by our Court, according to Mr. Khare, in Akhtar Ali Ansari and another v. State of U.P., 2015 SCC OnLine All 8680. 11. It is argued that in the context of the aforesaid controversy, the validity of degree/diploma, earned through Distance Education Mode, engaged the attention of the Corporation. In a meeting of their Board, convened on 28.12.2013, the issue was considered. Mr. Khare has invited the Court's attention to agenda note, relating to Item No.25, circulated amongst Members of the Board of Directors of the Corporation for consideration in their 157th Meeting, that was held on 28.12.2013. A copy of the agenda note is annexed as Annexure No. SRA-1 to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit. Mr. Khare has invited the Court's attention to agenda note, relating to Item No.25, circulated amongst Members of the Board of Directors of the Corporation for consideration in their 157th Meeting, that was held on 28.12.2013. A copy of the agenda note is annexed as Annexure No. SRA-1 to the supplementary rejoinder affidavit. It is also emphasized by the learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner, that in the proceedings of the Board of Directors of the Corporation, held on 28.12.2013, the resolution adopted under Agenda Item No.25, is to be understood in the context of the agenda note. The resolution is not to be read divorced from agenda note or in isolation. Upon reading the two together, the learned Senior Advocate submits that it is evident that the disqualification resolved for degrees/diplomas/certificates earned through Distance Education Mode is confined to the technical qualifications of diploma and degree in Engineering. The disqualification cannot be understood as one resolved for all kinds of certificates and qualifications, whether related to technical education or not. It is pointed out that a copy of the resolution of the Corporation Board dated 28.12.2013, including the resolution under Agenda Item No.25, is annexed as Annexure No. RA-7 to the rejoinder affidavit. 12. The submission on behalf of the petitioner is that the impugned office order dated 16.01.2014 proceeds on a manifestly incorrect interpretation of the Board's Resolution adopted in their 157th Meeting held on 28.12.2013. The resolution of the meeting is to be understood as one limited to holding a candidate ineligible for posts under the Corporation in case of Diploma, Degrees in Engineering Course alone, if these are earned through the Distance Education Mode. The resolution is not at all to be understood as disqualifying all other kinds of certificates or degrees earned through distance learning, that are not technical or of the same genre as a diploma or degree in Engineering. A High School Certificate, which is a certificate of very elementary graduation, according to Mr. Khare, would not be within the mischief of the Board's resolve to exclude diplomas/degrees earned through the Distance Education Mode. The submission, therefore, proceeds that the impugned order dated 16.01.2014 is at variance with the resolution of the Board dated 28.12.2013, and, for the said reason illegal. 13. The other submission advanced by Mr. Khare, would not be within the mischief of the Board's resolve to exclude diplomas/degrees earned through the Distance Education Mode. The submission, therefore, proceeds that the impugned order dated 16.01.2014 is at variance with the resolution of the Board dated 28.12.2013, and, for the said reason illegal. 13. The other submission advanced by Mr. Khare, learned Senior Advocate is that even otherwise it is in no manner permissible to the Corporation or the Board to exclude from consideration a qualification, which is valid and recognized by the law. In support of the aforesaid contention of his, Mr. Khare has placed reliance upon Dr. B.L. Asawa v. State of Rajasthan and others, (1982) 2 SCC 55 ; Gyanendra Kumar Sharma and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh through Secretary, 2007 SCC OnLine All 708; State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Bhupendra Nath Tripathi and others, (2010) 13 SCC 203 , Jitendra Kumar Soni and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh through Secretary, Department of Basic Education and another, 2010 SCC OnLine All 1494; and, Akhtar Ali Ansari (supra). 14. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that a High School Certificate awarded by the NIOS is a valid qualification, which cannot be ignored by the respondents in exercise of their power as the employers to prescribe qualification for posts, to which they propose to recruit. In support of this contention of his, Mr. Khare has placed reliance upon the holding of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Vikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2019:AHC:142871, the authority of the Patna High Court in Bablu Kumar v. State of Bihar and others, CWJC No.5014 of 2010, decided on 24.08.2010; and, a Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Sidharth Jagdishbhai Panchal v. Admission Committee for Professional Diploma Course (ACPDC), 2010 SCC OnLine Guj 9320. 15. Mr. Khare has drawn the attention of the Court to the assertion made in paragraph Nos.23 and 24 of the writ petition, where it is said that prior to the advertisement, giving rise to this petition, the Corporation had issued an advertisement, bearing No. 4-19/2025, advertising posts of Technician Grade-II (Electrical)/(Mechanical)/(Instrument). It is averred that pursuant to the advertisement of 2015 as also the present advertisement, candidates, who had passed their High School Certificate Examination as private candidates, had been permitted consideration with no similar objection against them. It is averred that pursuant to the advertisement of 2015 as also the present advertisement, candidates, who had passed their High School Certificate Examination as private candidates, had been permitted consideration with no similar objection against them. It is argued that in paragraph No.9 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation, the fact that candidates, who have passed their High School Examination privately, were permitted in the recruitment pursuant to the advertisement-2015 as also the present advertisement, has not been denied. It is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that there does not exist any difference between a High School Certificate earned by a candidate through Distance Education Mode and a certificate, that is earned passing the High School Examination privately, without attending classes. The submission, therefore, is that this constitutes discrimination prohibited by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is likewise argued that the contents of paragraph Nos.25 and 26 of the writ petition have not been specifically denied or the plea answered, where the petitioner has taken a case that the NIOS has been established by the Society under the name of National Open School Society. The aforesaid Society has been established under a resolution of the Ministry of Human Resource Development dated 21.11.1989 with the object of conducting courses of study, leading to award of certificates at the Middle, Secondary and Senior Secondary levels of education. It is further pleaded in the paragraphs under reference that certificates awarded by the NIOS are recognized for the purpose of securing admission to different courses. There is no denial to this plea in the counter affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos.3 and 4, as Mr. Khare asserts. 16. Rebutting the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner, it is submitted by Mr. Abhishek Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the Corporation, who has been joined by Mr. Aditya Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Service Commission and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State, that it is the prerogative of the employer, the primary decision maker, to prescribe qualifications for recruitment to posts in its Establishment. The qualifications prescribed are uniform and not tailor-made to pick and choose. There is, thus, no case of a possible discrimination, which the petitioner attempts to allege. Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State, that it is the prerogative of the employer, the primary decision maker, to prescribe qualifications for recruitment to posts in its Establishment. The qualifications prescribed are uniform and not tailor-made to pick and choose. There is, thus, no case of a possible discrimination, which the petitioner attempts to allege. The submission that the agenda note has to be read along with the Board's Resolution, by which High School Certificates, earned through Distance Education Mode, have been excluded from eligibility, in order to gather the true intendment of the Board's Resolve, is misplaced. The further submission that degrees/diploma and technical courses earned through Distance Education Mode alone can legitimately be held excluded for the purpose of supporting a valid candidature to the post in question but the same cannot be extended to exclude a High School Certificate holder by the Distance Education Mode, is an argument that treads in the forbidden territory of policy making. There is no arbitrariness or discrimination inherent in the decision that may invite interference by this Court on tested principles of constitutional invalidity. It is also urged, particularly, that the advertisement clearly carries the prohibition that candidates, who have secured certificates and technical certificates through the Distance Education Mode, would not be eligible and the petitioner applied with open eyes, alive to the said prohibition. He cannot, therefore, contend against the terms of the advertisement, subject to which he applied. It is emphasized that the advertisement itself has not been challenged by the petitioner, which he ought to have done before he submitted to the process. He is now estopped from raising the said issue. 17. