JUDGMENT : HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J. The question involved in this petition is if the petitioner was appointed on 30.05.2008 or a date after 01.04.2010 so as to entitle him, in the former case, to the benefit of the Old Pension Scheme [‘OPS’ for short], and in the latter, subject him to a regime of the National Pension System, popularly known as the New Pension Scheme[‘NPS’ for short]. 2. The petitioner says that he was appointed after 01.04.2010. There were, on this issue, dependant other rights of the petitioner as well vis-à-vis the private respondents, but, since the petitioner is no longer in the Bank’s service, the issue is limited to the question about entitlement to pension, as already indicated. 3. The facts giving rise to this petition are these : The petitioner says that he holds a decree of Bachelor of Engineering earned from the Pune University and a degree of Master of Science (Finance) from the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysts of India [‘ICFAI’ for short] University. During the period of time that the petitioner was still pursuing his course of Master of Science[‘M.Sc.’ for short], a campus selection was held, where the Bank of Baroda, represented by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to this petition, selected the petitioner for appointment as an officer in JMG/S-I Grade. On the 22nd of February, 2008, the General Manager (HR and Marketing) Bank of Baroda[‘Bank’ for short] sent a letter to the petitioner, saying that the he had been found eligible to be considered for appointment as an Officer, JMG/S-I and that the offer made was subject to the petitioner securing 60% or more marks in the final examinations of his M.Sc. (Finance) at the ICFAI School of Finance Studies, Hyderabad. The petitioner was asked to accept the offer on a copy of the letter, which he did the same day. The petitioner got more than 60% marks in his final examination of M.Sc. (Finance) and on 12.06.2008, the petitioner received Letter No. BCC/HRC/CAMPUS/100/950 dated 30.05.2008 sent by the Manager (HR and Marketing) of the Bank, saying that the petitioner has been appointed as an officer in the Junior Management Grade/Scale-I in the generalist category, which is equivalent to a Class II post. 4. The petitioner sent his acceptance through speed post on 12.06.2008. (Finance) and on 12.06.2008, the petitioner received Letter No. BCC/HRC/CAMPUS/100/950 dated 30.05.2008 sent by the Manager (HR and Marketing) of the Bank, saying that the petitioner has been appointed as an officer in the Junior Management Grade/Scale-I in the generalist category, which is equivalent to a Class II post. 4. The petitioner sent his acceptance through speed post on 12.06.2008. On the same day, the petitioner reported to the General Manager of the Bank, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand Zone, Lucknow. He was directed to get himself medically examined and the doctor certified him fit for Bank service. 5. On 18.06.2008, the General Manager (HR and Marketing) of the Bank issued a letter, saying that the authority had observed from the records submitted by the petitioner that he does not fulfill the maximum age criteria as prescribed by the Bank i.e. 30 years of age as on date, and, therefore, the Bank have withdrawn the offer of provisional appointment made vide letter dated 30.05.2008. 6. The petitioner challenged the cancellation of his appointment made vide order dated 18.06.2008 by moving Writ Petition No. 912 (SB) of 2008 before the Lucknow Bench of this Court. When the writ petition came up for admission on 17.07.2008, learned Counsel for the Bank gave an undertaking before the Court that the petitioner's grievance will be examined and appropriate orders made expeditiously. In view of the said undertaking given on behalf of the Bank, this Court sitting at Lucknow disposed of the writ petition, directing the Chairman and the Managing Director of the Bank to decide the petitioner’s representation dated 27.06.2008. On the 23rd of August, 2008, the General Manager (HR and Marketing) of the Bank sent a letter to the petitioner, rejecting his representation dated 27.06.2008 addressed to the Chairman and the Managing Director. 7. Aggrieved by the cancellation of his appointment, the petitioner again moved Service Bench No. 1153 of 2010 before the Lucknow Bench of this Court. The writ petition was heard and allowed videjudgment and order dated 04.05.2012. The order dated 18.06.2008 passed by the General Manager (HR and Marketing) of the Bank was quashed and the Bank directed to permit the petitioner to join duties, pursuant to the order of appointment dated 30.05.2008. The Bank challenged the judgment and order of this Court sitting at Lucknow by means of Special Leave Petition No. 19818 of 2012. The order dated 18.06.2008 passed by the General Manager (HR and Marketing) of the Bank was quashed and the Bank directed to permit the petitioner to join duties, pursuant to the order of appointment dated 30.05.2008. The Bank challenged the judgment and order of this Court sitting at Lucknow by means of Special Leave Petition No. 19818 of 2012. The Special Leave Petition came up for hearing before the Supreme Court on 23.07.2012, when it was ordered to be dismissed with a direction to the respondents to implement the order of this Court within four weeks. 8. On the 3rd of August, 2012, the Deputy General Manager (HRM and Administration) of the Bank sent a letter, which this Court is constrained to say, is expressed in very inappropriate words, the way it refers to an order of the Supreme Court, but conveys in effect that the Bank have decided to permit the petitioner to join their services. It is said that for the purpose, the petitioner was advised to report to the General Manager of the Bank, Eastern Zone, Lucknow on 22nd of August, 2012, where he would complete his pre-joining formalities and further placement. At this stage, we think that we must refer to the words that we have called inappropriate in the letter dated 03.08.2012 addressed by the Deputy General Manager (HRM and Admin.) of the Bank to the petitioner. These words are : On account of subsequent judicial reference and order dated 23.07.2012 of the Supreme Court, it has been decided to permit you to join the Bank’s service. 