JUDGMENT : This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short ‘the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellants/defendants challenging the Decree and Judgment, dated 31.07.2000, in O.S. No.4 of 1999 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narsipatnam [for short ‘the trial Court’]. The Respondents herein are the plaintiffs in the said Suit. 2. The respondents/plaintiffs filed the Suit in O.S.No.4 of 1999 for partition of ABC schedule properties into 12 equal shares and to allot seven such shares to the plaintiffs and put them in possession of such 7 shares and for grant of future profits and for costs. 3. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments of the plaint, in O.S. No.4 of 1999, are as under: Late Kolli Kannamanaidu, undivided son of the defendants 1 and 2, married the first plaintiff about 10 years back at Kotha Thutipala as per Hindu Law and caste custom, immediately after marriage, the marriage was consummated and since then the first plaintiff lived with her husband and lead marital life till about 7 years. The defendants 1 and 2, the fourth defendant i.e., daughter of defendants 1 and 2, the third defendant i.e., son of fourth defendant, the father of third defendant and the father’s mother of third defendant were living along with the first plaintiff and her husband. The first plaintiff and her husband lead married life amicably for about 2 or 3 years, during their wedlock the second plaintiff born to the first plaintiff through her husband Kannamanaidu. Later the defendants 1 and 2 and the parents of third defendant started to ill-treat the plaintiffs by not providing proper food and clothing. The first plaintiff came to know that her husband was having illicit intimacy with one Lakshmi, daughter of Seelamreddi Rajulu of Thutipala. With the instigation of said Lakshmi and the defendants 1 and 2 and the parents of third defendant, the husband of first plaintiff drove away the first plaintiff from his house, after driven away the first plaintiff, her husband brought the said Lakshmi into his own house and began to live with her. ii) The husband of first plaintiff died on 30.05.1987. The second plaintiff is his unmarried daughter. ii) The husband of first plaintiff died on 30.05.1987. The second plaintiff is his unmarried daughter. She acquired right by birth in all the properties of her father and she is also a coparcener in the joint family as per Section 29-A of Hindu Succession Act. The properties of late Kannamanaidu devolved on the plaintiffs and the second defendant. Late Kannamanaidu died in an undivided status with the second plaintiff and the first defendant. iii) During the pendency of the suit, the first defendant died intestate leaving behind the plaintiffs and the defendants 2 and 4 respectively. The plaintiffs do not wish to keep the properties described in A to C schedules joint with the defendants 2 and 4, so the plaintiffs filed the suit for partition of the described properties into 12 equal shares and to recover 7 shares from defendants 2 and 4 and for future profits. 5. The first defendant filed a written statement, which was adopted by the defendants 2 and 3, by denying all the averments mentioned in the plaint and further contended as under: - The first plaintiff’s husband died after executing a will dated 20.05.1987 bequeathing his share of properties. The survey numbers and patta numbers given in plaint A schedule are incorrect in several aspects. So far as plaint B schedule is concerned item No.1 belongs to the family of first defendant and his late son, item No.2 belongs to Marri Appalanaidu, so also item No.3 belongs to Gavireddi Nookaraju. The plaintiffs are not entitled to claim partition of plaint ABC schedule properties. The plaintiffs never demanded for partition and they are not entitled to the costs of the suit. 6. The fifth defendant filed a written statement by denying all the averments mentioned in the plaint and further contended as under: - The first and second defendants have taken the fifth defendant as adopted son and the adoption deed was also got registered on 30.12.1988 and the defendants 1 and 2 also made arrangement by executing a registered will dated 28.02.1997 in favour of the fifth defendant bequeathing the schedule property and he also adopting the written statement filed by the first defendant and he prayed to dismiss the suit with costs. 7. The first defendant fled additional written statement and the same was adopted by the defendants 2 and 3. 7. The first defendant fled additional written statement and the same was adopted by the defendants 2 and 3. The brief averments of the additional written statement filed by the first defendant are as under: The movables added to the plaint C schedule by way of amendment does not belong to the husband of the first plaintiff. Therefore, those properties were not originally included in the plaint C schedule and the first plaintiff’s husband executed a will dated 20.05.1987 and the plaintiffs have no right to claim any share in the properties under law and he prayed for dismissal of the suit. 8. The fifth defendant fled additional written statement. The brief averments of the additional written statement filed by the fifth defendant are as under: In view of the registered will said to have been executed by the first defendant in favour of the fifth defendant and in view of the registered adoption deed, the plaintiffs are not entitled any share in the plaint schedule property. Appellants 1 and 2 died, fourth appellant also died. L.R.s of fourth appellant are added as appellant Nos.6 to 8 in addition to third appellant. Third appellant is the son of fourth appellant. Appellants 6 to 8 are daughters of fourth appellant. 9. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to claim partition? (ii) Whether the will dated 29.05.1987 executed by Kannamnaidu is true, valid and binding on plaintiffs and defendants? (iii) Whether items 2 to 8, 14, 16 and 17 of Lot-I of A schedule and items 2, 4 to 6 and 8 of Lot-II do belong to first plaintiff’s husband and the first defendant? (iv) Whether the Court Fee provision and the Court fee paid on the plaint are not proper? (v) Whether the suit schedule is not correct? (vi) Whether the B schedule houses belong to persons mentioned in para 7 of the written statement? (vii) Whether C-Schedule is not in existence, as pleaded by defendants? (viii) Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to future mesne profits? (ix) Whether the pledged gold ornaments do not belong to first plaintiff’s husband? (x) Whether the plaint C-schedule movables are true, and whether they exist? (xi) To what relief? ADDITIONAL ISSUES FRAMED ON 01.07.1996 (i) Whether the claim in respect of the amended C-Schedule is barred by limitation? (viii) Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to future mesne profits? (ix) Whether the pledged gold ornaments do not belong to first plaintiff’s husband? (x) Whether the plaint C-schedule movables are true, and whether they exist? (xi) To what relief? ADDITIONAL ISSUES FRAMED ON 01.07.1996 (i) Whether the claim in respect of the amended C-Schedule is barred by limitation? (ii) Whether the claim in respect of the amended C-Schedule is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (iii) Whether the claim in respect of the amended C-Schedule is not tenable in the absence of prayer for the declaratory relief? (iv) Whether the plaintiffs are not indigent persons and as such they are liable to pay Court fee? ADDITIONAL ISSUES FRAMED ON 28.07.1998 (i) Whether the 5th defendant is the only legal heir to the deceased first defendant in view of the registered adoption deed dated 30.12.1988 and the registered will dated 28.02.1997 stated to have been executed by the defendants 1 and 2 and as such the other legal representatives of the deceased first defendant who are brought on record have no rights in the plaint schedule properties? (ii) Whether the registered adoption deed dated 30.12.1988 and registered will dated 28.02.1997 are binding on the plaintiffs? ADDITIONAL ISSUES FRAMED ON 27.11.1998 (i) Whether all the properties of the deceased first defendant Kolli Konda will exclusively devolve upon the fifth defendant after the death of second defendant in view of the registered will dated 28.02.1997 as contended by 5th defendant? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs are not entitled to the shares as claimed in the amended plaint? 10. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiffs, PW1 to PW6 were examined and Ex.A1 and Ex.A21 were marked. On behalf of the Defendants DW1 to DW11 were examined and Ex.B1 to Ex.B10 were marked. Ex.X1 to Ex.X3 were marked in the evidence of third parties. Ex.C1 to Ex.C3 were marked in the evidence of advocate commissioner. Ex.C4 was marked in the evidence of V.A.O. 11. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed for partition by a preliminary decree with costs vide its judgment, dated 31.07.2000, against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellants/defendants in the Suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed in O.S.No.4 of 1999 by the trial Court. 12. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed for partition by a preliminary decree with costs vide its judgment, dated 31.07.2000, against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellants/defendants in the Suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed in O.S.No.4 of 1999 by the trial Court. 12. Heard Sri K.A.Narasimham, learned counsel for appellants and Sri A.Ravi Kiran, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Sri D.V.Sitaramamurthy, learned counsel for respondents. 13. Learned counsel for appellants would contend that the decree and judgment passed in O.S.No.4 of 1999 dated 31.07.2000 are contrary to law and he would further contend that the trial Judge gravely erred in partly decreeing the suit in O.S.No.4 of 1999. He would further contend that the trial Court came to wrong conclusion that the alleged adoption deed Ex.B9 is not proved in accordance with law and he would further contend that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. 14. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondents would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly decreed the suit in part and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the learned trial Judge and the appeal may be dismissed by confirming the decree and judgment passed by the trial Judge. Prior to institution of suit O.S.No.4 of 1999, the plaintiffs filed a suit vide O.S.No.2 of 1999 for seeking maintenance, the plaintiffs filed the suit in O.S.No.4 of 1999 for seeking the relief of partition, the trial Court partly decreed the suit O.S.No.2 of 1999 by delivering a common judgment, but no appeal is filed by the either of the parties against the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.2 of 1999. The present appeal is confined with regard to the decree and judgment passed in O.S.No.4 of 1999. 15. Having regard to the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination: i. Whether the alleged registered adoption deed dated 30.12.1988 is not true and not valid as pleaded by the respondents/plaintiffs? ii. Whether the alleged will Ex.B10 dated 28.02.1997 is proved in accordance with law? iii. ii. Whether the alleged will Ex.B10 dated 28.02.1997 is proved in accordance with law? iii. Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for granting partition of the plaint schedule property? 16. Point No.1: Whether the alleged registered adoption deed dated 30.12.1988 is not true and not valid as pleaded by the respondents/plaintiffs? The case of the fifth defendant is that the defendants 1 and 2 adopted him at about 10 years ago, by the time he was aged about 10 years, and his natural parents are Bandaru Patrudu and Bandaru Kondamma and since the date of adoption he has been living with his adoptive parents. He further contend that the adoption function was held at Thutipala in the house of defendants 1 and 2 and his natural parents brought him from his native place Komarolu and when his natural parents and his adoptive parents were made to sit opposite to each other on two small benches and in the middle of the bench one pumpkin and coconut were kept and the entire adoption was taken place at the house of first defendant subsequently on the same day his natural parents and later adoptive parents went to the Sub-Registrar office, Narsipatnam at where the adoption deed was registered. 