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the record, this Court finds that the advertisement, that was issued in this case by the Corporation, is absolutely clear regarding the essential qualifications for the post in question. Paragraph No.2 (g) of the advertisement, which is about the post in question, reads: “2(g) Technician Grade-II (Post code-10, 11, 12): (emphasis by Court) 18. The essential qualifications prescribed are a High School Certificate earned with subjects, including Science and Mathematics or an equivalent examination. The other necessary qualification is a Fitters Trade Certificate from an ITI. Paragraph No.2 (g) of the advertisement, which is about the post in question, reads: “2(g) Technician Grade-II (Post code-10, 11, 12): (emphasis by Court) 18. The essential qualifications prescribed are a High School Certificate earned with subjects, including Science and Mathematics or an equivalent examination. The other necessary qualification is a Fitters Trade Certificate from an ITI. Apart from these two, the added qualification, that is required, is a CCC Certificate earned from the DOEACC (presently called NIELIT), granted after pursuing a course of 80 hours. The note appended, as reproduced hereinabove, shows that certificates through Distance Education Mode would not be valid. So far as the advertisement goes, the prohibition being one regarding all eligibility certificates earned through the Distance Education Mode, is unequivocal. The advertisement does not show that certificates relating to a Degree or Diploma in Engineering or a Technical Certificate alone, have to be earned through the conventional method of contact learning and other certificates, like High School, can be those earned through the Distance Education Mode. If one were to go by the letter of the advertisement, the petitioner would certainly be ineligible and he would be aware of it when he applied. 19. Now, the issue raised for a first is that this advertisement is not to be read on its face value. The Court has been taken through the agenda note relative to Item No.25, which was considered by the Corporation Board in their 157th Meeting held on 28.12.2013 to alter the eligibility qualifications, excluding certificates of eligibility earned through Distance Education Mode. The agenda note relative to Item No.25, no doubt, is concerned about technical education and goes into the advisability of recognizing as eligible, holders of diploma and degree in Engineering/Technologies earned through the Distance Education Mode. After a reference to some older regulations and notifications issued by the Government of India about the validity of degrees granted through Distance Education Mode, it is proposed vide the agenda note as follows: ^^mijksDr ifjis{; esa izLrkfor gS fd& ^^lh/kh HkrhZ ,oa inksUufr gsrq nqjLFk f'k{kk dks ikŒdkŒfyŒ dh Hkakfr vekU; ?kksf"kr dj fn;k tk;sa vkSj rnkuqlkj rRlcaf/kr fu;ekoyh esa fuEufyf[kr izLrj lfEefyr dj fy;k tk;s& "Degree/Diploma received through Distance Learning Education will not be eligible in direct recruitment as well as in promotion". izdj.k funsZ'kd eaMy ds leN mijksDr izLrj&5 esa fn;s x;s izLrko ds fopkjkFkZ ,oa vuqeksnukFkZ izLrqr gSA^^ 20. izdj.k funsZ'kd eaMy ds leN mijksDr izLrj&5 esa fn;s x;s izLrko ds fopkjkFkZ ,oa vuqeksnukFkZ izLrqr gSA^^ 20. The Board when they considered the matter in their 157th Meeting on 28.12.2013, resolved as follows: 25 fuxe esa nwjLFk f'k{kk ds lEca/k esaA funsZ'kd e.My us lh/kh HkrhZ ,oa inksUufr gsrq nwjLFk f'k{kk dks vekU; ?kksf"kr djus dk vuqeksnu iznku fd;kA ;g Hkh fu.kZ; fy;k xk fd nwjLFk f'k{kk dh vekU;rk dk izkfo/kku vfHk;a=.k lsok fu;ekoyh ds lkFk&lkFk vU; laoxkasZ dh lsok fu;ekofy;ks esa Hkh vafdr fd;k tk;s vkSj rnuqlkj lEcaf/kr fu;ekofy;ksa bl lhek rd la'kksf/kr ekuh tk;sxhA 21. To this Court's understanding, there is no basis or rationale to restrict the Board's Resolve or hold it in any manner controlled by what was said in the agenda note. No doubt, the agenda note seems to be concerned about the advisability of recognizing as eligible Degrees/Diplomas in Engineering for posts under the Corporation, but the agenda note is merely a proposal about the issue. There does not seem to be any principle or warrant, that would restrict the authority of the Board, to expand the restriction to certificates of eligibility earned through Distance Education Mode beyond Diploma and Degrees in Engineering and Technical Courses. If the Board have taken a conscious decision to extend the exclusion of certificates earned through the Distance Education Mode beyond Degrees and Diplomas in Engineering and Technical Courses, to a more fundamental qualification, like the High School Certificate, otherwise an essential qualification, there is no warrant to understand the Board's Resolution in the context of the agenda note. One needs to fall back upon something like an agenda note in a situation like this, if the words of the resolution by the Board are in some manner ambiguous or admit of two constructions. If the resolve of the Board is expressed in clear words, there is absolutely no warrant to look into what were the ideas that went into the ultimate resolution passed, or so to speak, consult the agenda note. This Court finds that the resolution of the Board is clear and unambiguous in that, that it holds all kinds of certificates necessary to maintain ones candidature for the post in question ineligible, if the particular certificate -whether technical or basic -is earned through the Distance Education Mode. 22. This Court finds that the resolution of the Board is clear and unambiguous in that, that it holds all kinds of certificates necessary to maintain ones candidature for the post in question ineligible, if the particular certificate -whether technical or basic -is earned through the Distance Education Mode. 22. For the same reason, while it is true that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rabi Sankar Patro (supra) thought that technical education acquired through Distance Education Mode, leads to invalid degrees for a principle, but that holding does not necessarily mean that the Corporation Board could not have thought on expanded lines and insist upon other eligibility certification as well being earned by candidates through contact learning, as distinguished from the Distance Education Mode. It is, accordingly, held that the Board's Resolution has to be understood according to the resolve on its face value and there is no warrant to go behind what went into the making of this decision to understand its otherwise explicit terms. The Board's Resolution does not permit a High School Certificate earned through the Distance Education Mode to confer a valid candidature on a person staking claim for the post in question. 23. The other limb of the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that it is in no manner open to the respondents to exclude from consideration a qualification, which is valid and recognized by the law. This proposition is very wide and virtually tantamounts to saying that if a degree, diploma or certificate is granted by a University, Authority or Body, authorized by the law to grant it, it is not open to an employer, who prescribes as the eligibility qualifications the possession of that certificate, degree or diploma, to say that the eligibility is further qualified by the degree or certificate or diploma being acquired through a particular mode or method of teaching. More widely stated, if by law a certificate has been authorizedly granted by a Body or University and it is a certificate of that level, which is prescribed as the eligibility qualification by the employer, the employer by his rules or the terms of his advertisement, cannot add further qualifications or conditions to the eligibility certificate for the purpose of maintaining a valid candidature. In support of the petitioner's contention, reliance has been placed on Dr. B.L. Asawa (supra). In Dr. In support of the petitioner's contention, reliance has been placed on Dr. B.L. Asawa (supra). In Dr. B.L. Asawa, the facts would show that Dr. B.L. Asawa was held ineligible for recruitment to the post of Lecturer, Forensic Medicine Government Medical Colleges in the State of Rajasthan since he lacked the necessary academic qualification specified in the advertisement. The further facts that are seminal to understand the principle in Dr. B.L. Asawa can best be recapitulated in the words of their Lordships that figure in the report. These read: “3. The appellant secured the MBBS degree from the University of Rajasthan in the year 1954 and after undergoing housemanship for one year, he was substantively appointed as Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Rajasthan State Medical Service with effect from May 26, 1956. In 1962, the Rajasthan Medical Service was bifurcated into two branches, namely, (1) the Rajasthan Medical Service and (2) the Rajasthan Medical Service Collegiate Branch). Separate service rules known as the Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962 (hereinafter called “the Rules”) were framed for the Collegiate Branch and all appointments of teaching staff in the Government Medical Colleges in Rajasthan were thereafter governed by the said Rules. Under the provisions of the Rules, the post of Lecturer is to be filled up only by direct recruitment. It is laid down in Chapter IV of the Rules which prescribes the procedure for direct recruitment that the appointments are to be made on the basis of selection by the State Public Service Commission. Rule 12 lays down that “the candidate for direct recruitment to the post specified in Parts A, B and C of the Schedule shall possess such academic and technical qualifications and experience as is laid down, from time to time, by the Rajasthan University for the teaching staff in Medical Colleges”. The post of Lecturers is included in Part C of the Schedule to the Rules. Hence, for ascertaining the qualifications required for the post of Lecturer under the Rules one has to refer to the Rules relating to technical qualifications and experience laid down by the Rajasthan University for the teaching staff in Medical Colleges. 