9. We think that the reference to the order of the Supreme Court is inappropriate, for reason that a man placed as a General Manager of a Bank ought to know how to refer to orders of Courts, be it the High Court or the Supreme Court or any other Court. Failing before the High Court in a writ petition, the Bank had preferred a Special Leave Petition, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 23.07.2012. To describe that order as a “subsequent judicial reference and order” is the most inaccurate, and therefore, the most inappropriate description of the Supreme Court’s order. It exhibits an attitude of nonchalance on the author’s part. 10. On the 1st of April, 2010, the Bank implemented the NPS, which was applicable to personnel appointed after the aforesaid date. To describe that order as a “subsequent judicial reference and order” is the most inaccurate, and therefore, the most inappropriate description of the Supreme Court’s order. It exhibits an attitude of nonchalance on the author’s part. 10. On the 1st of April, 2010, the Bank implemented the NPS, which was applicable to personnel appointed after the aforesaid date. The NPS provides for a contributory pension scheme instead of a General Provident Fund-cum-Pension Scheme that was the regime under the OPS in vogue before 01.04.2010. The petitioner pleads that he was appointed on 30.05.2008 and reported for joining on 12.06.2008, but wrongly not permitted to join duties. Subsequently, the order of cancellation of his appointment dated 18.06.2018 was quashed by this Court and he was permitted to join duties, in pursuance of the appointment order dated 30.05.2008. The Supreme Court upheld this Court’s order, with a dismissal of the Special Leave Petition preferred by the respondents against the order of the Division Bench of this Court. The petitioner asserts that he was allowed to join duty after a long delay for no fault of his. In substance, the petitioner pleads that he has a right to trace his appointment to 30.05.2008, when the letter of his appointment was issued and he joined in pursuance thereof at a much later date, after the respondents’ Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 11. In the writ petition, there are pleadings and reliefs claiming seniority with effect from 30.05.2008 as also consequential benefits, which include increments, promotion and one of them, the benefit of the OPS that was in vogue on 30.05.2008. Directions have been sought to correct the seniority list and relief also sought with regard to promotion. 12. This writ petition was instituted on 23.05.2014 and notice of motion issued on 28.05.2014. At the relevant time, the petitioner was in the Bank’s services. It is for the said reason that all those reliefs indicated hereinabove were sought. 13. A counter affidavit on behalf of the Bank was filed on 20.05.2016, to which, a rejoinder affidavit was filed on 13.12.2016. Two supplementary affidavits were also filed, one dated 03.02.2023 and a second supplementary affidavit dated 26.10.2023. On 03.11.2023, when the petition came up, this Court, noticing that parties had exchanged affidavits, admitted the writ petition to hearing, which proceeded forthwith. Two supplementary affidavits were also filed, one dated 03.02.2023 and a second supplementary affidavit dated 26.10.2023. On 03.11.2023, when the petition came up, this Court, noticing that parties had exchanged affidavits, admitted the writ petition to hearing, which proceeded forthwith. It was pointed out by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the first supplementary affidavit shows that the Bank harassed the petitioner throughout, leading him to tender his resignation on 21.07.2022, after completing all formalities.Videletter dated 29.09.2022, the Bank accepted the petitioner's resignation and relieved him from service on 29.09.2022. When the petition was taken up for hearing, learned Counsel for the petitioner stated that in view of the petitioner’s resignation from service, the only issue surviving in the petition is about his entitlement to be governed by the OPS or the NPS, that was introduced in the Bank with effect from 01.04.2010. It is recorded in the order dated 03.11.2023 that since there is no issue as to seniority, there are no chances of the private respondents’ seniority or other service interest being adversely affected now. Accordingly, issue of notice to the private respondents was dispensed with. The matter was heard on 03.11.2023 and adjourned to 09.11.2023. It could not be taken up on 09.11.2023, when it was directed to come up again on 30.11.2023. On 30.11.2023, learned Counsel for both parties concluded their submissions. Judgment was reserved. 14. Heard Mr. Javed Hussain Khan, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ashok Kumar Lal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 15. The short issue, therefore, is whether the petitioner would be governed by the OPS or the NPS and that too, about the terms of settlement of his terminal benefits. The reason is that the petitioner has already resigned. It appears that the petitioner may not have contributed anything towards the contributory pension scheme, about which, there is an indication in the letter dated 22.10.2013 addressed to the petitioner by the Deputy Regional Manager of the Bank. It mentions that the petitioner has not submitted application forms for generation of a Permanent Retirement Account Number[‘PRAN’ for short] and without the PRAN, the Bank is unable to remit their fund to the National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL). As a result, the fund remains with the Bank, without any yield. It mentions that the petitioner has not submitted application forms for generation of a Permanent Retirement Account Number[‘PRAN’ for short] and without the PRAN, the Bank is unable to remit their fund to the National Securities Depository Limited (NSDL). As a result, the fund remains with the Bank, without any yield. The Bank cannot invest it or pay interest and the petitioner is at double loss, because he does not