17. The plaintiffs pleaded that the defendants 1 and 2 have not adopted the fifth defendant and the natural parents of the fifth defendant are alive and the fifth defendant is residing with his natural parents and no adoption was taken place and Ex.B9 document is not a genuine and it is a forged document. 18. In order to prove the Ex.B9 alleged registered adoption deed, the fifth defendant is examined as DW8. As per his evidence by that time he was aged about 10 years. He was adopted by the defendants 1 and 2 and his natural parents by names Bandaru Patrudu and Bandaru Kondamma came to the house of the first defendant on the date of adoption and the entire adoption was taken place in the house of the first defendant and subsequently his natural parents and adoptive parents went to the Sub-Registrar Office, Narsipatnam on the same day at where the adoption deed was registered. His evidence goes to show that the adoption was taken place at the residence of the defendants 1 and 2 and registration of adoption deed also taken place on the same day. His evidence goes to show that the adoption was taken place at the residence of the defendants 1 and 2 and registration of adoption deed also taken place on the same day. In his evidence in cross examination, he admits that he was not present at the time of registration of adoption deed. It is also relevant to say that by the date of alleged adoption the natural son and daughter of alleged adoptive parents i.e., the defendants 1 and 2, are alive and as per the evidence of DW8 he was not present at the time of registration of alleged adoption deed. Therefore, it is clear that he was not present at the time of registration of Ex.B9 adoption deed. 19. DW9 is said to have been one of the attestor to the registered adoption deed. As per his evidence the entire adoption ceremony was taken at the house of first defendant in the presence of natural parents and adoptive parents, by that time all are present and subsequently on the same day they went to Sub-Registrar Office, Narsipatnam, at where the adoption deed was got drafted and he attested the document. In his evidence in cross examination he admits that they went to Narsipatnam by 2.00 p.m. and he pleaded ignorance about the name of the scribe of Ex.B9 and the entire drafting of adoption deed was over by 3.30 p.m. and later it was presented before the Sub-Registrar, Narsipatnam, but the Ex.B9 registration adoption deed clearly goes to show that the said document was presented before the sub-Registrar in between 12.00 noon and 1.00 p.m. In Ex.B9 it was stated adoption was happened at the house of first defendant about one year ago, but as per alleged adopted son, attestor of alleged adoption deed, on the same day in the morning adoption ceremony was taken place at the house of first defendant at Thutipala village and later it was registered afternoon on the same day in the registration office at Narsipatnam. His evidence also further goes to show that by the date of alleged adoption, the son and daughter of the first defendant were alive. In such a case, it has to be explained by the defendants 1 and 2 what are the reasons for taking adopting the fifth defendant, though they are having natural son and daughter. His evidence also further goes to show that by the date of alleged adoption, the son and daughter of the first defendant were alive. In such a case, it has to be explained by the defendants 1 and 2 what are the reasons for taking adopting the fifth defendant, though they are having natural son and daughter. Admittedly as per the case of DW8 and DW9, the natural parents and adoptive parents of the fifth defendant are present at the house of first defendant at the time of alleged adoption, the first defendant is examined as DW1. The natural mother of the adopted son i.e., fifth defendant is examined as DW6. There is no whisper in the evidence of DW1 about the alleged adoption by the first defendant and his wife second defendant. The evidence of DW1 is silent about the alleged adoption of fifth defendant and also about the registration of Ex.B9 adoption deed before the Sub- Registrar, Narsipatnam. If really, any adoption is taken place naturally the first defendant, who is adopted father is a proper person to say about the factum of adoption, but the fact remains nothing was stated by DW1 in his evidence about the alleged adoption and so also about the registration of adoption deed Ex.B9. According to fifth defendant, his natural parents are Bandaru Patrudu and Bandaru Kondamma. Bandaru Kondamma is examined as DW6, her evidence is also silent about the giving adoption of fifth defendant to the defendant 1 and 2 and so also about the registration of Ex.B9 before the Sub-Registrar, Narsipatnam. If really any adoption is taken place what prevented the natural mother of fifth defendant to say about the factum of adoption and so also registration of adoption deed before the Sub-Registrar, Narsipatnam. But the fact remains nothing was stated by DW6 about the alleged adoption and registration of Ex.B9. 20. As noticed supra, the alleged adopted father first defendant is examined as DW1. He never stated any fact relating to alleged factum of adoption and also registration of alleged adoption deed. Moreover, the natural mother of the fifth defendant also did not reveal anything regarding the factum of alleged adoption and also registration of adoption deed. Therefore, the alleged adoption is highly doubtful. He never stated any fact relating to alleged factum of adoption and also registration of alleged adoption deed. Moreover, the natural mother of the fifth defendant also did not reveal anything regarding the factum of alleged adoption and also registration of adoption deed. Therefore, the alleged adoption is highly doubtful. Furthermore, asper the own admissions of DW9 they went to Sub-Registrar office, Narsipatnam at 2.00 p.m. and the entire drafting of document Ex.B9 was over by 3.30 p.m. and later it was presented before the Sub-Registrar after 3.30 p.m. But the fact remains that the recitals in Ex.B9 goes to show that Ex.B9 was presented before the Sub-Registrar in between 12.00 noon and 1.00 p.m., the aforesaid circumstances clearly thrown suspicious on the alleged adoption as pleaded by the fifth defendant. 