4. Clause (vii) of Ordinance 65 occurring in Chapter XX of the Handbook of the University of Rajasthan, Part II, Vol. 4. Clause (vii) of Ordinance 65 occurring in Chapter XX of the Handbook of the University of Rajasthan, Part II, Vol. 1, is the relevant provision wherein the University of Rajasthan has prescribed the academic and technical qualifications and experience required for eligibility for appointment as teachers in Medical Colleges. That clause is in the following terms: “(1) All teachers must possess a basic University or equivalent qualification entered in Schedules to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, except in the non-clinical departments of Anatomy, Physiology, Biochemistry, Pharmacology, Microbiology where non-medical teachers, to the extent of 30 per cent of the total posts of the department may be appointed to posts other than that of the Director or Head of the Department, who must necessarily hold a recognised medical qualification. (2) Medical men must be registered under the State Central Medical Registration Act and non medical persons must be recognised as teachers with the University before appointments are made permanent. (3) All the teachers in Medical Colleges except Registrars and Demonstrators must possess the requisite post-graduate qualification in their respective subjects. (4) Fifty per cent of the time spent in recognised research under the Indian Council of Medical Research or a University or a Medical College, after obtaining the requisite post graduate qualification be counted towards teaching experience for the post of Lecturer in the same or in allied subject provided that 50 per cent of the teaching experience shall be the regular teaching experience. (5) Equivalent qualification referred to above and in the recommendations below shall be determined by the University of Rajasthan. (6) In case of specialities under Medicine and Surgery the qualifications and experience should also be as scheduled below but in case the host has been advertised and suitable candidates are not available the qualifications can be relaid.” This is followed by a tabular statement headed “Requirements of Special Academic Qualifications and Teaching Experience”. Column 1 of this table deals with the posts, column 2 lays down the academic qualifications and column 3 is about teaching experience. The table has a number of sub-headings according to the various specialities. The speciality of Forensic Medicine is given at p. 168 of the Handbook (1971 Edn.). Column 1 of this table deals with the posts, column 2 lays down the academic qualifications and column 3 is about teaching experience. The table has a number of sub-headings according to the various specialities. The speciality of Forensic Medicine is given at p. 168 of the Handbook (1971 Edn.). The relevant provision regarding “Lecturer in Forensic Medicine” is as follows: (d) Assistant-M.D. (Path), M.D.Two Professor/Lec(Forensic Medicine),years of turer Speciality Board of medico-Pathology (USA), legal M.D./M.R.C.P./F.R.C.P.work (with Diploma D.F.M.), M.R.C.P. (with Forensic Medicine as special subject) or equivalent qualification or post graduate degree or equivalent qualification in Medicine or Surgery 5. On March 3, 1972, the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short, “the Commission”) issued advertisements inviting applications for the recruitment of two Lecturers in Forensic Medicine for Medical Colleges, Medical & Public Health Department in accordance with the Rules. 6. The appellant had, by then, obtained the M.D. degree in Forensic Medicine from the University of Bihar, Muzaffarpur in 1970 and had been functioning as Lecturer in Forensic Medicine in one of the Government Medical Colleges in Rajasthan on a temporary and ad hoc basis from December 31, 1970 onwards. 7. In response to the aforesaid advertisement published by the Commission, the appellant applied for appointment to one of the two posts. However, by the impugned letter (Annexure IV) dated July 21, 1973, issued by the Secretary of the Commission, the appellant was informed that his application for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine was rejected since he did not possess the necessary academic qualification.........” 24. In Dr. B.L. Asawa, it was observed: “8. The short point to be considered is whether the Commission was right in law in excluding the appellant from consideration on the ground that he did not possess the academic qualification prescribed by clause (vii) of Ordinance 65 of the Rajasthan University Ordinances for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine. 9. The qualifications prescribed for the said post by clause (vii) of Ordinance 65 are: “(1) A basic University (degree?) or equivalent qualification entered in Schedules to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. (2) Registration under the State/Central Medical Registration Act. (3) Post-graduate qualification in the concerned subject. (4) Two years' experience of medico-legal work.” 10. 9. The qualifications prescribed for the said post by clause (vii) of Ordinance 65 are: “(1) A basic University (degree?) or equivalent qualification entered in Schedules to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956. (2) Registration under the State/Central Medical Registration Act. (3) Post-graduate qualification in the concerned subject. (4) Two years' experience of medico-legal work.” 10. The appellant is admittedly the holder of the basic degree of MBBS from the Rajasthan University, which is a qualification entered in the First Schedule to the Indian Medical Council Act. It is also not in dispute that he is duly registered under the Medical Registration Act. The sole ground on which the appellant was treated by the Commission as ineligible for consideration was that the post-graduate degree in Forensic Medicine possessed by the appellant is not one awarded by the University of Rajasthan and the said degree has also not been recognised by the University of Rajasthan as an equivalent qualification. 11. The University of Bihar at Muzaffarpur is one duly established by statute and it is fully competent to conduct examinations and award degrees. The degree of Doctor of Medicine (Forensic Medicine) — M.D. (Forensic Medicine) — of the University of Bihar is included in the Schedule to the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 as a degree fully recognised by the Indian Medical Council which is the paramount professional body set up by statute with authority to recognise the medical qualifications granted by any University or Medical Institution in India. A post-graduate medical degree granted by a University duly established by statute in this country and which has also been recognised by the Indian Medical Council by inclusion in the Schedule to the Medical Council Act has ipso facto to be regarded, accepted and treated as valid throughout our country. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, such a degree does not require to be specifically recognised by other Universities in any State in India before it can be accepted as a valid qualification for the purpose of appointment to any post in such a State. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, such a degree does not require to be specifically recognised by other Universities in any State in India before it can be accepted as a valid qualification for the purpose of appointment to any post in such a State. The Division Bench of the High Court was, in our opinion, manifestly in error in thinking that since the post-graduate degree possessed by the appellant was not one obtained from the University of Rajasthan, it could not be treated as a valid qualification for the purpose of recruitment in question in the absence of any specific order by the University of Rajasthan recognising the said degree or declaring it as an equivalent qualification. It is common ground before us that the University of Rajasthan does not conduct post-graduate examinations in the subject of Forensic Medicine and it does not award the degree of M.D. (Forensic Medicine). In order that there should be scope for declaration of “equivalence” of a qualification obtained from another body, there should be a corresponding qualification that can be earned by virtue of passing an examination or test conducted by the concerned University. There can be declaration of equivalence only as between a degree etc. awarded by the concerned University and one obtained from a body different from the concerned University. When the University of Rajasthan does not conduct any examination for the award of the degree of M.D. (Forensic Medicine), there cannot be any question of declaration of “equivalence” in respect of such a degree awarded by any University. Unfortunately, the State Public Service Commission as well as the Division Bench of the High Court failed to notice this crucial aspect. We may also point out that the declaration of “equivalence” referred to in Section 23-A of the Rajasthan University Act as well as in clause (vii) of Ordinance 65 of the Rajasthan University Ordinances can only be in respect of qualifications other than basic or post-graduate degrees awarded by other statutory Indian Universities in the concerned subjects. In the case of a post-graduate degree in the concerned subject awarded by a statutory Indian University, no recognition or declaration of equivalence by any other University is called for. In the case of a post-graduate degree in the concerned subject awarded by a statutory Indian University, no recognition or declaration of equivalence by any other University is called for. This is all the more so in the case of a medical degree — basic as well as post-graduate — that is awarded by a statutory Indian University and which has been specifically recognised by the Indian Medical Council.” (emphasis by Court) 25. Dr. Asawa's case was one related to treating as good eligibility qualification a Postgraduate Degree in a particular branch of medicine, granted by a University, established by statute outside the State of Rajasthan, the degree being duly recognized by the Indian Medical Council under the relevant statute. It was in the context of a degree of this kind relating to a Postgraduate Qualification in medicine earned from a University established by law outside the State, that the holding of the Supreme Court is to be understood. It is a principle to confer universality of status and recognize degrees granted by a University established by law as valid qualification throughout the country. To the understanding of this Court, the principle laid down by their Lordships in Dr. B.L. Asawa does not predicate a rule, where an employer is forbidden from framing rules, classifying certificates of eligibility granted by statutory bodies to be valid for particular posts in their Establishment, if they have been earned in particular subjects or through a particular mode of teaching, such as contact learning. The principle in Dr. Asawa, therefore, cannot be relied upon by the petitioner. 