JUDGMENT : Pankaj Jain, J. Tenant is in revision aggrieved of order dated 29.05.2024 (Annexure P-7) passed by the Appellate Authority, Gurugram whereby order dated 16.04.2024 (Annexure P-5) passed by Rent Controller, Gurugram stands affirmed in part. 2. Landlord filed eviction petition against the tenant under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short ‘the 1973 Act’) read with 1976 Rules claiming that the respondent was inducted as tenant by his father vide lease deed dated 15.10.2002 for a period of twenty years at a monthly rent of Rs.42,500/- with an escalation clause of 5% per year till the end of 10" year. It was further agreed that the terms of tenancy will be reviewed at the end of 10 years with mutual consent. Eviction has been sought on ground of non-payment of rent. Landlord claimed unpaid rent for the period commencing from 30.06.2020 till 14.10.2022. The eviction petition was filed in November, 2022. 3 Tenant filed written statement. Rent Controller vide order dated 16.04.2024 assessed the arrears of rent till April 2024 including the rent pendent lite i.e. for the period from November, 2022 to April 2024. The Rent Controller found that the tenant was required to pay an amount of Rs.26,15,000/- which included arrears of rent, interest and cost. The tenant was directed to tender rent on or before 01.05.2024. 4 Tenant preferred appeal. Appellate Authority found that there was a miscalculation and corrected the arithmetic error holding the tenant liable to pay an amount of Rs.24,04,066/-. 5. Learned Senior counsel for the tenant has assailed the impugned order claiming that the authorities below have gone beyond the prayer made in the eviction petition. 6. Mr. Sunil Chadha, Senior Advocate submits that from eviction petition it is evident that the rent claimed was only for the period commencing from 30.06.2020 till 14.10.2022. It has been contended that as per settled law, authorities cannot travel beyond the prayer. Thus the rent pendent lite assessed by the Rent Controller and affirmed by the Appellate Authority cannot be sustained. 7. He also submits that as per the case pleaded by the landlord, lease deed stands terminated on 27.07.2022 and thus the landlord is not entitled for rent thereafter. He can only claim mesne profit. He further submits that landlord himself has filed application for fixation of fair rent. 7. He also submits that as per the case pleaded by the landlord, lease deed stands terminated on 27.07.2022 and thus the landlord is not entitled for rent thereafter. He can only claim mesne profit. He further submits that landlord himself has filed application for fixation of fair rent. Till the said application is decided the petitioner cannot be asked to tender rent. 8. In order to substantiate his contentions, learned senior counsel has relied upon Dr. N.K. Sood Vs. Smt. Tara Wati & anr., 1992(1) RCR (Rent) 55, Sunder Krishan Vs. Murari Lal, 2003(1) RCR (Rent) 239, Sat Pal Vs. Kesar Singh, 1968 PLR 834, Neera Chadha Vs. Smt. Pardeep Kaur @ Pooja, 2021 (1) RCR (Rent) 366 and Shrimati Manjit Kaur Vs. Rajinder Singh Doctor & sons, 1977 PLR 707 . 9. Per contra, Mr. Amit Jain, Advocate appearing for the landlord submits that it is not in dispute that the petitioner-tenant is still in possession of the demised premises. It is also admitted that the tenant has not paid rent during the pendency of the eviction petition. Thus Rent Controller has rightly assessed the provisional rent including the rent pendent lite and directed the tenant-petitioner to tender the same. He further refers to definition of tenant as enumerated under Section 2(h) of the 1973 Act to submit that the determination of lease would not absolve petitioner of his liability to pay rent. Even after termination of tenancy a tenant in possession of the suit property remains a tenant until he is ordered to be evicted. He further submits that precise issue came up for consideration before Coordinate Bench of this Court in M/s Queen Distillers and Bottlers Pvt. Ltd. Works Vs. M/s Kuldip Industrial Corporation and others, 2024(2) RCR (Rent) 185 and M/s Ghar Shingar Paints and others Vs. Parminder Kaur, passed in CR No.4826 of 2022 decided on 29.10.2022 wherein this Court held that the Rent Controller did not commit any illegality in assessing the rent pendent lite while assessing the provisional rent. He further relies upon Rakesh Wadhawan Vs. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation, 2002 AIR (Supreme Court) 2004, Sat Pal (supra) and Sunder Krishan (supra). 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through records of the case. 11. He further relies upon Rakesh Wadhawan Vs. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation, 2002 AIR (Supreme Court) 2004, Sat Pal (supra) and Sunder Krishan (supra). 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully gone through records of the case. 11. The primary issue that arises for the consideration of this Court is :- “Whether Rent Controller while assessing provisional rent under The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 is precluded from assessing rent pendent lite?” 12. ‘Pay and stay’ is the principle that forms life blood of all laws related to tenancy. The State Rent Statutes including the 1973 Act are manifestation of the said rule. The relationship of landlord-tenant is in nature of reciprocatory promise. Tenant pays for staying in a property of landlord with his permission. State legislations including 1973 Act have been enacted to control increase of rent of buildings and rented lands situated within urban areas. Section 2 (h), Section 6A and Section 13(2) of the 1973 Act read as under:- Section 2(h) “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy and in the event of such person’s death, such of his heirs as are mentioned in the Schedule appended to this Act and who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rental land by its tenant, except with the written consent of the landlord, or person to whom the collection of rent or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter-house or of rents for shops has been framed out, or leased by a municipal town or notified area committee; Section 6A. Deposit of rent.