21. The learned counsel for appellants relied on a decision in Golavalli Ramakrishna Murthy vs. Muramalla Ammanna Raju and others, 2008 (5) ALT 712 (SB). In the case on hand, the alleged adoption deed is not at all proved, the adopted father of fifth defendant is examined as DW1, there is no whisper in the evidence of DW1 about the alleged adoption and about the alleged registered adoption deed, though the natural mother of alleged adopted son i.e., fifth defendant is examined as DW6, she also has not stated anything about the factum of alleged adoption and also about the registration of alleged adoption deed. Furthermore, the recitals in Ex.B9 alleged registered adoption deed itself goes to show that the adoption was taken place at the house of the first defendant one year prior to the date of Ex.B10 document, but as per the evidence of DW8 and DW9 i.e., one of the attestor in the alleged adoption deed, the adoption ceremony was happened in the morning time at the house of first defendant at Thutipala village and the registration of the document of adoption deed was also happened after completion of adoption ceremony at the house on the same day itself in the Sub-Registrar Office, Narsipatnam. Therefore, the alleged adoption deed is highly doubtful. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the cited decision are different to the instant case. 22. By the date of alleged adoption, the defendants 1 and 2 i.e., alleged adopted parents having one son and one daughter. Therefore, the alleged adoption deed is highly doubtful. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in the cited decision are different to the instant case. 22. By the date of alleged adoption, the defendants 1 and 2 i.e., alleged adopted parents having one son and one daughter. The recitals in Ex.B9 alleged registered adoption deed dated 30.12.1988 goes to show that one year prior to the date of Ex.B9 the alleged adoption has been taken place at the house of the first defendant and the natural parents of fifth defendant agreed to give the fifth defendant by way of adoption to the defendants 1 and 2, except that there is no whisper in Ex.B9 about the details of performance of adoption ceremony as narrated by the alleged adopted son fifth defendant in his evidence. The alleged adoption deed is prepared on 30.12.1988 and it was presented before the Sub-Registrar on the next day i.e., 31.12.1988 in between 12.00 noon and 1.00 p.m. It is also relevant to say the stamp papers used under Ex.B9 are said to have been purchased on 29.12.1988. Furthermore, the fifth defendant i.e., alleged adopted son i.e., DW8 and attestor of Ex.B9 i.e., DW9 stated in their evidence itself that the adoption function was taken place in the morning hours on the date of registration of Ex.B9 registered adoption deed and registration was happened on the same day in the registration office at Narsipatnam after completion of performance of adoption ceremony function at the house of first defendant. Furthermore, the date of Ex.B9 is 31.12.1988, the alleged adopted father first defendant gave evidence on 20.02.1995 but for the reasons best known to the defendants, the Ex.B9 alleged adoption deed is not exhibited through DW1, it was marked through DW8 on 15.12.1998. Furthermore, the alleged adopted mother second defendant is alive during the pendency of the suit and she died during the pendency of the appeal in the year 2016. Therefore, the defendants 1 and 2 are proper persons to disclose about the alleged adoption of fifth defendant. As noticed supra, the natural mother of the fifth defendant is also examined as DW6. There is no whisper in the evidence of DW6 about the alleged adoption of fifth defendant. 23. Therefore, the defendants 1 and 2 are proper persons to disclose about the alleged adoption of fifth defendant. As noticed supra, the natural mother of the fifth defendant is also examined as DW6. There is no whisper in the evidence of DW6 about the alleged adoption of fifth defendant. 23. The learned counsel for appellants would contend that the adoption is reduced into writing and it was a registered document, therefore, as per Section 16 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956, the said document is proved, nothing is required to prove the Ex.B9. For convenience’s sake it would be worthwhile to note the provision for its true purport Section 16 of Hindu adoptions and maintenance Act, 1956 reads as follows: 16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.— Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. 24. The presumption, as is clear from the provision itself, is rebuttable. In G.Vasu vs. Syed Yaseen Sifuddin Quadri, AIR 1987 AP 139 , a Full Bench of Apex Court pointed out that presumptions are of two kinds - presumptions of fact and of law. It was noted that a presumption of fact is an inference logically drawn from one fact as to the existence of other facts and such presumptions of fact are rebuttable by evidence to the contrary. It was also held that presumptions of law may be either irrebutable, so that no evidence to a contrary may be given, or rebuttable, and a rebuttable presumption of law is a legal rule to be applied by the Courts in the absence of conflicting evidence. 25. In this regard, Section 11 of the Act of 1956 stipulates the conditions to be complied with to constitute a valid adoption and, to the extent relevant, it reads as under: ‘11. Other conditions for a valid adoption. 