26. The Bench decision of this Court in Gyanendra Kumar Sharma (supra) related to the interpretation of the Government Order dated 10.07.2007, which permitted holders of B.Ed. Degrees to be considered for admission to the Special Basic Training Course, 2007 (for short, 'the Special BTC') conducted by the Government for enhancing the strength of primary teachers in the State. The issue that arose before their Lordships of the Division Bench was if the holders of B.Ed. Degrees through distance education, as distinguished from the conventional method of face-to-face teaching, would also be eligible for admission to the Special BTC, offered by the State Government. The issue that arose before their Lordships of the Division Bench was if the holders of B.Ed. Degrees through distance education, as distinguished from the conventional method of face-to-face teaching, would also be eligible for admission to the Special BTC, offered by the State Government. It appears that the Government Order dated 10.07.2007, through which the Special BTC was created to enhance the number of qualified primary teachers in the State of U.P., prescribed as the eligibility qualification a degree of graduation together with a B.Ed. Degree from a Recognized College/Postgraduate College/Training College run by the State Government/Central Government, which are recognized by the National Council for Teachers Education (for short, 'the NCTE). It further provided that the candidates must be recognized institutional B.Ed. students. The precise words employed in the G.O. in Hindi are mentioned by their Lordships in the report of their decision as: “Anumanya Sansthagat B.Ed. Uttirna Abhyarthi”. The learned Single Judge, before whom the writ petition came up, thought that it was imperative in terms of the G.O. that the B.Ed. Degree earned by a candidate, seeking admission through the Special BTC, should have passed his B.Ed. Examination through contact or face-to-face learning as distinguished from correspondence or Distance Education Mode. Their Lordships of the Division Bench, upon appeal by the unsuccessful writ petitioners, held: “19. As we have referred to the Government Order as well as the advertisement, the word used is “Sansthagat Abhyarthi”. At the highest, it can be read to mean “institutional students” or a “regular students”. However, being the “institutional student” or being a “regular student” does not indicate any method of training. We are concerned with two groups of students, one who have taken their training by what is known as face-to-face method and the others who have taken by the distant education. 20. When the State Government wrote to N.C.T.E. seeking the clearance for the Special B.T.C. Course, it pointed out its difficulties and obtained this special permission to start this course as crash programme so that larger number of teachers become available for Primary Education. Considering these difficulties which have been pointed out by the State Government, the N.C.T.E. granted the approval to the course, which the State Government had proposed. The clarification by the N.C.T.E. later on in its letter dated 9-8-2007, therefore, becomes relevant and cannot be brushed aside. 21. Considering these difficulties which have been pointed out by the State Government, the N.C.T.E. granted the approval to the course, which the State Government had proposed. The clarification by the N.C.T.E. later on in its letter dated 9-8-2007, therefore, becomes relevant and cannot be brushed aside. 21. What we have to keep in mind is as to what was the proposal of the State Government and what was the approval given by the N.C.T.E. In its letter, the N.C.T.E. has itself clarified that it has allowed all B.Ed. graduates for the above course and no difference was made between B.Ed. (face-to-face) and B.Ed. (Distant Mode). 22. Thus as far as the context is concerned, it is clear that it is on this background that large number of teachers have been permitted by the N.C.T.E. for this Special B.T.C. course squarely. 23. In so far as the text of the Government Order as well as the Government advertisement are concerned, they did not specifically provide for any particular mode of training to be the necessary requirement. Nothing prevented the State Government from making such provision when it came with its advertisement or issued the Government Order. 24. It is again material to note that when the Government sent its proposal on the first occasion on 22nd June, 2006, it proposed that those who have done their B.P. Ed., C.P. Ed., and D.P. Ed. be also permitted for this training N.C.T.E. having given the clearance, Government went for excluding these categories. Later on they were permitted under High Court Order. 25. Thus, the intention of the Government was to cover these categories in this course. It is therefore to be seen in the proper perspective. Those who have taken training for physical education are permitted to take this course. Thus if the physical teachers are to be permitted to take this course, there was no reason for exclusion of those who have done the B.Ed. course by a distant mode. It will amount to exclude those who are similarly situated and include those who are dissimilar for the object to be achieved. The interpretation by the Government Council will, therefore, make the Government Order violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We cannot find any such intention of the State Government. course by a distant mode. It will amount to exclude those who are similarly situated and include those who are dissimilar for the object to be achieved. The interpretation by the Government Council will, therefore, make the Government Order violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We cannot find any such intention of the State Government. The correct course is to read it properly and a proper reading of the advertisement and the Government Order is indicative of the fact that it covers the institutional students, or the regular students but there is no special preference for any particular mode of training that they should be the students who have taken face-to-face training. There is no such specific provision nor can it be read by implication.” 27. Now, the Bench decision in Gyanendra Kumar Sharma was about a very special situation, which related to admission to a particular kind of course to equip holders of B.Ed. Degree, otherwise trained teachers, to teach students at the primary level. The permission for the Special BTC, that was provided by the State Government to equip such teachers, had to be approved for the purpose by the NCTE. The NCTE had not made any distinction between holders of a B.Ed. Degree, earning it through contact learning or through the Distance Education Mode for the purpose of being eligible for admission to the Special BTC. Therefore, the condition of eligibility described as recognized institutional B.Ed. students was interpreted by their Lordships, not in the restricted sense of being regular students of a institution learning through contact, but students, who had earned the B.Ed. Degree from a recognized University through any mode, contact or distance. This view was taken, bearing in mind the fact that the course was designed to provide a large number of trained teachers for recruitment at the primary level and the permission granted to the State Government by the NCTE, did not create any classification or lay restriction for eligibility to students alone, who had passed the B.Ed. Course through contact learning. It would also be well to remember that the decision in Gyanendra Kumar Sharma was not about an employer's decision to prescribe qualifications of candidates to be eligible for a post in their Establishment. It was about the eligibility for admission to a Special Course of education, leading to a degree after all, that was in issue. It would also be well to remember that the decision in Gyanendra Kumar Sharma was not about an employer's decision to prescribe qualifications of candidates to be eligible for a post in their Establishment. It was about the eligibility for admission to a Special Course of education, leading to a degree after all, that was in issue. It is quite another matter that the course was designed for recruitment of teachers to teach a particular level of students, that is to say, primary level. Different considerations do certainly apply when it comes to an employer prescribing qualifications of eligibility for candidates, seeking recruitment to a post in their Establishment. The employers certainly have the choice to specify requisite qualifications, that would suit their needs. It is also of seminal importance for a distinguishing feature to notice that Gyanendra Kumar Sharma was not a case, where there was any kind of specific restriction, holding a candidate ineligible, if he had passed his B.Ed. Degree through the Distance Education Mode. Unlike that in the present case, such a restriction is to be eloquently found in the advertisement, mentioning the eligibility qualifications. The decision in Gyanendra Kumar Sharma is, therefore, also of little assistance to the petitioner. 28. The petitioner has placed reliance next on Bhupendra Nath Tripathi (supra). This was again a case relating to qualifications for admission to the Special BTC. The question was if the B.Ed. Course, in addition to Graduation that was necessary, can be insisted upon by the State Government to be one earned from a College, University etc., which was recognized by the NCTE. Put more lucidly, if the demand by the State that the B.Ed. Degree for being eligible to a consideration for admission to the Special BTC, should be one earned from a College, University, duly recognized by the NCTE was valid. The corollary was if a B.Ed. Degree earned from a College, University at a time when the NCTE had not come into existence or if it had, the Institution's application for the recognition of their B.Ed. Course was pending, which was later on granted, would not qualify for a valid candidature for admission to the Special BTC. 29. The State Government had taken a stand that two classes of holders of the B.Ed. Course was pending, which was later on granted, would not qualify for a valid candidature for admission to the Special BTC. 29. The State Government had taken a stand that two classes of holders of the B.Ed. Degree from Universities or other Colleges and Institutions recognized by the UGC, would not be eligible for a consideration for admission to the Special BTC. These two classes were, where the B.Ed. Degree was earned at a time when the NCTE had not come into existence, or earned at a point of time when the NCTE was in existence, but the University or the College's course was not yet approved and an application by the College or the University was pending with the NCTE, that was later on granted. This classification, amongst holders of B.Ed. Degree, where one class would be entitled, was not accepted by this Court. The questions were referred to a Full Bench, yet the State's stand was not accepted about this kind of a