get any interest on the fund nor his fund gets investment benefits. This letter shows that the petitioner did not subscribe to the contributory pension scheme, an inseparable part of the NPS. 16. The petitioner’s letter dated 29.09.2022 shows that he generated his PRAN at a very late date and under protest, subject to the result of the present petition. The result is that the petitioner wants terminal benefits in terms of the OPS; not the NPS. 17. Mr. Javed Hussain Khan, learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner was issued with a letter of appointment dated 30.05.2008, which he accepted on 12.06.2008 sending his acceptance through speed post. On the said date, he reported to the General Manager, Bank of Baroda, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand Zone, Lucknow and upon a direction, got himself medically examined. The doctor found him fit for joining the Bank’s service, as already said. This offer of appointment carried in the appointment letter dated 30.05.2008 was accepted by the petitioner on 12.06.2008, when he reported to the General Manager of the Bank of Baroda. It was cancelled on 18.06.2008 by the General Manager (HR and Marketing) through a letter of that date. When the petitioner challenged the said letter, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and succeeded before the Division Bench of this Court at Lucknow in Service Bench No. 1153 of 2010, decided on 04.05.2012, not only was the order of cancellation of the petitioner’s appointment dated 18.06.2008 quashed, but also a mandamus issued to the Bank to permit the petitioner to join duties, pursuant to the appointment order dated 30.05.2008. It is argued that the petitioner’s rights are, therefore, traceable to 30.05.2008, whatever be the date of his joining the services of the Bank post litigation up to the Supreme Court. 18. Mr. Ashok Kumar Lal, learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 has vehemently opposed the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. It is argued that the petitioner’s rights are, therefore, traceable to 30.05.2008, whatever be the date of his joining the services of the Bank post litigation up to the Supreme Court. 18. Mr. Ashok Kumar Lal, learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 has vehemently opposed the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. He submits that the petitioner joined the services of the Bank on 21.08.2012, in compliance with the order of the Supreme Court dated 23.07.2012 and the judgment of this Court dated 04.05.2012. The date on which the petitioner joined the services of the Bank, that is to say, 21.08.2012, the NPS had come into force with the cut off date for the NPS being 01.04.2010. He submits that the petitioner’s services would be governed, therefore, by the NPS, when he actually joined the Bank’s services. It is the date when the petitioner joined the Bank’s services which is material to determine his entitlement to be governed by the OPS or the NPS. It is emphasized that what is relevant is the date of the petitioner actually joining service and deduction of certain percentage of salary and the corresponding contribution by the petitioner for transfer to the pension fund, as per the applicable scheme, the NPS. Attention of the Court has been drawn towards the circular dated 04.01.2012 for implementation of the NPS, in terms of the bipartite settlement between the Indian Banks’ Association and Employees’ Organization, the relevant part whereof reads : In terms of Bipartite settlement and joint note dated 27.04.2010 between IBA and Employees’ Organizations’ on extending another option for pension, employees joining the services of the Bank on or after 1.4.2010 are eligible for the Defined Contributory Pension Scheme, which will be introduced by the Banks in terms of the Joint Note/Settlement dated 27.04.2010, similar to the one governed by the provisions of New Pension Scheme introduced for the employees of Central Government w.e.f. 1.1.2004 and as modified from time to time. Hence, they are not eligible for becoming members of Banks Provident Fund Scheme and Pension Scheme. Hence, they are not eligible for becoming members of Banks Provident Fund Scheme and Pension Scheme. In view of above, in respect of employees of the Bank who have joined the services of the Bank on or after 1.4.2010, deduction towards New Pension Scheme at the rate of 10% of Pay and Dearness Allowance from the salary with a matching contribution from Bank is being made kept separately till the New Pension Scheme is implemented and operationalised. 19. Mr. Lal submits, therefore, that there is no escape from the position of the law that it is the date of joining for the petitioner that is material and not the date of appointment. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Bench decision of this Court in Union of India v. Roop Chandra and others, Neutral Citation No. - 2019:AHC:209315-DB, besides the judgment of this Court in Ravi Raj and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2020 SCC OnLine All 189. Reliance has also been placed upon the authority of a learned Single Judge in Bharat Yadav v. State of U.P. and others, Writ - A No. 16838 of 2019, decided on 23.10.2019, besides another authority of the learned Single Judge in Satyesh Kumar Mishra and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2016 (6) ADJ 808 . Above all, reliance is placed upon the authority of the Supreme Court in The State of Bihar and others v. Rajmati Devi and another, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 669. 