JUDGMENT : DEVNARAYAN MISHRA, j. Heard on I.A No.5430/2023 an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing this appeal. 1. As per I.A No.5430/2023 the applicants have filed the present appeal being aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by Learned Additional District Judge, Jawad in civil suit No.RCS-A/22/2014 dated 10.02.2022 wherein the appellants suit was partially decreed. 2. The appellants were in possession of suit land since 23.10.1982 suit was filed by the appellant for the relief of specific performance of contract and alternatively for the relief of declaration of title on the ground of adverse possession and declaring the disputed executed sale-deed void, and for permanent injunction that was dismissed. 3. As per the law the appeal ought to have been preferred before their Court within a period of 90 days excluding the period of obtaining the copy of judgment and decree however, they were not having the knowledge of passing of judgment and decree. They came to know about the judgment and decree when they got the notice from the Revenue Court, Jawad under the proceedings of Section 250 of the M.P Land Revenue Code,1959 for the possession. 4. The appellants are also not educated and well conversant with the law and were not properly adviced that there is need to challenge the said judgment and decree however, later on when they came to know that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is not proper and legal, question of law is involved in this case, appeal is required to be filed before this Court. Then this appeal has been filed with the delay of 330 days. The appeal is bonafide so, the delay be condoned in filing this appeal. 5. The respondents in their reply has stated that the appellants were having the knowledge of limitation and decree, it is not correct to say that appellants were not properly advised. Appeal is filed after inordinate delay there is no ground, no sufficient cause has been shown for the condonation of delay. The appellants have not presented any sufficient cause to file the appeal within limitation hence, the application be dismissed. Heard. 6. The impugned judgment was passed on 10.02.2023 and the appeal was presented on 12.07.2023 before this Court. Appeal is filed after inordinate delay there is no ground, no sufficient cause has been shown for the condonation of delay. The appellants have not presented any sufficient cause to file the appeal within limitation hence, the application be dismissed. Heard. 6. The impugned judgment was passed on 10.02.2023 and the appeal was presented on 12.07.2023 before this Court. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the appellants are villagers and their suit was partially decreed with the direction to the defendant that by himself or through representatives shall not dispossess the plaintiff from the disputed land without following due course of law. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Raheem Shah and Ors. Vs. Govind Singh and Ors. SC/0829/2023. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that in this case there is an inordinate delay of approx. 01 year and there are no sufficient reasons for the delay in that situation the delay cannot be condoned as routine matter. The delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned as matter of right, the Court does not have unlimited powers to condone the delay. Hence, submitted that the application for condonation of delay be dismissed and consequently, the appeal also be dismissed. 9. Counsel for the respondent has relied on the judgment of Shaligram vs. Nagar Palika Vidisha 2004(II) MPJR 170 , Union of India vs. M/S Diamond Cements 2001(3) M.P.L.J 371 , Arvind Kumar Nitin Kumar Memorial Trust vs. Nimad Vanita Wishwa Khandwa 2004 (II) MPJR 176, P.K Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and another AIR 1998 SC 2276, Lanka Venkateswarlu (dead) by Lrs. vs. State of A.P and others 2011(3) M.P.L.J 135 . Heard both the parties and perused the record. 10. The impugned judgments relates to civil suit filed by the appellants for specific performance of contract and to annul the sale-deed executed by respondent No.1, 2, 4 and 6 in favour of respondent No.8 and 10 and alternately for the declaration of title on the basis of adverse possession. The trial Court has dismissed the suit but granted the relief to the appellants as stated above. 11. The trial Court has dismissed the suit but granted the relief to the appellants as stated above. 11. The grounds that are stated in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is that they were not having knowledge of the decree, they were not properly advised that they have to file an appeal, they came to know about passing of the judgment only when they got the notice from the Revenue Court, Jawad under the proceedings of Section 250 of the M.P Land Revenue Code,195. On this point the principle laid down in Raheem Shah and Ors. vs. Govind Singh and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court in para 04 of the judgment has laid down the certain principle that they have been considered while deciding the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which is reproduced below:- " 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal." 12. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal." 12. I have gone through the judgment relied by the respondents in the case of Shaligram vs. Nagar Palika Vidisha (supra) wherein the court has held that application in condonation of delay is not a matter of right, in the case of P.K Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Another (supra) the Apex Court has held that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour when the statue so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The same principle have been held in Lanka Venkateswarlu (dead) by Lrs. vs. State of A.P and Others (supra) that the Court does not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers decision has to be decided in a systematic manner and informed by reason, this Court in Union of India vs. M/S Diamond Cements (supra) has held the same principle as held in P.K Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Another (supra). 13. From the factual matrix of this case it is clear that the appellants are resident of village Hanumantiya Tehsil Jawad District Neemuch and the appellants have clearly stated that they were not advised properly, so they have not filed the appeal within time and they were not having the knowledge of passing of the judgment and decree. It is also clear from the record of the trial Court that after 26.11.2020 the parties were not present before the trial Court personally and they were represented by their counsel and counsel was appearing in these proceedings before the trial Court. On that basis it cannot be concluded that they were personally appearing and they were having knowledge of passing of the decree so on the factual aspect it cannot be said that the appellants were having knowledge of the passing of the decree and nothing contrary have been brought on record by which the application be dismissed. 14. Looking to the subject matter of the suit that is agricultural land and the adjudication on the merit is required so, that dispute be resolved finally. 14. Looking to the subject matter of the suit that is agricultural land and the adjudication on the merit is required so, that dispute be resolved finally. In the light of principle laid down in Raheem Shah and Ors. vs. Govind Singh and Ors. (supra), I.A No. 5430/2023 is allowed. The delay is condoned. List after four weeks.