classification, amongst holders of the B.Ed. Degree, seeking admission to the Special BTC. The matter was, therefore, taken in appeal to the Supreme Court by special leave at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh The State's stand was repelled and the sub-classification of the holders of B.Ed. Degree into one, who had earned it before coming into existence of the NCTE, or those who had earned it while the University or Institution's application for recognition by the NCTE was pending on one hand, and those who had passed from an Institution, that already had a NCTE recognition on the other, was not accepted by their Lordships in Bhupendra Nath Tripathi, where it was observed: “32. Each of the universities have their own systems and mechanism to grant affiliation to the institutions offering courses at the college/university level and grant of affiliation is never considered to be a matter of course. Universities always ensure maintenance of standards and degrees awarded only after successfully completing the prescribed syllabi and the examinations conducted by the universities. The NCTE Act in no manner makes any distinction between the degrees granted by the universities or authorised bodies recognised by the University Grants Commission prior to the enactment of the Act and the degrees granted by the recognised institutions after the Act has come into force. The NCTE Act in no manner makes any distinction between the degrees granted by the universities or authorised bodies recognised by the University Grants Commission prior to the enactment of the Act and the degrees granted by the recognised institutions after the Act has come into force. The NCTE Act provides for the recognition of the institution offering course or training in teacher education and does not speak about recognition of the degrees granted by the institution prior to the Act coming into force. Thus, degrees granted by the institutions already in existence offering a course or training in teacher education shall be deemed to be on a par with the degrees or certificates granted by the recognised institutions after the commencement of the Act provided those institutions in existence offering the course also received recognition under the Act. 33. In our considered view the State Government cannot make any distinction between the degrees obtained from the existing institutions prior to the Act coming into force but received recognition after the commencement of the Act and the degrees obtained from the recognised institutions after the Act coming into force. It is not shown how such a classification is based on an intelligible differentia and on a rational consideration and further how it bears a nexus to the purpose and object thereof. The impugned action of the State results in the classification or division of members of a homogeneous group and subjecting them to differential treatment without any rhyme or reason. 34. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State however submitted that the State which runs a training course with the approval of NCTE is entitled to prescribe the qualifications for candidates seeking admission to the course so long as the qualifications prescribed are not lower than those prescribed by or under the NCTE Act. The submission was that after the NCTE Act has come into force the State is justified in insisting and prescribing BEd qualification from only such of those institutions recognised by NCTE. Reliance has been placed upon the decisions of this Court in State of A.P. v. Lavu Narendranath [ (1971) 1 SCC 607 : (1971) 3 SCR 699 ] , Preeti Srivastava (Dr.) v. State of M.P. [ (1999) 7 SCC 120 ] and State of T.N. v. S.V. Bratheep [ (2004) 4 SCC 513 ] . 35. Reliance has been placed upon the decisions of this Court in State of A.P. v. Lavu Narendranath [ (1971) 1 SCC 607 : (1971) 3 SCR 699 ] , Preeti Srivastava (Dr.) v. State of M.P. [ (1999) 7 SCC 120 ] and State of T.N. v. S.V. Bratheep [ (2004) 4 SCC 513 ] . 35. the There is no quarrel with the proposition that State in its discretion is entitled to prescribe such qualifications as it may consider appropriate for candidates seeking admission into BTC course so long as the qualifications so prescribed are not lower than those prescribed by or under the NCTE Act. The State can always prescribe higher qualification, but the argument proceeds on the assumption that BEd qualification obtained from only such of those institutions established and recognised by NCTE after the Act coming into force is higher or superior than the BEd qualification obtained from the universities or affiliated colleges duly recognised by the University Grants Commission prior to the Act coming into force. What is the rational basis for such a presumption? None. This fact assumes significance particularly in the light of the fact that all the institutions from where the candidates obtained their BEd qualification have themselves received recognition from the Regional Council after the NCTE Act came into force.” 30. This decision, in the clear opinion of ours, does not at all further the petitioner's case. It proceeds on the principle that a B.Ed. degree earned from a University or an Institution before the NCTE came into existence or at a time when the Institution's application for recognition was still pending, or the Institution later on got recognition, possibly in the case of older degrees, would relate back to validate the B.Ed. Degree. If anything has bearing on the issue here, are the opening remarks of their Lordships in paragraph No.35 of the report that the State have discretion to prescribe such qualifications, as may be considered appropriate for candidates, seeking admission to the BTC Course, so long as the qualifications prescribed are not lower than those prescribed by the NCTE Act. Degree. If anything has bearing on the issue here, are the opening remarks of their Lordships in paragraph No.35 of the report that the State have discretion to prescribe such qualifications, as may be considered appropriate for candidates, seeking admission to the BTC Course, so long as the qualifications prescribed are not lower than those prescribed by the NCTE Act. Here is a case, where a Corporation of the State have prescribed qualifications to be earned through a particular mode, which may not make the holder of a High School Certificate, the possessor of a higher qualification, than the holder of a like certificate, earned through the Distance Education Mode, but the two modes of acquisition of the same qualification are substantially and fundamentally different. One is through contact learning and the other through Distance Education Mode. The principle in Bhupendra Nath Tripathi if at all can be expanded to apply to the present case, the remarks in paragraph No.35 of the report, would endorse the Corporation's freedom to prescribe acquisition of the basic qualification of High School through a particular mode of teaching, that is to say, contact teaching, as distinguished from the Distance Education Mode. 31. Jitendra Kumar Soni (supra) was a reference to a Full Bench in the face of reservations of a learned Single Judge to the opinion of a Division Bench. The learned Single Judge in Jitendra Kumar Soni thought that the Division Bench in Vijay Kumar Kushwaha v. State of U.P. (2003) 3 UPLBEC 2211 went utterly wrong in taking the view their Lordships did. The following questions (as re-framed by the Full Bench) were referred to the Full Bench in Jitendra Kumar Soni: “(a) Whether the degree obtained by a student from an institution/university established by law, situate at a place out side the State of Uttar Pradesh but duly recognized by the N.C.T.E. can be refused acceptance as valid qualification for being admitted to Special B.T.C. Course-2008 by the State? (b) Whether the classification under the Government Order between the degree of B. Ed. obtained from other State being valid for admission to B.T.C. Course-2008, while the degree of C.P. Ed., B.P. Ed. and D.P. Ed. (b) Whether the classification under the Government Order between the degree of B. Ed. obtained from other State being valid for admission to B.T.C. Course-2008, while the degree of C.P. Ed., B.P. Ed. and D.P. Ed. similarly obtained from the institutions situate outside the State of Uttar Pradesh being invalid for considered for admission to B.T.C. Course-2008 is arbitrary and without any reasonable rational and therefore hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India? (c) Whether the Division Bench judgment in the case of Vijay Kumar Kushwaha v. State of U.P. [ (2003) 3 UPLBEC 2211 .], lays down the correct law?” 32. The substance of the issue in Jitendra Kumar Soni was if qualifications, such as LT, B.P. Ed., D.P. Ed. and C.P. Ed. earned from Institutions outside the State of U.P., that had the recognition of the NCTE, could be excluded from consideration for admission to the Special BTC, while recognizing B.Ed. Degrees granted by Institutions outside the State, also approved by the NCTE for the same purpose, without rendering the classification discriminatory. In holding this classification to be unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, their Lordships of the Full Bench observed: “34. We are concerned with answering the questions referred to for our consideration. We have earlier, to some extent, referred to the judgments, both in the case of Upendra Rai (supra) and Vijay Kumar Kushwaha (supra). We propose to re-visit the judgments to find out the ratio of each of the judgments. 