20. Upon hearing learned Counsel for parties, it may be observed that the governing principle about the Old Pension Scheme or the new one, going by the date of the employee’s joining the Establishment, is a general principle, which cannot be universally applied to decide all kinds of rights arising under different set of rules or the origin for establishment of the right to appointment. In the Bench decision in Roop Chandra (supra)the facts and holding are apparent from the following remarks of their Lordships : 4. From perusal of record, we find that in both writ petitions applicant-respondents were actually appointed in the year 2004. Initially 53 posts of Durwans were advertised in December, 2003. Several persons came to be empanelled for appointment in the year 1985. However, no consequential appointment could be made on account of ban imposed by Central Government. From perusal of record, we find that in both writ petitions applicant-respondents were actually appointed in the year 2004. Initially 53 posts of Durwans were advertised in December, 2003. Several persons came to be empanelled for appointment in the year 1985. However, no consequential appointment could be made on account of ban imposed by Central Government. At this stage applicants approached Tribunal for a direction to respondents therein for appointing applicants. Aforesaid O.A. came to be disposed of vide order dated 9.11.1995. Subsequently letters were send to empanelled candidates seeking their willingness to join. Consequently, applicants gave their consent on 15.3.2004 for joining on the post of Durwans. Ultimately appointments letters dated 27.6.2004 were issued to applicant respondent appointing them on the post of Durwans. By the time of appointment, new pension scheme had come into force i.e. with effect from 1.1.2004. Consequently, applicant respondent approached Tribunal by means of above mentioned application which have been allowed by impugned judgement and orders passed by Tribunal with certain directions noted above. 5. Once applicant-respondent have not challenged their appointment from particular date, applicant-respondent cannot subsequently claim that their appointment be treated prior to date of appointment as same will enable them benefit of old pension scheme. 6. Admittedly, new pension scheme came into force from 1.1.2004. Applicant-respondent by virtue of provisions contained in new pension scheme were entitled to be Goverened by it. Tribunal has erred in accepting the contention and granting relief to applicant respondents for treating as if they were appointed just a day before the new pension scheme was enforced. 21. Roop Chandra was a case where posts of Durwanswere advertised in December, 2003, but, after empanelment, they were not appointed. This led to an action in the Central Administrative Tribunal being brought by the selectees, where, after decision of the original application, the selectees gave consent to join the posts of Durwans on 15.03.2004. Appointment letters were issued on 27.06.2004. By the time all the selectees were appointed, the NPS had come into force with effect from 01.01.2004. It was in the context of the appointment letters that were accepted by the employees, appointing them after the cut-off date, that the Division Bench held that the employees cannot contend that their employment be treated as one prior to the cut-off date and governed by the OPS. It was in the context of the appointment letters that were accepted by the employees, appointing them after the cut-off date, that the Division Bench held that the employees cannot contend that their employment be treated as one prior to the cut-off date and governed by the OPS. All that is discernible for a principle is that commencement of recruitment process was not held to be decisive, but the date of appointment, upon which the applicability of the relevant pension scheme is dependent. 22. In Ravi Raj (supra), the case was one related to Group C employees in different departments of the State Government. The petitioners were selected initially in the year 2001, but, after litigation, came to be appointed in October, 2006. In the establishment of the State, the NPS was enforced with effect from 01.04.2005. Now, Ravi Raj was a case which was governed by The Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961[‘the Rules of 1961’ for short], as it related to government servants of Group C. These rules were amended in the year 2005, where the amended Rule 2(3) of the Rules of 1961 reads : 2(3) These Rules shall not apply to employees entering services and posts on or after April 1, 2005 in connection with the affairs of the State, borne on pensionable establishment, whether temporary or permanent. 23. The employees, therefore, entering government service on or after April, 2005 would be governed by the NPS, for which, there were different rules. 23. The employees, therefore, entering government service on or after April, 2005 would be governed by the NPS, for which, there were different rules. It was in this context that in Ravi Raj, after considering a wealth of decisions like Bharat Yadav (supra), Satyesh Kumar Mishra (supra) Ram Nakul v. State of U.P. and others, Writ -A No. 15392 of 2012, decided on 03.09.2019 , Mahesh Narayan and others v. State of U.P. and others 2020 (2) All LJ 518, Firangi Prasad v. State of U.P. and others, 2011 (2) UPLBEC 987, the authority of the Uttarakhand High Court in Ashutosh Joshi and others v. State of Uttarakhand and others, Writ Petition (S/S) No. 1170 of 2010, decided on 26.06.2014 and the holding of the Delhi High Court in Inspector Rajendra Singh and others v. Union of India and others, W.P. (C) No. 2810/2016, decided on 27.03.2017, it was held : Having conferred thoughtful consideration on the various decisions that have come to be rendered on the subject, the Court firstly notes that Mahesh Narayan fails to notice Ram Nakul and Bharat Yadav. Both these decisions directly dealt with the issue of applicability of the Old and New Pension Schemes depending upon the date of entry into service of a particular candidate. These decisions clearly bound the learned Judge while proceeding to decide Mahesh Narayan. However they do not appear to have been brought to the attention of the Court. Both Ram Nakul and Bharat Yadav fundamentally rest and pivot on the statutory amendments as introduced in 2005 in the 1961 Rules. As noted above, Rule 2(3) introduces and constructs a specific injunction in respect of its applicability to employees "entering" services or posts on or after April 01, 2005. Guided by the plain language as used in that Rule, it is manifest that it does not connect the applicability of the Rules to either a selection process commenced or pending or for that matter to any event prior to