25. In this regard, Section 11 of the Act of 1956 stipulates the conditions to be complied with to constitute a valid adoption and, to the extent relevant, it reads as under: ‘11. Other conditions for a valid adoption. - In every adoption, the following conditions must be complied with: (i) to (v) ……; (vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth or in the case of an abandoned child or a child whose parentage is not known, from the place or family where it has been brought up to the family of its adoption: Provided that the performance of datta homam shall not be essential to the validity of adoption’ 26. In a case of Laxmibai (dead) through L.Rs and another vs. Bhagwantbuva (dead) through L.Rs and others, 2013(4) SCC 97 , the Apex Court held that mere signature or thumb impression on a document is not adequate to prove the contents thereof but, in a case where a person who has given his son in adoption appears in the witness box and proves the validity of the said document, the Court ought to accept the same taking into consideration the presumption under Section 16 of the Act 1956. Therefore, the proving of the validity of the document is a must. 27. In a case of Kishori Lal vs. Mst. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 a three Judge bench of Apex Court held that “an adoption results in changing the course of succession, it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicious of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth”. 28. In a case of Govinda vs. Chimabai and others, AIR 1968 Mysore 309, a Division Bench of Mysore High Court held that the mere fact that a deed of adoption has been registered cannot be taken as evidence of proof of adoption, as an adoption deed never proves an adoption. It was rightly held that the factum of adoption has to be proved by oral evidence of giving or taking of the child and that the necessary ceremonies, where they are necessary to be performed, were carried out in accordance with shastras. It was rightly held that the factum of adoption has to be proved by oral evidence of giving or taking of the child and that the necessary ceremonies, where they are necessary to be performed, were carried out in accordance with shastras. 29. In a case of M.Vanaja vs. M.Sarla devi (dead), (2020) 5 SCC 307 , the Apex Court held that a plain reading of the provisions of Hindi Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 made it clear that compliance with the conditions in chapter 1 of the Act of 1956 is mandatory for an adoption to be treated as valid and that the two important conditions mentioned in Sections 7 and 11 of the Act of 1956 are the consent of the wife before a male Hindu adopts a child and the proof of ceremony of actual giving and taking in adoption. 30. In the case on hand, as stated supra, though the adoptive father was examined as DW1, nothing was stated by DW1 in his evidence about the factum of adoption and also about the registration of adoption deed before the Sub-Registrar. Admittedly, his evidence is silent about the factum of adoption and also registration of adoption deed, though the adopted mother of fifth defendant is alive during the pendency of the suit, she was not examined as a witness. Though the natural mother of the fifth defendant is examined as DW6, her evidence is also silent about the giving of adoption and also taking of adoption by the adopted parents i.e., defendants 1 and 2. Furthermore, as per the evidence of one of the attestor DW9, the document was prepared by 3.30 p.m. at Narsipatnam and it was presented after 3.30 p.m. before the Sub-Registrar office, Narsipatnam but the alleged registered adoption deed goes to show that it was presented in between 12.00 noon and 1.00 p.m. As per the evidence of alleged adopted son, he was not present at the time of registration of Ex.B9. Furthermore, according to alleged adopted son and one of the attestor in the alleged adoption deed, adoption ceremony at the house of first defendant and registration of adoption deed were happened on the same day, but the recitals of Ex.B9 goes to show about one year ago the adoption ceremony was taken place at the house of first defendant. 31. Furthermore, according to alleged adopted son and one of the attestor in the alleged adoption deed, adoption ceremony at the house of first defendant and registration of adoption deed were happened on the same day, but the recitals of Ex.B9 goes to show about one year ago the adoption ceremony was taken place at the house of first defendant. 31. For the said reasons, mere registration of Ex.B9 adoption deed did not absolve the person asserting such adoption from proving the fact by cogent evidence and the person contesting it from adducing evidence to the contrary. The clandestine manner in which the alleged adoption is stated to have taken place raises a doubt but the same has not been adequately explained. The actual giving and taking of the child in adoption being an essential requisite under Section II (6) of the Act 1956, though the adopted father is examined as DW1 and though the natural mother of the alleged adopted son is examined as DW6, giving and taking of the child in adoption is not at all spoken either by DW1 or DW6.As stated supra, the evidence of DW1 and DW6 is silent about the alleged factum of adoption and also registration of alleged adoption deed in the Sub-Registrar office, Narsipatnam. Therefore, the alleged registered adoption deed dated 30.12.1988 is not at all proved in accordance with law despite the registration of Ex.B9 adoption deed dated 30.12.1988, accordingly, the point No.1 is answered against the appellants. 32. Point No.2: Whether the alleged will Ex.B10 dated 28.02.1997 is proved in accordance with law? The case of the fifth defendant i.e., profounder of the alleged Ex.B10 will, is that his adoptive parents executed a registered will dated 28.02.1997 under Ex.B10 and as per the terms of the will after the demise of his adoptive parents, their properties if any that have remain shall devolve upon him as a bequest. As stated supra, the alleged adoption deed is not proved in accordance with law. Ex.B10 is said to have been executed by defendants 1 and 2 by bequeathing Ex.B10 property in favour of their adopted son fifth defendant and the said will has to be come into force subsequent to the death of both the executants of the will. As noticed supra, the alleged Ex.B10 will is dated 28.02.1997. Ex.B10 is said to have been executed by defendants 1 and 2 by bequeathing Ex.B10 property in favour of their adopted son fifth defendant and the said will has to be come into force subsequent to the death