35. The challenge in Upendra Rai (supra), as noted, was to the legality of the advertisement dated 28.4.1999 and the Government Circular dated 11.8.1997. In terms of Government Circular dated 11.8.1997, the Government had decided to fill up the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior Basic Schools only from such candidates, who have, according to Rules, 1981, obtained the respective certificates from the Institutions run by the Government of Uttar Pradesh and to rescind with immediate effect the equivalence to BTC granted to other training courses and degrees/diplomas. The issue, therefore, was for filing up of the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior Basic School from the certificate holders mentioned earlier. The issue, therefore, was for filing up of the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior Basic School from the certificate holders mentioned earlier. In paragraph 2 of the judgment, the learned Bench framed the question for consideration, which was, “whether the appellant was eligible for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior Basic Schools run by the Uttar Pradesh Basic Shiksha Parishad”. The entire issue was thereafter considered in that context. No doubt, the learned Division Bench also noted the provisions of the Act, 1993 and observed that if any provision in the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 or rule made thereunder is found to be in conflict with any provision embodied in the aforestated Central Act, the same will have to be discounted to the extent of inconsistency in view of the provisions contained in Article 254 of the Constitution of India. It is in that context, the Court held that the circular and the advertisement insofar as it has the effect of excluding the candidates having teacher qualification obtained from an Institution recognized under the provisions of N.C.T.E. Act are void in view of Article 254 of the Constitution. The Division Bench further held that the appellant was equipped with the requisite qualification for being considered for appointment as Assistant Teacher in Junior Basic School. Therefore, the Court held that the impugned circular and advertisement, which have the effect of excluding the candidature of candidates having obtained teachers education certificate from any Institution recognized under the N.C.T.E. Act, were void being ultra vires the Article 354 of the Constitution. 36. The next judgment is Vijay Kumar Kushwaha (supra). Before the Division Bench, what was under consideration, was the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 27.8.1999 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27948 of 1999. There also, an advertisement was issued permitting only those candidates, who had obtained B. Ed./LT/B.P. Ed./D.P. Ed./C.P. Ed. degrees/certificates from the Institutions situate within the State of Uttar Pradesh, to apply. Before the Division Bench, what was under consideration, was the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 27.8.1999 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 27948 of 1999. There also, an advertisement was issued permitting only those candidates, who had obtained B. Ed./LT/B.P. Ed./D.P. Ed./C.P. Ed. degrees/certificates from the Institutions situate within the State of Uttar Pradesh, to apply. The learned Bench then noted the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents, where it was observed that the Government Order dated 9.1.1998 had already been upheld in the case of Alok Kumar Pandey v. State of U.P., decided on 19.7.1999 (Writ Petition No. 29107 of 1999) and in paragraph 5 of the judgment, without giving any reason merely affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge by holding that the restriction was valid and could not be said to be violative of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The issue of Article 254 of the Constitution was not in issue, nor considered. The judgment of the learned Single Judge, from which the appeal arose, also has given no reasons as to why Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution were not attracted. 37. In Basic Education Board, U.P. (supra) again the issue of appointment of Assistant Master in Junior Basic School. In paragraph 2 of the impugned Circular, it has been said that the appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher in Junior Basic School will be made from the candidates, who have obtained BTC, Hindustani Teaching Certificate, JCT or Certificate of Teaching from the Institutions situate within the State of Uttar Pradesh, as per the Rules, 1981, and other qualification equivalent to BTC be cancelled with immediate effect. Grant of equivalence and/or revocation of equivalence is for the body empowered and normally it would not be interfered with by the Court. The learned Bench, then referred to the N.C.T.E. Act, 1993 and observed that the qualification for appointment as teacher in the ordinary educational institutions like the primary school, cannot be prescribed under the N.C.T.E. Act. 38. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajeshwar Singh (supra) noted the two judgments, Upendra Rai (Supra) and Vijay Kumar Kushwaha, (supra) and observed that the Supreme Court had set aside the judgment of Upendra Rai and upheld the findings in the case of Vijay Kumar Kushwaha (supra). 38. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rajeshwar Singh (supra) noted the two judgments, Upendra Rai (Supra) and Vijay Kumar Kushwaha, (supra) and observed that the Supreme Court had set aside the judgment of Upendra Rai and upheld the findings in the case of Vijay Kumar Kushwaha (supra). We may note that in Basic Education Board, U.P. (supra), neither Upendra Rai (supra) nor Vijay Kumar Kushwaha (supra) were considered, but what was referred to was the judgment of Single Judge in Hiraman (Writ Petition No. 33856 of 1997) and Smt. Karuna Kumari (Writ Petition No. 3218 of 1997). 39. Having considered the aforesaid judgments, the issue as to whether a candidate can be excluded from consideration for admission to the Special B.T.C. Course on the ground that he had obtained degree/diploma/certificate in LT/B.P. Ed./D.P. Ed./C.P. Ed. from an institution recognized by the N.C.T.E. situate outside the State of U.P. was not under consideration, nor in issue in any of the judgments. In all the judgments considered, what was under consideration, was merely an issue in the matter of essential qualification for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher. As we have noted earlier, the essential distinction is (1) appointment to a post under the Rules of 1981, and (2) eligibility for admission to Special BTC course, which may result in a candidate becoming eligible for appointment as an Assistant Teacher by acquiring an essential educational qualification. 40. On behalf of the writ petitioners, learned Counsel had drawn our attention to the judgment in the case of Dr. B.L. Asawa v. State of Rajasthan [ (1982) 2 SCC 55 : AIR 1982 SC 933 . The question before the Supreme Court was whether the Commission was right in law in excluding the appellant from consideration on the ground that he did not possess the academic qualification prescribed by clause (vii) of Ordinance No. 65 of the Rajasthan University Ordinances for the post of Lecturer in Forensic Medicine. The appellant was held to be ineligible by the University, as the Post Graduate Degree in Forensic Medicine possessed by the appellant is not awarded by the University of Rajasthan and the said degree has also not been recognized by the University of Rajasthan as an educational qualification. The appellant was held to be ineligible by the University, as the Post Graduate Degree in Forensic Medicine possessed by the appellant is not awarded by the University of Rajasthan and the said degree has also not been recognized by the University of Rajasthan as an educational qualification. The Supreme Court, after considering this aspect, observed as under: “11………A Post-graduate Medical Degree granted by a University duly established by statute in this country and which has also been recognized by the Indian Medical Council by inclusion to the Schedule of the Medical Council Act has ipso facto to be regarded, accepted and treated as valid throughout our country. In the absence of any express provision to the contrary, such a degree does not require to be specifically recognized by other Universities in any State in India before it can be accepted as a valid qualification for the purpose of appointment to any post in such a state.” 41. Then, following paragraph will also be relevant: “11……… In the case of a Post-graduate degree in the concerned subject awarded by a statutory Indian University, no recognition or declaration of equivalence by any other University is called for. This is all the more so in the case of a medical degree basic as well as Post-graduate that is awarded by a statutory Indian University and which has been specifically recognized by the Indian Medical Council.” 42. Thus, from the judgment of the Supreme Court what follows, is that if a Post-graduate Medical Degree is awarded by the statutory Indian University and it has been specifically recognized by the Indian Medical Council, that is a valid qualification for the purpose of appointment to any post in any part of the country insofar as the academic qualification is concerned. 43. The learned Counsel submitted that considering the provisions of the N.C.T.E. Act, 1993, it is the only authority under that Act that can grant recognition to the Institution for imparting training. The Scheme of the Act would also show that they have power to lay down guidelines in respect of minimum qualifications for a person to be admitted in a teachers training institution as also to ensure planned and co-ordinated development of standard for teacher education and for the purpose of performing its functions under this Act. 44. The Scheme of the Act would also show that they have power to lay down guidelines in respect of minimum qualifications for a person to be admitted in a teachers training institution as also to ensure planned and co-ordinated development of standard for teacher education and for the purpose of performing its functions under this Act. 44. Once that be the case, it must follow the degree/diploma/certificate, if obtained from an institution recognized by the N.C.T.E., may be from the State of Madhya Pradesh, that degree/diploma/certificate would entitle a person, who possesses it, to apply for admission to Special B.T.C. Course or the B.T.C. Course itself. That the Special B.T.C. Course was started for the purpose of filling in the vacancies of teachers, who possess the Special B.T.C. certificate, is irrelevant. 