actual entry into service. In the considered view of this Court the expression "entering services..." cannot be equated to the selection or empanelment of an incumbent to government service. It is manifest that the applicability of the 1961 Rules is made dependent upon an incumbent actually being recognised as having become a member of the service on or before 1 April 2005. In the considered view of this Court the expression "entering services..." cannot be equated to the selection or empanelment of an incumbent to government service. It is manifest that the applicability of the 1961 Rules is made dependent upon an incumbent actually being recognised as having become a member of the service on or before 1 April 2005. Viewed on its plain language it must be held, as this Court does, that entry into service alone would be determinative and since that event would occur only upon the issuance of an actual appointment letter and consequential joining it is these twin facets alone which would govern the issue of applicability of the Old or New Pension Scheme. Unless an incumbent is formally inducted into service, he cannot be viewed as having become a member thereof or a holder of a post. The expression "entering services or posts..." cannot be understood as referring to or hinging upon something inchoate or nebulous. Till such time as the incumbent accepts the offer of appointment and joins on the post, his position remains that of someone waiting at the threshold. It is only once he accepts the appointment, the terms and conditions stipulated therein and joins that he is ordained in service. In view of the aforesaid exposition the Court comes to conclude that the expression "entering" cannot be accorded any other interpretation. That then takes the Court to consider whether Satyesh Kumar Mishra could be said to have been rendered per incuriam. While Mahesh Narayan does so observe on the premise that it fails to notice Firangi Prasad, that would really depend upon whether the Court can on a holistic and careful examination come to the irresistible conclusion that the factual backdrop in which that decision came to be entered and the issue which essentially fell for determination were identical or at least analogous. It must at the outset be noted that Firangi Prasad was not a decision rendered in the backdrop of the 1961 Rules at all. That decision was dealing with a right of an individual to seek regularisation under the provisions of Section 33C of the U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board Act, 1982. The Division Bench in Firangi Prasad observed:- 15. That decision was dealing with a right of an individual to seek regularisation under the provisions of Section 33C of the U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board Act, 1982. The Division Bench in Firangi Prasad observed:- 15. The second contention needs to be examined in the light of the facts that have emerged from the record, namely that the appellant for no fault on his part was kept out of the Institution by the inaction of the Management in spite of the District Inspector of Schools having dispatched the selection order on 18.01.1993. From the facts on record, it is evident that the Manager of the Institution had to perform the ministerial act of issuing a letter of appointment to the appellant in terms of the selection order dated 18.01.1993. The Management admittedly complied with it after much persuasion on 25.08.1993, for which the appellant is nowhere at fault. On the contrary, the appellant had been continuously approaching the Management time and again expressing his willingness to join the Institution. 16. In these circumstances, teachers like the appellant fall within an altogether different class of candidates, who have been wrongfully prevented by the inaction of the Management in joining the Institution. The Management has to perform only a ministerial act and by its inaction, it cannot defeat the legitimate claim of a teacher like appellant. ........ 19. The respondents cannot by their inaction, therefore, deprive a candidate of his or her legitimate right to claim continuance in service. It is, therefore, clear that there was a deliberate delay on the part of the Management in issuing the letter of appointment in the present case and accordingly, the right of the appellant to claim continuance under the selection order dated 18.01.1993 cannot be denied. The appellant will, therefore, be entitled to the benefits flowing out of the order dated 18.01.1993 and in such a situation, the letter of appointment will relate back prior to the cut-off date i.e. 06.08.1993. Section 33C, it may be noted, does not engraft any threshold precondition which may be recognised as controlling access to the benefits enshrined in that provision except to the extent where it prescribes the class of teachers who would be entitled to be considered for regularisation. Section 33C, it may be noted, does not engraft any threshold precondition which may be recognised as controlling access to the benefits enshrined in that provision except to the extent where it prescribes the class of teachers who would be entitled to be considered for regularisation. Secondly, unlike Rule 2(3) of the 1961 Rules, the provision also does not commence with a negative stipulation couched in imperative terms, which may be recognised as a legislative injunct against extension of its benefits. Rule 2(3) in no uncertain terms restricts its applicability and in unequivocal terms debars incumbents entering service after 1 April 2005 from the benefits of those Rules. The structure of Section 33C, in this sense, is clearly distinct and dissimilar. Thirdly, the statutory scheme underlying the 1982 Act must also be appreciated under which the management is to perform only a ministerial act of issuing an appointment letter upon receiving intimation of selection of the incumbent by the Board. In fact and as is evident from Rule 13 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Selection Board Rules, 1998,a structured time frame for issuance of an appointment order is put in place coupled with an obligation upon the Management to report compliance. The decision