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, if a landlord refuses to receive, or grant a receipt for, any rent payable in respect of the building or rented land when tendered to him by a tenant, the tenant may apply to the Controller for leave to deposit, the rent in his office, and the Controller shall receive the deposit, if after examining the applicant, he is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for the application and if the applicant pays the fee, if any, chargeable for the issue of the notice hereinafter provided. (2) When a deposit has been received under sub-section (1), it shall be deemed to be a payment made by the tenant, to his landlord in respect of the rent due. (3) On receiving the deposit, the Controller shall give notice of the receipt thereof to the landlord and shall pay the amount thereof to him. Section 13(2) (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller, for a direction in that behalf. (3) On receiving the deposit, the Controller shall give notice of the receipt thereof to the landlord and shall pay the amount thereof to him. Section 13(2) (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller, for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied,-- (i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable: Provided that if the tenant, within a period of fifteen days of the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service, pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest, to be calculated by the Controller, at eight per centum per annum on such arrears together with such costs of the application, if any, as may be allowed by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid: Provided further that the landlord shall not be entitled to claim arrears of rent for a period exceeding three years immediately preceding the date of application under the provisions of this Act; (ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of the 1949 Act without the written consent of the landlord,-- (a) transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or rented land or any portion thereof, or (b) used the building or rented land for a purpose other than that for which it was leased; (iii) that the tenant has committed or caused to be committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land; (iv) that the tenant has been guilty of such acts and conduct as are a nuisance to the occupants of the same building or buildings in the neighbourhood; (v) that where the building is situated in a place other than a hill station, the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous, period of four months without reasonable cause; the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate. 13.Explaining difference between statutory tenancy and the in contractual tenancy 7 Judges in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, 1979(2) RCR 352 (SC) : 1980(1) SCR 334 observed as under :- 7. Without adverting to the effect and the details of waiver of forfeiture, waiver of notice to quit, relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent, etc. as provided for in Sections 112 to 114A of the Transfer of Property Act, suffice it to say that under the said Act no ground of eviction of a tenant has to be made out once a contractual tenancy is put to an end by service of a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Until and unless the lease is determined, the lessee is entitled to continue in possession. Once it is determined it becomes open to the lessor to enforce his right of recovery of possession of the property against him. In such a situation it was plain and clear that if the lease of the immovable property did not stand determined under any of the clauses (a) to (g) of Section 111, a notice to determine it under Section 106 was necessary. But when under the various State Rent Acts, either in one language or the other, it has been provided that a tenant can be evicted on the grounds mentioned in certain sections of the said Acts, then how does the question of determination of a tenancy by notice arise ? If the State Rent Act requires the giving of a particular type of notice in order to get a particular kind of relief, such a notice will have to be given. Or, it may be, that a landlord will be well advised by way of abundant precaution and in order to lend additional support to this case, to give a notice to his tenant intimating that he intended to file a suit against him for his eviction on the ground mentioned in the notice. But that is not to say that such a notice is compulsory or obligatory or that it must fulfill all the technical requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Once the liability to be evicted is incurred by the tenant, he cannot turn round and say that the contractual lease has not been determined. But that is not to say that such a notice is compulsory or obligatory or that it must fulfill all the technical requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Once the liability to be evicted is incurred by the tenant, he cannot turn round and say that the contractual lease has not been