of both the executants of the will. As noticed supra, the alleged Ex.B10 will is dated 28.02.1997. The second defendant is alive and she died in the year 2016 during the pendency of the appeal proceedings. The first defendant also gave evidence in the present suit proceedings on 20.02.1995, it clearly goes to show that the alleged Ex.B10 will is said to have executed by defendants 1 and 2 during the pendency of the suit. The recitals in Ex.B10 goes to show that their entire properties have to be bequeathed to their adopted son after the death of the both the executants of the will. As noticed supra, the alleged adoption of fifth defendant is not at all proved in accordance with law. The recitals in Ex.B10 goes to show that they have got ancestral and self-acquired properties of Ac.8.00 cents and thatched hut and other movable properties. In Ex.B10 it was further recited after the death of defendants 1 and 2 their entire property will be bequeathed to fifth defendant and the fifth defendant is having absolute rights in the schedule property. The fact remains one of the executant of the will is alive during the pendency of the suit and she died in the year 2016 during the pendency of the appeal proceedings. In Ex.B10 a specific recital was also made that right to cancellation or modification of the will were reserved by the executants during their life time. As stated supra, Ex.B10 is marked through DW8 in his evidence on 17.12.1998. 33. DW8 is the profounder of the alleged Ex.B10, he deposed in his evidence that as per the terms of the will after the demise of his adoptive parents their properties if any that may remain shall devolve upon him as a bequest. Another admission made by him is that his adoptive mother is alive. Admittedly, the fifth defendant is not having any personal knowledge about the alleged Ex.B10 will. As per his own statement he was informed by the second defendant about the Ex.B10 will, after the death of the first defendant. Another admission made by him is that his adoptive mother is alive. Admittedly, the fifth defendant is not having any personal knowledge about the alleged Ex.B10 will. As per his own statement he was informed by the second defendant about the Ex.B10 will, after the death of the first defendant. He further stated in his evidence that the second defendant is having life interest only in the family properties and he has got absolute rights in the suit properties. The recitals in Ex.B10 goes to show that after the death of defendants 1 and 2 only, the property in Ex.B10 will be bequeathed to the fifth defendant and furthermore, the defendants 1 and 2 reserved their right during their life time to cancel or modified the will. As stated supra, the trial Court decreed the suit on 31.07.2000 and an appeal was filed in the year 2001, the second defendant, who is one of the executant of the will was alive during the pendency of the suit and also during the pendency of the appeal proceedings till 2016. He deposed in his evidence that his adoptive father i.e., the first defendant alone executed the will in his favour and during his life time he told him that he will execute a will in his favour and 6 months prior to his death the mental capacity of his adoptive father Kolli Konda was not proper and since one year prior to his death, he lost his eye sight to a great extent. As stated supra, the alleged will is dated 28.02.1997, in the written arguments filed by the learned counsel for appellants, it was stated that Konda died in the year 1997, there is no evidence on record with regard to the date of death of Konda in the year 1997. It is relevant to note that the alleged will is said to have been executed on 28.02.1997. As per the own admissions of the profounder of the will, 6 months prior to the death of the first defendant his mental capacity was not proper and since one year prior to his death, the first defendant lost his eye sight to a greater extent. As per the own admissions of the profounder of the will, 6 months prior to the death of the first defendant his mental capacity was not proper and since one year prior to his death, the first defendant lost his eye sight to a greater extent. As per the own admissions of DW10 i.e., one of the attestor, Ex.B10 was drafted one year prior to the death of the first defendant and the first defendant proceeded in a bus and he is able to walk by the date of will without any assistance and since 5 years prior to his death his eye sight was blurred. Another admission made by DW11, who is also another attestor in the alleged will is that himself and the first defendant walked Burugupalli and from there they travelled by bus to Narsipatnam on the date of alleged will and nobody assisted the first defendant at that time he walked on his own. Furthermore, as per the admissions of one of the attestor DW10 in his evidence that he used to work as a clerk in panchayat office. The other admission made by another attestor of the will DW11 is that DW10 did not work as a clerk in the panchayat office. As noticed supra, there are several suspicious circumstances surrounded by the alleged execution of the will. 34. It is a well settled principle that in every case the burden lies on the profounder of the will and it is the duty of the profounder of the will, he has to satisfy the conscious of the Court that the instrument as propounded is the last will of a free and capable testator, meaning thereby obviously that the testator at the time when he subscribed his signature on a will in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory and ordinarily however, the onus is discharged as regards the due execution of the will, if the propounder leads evidence to show that the will bears the signature and mark of the testator and the will is duly attested. This attestation however shall have to be in accordance with Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act which requires that if a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until atleast one attesting witness has been called for the purpose of proving its execution and the same is so however in the event of there being an attesting witness alive and capable of giving evidence. The law is also equally settled that in the event of there, being circumstances surrounding the execution of will, surrounded in suspicion, it is the paramount duty on the part of the propounder to remove the suspicion by leading satisfactory evidence. As stated supra, in the case on hand, no satisfactory evidence is produced by the defendants to remove the suspicious circumstances. 