rendered in Firangi Prasad has to consequently be understood and appreciated in light of what has been noted above. To put it differently, the ratio of Firangi Prasad cannot be appreciated without bearing in mind the distinguishable statutory scheme of the 1982 Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Similarly the reliance placed by the learned Judge on Naveen Kumar Jha v. Union of India and Others14 also appears to be inapposite since that too dealt with a selection for Para Military Forces and does not appear to deal with a provision akin to Rule 2(3). However these pivotal and crucial aspects appear to have been ignored in Mahesh Narayan. The ex facie distinction between Rule 2(3) and Section 33C has clearly not been borne in mind. This perhaps because Rule 2(3) has not even been independently noticed by the learned Judge. However these pivotal and crucial aspects appear to have been ignored in Mahesh Narayan. The ex facie distinction between Rule 2(3) and Section 33C has clearly not been borne in mind. This perhaps because Rule 2(3) has not even been independently noticed by the learned Judge. The judgment in Firangi Prasad dealing as it did with the right of regularisation as conferred by Section 33C and the observations made in its backdrop cannot consequently be recognised as laying down a proposition on the basis of which Satyesh Kumar Mishra, Ram Nakul and Bharat Yadav may be said to have been incorrectly decided or be per incuriam. The decision in Mahesh Narayan insofar as it seeks to draw sustenance from the judgments rendered by the Uttarakhand and Delhi High Courts also does not commend acceptance in light of the aspect which is noticed by the learned Judge in Bharat Yadav, namely, that in none of the decisions rendered by the two High Courts were provisions pari materia to Rule 2(3) shown to apply. On an overall conspectus of the aforesaid, the Court is of the considered view that insofar as the question that arises in this petition is concerned, it must be answered in light of the provisions made in the 1961 Rules and the decisions rendered in Satyesh Kumar Mishra, Ram Nakul and Bharat Yadav have rightly answered the issue by holding that incumbents appointed after 1 April 2005 cannot be recognised as being eligible to claim benefits of the Old Pension Scheme. ‘The Court additionally notes that the provisions of Rule 2(3) of the 1961 Rules are not assailed. The judgment therefore must necessarily proceed on the basis of that it is that provision alone which governs and must dictate the answer to the question posited. That Rule, as noted above, clearly refers to entry into service as being the determinative factor. None of the petitioners here are shown to have entered into service prior to 01 April 2005. The mere fact that the process of recruitment was initiated prior thereto can be of no assistance to their cause of being governed by the Old Pension Scheme. (emphasis supplied) 24. None of the petitioners here are shown to have entered into service prior to 01 April 2005. The mere fact that the process of recruitment was initiated prior thereto can be of no assistance to their cause of being governed by the Old Pension Scheme. (emphasis supplied) 24. Very recently, there are two Bench decisions of this Court in Smt. Neeta Srivstava v. State of U.P. and others, Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:62593-DB and Smt. Sushma Yadav v. State of U.P. and others Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:38423. Both these decisions relate to appointment of primary teachers, who appear to have joined the Special BTC Course prior to introduction of the NPS, but passed it after commencement of the said scheme. The decisions appear to have turned on the holding in Ravi Raj and Ram Nakul, and emphasized that the expression “entering” cannot be accorded any other interpretation, but that the applicability of the NPS would be governed by the date of the employee actually joining service. All employees entering service with effect from 01.04.2005 would be governed by the NPS. The Court held that the rights of the writ-petitioner appellants were squarely covered by the judgment in Ravi Raj and Ram Nakul. This Court, therefore, assumes that the rights of the writ-petitioner appellants were indeed governed by the Rules of 1961, because, the event in the appeal turned on interpretation of the expression “entering services”, which is referable to the said rule and no other. The interpretation that Rule 2(3) of the Rules of 1961 has received in Bharat Yadav and Ravi Raj is applicable to the Establishment, to which the said Rules apply; not to Establishments to which these do not apply. The decision of the Division Bench in Smt. Sushma Yadav is, therefore, an authority in relation to an Establishment, to which the Rules of 1961 apply. 25. The other Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Neeta Srivastava (supra)relates to a case where the writ-petitioner appellant had applied for admission in the BTC course in the academic session 2000-01, in response to an advertisement made in the month of October, 2000. She appeared in the test, but, did not succeed. She said that there were some mistakes in the answer-sheet in the BTC entrance test. She appeared in the test, but, did not succeed. She said that there were some mistakes in the answer-sheet in the BTC entrance test. The petitioner-appellant instituted Writ Petition No. 3060 (M/S) of 2001 before the Lucknow Bench, which dismissed her petition vide order dated 06.11.2001, with a direction to the Director of Basic Education to consider the writ petitioner-appellant’s case. She again challenged the order rejecting her claim made by the Director of Basic Education in Writ -A No. 21149 of 2002. The writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge videjudgment and order dated 22.07.2003 and a direction issued to the respondents to permit the petitioner to pursue her regular BTC course, in the next academic session in any institution across the State. She was allowed two years to complete her BTC course. The writ petitioner-appellant could not complete her BTC course on account of some discrepancy in the select list