determined. The action of the landlord in instituting a suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in any State Rent Act will be tantamount to an expression of his intention that he does not want the tenant to continue as his lessee and the jural relationship of lessor and lessee will come to an end on the passing of an order or a decree for eviction. Until then, under the extended definition of the word ‘tenant’ under the various State Rent Acts, the tenant continues to be a tenant even though the contractual tenancy has been determined by giving of a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In many cases the distinction between a contractual tenant and a statutory tenant was alluded to for the purpose of elucidating some particular aspects which cropped up in a particular case. That led to the criticism of that expression in some of the decisions. Without detaining ourselves on this aspect of the matter by any elaborate discussion, in our opinion it will suffice to say that the various State Rent Control Acts make a serious encroachment in the field of freedom of contract. It does not permit the landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by his act of serving a notice to quit on him. In spite of the notice, the law says that he continues to be a tenant and he does so enjoying all the rights of a lessee and is at the same time deemed to be under all the liabilities such as payment of rent, etc. in accordance with the law. 14. The aforesaid observation the tenant enjoying protection under the statute does not lose his right to continue in possession merely on termination of contractual tenancy, will hold good for his liability to pay rent as well. Thus the contention raised by Mr. Chadha, Senior Advocate with respect to right of the tenant not to pay rent on account of expiry/termination of lease deed sans merit and the same is rejected. Thus the contention raised by Mr. Chadha, Senior Advocate with respect to right of the tenant not to pay rent on account of expiry/termination of lease deed sans merit and the same is rejected. Rather Section 6(A) of the 1973 Act which was introduced by way of amendment in 1978 makes it clear that even when the landlord refuses to receive rent the tenant can apply to the Controller to pay rent. 15. Section 13 of the 1973 Act deals with eviction of tenants. Section 13 (1) of the 1973 Act provides that a tenant in possession of a building or a rented land shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 of the 1973 Act. As per Section 13(2) of the 1973 Act the first and foremost ground on which the landlord is entitled to seek eviction of the tenant is ‘non-payment of rent’. The principal provision provides for non-payment of rent as the ground for eviction. Proviso appended thereto grants protection to the tenant subject to payment of arrears of rent along with interest and cost. The prime objective of the proviso was spelled out by Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa Devi Vs. Milkhi Ram (1990) 2 SCC 134 with the following observations :- “21. The apparent purpose of the proviso was to relieve the defaulting tenant from extreme penalty of eviction. There cannot be any doubt on this purpose. The provision seems to be analogous to Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1892 which confers discretion to the Court to grant relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent. But the proviso goes a step further and leaves no such discretion to the controller or court even if the tenant is a constant defaulter. If the arrears and other amounts specified are paid or tendered on the first date of hearing, the default as a ground for eviction disappears and the Controller is precluded from passing a decree for eviction. The governing principle of the proviso is that the tenant could pay and stay in an action for eviction on default. At the same time, the landlord is ensured payment of arrears, interest and the costs that he has incurred without the necessity of going to civil court to recover it. The governing principle of the proviso is that the tenant could pay and stay in an action for eviction on default. At the same time, the landlord is ensured payment of arrears, interest and the costs that he has incurred without the necessity of going to civil court to recover it. This seems to be the will and intention of the legislature in the shape and scope or’ the proviso.” 16. Different expressions have been used in Principal provision of Section 13(2) (i) of the 1973 Act and the proviso appended thereto. The provision provides for expression ‘the rent due’ whereas the proviso contemplates ‘arrears of rent’. The object of the provision is not only to protect tenant from being exploited at the hands of a trumped-up landlord but also to put a check on an unscrupulous tenant who intends to protect his possession without paying rent. The aforesaid provision was interpreted by Division Bench of this Court in Isher Dass Tara Chand Vs. Harcharan Dass, passed in Civil Revision No.318 of 1954 decided on 30.08.1960. The Division Bench held as under :- xxx xxx, under the East Punjab Urban Rent-Restriction Act, the arrears of rent are required to be paid by the first hearing of the application and no Court has any power to extend that period. The object of the proviso, under consideration seems to be to save a tenant, from the consequences of non-payment, which may sometimes be due to the misconduct of the landlord himself in avoiding the acceptance of payment so as to create a ground for forfeiture and not on account of any deliberate default on the part of the tenant. In these circumstances, it will be