35. As per the evidence of profounder of the will he was not present at the time of execution of the alleged will Ex.B10. Therefore, he is not having any personal knowledge about Ex.B10. As stated supra, the first attestor in the alleged will is examined as DW10 and second attestor in the alleged will is examined as DW11. Furthermore, the recitals in Ex.B10 will goes to show that the executants of the will have got both ancestral and self-acquired properties both wet and dry lands at Thutipala in an extent of Ac.8.00 cents and thatched house and other movable properties. As stated supra, the right to change, modify or cancel the will is reserved with the executants of the will and after their death only the will shall come into force. The second defendant i.e., one of the executant of the Ex.B10 will is alive during the pendency of the suit proceedings and she also filed an appeal against the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court and she was shown as second appellant and she died during the pendency of appeal proceedings in the year 2016. The first defendant died during the pendency of the suit. The profounder of the alleged will i.e., the fifth defendant cannot claim any right or interest in the suit property during the life time of one of the executant of the will at present or in future in view of the conditions made in the will. The first defendant died during the pendency of the suit. The profounder of the alleged will i.e., the fifth defendant cannot claim any right or interest in the suit property during the life time of one of the executant of the will at present or in future in view of the conditions made in the will. Furthermore, the defendants 1 and 2 are having daughter-in-law and grand daughter i.e., the plaintiffs, no bequest has made to the daughter-in-law and grand daughter by both the defendants 1 and 2, though they are alive as on date also. No provisions is made in the alleged will by that date they are having one daughter by name Pydithalli. 36. Four Judge Bench of Apex Court in the case of Rani Purnima Debi and another vs. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb and another, AIR 1962 SC 567 held as follows: We have already pointed out that the High Court was of the view that there were suspicious circumstances attending the execution of the will and that it was an unnatural will. The testator left behind him his widow and his married daughter (who are appellants before us) and an unmarried sister who was dependent upon him. Besides these, the testator had a number of other relations who were much nearer to him than the respondent. Even if we leave out of account the married daughter and the other nearer relations, the widow and the sister were certainly expected to be properly provided for by the testator. It is not in dispute that the relations between the testator and his wife and sister were good. In these circumstances, we should have expected something better than what is provided in the will for these two, All that the will says is that the wife and the sister would be suitably maintained by the respondent during their lifetime. No amount is specified which should be given to these two ladies as maintenance and no charge is created on the properties left by the testator which were considerable. In effect, the two ladies were left to the tender mercies of the respondent in the matter of their maintenance. Further the result of this will is that the daughter would be completely disinherited. The testator had a number of children but all had died many years before and only one daughter was alive at the time of his death. In effect, the two ladies were left to the tender mercies of the respondent in the matter of their maintenance. Further the result of this will is that the daughter would be completely disinherited. The testator had a number of children but all had died many years before and only one daughter was alive at the time of his death. She was married and on behalf of the propounder it is said that the relations between the testator mid her husband were not very happy. The evidence, however, does not show that the relations between the testator and his sonin- law were particularly strained at the time of the execution of the will. In any case there is no satisfactory evidence to show that relations between the testator and his daughter were bad, even if the relations between him and his son-in-law were not of the best, In the circumstances we should have expected the testator to make some provision for the daughter, particularly when it is said that she was not well-off. There is no doubt therefore that the will is most unnatural and that is a suspicious circumstance which must be satisfactorily explained before the respondent can get letters of administration. As stated supra, as on today also the daughter-in-law and grand daughter of defendants 1 and 2 are alive, no specific reasons were expelled by the defendants 1 and 2 in Ex.B10 for not bequesting any property in the will in favour of the plaintiffs. By the date of alleged will, the daughter of defendants 1 and 2 Pydithalli was alive, no arrangement was made for daughter in the Ex.B10 alleged will. 37. As per the own statement of the profounder of the alleged will, one of the executant of the will Kolli Konda was not having proper mental capacity since 6 months prior to his death and since one year prior to his death, he lost his eye sight to a greater extent. As per the own statement of DW10 in his evidence since 5 years prior to the death of first defendant, his eye sight was blurred. As per the evidence of the profounder of the will since 6 months prior to death of first defendant his mental condition was not proper. Furthermore, the alleged will is said to have been executed on 28.02.1997. As