ORDER : Prayer: Writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to issue a Writ of Mandamus, forbearing the respondents to evict the petitioner from M/s.SRM Hotels, Kottapattu Village comprised in T.S.Nos.35/1 and 30/4 at Tiruchirappalli except due process of law. 1. The writ petitioner is an incorporated private limited company engaged in hotel business. When the Government of Tamil Nadu invited applications for setting up star and budget accomdation to house delegates attending the 8th World Tamil Conference at Thanjavur in January 1995, the petitioner was one of the applicants. The petitioner was chosen for developing the site comprised in T.S.Nos.35/1 and 36/1 Kottapattu Village. G.O.(Ms)No. 150 Information and Tourism Department dated 10.06.1994 was issued calling upon the Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Tourism Development Corporation Limited to enter into an agreement with the petitioner and hand over the site. Pursuant thereto, lease deed dated 29.03.1996 was entered into between the parties. 2. After the petitioner was given possession of the aforesaid site, they built a four star hotel. The annual lease amount was fixed at Rs.3,85,275/-. It was revisable once in three years. It was to be fixed at 7% of the market value. The lease period was 30 years. Clause 4(c), (d) and (e) of the agreement read as follows: “(c) The lessee shall not be entitled to claim renewal of the lease after the expiration of the lease period stipulated in this lease deed. However, if the government of Tamil Nadu directs the lessor to renew the lease beyond the period of 30 years, the lessor shall abide by it subject to lease amount to be stipulated by the Government, if agreeable to the lessee. (d) After the expiration of the lease the lessee shall surrender possession of the demised premises together with all immovables including superstructure that now exist and also to be constructed by them for the purpose of upgrading to star hotel. (e) The lessee shall claim no title to the superstructure already put up and to be put up by him or claim any compensation at the time of surrendering possession after the expiration of the lease.” The lease period ended on 13.06.2024. During the currency of the lease period, dispute arose as regards the quantum of lease amount. It was subject matter of W.P.(MD)Nos.12709 and 14498 of 2022. It is prensently pending adjudication before the jurisdictional civil court. 3. During the currency of the lease period, dispute arose as regards the quantum of lease amount. It was subject matter of W.P.(MD)Nos.12709 and 14498 of 2022. It is prensently pending adjudication before the jurisdictional civil court. 3. On 14.06.2024, the counsel representing the petitioner requested me to permit him to move this writ petition by way of lunch motion. Permission was granted and the writ petition was taken up in the afternoon. The petitioner's prayer in the writ petition is that the respondents should not evict them except by due process of law. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that possession of the petition-mentioned premises was already taken in the forenoon. Notwithstanding the said submission, I granted interim order and listed the matter for filing counter on 18.06.2024. 4. Counter affidavit was filed by the Tamil Nadu Tourism Development Corportion Limited. The learned Additional Advocate General took me through its contents. He pointed out that the petitioner is in huge arrears. The grievance of the respondents is that the petitioner is paying paltry annual lease rent of Rs.7,00,562/- which was fixed for the block year 2002-2003. The petitioner has no right to squat on the property. The respondents took possession of the premises only after the expiration of the lease period. The petitioner cannot plead contrary to the covenants set out in the lease agreement. The learned Additional Advocate General wanted this Court to dismiss the writ petition. 5. The questions that call for consideration are two fold: (1) Whether the respondents can summarily dispossess the petitioner on the ground that the lease period is over and (2) Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as infructuous since possession was taken by the respondents in the forenoon of 14.06.2024. 6. The first issue is no longer res integra. It was settled by the Constitution Bench decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Bishan Das Vs. State of Punjab ( AIR 1961 SC 1570 ). When the State Government summarily proceeded against certain trust properties built on state land and resumed possession, the Hon'ble Supreme Court characterised the conduct of the State and its officers as destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law and held that the State or its executive officers do not have the right to take the law into their own hands. Lallu Yeshwant Singh Vs. Lallu Yeshwant Singh Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620 is another important decision. It approvingly cited the Privy Council ruling in Midnapur Zamindary Company Ltd. Vs. Kumar Naresh Narayan Roy, 1924 Privy Council 144 in which it was noted that in India, persons are not permitted to take forcible possession and they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. It also approved the judgment rendered in K.K.Verma Vs. Naraindas C.Malkani, AIR 1954 Bom 358 in which Chagla C.J. laid down that a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is still protected by law. 7. In State of U.P Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505 , it was held as follows: “30. A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're- entry' in the lease-deed does not authorise extrajudicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a 'legal pedigree'. In Bishandas v. State of Punjab, [1962] 2 SCR 69 this Court said: “We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order.” “Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law.” 31. Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extra-judicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extra-judicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It cannot resume possession otherwise than in accord- ance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law.” 8. The above decisions were followed and the law reiterated in Annamallai Club Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu, (1997) 3 SCC 169 . It was held therein that the State cannot take unilateral possession without taking recourse to the procedure provided under the statute. The person in juridical possession or settled possession cannot be ejected without recourse to law. In Rame Gowda Vs. Varadappa Naidu, AIR 2004 SC 4609 , the importance of protecting settled possession and the need to take recourse to due process was emphasised. In contrast, there is only one discordant note. Justice Gajendragadkar rendered a contra opinion in State of Orissa Vs. Ram Chandra Dev, AIR 1964 SC 685 . This judgment was termed as per incuriam in Express Newspapers Private Limited Vs. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133 . Sukh Dutt Ratra Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2022) 7 SCC 508 proclaims that it is a cardinal principle of law that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due process of law. 9. The petitioner is not a trespasser. They were given possession by the State. They put up a star hotel. There are a large number of guests. The petitioner has been in possession for 30 years. No doubt, the lease period is over. The State has rejected the petitioner's request for renewal. The stand of the State has been assailed by the petitioner in W.P.(MD)No. 13133 of 2024. In these circumstances, the conduct of the district administration as well as the jurisdictional police in entering the premises and taking possession in the forenoon of 14.06.2024 can only be characterised as height of arbitrariness and illegality. The respondents ought to have followed due process of law. They could not have simply barged in. I answer the first issue in favour of the petitioner. 10. The second question is whether the petition should have been closed as infructuous at the inception by citing the developments that took place in the forenoon of 14.06.2024. The respondents ought to have followed due process of law. They could not have simply barged in. I answer the first issue in favour of the petitioner. 10. The second question is whether the petition should have been closed as infructuous at the inception by citing the developments that took place in the forenoon of 14.06.2024. When once I come to the conclusion that the respondents have acted illegally, it is my duty to put the clock back and restore the status quo ante. On account of the interim order passed by me, the mischief committed by the respondents has been undone. If I close the writ petition as infructuous, it would amount to permitting the respondents to take advantage of their own wrong (Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria – No one can gain advantage by his own wrong). No order of the Court can result in perpetuation of illegality. In Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. AIR 1954 SC 415 , it was held that even if a person was not in lawful possession of goods, the police cannot seize the same except under authority of law and in absence of such authority, the possessor cannot be deprived of his goods. Relief was granted by directing issuance of an appropriate writ for restoration of the goods illegally seized. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act provides for restoration of possession when dispossession of immovable property had taken place otherwise than in due course of law. When the civil court can grant relief under the aforesaid provision, it is idle to contend that the writ court is powerless. The second issue is also answered in favour of the petitioner. 11. The only relief sought by the petitioner is that they should not be dispossessed except by due process of law. I grant it. What is “due process” need not be adumbrated at this stage. It could be invocation of the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1975. It could be institution of suit. I leave that open. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.