unreasonable to insist upon the tenant pay- ing the rent calculated right up to the date of the first hearing notwithstanding that the rent for the month, in which the first hearing occurs may not have yet fallen due. In view of all that has been said above, I have no hesitation in respectfully agreeing with the view taken in Basant Ram v. Gurcharan Singh and an- other,. In view of all that has been said above, I have no hesitation in respectfully agreeing with the view taken in Basant Ram v. Gurcharan Singh and an- other,. In my opinion the rent which a tenant is required to pay under the proviso to clause (i) to sub-section 2 to section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent-Restriction Act, to save himself from forfeiture of the tenancy, is the rent due from him and remaining unpaid on the date of the application and not on the date of first hearing.__” The Division Bench was interpreting the provisions as contained under Section 13 of the 1949 Act which are pari materia to the provision under consideration in instant revision. 17. The aforesaid interpretation continued to hold good till Section 13(2) of the 1949 Act was expanded by supplying casus-omissus by the Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Wadhawan (supra). Finding that provision suffered from gaps that need to be filled, the Supreme Court observed as under -- “14. The expression employed is ‘the rent due’. A Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab in Rullia Ram Hakim Rai v. S. Fateh Singh S. Sham Sher Singh, AIR 1962 Punjab 256, has taken the view that the expression ‘rent due’ in contradistinction with the words ‘rent legally due’ or ‘rent recoverable’ or the ‘arrears of rent within the period of limitation’ implies that the obligation of the tenant to pay or tender the rent extends to depositing all the arrears of rent without regard to the period of limitation. This view finds support from a decision of this Court in Khadi Gram Udyog Trust Vs. Shri Ram Chandraji Mandir, 1978 (1) SCC 44 , wherein, interpreting the pari materia provision contained in the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, this Court has held that the expression “entire amount of rent due” includes the rent the recovery whereof has become barred by time, for, the statute of limitation bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right. The learned counsel for the tenants conceded during the course of hearing that on the present framing of the provision under examination, the obligation of the tenant to pay or tender even time barred rent, to take advantage of the proviso, cannot be denied.” 18. The Supreme Court further concluded as under :- 30. The learned counsel for the tenants conceded during the course of hearing that on the present framing of the provision under examination, the obligation of the tenant to pay or tender even time barred rent, to take advantage of the proviso, cannot be denied.” 18. The Supreme Court further concluded as under :- 30. To sum up, our conclusions are: 1. In Section 13(2) (i) proviso, the words ‘assessed by the Controller’ qualify not merely the words ‘the cost of application’ but the entire preceding part of the sentence i.e. ‘the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application’. 2. The proviso to Section 13(2)(i) of East Punjab Urban Restriction Act, 1949 casts an obligation on the Controller to make an assessment of (i) arrears of rent (ii) the interest on such arrears, and (iii) the cost of application and then quantify by way of an interim or provisional order the amount which the tenant must pay or tender on the ‘first date of hearing’ after the passing of such order of ‘assessment’ by the Controller so as to satisfy the requirement of the proviso. 3. Of necessity, ‘the date of first hearing of the application’ would mean the date falling after the date of such order by Controller. 4. On the failure of the tenant to comply, nothing remains to be done and an order for eviction shall follow. If the tenant makes compliance, the inquiry shall continue for finally adjudicating upon the dispute as to the arrears of rent in the light of the contending pleas raised by the landlord and the tenant before the Controller. 5. If the final adjudication by the Controller be at variance with his interim or provisional order passed under the proviso, one of the following two orders may be made depending on the facts situation of a given case. If the amount deposited by the tenant is found to be in excess, the Controller may direct a refund. If, on the other hand, the amount deposited by the tenant is found to be short or deficient, the Controller may pass a conditional order directing tenant to place the landlord in possession of the premises by giving a reasonable time to the tenant for paying or tendering the deficit amount, failing which alone he shall be liable to be evicted. Compliance shall save him from eviction. 6. While exercising discretion for affording the tenant an opportunity of making good the deficit, one of the relevant factors to be taken into consideration by the Controller would be, whether the tenant has paid or tendered with substantial regularity the rent falling due month by month during the pendency of the proceedings. ‘emphasis supplied’ 19. Judgments relied upon by Mr. Chadha, Sr. Advocate in the case of Dr. N.K. Sood (supra), Sat Pal (supra) and in the case of Shrimati Manjit Kaur (supra) relate to pre Rakesh Wadhawan (supra) era and are thus not applicable to the present case. Faced with the situation, Mr. Chadha, Sr. Advocate by relying upon Neera Chadha (supra) submits that each default by a tenant in payment of rent gives the landlord a fresh cause of action to seek his eviction. He thus submits that for default by a tenant qua rent pendent lite beyond the rent claimed in the eviction petition, the landlord has to file fresh eviction petition. The argument raised by Mr. Chadha, Sr. Advocate to be understood by illustration is that where a landlord is before Rent Controller seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent say upto 31.03.2024 and the provisional rent is assessed by the Rent Controller in the month of July, 2024 the tenant can be held to be in arrears of rent only upto 31.03.2024 and not beyond that. The contention if accepted shall lead to absurd results. Trite it is that the law cannot be read to render it absurd. 