of BTC 2000-01. The petitioner did not complete her course along with other candidates in the academic year of which she was a part. The others, who completed it on time, were selected in the BTC course of the same academic year as the writ petitioner-appellant and their result was declared on 09.02.2003. After completing their course, the other similarly circumstanced candidates were permitted to join in the year 2003 and given benefit of the OPS, the NPS being enforced with effect from 01.04.2005. The petitioner completed her BTC training course, after commencement of the NPS and the contention on behalf of the respondents was that she cannot be given benefit of the OPS. 26. In dismissing the writ petition, from which the appeal in Smt. Neeta Srivastava arose, it was reasoned by the learned Single Judge that acquisition of a BTC qualification is altogether different from securing an appointment to a Teacher’s post. Acquisition of the qualification makes the candidate eligible for appointment. The petitioner was appointed on 21.01.2006, that is to say, after the cut-off date, and therefore, denied benefit of the OPS. The Division Bench did not interfere with the aforesaid reasoning of the learned Single Judge in Smt. Neeta Srivastava. Now, Smt. Neeta Srivastava is a case where the petitioner’s appointment was not a crystallized right before the NPS came into force with effect from 01.04.2005. The Division Bench did not interfere with the aforesaid reasoning of the learned Single Judge in Smt. Neeta Srivastava. Now, Smt. Neeta Srivastava is a case where the petitioner’s appointment was not a crystallized right before the NPS came into force with effect from 01.04.2005. The Contributory Provident Fund Rules considered in Smt. Neeta Srivastava are said to have come into effect from 07.04.2005, whereas the writ petitioner in that case was appointed on 21.01.2006, much after the cut-off date. 27. The crux of the matter in Smt. Neeta Srivastava, therefore, lies in the fact that the acquisition of BTC qualification is not the same thing as a crystallized right to appointment. The appointment in that case came much after the petitioner earned her BTC degree and was appointed on 21.01.2006, which is after the cut-off date. A reading of this decision also shows that it turns upon a principle that is dependent on the way the right of the petitioner has crystallized, which is different from the one involved in this case. The very detailed remarks in Ravi Raj, which we have extensively quoted, show how differently the principle about cut-off date would apply to different rules applicable in various Establishments and the way the right to appointment has crystallized with reference to the cutoff date. It is for the said reason that we have remarked earlier that there is no thumb rule about the applicability of the cut-off date with reference to the joining of a candidate in every Establishment, irrespective of the rules governing it and, of course, irrespective of manner in which the right to be appointed has crystallized with reference to a particular point of time or date. 28. During the hearing, our attention was also drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Rachna Hills and others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 506. Now, Rachna Hills (supra) is a case about the rules that would apply to recruitment, where they have undergone a change between commencement of the recruitment process and before its conclusion. The cases, which are three in number, pertain to minority institutions, where, amongst others, the plea raised was that a different and nominally regulative regime by State-Authorities in the matter of recruitment applies. The cases, which are three in number, pertain to minority institutions, where, amongst others, the plea raised was that a different and nominally regulative regime by State-Authorities in the matter of recruitment applies. This case was generally not about determination of a cut-off date for an employee to be governed by a particular kind of scheme relating to terminal benefits or some other rights with reference to the date of his appointment. The case essentially was about what recruitment rules would be applicable if there was a change after commencement of process. Three issues were considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and amongst these, Issue No. 3 can alone have some bearing. In the leading appeal, Rakha Balika Inter College, Fatehgarh in the District of Farrukhabad is a recognized aided minority institution, that teaches scholars up to the intermediate level. On 04.10.2017, the College issued an advertisement, inviting applications from eligible candidates for selection and appointment to three posts of Assistant Teachers. The Selection Committee constituted by the College interviewed the candidates and by its recommendations dated 17.01.2018, short-listed and recommended the names of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to the appeal for appointment to the College. The College Management accepted the recommendation and by their letter dated 10.02.2018, sought approval of the District Inspector of Schools[‘DIOS’ for short]. The DIOS, by his letter dated 08.03.2018, informed the Management that the proposal for approval is incomplete and called for some necessary information with supporting documents. Before the College could send the necessary information, the regulations governing the process of appointment were amended. The amended regulations came into force with effect from 20.03.2018. The DIOS, therefore, by his letter dated 14.03.2018, returned the papers to the College with a request to undertake the recruitment according to the amended regulations. 