45. We may now answer the reference: (1) In answer to Question No. (a), it is not open to the State or the State authorities to exclude the students, who have obtained degree/diploma/certificate in LT/B.P. Ed./D.P. Ed./C.P. Ed. from Institutions/Universities established by law situate at place outside the State of Uttar Pradesh and duly recognized by the N.C.T.E., from applying either for the Special B.T.C. Course or B.T.C. Course. Any such exclusion is illegal. Question No. (a) is answered, accordingly. (2) Insofar as Question No. (b) is concerned, the classification, if any, is unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. At any rate, the only ground given by the State Government for not putting restriction on B. Ed. degree, and putting restriction on LT/B.P. Ed./D.P. Ed./C.P. Ed., is not sustainable in terms of the rules of N.C.T.E., as the admission can only be based on merit. (3) Insofar as Question No. (c) is concerned, the judgment in Vijay Kumar Kushwaha (supra) did not answer the issue of admission to Special B.T.C. Course, but dealt with the issue of appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher. Even otherwise, considering the findings on question Nos. (a) and (b), we will have to hold that the judgment in Vijay Kumar Kushwaha does not lay down the correct law.” 33. For one, the principle laid down by the Full Bench in Jitendra Kumar Soni is about the binding character of the recognition granted to an Institution, imparting training in teaching. (a) and (b), we will have to hold that the judgment in Vijay Kumar Kushwaha does not lay down the correct law.” 33. For one, the principle laid down by the Full Bench in Jitendra Kumar Soni is about the binding character of the recognition granted to an Institution, imparting training in teaching. It is observed that the NCTE alone have the power to lay down guidelines relating to minimum qualifications for a person to be admitted in a Teachers Training Institution. The corollary of this power vested in the NCTE, that has been acknowledged, is that if an Institution is recognized by the NCTE for imparting training to teachers, the location of the recognized Institution in a different State, would entitle the holder of the degree or diploma from such Institution to apply for admission to another course with a Training Institute or other Special Training Course for teachers, in any other State. Essentially, therefore, the principle laid down in the Full Bench is about the eligibility of diploma/degree holders earned from recognized Institutes outside the State to join the Special BTC of the State of U.P., where the courses outside the State are recognized by the NCTE. The principle rests upon the authority of the NCTE granted to it by a Central Legislation to be the Authority under the NCTE Act, 1993 to lay down guidelines in respect of minimum qualification for a person to be admitted to a Teachers Training Institute. There is no principle laid down by the Full Bench, that may bind the employer to accept as valid qualification, recognized by the NCTE for the purpose of offering employment in their Establishment. The employer can always prescribe higher qualifications, or for valid reason, specify an otherwise equivalent qualification as unacceptable for employment in the Establishment, based on the mode or method of training. The reference in the Full Bench to the case of Dr. Asawa, which though decided on wider ground about qualifications, has been shown earlier in this judgment to be distinguishable on principle, vis-a-vis the issue involved here. For the said reason, the Full Bench in Jitendra Kumar Soni also does not lend support to the petitioner's cause. 34. The Full Bench decision of our Court in Akhtar Ali Ansari was again about the recognition of Degrees granted through off-campus centres by Deemed Universities. For the said reason, the Full Bench in Jitendra Kumar Soni also does not lend support to the petitioner's cause. 34. The Full Bench decision of our Court in Akhtar Ali Ansari was again about the recognition of Degrees granted through off-campus centres by Deemed Universities. There is nothing said on principle in the Full Bench decision that comes close in point like some other decisions too, on which the petitioner has forcefully relied. The Full Bench in Akhtar Ali Ansari does not hold that a certificate recognized by law, granted by a competent Body or Institution through the Distance Education Mode, would have to be imperatively accepted by the employer, even if they have resolved before advertising a particular post that the particular educational qualification or certificate must only be through contact learning and not through Distance Education Mode. The Full Bench decision also, therefore, does not avail the petitioner. 35. Reliance has next been placed by Mr. Ashok Khare upon the decision of this Court in Vikas Yadav (supra), which is a short judgment by esteemed Brother Ashwani Kumar Mishra, which has to be set out for every word of it, because on facts it comes close in point to the issue involved. The observations of his Lordship in Vikas Yadav read: “Petitioner had applied for appointment to the post of Constable pursuant to recruitment exercise initiated in the year 2018. It appears that the petitioner has also been selected but his claim for appointment has not been considered on the ground that his Intermediate certificate issued from National Institute of Open Schooling (N.I.O.S.) is not recognised as equivalent certificate to Intermediate certificates issued by the U.P. Board. Following orders were passed in the matter on 13.8.2019:- "Although it is stated that Intermediate Certificate issued by National Institute of Open Schooling, NOIDA is not recognized but the communications annexed at Page 5 of the counter affidavit appears to suggest otherwise. Learned Standing Counsel is directed to obtain specific instructions from the respondent no.5 by the next date fixed. Post as fresh, once again, on 22nd August, 2019. Learned Standing Counsel is directed to obtain specific instructions from the respondent no.5 by the next date fixed. Post as fresh, once again, on 22nd August, 2019. The counter affidavit, which is alleged to have been filed on 26th July, 2019, would be placed on record." Learned Standing Counsel has obtained instructions from Secretary, Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, Prayagraj, according to which the Intermediate Certificate of N.I.O.S. has been granted recognition by the U.P. Board and that it be treated as equivalent to the Intermediate Certificate issued by the U.P. Board. Copy of the instructions have also been furnished to the counsel for the petitioner. It is also stated that the Board in question is also recognized by the Council of Boards of School Education in India. The instructions of the Secretary concerned is taken on record. Learned Standing Counsel states that in view of the stand taken by the Secretary concerned, the authorities shall consider petitioner's claim for appointment. In the facts and circumstances of the case, noticed above, this petition stands disposed of with a direction upon the respondent no. 4 to examine the petitioner's claim for appointment on the post of Constable. The Intermediate certificate issued by the National Institute of Open Schooling would not be ignored and would be treated as equivalent to the Intermediate Certificate issued by the U.P. Board, in light of the communication received from the Secretary Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, Prayagraj. The required consideration would be made within a period of three months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of this order.” 36. It is true that on facts what has been ordered by his Lordship in Vikas Yadav would bear closely in the petitioner's favour, but as would appear, Vikas Yadav does not lay down any principle, on which the decision turns. It appears to be a direction in the writ petitioner's favour in that case, based upon the facts and circumstances. What is binding as precedent is principle and not the decision rendered in a particular case on facts and circumstances. It appears to be a direction in the writ petitioner's favour in that case, based upon the facts and circumstances. What is binding as precedent is principle and not the decision rendered in a particular case on facts and circumstances. There is no principle laid down in Vikas Yadav, particularly, to the effect that if the Intermediate Certificate issued by the NIOS, has been recognized as equivalent to the Intermediate Certificate by the U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education (for short, 'the U.P. Board'), it would bind the employer to recognize that qualification as equivalent. No doubt, directions were issued to the respondents in that case to consider the petitioner's claim for appointment on the post of Principal, treating his intermediate certificate granted through the NIOS as equivalent to a contact learning certificate, issued by the U.P. Board, but that is a direction issued on facts. It would, therefore, not bind this Court in any manner, either way. 37. The unreported decision of the Patna High Court in Bablu Kumar (supra), relied on behalf of the petitioner, relates to the eligibility for admission to the Bachelor of Pharmacy Course at the Government Pharmacy Institute, Gulzar Bagh, Patna, on the basis of an intermediate education certificate earned from the NIOS. The petitioner was denied admission at the stage of counseling on ground that he had earned his Senior Secondary or Intermediate Certificate from the NIOS. The petitioner was held entitled by the Court observing: “This Court finds it peculiar that the Central Council of the Pharmacy Council of India seeks to raise issues against the Central Government itself. The Director of the National Institute of Open Schooling asserts that it is an institution run under the aegis of the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Education, Government of India. The Pharmacy Council of India says that it will not admit students from the National Open School. The actions of the Pharmacy Council of India when questioned before the Court, the Pharmacy Council of India decides to keep quiet. This Court therefore draws an adverse inference against the Pharmacy Council of India. The Pharmacy Council of India says that it will not admit students from the National Open School. The actions of the Pharmacy Council of India when questioned before the Court, the Pharmacy Council of India decides to keep quiet. This Court therefore draws an adverse inference against the Pharmacy Council of India. This Court holds that the communication dated 17.7.2009 of the Pharmacy Council of India is obviously restricted and confined in its application to those category of National Open School which may fall under the category of an unrecognized and sub standard institution, but not one run under the aegis of the Government of India itself. This Court therefore holds that the communication dated 17.7.2009 of the Pharmacy Council of India has no application to the secondary course run by the National Institute of Open Schooling. It is indeed peculiar to notice as to the manner in which the government institutions appear in conflict with each other, and at the receiving end is the student who has obtained his qualification from a government institution. Had the National Institute of Open School not been run under the aegis of Government of India matters may have been different.” 