20. Supreme Court in Pushpa Devi (supra) observed as under :- “20. Great artistry on the Bench as elsewhere is, therefore, needed before we accept, reject or modify any theory or principle. Law as creative response should be so interpreted to meet the different fact situations corning before the court. For, Acts of Parliament were not drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. It is not possible for the legislators to foresee the manifold sets of facts and controversies which may arise while giving effect to a particular provision. Indeed, the legislators do not deal with the specific controversies. When conflicting interests arise or defect appears from the language of the statute, the Court by consideration of the legislative intent must supplement the written word with ‘force and life’. Indeed, the legislators do not deal with the specific controversies. When conflicting interests arise or defect appears from the language of the statute, the Court by consideration of the legislative intent must supplement the written word with ‘force and life’. See, the observation of Lord Denning in Seaford Estate Ltd. v. Asher, [1949] 2 KB 481 at 498.” 21. Lord Green M.R. in Grundt Vs. Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd. (1948) 1 All ER 21 observed as under “Absurdity, like public policy, is a very unruly horse........ that although the absurdity or the non-absurdity of one conclusion as compared with another may be, and very often is, of assistance to the Court in choosing between two possible meanings of ambiguous words, it is a doctrine which has to be applied with very great care, remembering that Judges may be fallible in this question of an absurdity, and in any event it must not be applied so as to result in twisting language into a meaning which it cannot bear. It is a doctrine which must not be used to rewrite the language in a way different from that in which it was originally framed.” 48. Similarly Crawford on Statutory Construction. Article 177, pp. 286-289 has observed: “A thing which is within the letter of statute is not within the statute unless it be within the intent of the legislature. It is a rule of statutory construction that if a too liberal adherence to the words of an enactment appears to produce an absurdity or an injustice, it will be the duty of a Court of construction to adopt a construction not quite, strictly grammatical.” 49. So also has Lord Lindley in The Duke of Buccleuch, (1889) 15 PD 86; in Appeal Eastern S.S. Co. Ltd. v. Smith, ‘The Duke of Buccleuch’, 1891 AC 310 observed: “You are not so to construe the Act of Parliament as to reduce it to rank absurdity. You are not to attribute to general language used by the legislature in this case, any more than in any other case, a meaning which would not can out its object, but produce consequences which, to the ordinary intelligence, are absurd. You are not to attribute to general language used by the legislature in this case, any more than in any other case, a meaning which would not can out its object, but produce consequences which, to the ordinary intelligence, are absurd. You must give it such a meaning as will carry out its object.” “If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.” (Vide 1940 AC 1014, 1022). “A construction from which one’s judgment recoils cannot be a true construction of a statute.” (Per Lord Coleridge, C.J., R. v. Clarence, (1888) 22 QBD 23). 50. The same is the principle laid down in Ramaswamy Nadar v. State of Madras, AIR 1958 SC 56 wherein it has been held: “If in construing the section, the Court has to supply some words in order to make the meaning of the statute clear, it will naturally prefer the construction which is more in consonance with reason and justice.” 22. Though at the time of filing of the petition seeking eviction of the tenant for non-payment of rent, landlord cannot claim future rent but the liability of the tenant to pay rent is recurring and continues till he enjoys possession. It is for this reason that the legislature in its own wisdom has used different expressions. The landlord claims ‘rent due’ but the tenant is liable to tender ‘arrears of rent’. Though apparently the expressions seem to be conveying the same meaning, but these are different expressions comprising different words. Trite it is where in relation to same subject matter, same words are used in the same statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. Reference can be made to observations made by Supreme Court in the case of The Member, Board of Revenue Vs. Arthur Paul Benthall, 1956 AIR Supreme Court 35. 23. I may add here that, Under Section 23 of the 1973 Act, State Government has been empowered to make rules to carry out all or any of the purposes of the Act. State of Haryana framed Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1976. Arthur Paul Benthall, 1956 AIR Supreme Court 35. 