per the evidence of the profounder of the will since 6 months prior to death of first defendant his mental condition was not proper. Furthermore, the alleged will is said to have been executed on 28.02.1997. As per the case of the appellants in the written arguments submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the first defendant died in the year 1997. It is relevant to say there is no evidence on record about the date and month of alleged death of the first defendant. Another attestor also stated in his evidence that they walked up to Burugupalli and from there they travelled by bus to Narsipatnam on the date of Ex.B10 will and nobody assisted to first defendant. As per the evidence of first attestor also the first defendant took him to Narsipatnam in a bus and the first defendant was able to walk on the date of alleged will without any assistance. The above admissions of profounder of the alleged will i.e., DW8, DW10 and DW11 thrown suspicious circumstances on the alleged execution of Ex.B10 will. As stated supra, the will was alleged to have been executed by defendants 1 and 2 and the second defendant was alive during the pendency of the suit and she died during the pendency of the appeal in the year 2016, therefore, the fifth defendant i.e., the alleged profounder of the will cannot get any absolute rights in the property of Ex.B10 during the pendency of suit. Furthermore, Ex.B10 is not proved in accordance with law. 38. For the aforesaid reasons, the alleged Ex.B10 will is found to be surrounded by several suspicious circumstances, as noticed supra, but the profounder of the alleged will i.e., fifth defendant failed to remove the same, therefore, the alleged Ex.B10 will is not proved in accordance with law, accordingly, the point No.2 is answered against the appellants. 39. Point No.3: Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for granting partition of the plaint schedule property? 39. Point No.3: Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for granting partition of the plaint schedule property? The undisputed facts are the undivided son of defendants 1 and 2 by name Kolli Kannamanaidu married the first plaintiff at about 10 years ago prior to the institution of the suit as per the Hindu rites and caste custom in the presence of elders and relatives, the same is not at all disputed by the parents of Kannamanaidu i.e., defendants 1 and 2 and after the marriage, the marriage was consummated and since then the first plaintiff lived with her husband and lead marital life for about 7 years and during their wedlock, the second plaintiff born to the first plaintiff through Kannamanaidu. The said Kannamanaidu is none other than the natural son of the defendants 1 and 2 and defendants 1 and 2 are also having one daughter by name Pydithalli and she was shown as fourth defendant in the suit and she was alive during the pendency of the suit. The appellants 6 to 8 are also added as legal representatives of fourth defendant in addition to the third defendant, who is none other than the son of Pydithalli fourth defendant. It is not in dispute that the schedule property is undivided joint family property. The plaintiffs are none other than the daughter-in-law and granddaughter of defendants 1 and 2 and fourth defendant is none other than the daughter of defendants 1 and 2 and the fourth defendant was alive up to central amendment effected to Hindu Succession Act and died in the year 2008 during the pendency of the appeal and his son Prasad is shown as third defendant in the suit. After the death of Pydithalli i.e., fourth defendant, his daughters are joined as legal representatives of Pydithalli as appellants 6 to 8. It is the specific case of the appellants that the defendants 1 and 2 executed the alleged Ex.B10 will bequeathing their properties in favour of fifth defendant, as stated supra the alleged Ex.B10 will is not at all proved in accordance with law. Another contention taken by the leaned counsel for appellants is that since the fifth defendant is adopted son of defendants 1 and 2, he is also entitled one share in the properties of defendants 1 and 2. Another contention taken by the leaned counsel for appellants is that since the fifth defendant is adopted son of defendants 1 and 2, he is also entitled one share in the properties of defendants 1 and 2. As stated supra, the alleged adoption is not at all proved in accordance with law. Therefore, the property of defendants 1 and 2 have to be divided into two equal shares and one such share has to be allotted to the son of defendants 1 and 2 i.e., Kannamanaidu and the remaining another share has to be allotted to the daughter of defendants 1 and 2i.e., Pydithalli. It is relevant to say that Kannamanaidu and Pydithalli i.e., natural children of defendants 1 and 2 are no more. Therefore, the share allotted to Kannamanaidu has to be given to the plaintiffs 1 and 2 and the remaining another share has to be allotted to the legal representatives of Pydithalli (fourth defendant) i.e., appellant Nos.3, 6 to 8. As stated supra, the children of Pydithalli i.e., appellant Nos.3, 6 to 8 are entitled remaining one share allotted to Pydithalli because she died during the pendency of the appeal in the year 2008. 40. For the aforesaid reasons, the plaint schedule property has to be divided into two equal shares, one such share has to be allotted to the plaintiffs and the remaining another such share has to be allotted to the legal heirs of Pydithalli i.e., appellant Nos.3, 6 to 8 and the rest of the judgment in O.S.No.4 of 1999 of the trail Court holds good, accordingly the point No.3 is answered. 41. In view of my findings on point Nos.1 to 3, the appeal is partly allowed by modifying the preliminary decree and judgment passed by the trail Court in O.S.No.4 of 1999 as the plaint schedule property has to be divided into two equal shares, the plaintiffs are entitled one such share and the appellant Nos.3, 6 to 8 are entitled the remaining one such share. The rest of the judgment of the trial Court in O.S.No.4 of 1999 holds good. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in the appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.