38. The holding of the Patna High Court in Bablu Kumar is again not an authority for the principle that the employer does not have the choice by express stipulation to exclude from consideration the holder of a certificate of the kind that it has prescribed as essential, but one earned through the NIOS. It is about the entitlement to be admitted to a professional course, where to all seeming, the conditions of eligibility in the brochure, did not curtail the right of students from the NIOS to seek admission to the Pharmacy Course. In case of admissions to courses of study, some different principle may apply, but this Court does not wish to comment on the issue. For the question, that is involved here, is about eligibility for employment in an employer's Establishment; not the right to seek further admission to a particular course on the basis of a certificate earned from the NIOS. 39. For the question, that is involved here, is about eligibility for employment in an employer's Establishment; not the right to seek further admission to a particular course on the basis of a certificate earned from the NIOS. 39. The Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Sidharth Jagdishbhai Panchal (supra), the last to be called in aid on behalf of the petitioner, relates to the eligibility of candidates passing their Secondary School Examination (Class X) from the NIOS for admission to Professional Diploma Courses in the State of Gujarat. It was declined on ground that he had passed his Secondary School Examination from the NIOS, whereas under the Professional Diploma Courses (Regulation of Admission and Payment of Fees) Rules, 2008 (for short, 'the Rules of 2008') framed under the Gujarat Professional Technical Education Colleges or Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Fixation of Fees) Act, 2007 (for short, ‘the Gujarat Act’), ‘qualifying examination’ had been defined under Rule 2(g) read with Rule 5 of the Rules of 2008, which did not specify the NIOS as one of the Boards, from which a candidate could pass the qualifying examination. In deciding the challenge to a denial of the petitioner's right to be admitted to a Diploma Course of the State of Gujarat, their Lordships of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court held: “15. It has not been disputed that CBSE, CISCE, as also NIOS, all Boards have been constituted by the Education Department, Government of India. For all purposes, they are equivalent. It is also not in dispute that there are institutions in the State of Gujarat, including the institution in which the petitioner has studied, which is recognised by the NIOS and certificate is granted by NIOS. Previously, on behalf of the NIOS, CBSE used to grant the certificate and now after the decision of the Central Government, since 2002, it has been granted by NIOS. 16. It is true that the State Government can frame Rules and confine recognition of institution located within the State of Gujarat, though the Board may be located outside the State like CBSE or CISCE. 16. It is true that the State Government can frame Rules and confine recognition of institution located within the State of Gujarat, though the Board may be located outside the State like CBSE or CISCE. If any institution is located outside the State of Gujarat, and if the Board which grants certificate is also located outside Gujarat, it is always open to the State not to allow the students of such institutions for admission in one or the other courses within the State, but it cannot discriminate among two institutions or Board similarly situated. 17. It has already been pointed out that NIOS is constituted by the Central Government. It is also recognised for all purposes by the State of Gujarat, and the centre in which the petitioner was studying is also located in the State of Gujarat. Having noticed the aforesaid facts, the State Government has also accepted to recognize the candidates, who have passed from the institutions situated in the State of Gujarat, and are granted certificate by NIOS for the future academic session 2011-12, but the ground given for not granting such recognition to the students for the academic session 2010-11 is that it will be flooded with applications, cannot be accepted as not allowing such applicants to take part in the selection for admission in the Diploma courses will render the admissions violative of Art.14 of the Constitution, and in such case, Rule 5 may be doubted. 18. In the circumstances, instead of declaring Rule 5 ultravires, we direct the State to make necessary amendment in the Rule as per the stand taken before this Court in its affidavit…...” 40. This decision again is about a very different principle, where legislation restricting admission to certain Institutions on the basis of qualifying examination certificates earned from certain Boards within the State was involved. It concerned almost the vires of a special legislation, bringing in that restriction. Above all, the principle relates to the right of a candidate to be admitted to a professional college, if he has passed his examination from the NIOS, a system managed by the Central Government, but the decision in Sidharth Jagdishbhai Panchal is not about the right of an employer to prescribe qualifications, where the required grade of qualification is restricted to be earned through the conventional method of teaching. Moreover, the decision is about the right to be admitted to an educational institution; not employment. Above all, in Sidharth Jagdishbhai Panchal, there is no issue at all if Distance Education Mode or the NIOS could be differentially treated for the purpose of eligibility qualification, be it for admission or employment. This point was not at all involved in Sidharth Jagdishbhai Panchal. The decision is, therefore, unfortunately of no assistance to the petitioner as well. 41. This Court, upon a consideration of the entire matter, is of opinion that while it is trite principle that degrees, diplomas, certificates issued by Bodies, authorized by statutes to grant them, ought to be honoured for their validity and consequential eligibility in public employment by all Public Bodies, but this general principle propounded in Dr. Asawa's case does not preclude an employer from making a conscious decision to restrict or further specify their requirements for qualifications about the posts, which they intend to fill up, particularly when the decision is taken by the competent Authority to prescribe it by rules. If the competent Authority of the employer by rules or administrative decision making, well ahead of the recruitment prescribes qualifications, not only by the level of the certificate or degree, but the mode or method, by which it is earned from a particular Institution, there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal about it, unless it can be demonstrated to be an utterly arbitrary or discriminatory determination, bearing no reasonable nexus with the object of classification within the specified level of qualifications. For very many reasons, while a certificate earned through the NIOS, may be regarded as valid as one awarded in a conventional system of contact learning for certain employment, the employer may think that a certificate ought to be the result of successful completion of a course through contact learning. This is particularly true of technical posts. 42. The effort of the petitioner has been to the effect that specification or further limitation on qualifications about contact or conventional schooling, may be relevant, as far as the technical certificates, degrees or diplomas are concerned and would not apply to basic schooling certificates. We are afraid that this may not always be so. 42. The effort of the petitioner has been to the effect that specification or further limitation on qualifications about contact or conventional schooling, may be relevant, as far as the technical certificates, degrees or diplomas are concerned and would not apply to basic schooling certificates. We are afraid that this may not always be so. There are certain posts or jobs, which may require, or at least the employer does have the right to think that it requires, as the primary decision maker, training and learning to earn the certificate through contact or face-to-face teaching the conventional way. It would be noticed that the High School Qualification prescribed for Technician Grade-II just does not say a High School Certificate earned from the U.P. Board, but further qualifies it that the course, leading to the certificate of High School, must include the subjects of Science and Mathematics. Though, generally in the High School, these subjects are always taught, sometimes in some special courses, leading to the grant of a High School Certificate, it might not be so. It is for this reason that bearing in mind the nature of the job, the respondents have specified that the candidate ought to have earned his/her High School Certificate with subjects of Science and Mathematics. This specific requirement is based, bearing in mind the requirements of the job of a Technician Grade-II in the Fitter's Trade. If the basic certificate, that is the High School Certificate, has been thought of by the employers to be necessary with the candidate passing his High School Examination with subjects of Science and Mathematics to be part of curriculum, it can well be thought by the employer, for obvious reasons of a thorough training in Science etc., would require candidates, who have gone through a regimen of contact learning as distinguished from the NIOS. This is not to say that the High School Certificate earned through the NIOS is in any way inferior. It is just that an employer, given the nature of a particular job, may insist upon the basic certificate, like others, to be earned through contact learning, instead of the NIOS. This is particularly part of the employer's primary decision making, where in the absence of a plea of discrimination or some serious unconstitutionality being demonstrated, this Court would have little scope to interfere, doing a secondary review of the decision. 43. This is particularly part of the employer's primary decision making, where in the absence of a plea of discrimination or some serious unconstitutionality being demonstrated, this Court would have little scope to interfere, doing a secondary review of the decision. 43. No other point was pressed. 44. This writ petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. 45. There shall be no order as to costs.