23. I may add here that, Under Section 23 of the 1973 Act, State Government has been empowered to make rules to carry out all or any of the purposes of the Act. State of Haryana framed Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1976. Rule 7 thereof reads as under :- “7. Procedure to be adopted by Controller [Section 23].- (1) When an application under the Act is presented to the Controller he shall fix the date, time and place at which the enquiry in respect of the application will be held and send a notice along with a copy of the application to each respondent in Form ‘A’ appended to these rules. (2) The Controller shall give to the parties, a reasonable opportunity to state their case. He shall also record the evidence of the parties and witnesses examined on either side and in doing so and in fixing dates for the hearing of parties and their witnesses, in adjourning proceedings and dismissing application for default or for other sufficient reasons, the Controller shall be guided by the principles of the procedure as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure.” 24. Thus as per the Rule 7 of 1976 Rules, principles of procedure laid down in Civil Procedure, 1908 have been prescribed as a guide to Rent Controller. State of Haryana vide Gazette notification dated 13.05.1991 amended CPC by incorporating Order XV Rule 5 which reads as under :- “5, Striking off defence for failure to deposit admitted rent. (1) In any suit by a lessor for the eviction of a lessee after the determination of his lease and for the recovery from him of rent or compensation for use and occupation, the defendant shall, at or before the first hearing of the suit, deposit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent. per annum and whether or not he admits any amount to be due, he shall throughout the continuation of the suit regularly deposit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual, and in the event of any default in making the deposit of the entire amount admitted by him to be due or monthly amount due as aforesaid, the Court may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) strike off his defence.” (2) Before making an order for striking off defence, that Court may consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf provided such representation is made within 10 days of the first hearing or, of the expiry of the week referred to in sub- section (1) as the case may be. (3) The amount deposited under this rule may at any time be withdrawn by the plaintiff: Provided that such withdrawal shall not have the effect of prejudicing any claim by the plaintiff disputing the correctness of the amount deposited: Provided further that if the amount deposited includes any sums claimed by the depositor to be deductible or any account, the Court may require the plaintiff to furnish the security for such sum before he is allowed to withdraw the same.” 25. In view of aforesaid provision, also a duty is casted upon the lessee to pay monthly rent during the pendency of the petition. 26. Once the dispute between landlord and tenant spills on the floor of the Courts, either landlord stops accepting the rent or the tenant stops paying it. Section 6(A) of the 1973 Act contemplates such situation and saves tenant from ending up paying interest and costs apart from saving him from eviction proceedings. So far as landlord is concerned, to get rid of a bad tenant, he is required to file a fresh eviction petition. Once the provisional rent is tendered, the recalcitrant tenant often protracts the litigation enjoying possession without paying rent. In such situation landlord is forced either to file another eviction petition for non-payment of rent or to await the result of the first eviction petition. Once tenant is ordered to be evicted on a ground other than the non-payment of rent, the unpaid arrears of rent pendent lite becomes a tool in hands of tenant enhancing his bargaining power. The interpretation of law as suggested by Mr. Once tenant is ordered to be evicted on a ground other than the non-payment of rent, the unpaid arrears of rent pendent lite becomes a tool in hands of tenant enhancing his bargaining power. The interpretation of law as suggested by Mr. Chadha, Senior counsel representing the tenant not only breeds unfairness but also leads to filing of successive eviction petitions thereby clogging the whole system. 27. Observation made by Supreme Court Rakesh Wadhawan’s case ibid with respect to the conduct of the tenant in paying rent regularly following due month by month during the pendency of the proceedings being a consideration serves as a sufficient guide to this Court. Thus, while assessing provisional rent, Rent Controller is within its power not merely to go by the rent claimed in the eviction petition but also to consider that the rent is paid during the pendency of proceedings. 28. In view thereof this Court finds that the Rent Controller rightly assessed the provisional rent pendent lite and there is no legal infirmity in doing so. 29. The argument with respect to pendency of the application seeking fixation of fair rent is also misplaced. The instant petition is for assessment of the provisional rent. The tenant as well as the landlord is within their right to get set off at the time of final adjudication. Thus, pendency of an application seeking fixation of fair rent has no bearing on the assessment of provisional rent and tender thereof. 30. In view of above, finding no merits in the present case, the revision petition is ordered to be dismissed. The petitioner-tenant is granted four weeks time from today to tender the provisional rent as assessed by the Appellate Authority/Rent Controller.