29. The three respondents, who were the selected candidates, challenged the decision of the DIOS by filing a writ petition before this Court. The learned Single Judge set aside the directions of the DIOS, ordering him to reconsider the decision on ground that the amended regulations would not apply to the selection process that had attained finality. There were other issues also about deemed approval that were decided. The learned Single Judge set aside the directions of the DIOS, ordering him to reconsider the decision on ground that the amended regulations would not apply to the selection process that had attained finality. There were other issues also about deemed approval that were decided. The State of Uttar Pradesh filed a Special Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which too was dismissed, and that is how the matter came up before their Lordships of the Supreme Court by Special Leave. Issue No. 3, of which we have spoken earlier and the holding of their Lordships regarding it, reads thus : Re issue no. 3 : Whether the posts of teachers could be filled as per the Rules and Regulations that existed when the vacancies arose and not as per the amended Regulations? 28. The Division Bench, as well as the Single Judge of the High Court, accepted the submission of the selected candidates that the vacancies to the post of teachers could be filled only as per the Rules and Regulations that operated when the vacancies arose and not as per the Regulations that came to be amended thereafter. 29. We have already held that approval of DIOS is mandatory and that the Act injuncts the appointment of a Teacher without such approval. We have also held that the legal regime concerning the appointment of Teachers does not contemplate any concept of deemed appointment if the DIOS does not decide upon the proposal within 15 days. Under these circumstances, the reference to and reliance on the principle that Rules that existed at the time when vacancies arose will govern the appointments is misplaced. 30. In any event, it is now a settled principle of law that a candidate has a right to be considered in the light of existing Rules, which implies Rules in force as on the date of consideration. This principle is affirmed by this Court in Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P.16, as below: “26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the “rule in force” on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah case lays down any particular time-frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants has been taken away by the amendment.” 31. While reaffirming the above referred principle, in a subsequent case of Rajasthan State Sports Council v. Uma Dadhich, (in which one of us was a member Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J., as he then was). This Court noted: “5. There is merit in the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants that the respondent had no vested right to promotion but only a right to be considered in accordance with the rules as they existed on the date when the case for promotion was taken up. This principle has been reiterated in several decisions of this Court. (See H.S. Grewal v. Union of India, Deepak Agarwal v. State of U.P., State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty and Union of India v. Krishna Kumar.” (emphasis supplied) 32. In a recent decision, in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar, after reviewing a number of decisions on the same subject, this Court formulated the following principles: “70. A review of the fifteen cases that have distinguished Rangaiah would demonstrate that this Court has been consistently carving out exceptions to the broad proposition formulated in Rangaiah. The findings in these judgments, that have a direct bearing on the proposition formulated by Rangaiah are as under: 1. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must be necessarily filled on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose, Rangaiah's case must be understood in the context of the rules involved therein. 2. There is no rule of universal application that vacancies must be necessarily filled on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose, Rangaiah's case must be understood in the context of the rules involved therein. 2. It is now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has a right to be considered in the light of the existed rules, which implies the “rule in force” as on the date consideration takes place. The right to be considered for promotion occurs on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. 3. The Government is entitled to take a conscious policy decision not to fill up the vacancies arising prior to the amendment of the rules. The employee does not acquire any vested right to being considered for promotion in accordance with the repealed rules in view of the policy decision taken by the Government. There is no obligation for the Government to make appointments as per the old rules in the event of restructuring of the cadre is intended for efficient working of the unit. The only requirement is that the policy decisions of the Government must be fair and reasonable and must be justified on the touchstone of Article 14. 4. The principle in Rangaiah need not be applied merely because posts were created, as it is not obligatory for the appointing authority to fill up the posts immediately. 5. When there is no statutory duty cast upon the State to consider appointments to vacancies that existed prior to the amendment, the State cannot be directed to consider the cases.” (emphasis supplied) 33. In view of the clear enunciation of the law, we have no hesitation in rejecting the submission made by the learned counsels for the Respondents, that the vacancies that existed prior to the amendment of Regulation 17 of Chapter II, must be governed by unamended rules. 30. The principle, that is deducible from the holding in Rachna Hills is that the rules of recruitment, before rights are vested, can be changed after the process of recruitment has commenced. The rigour of the rule in Y.V. Rangaiah and others v. J. Sreenivasa Rao and others, (1983) 3 SCC 284 has been relaxed in State of Himanchal Pradesh and others v. Raj Kumar and others, (2023) 3 SCC 773 , which has been approved in Rachna Hills. The rigour of the rule in Y.V. Rangaiah and others v. J. Sreenivasa Rao and others, (1983) 3 SCC 284 has been relaxed in State of Himanchal Pradesh and others v. Raj Kumar and others, (2023) 3 SCC 773 , which has been approved in Rachna Hills. This principle would not have much and direct bearing on the issue whether the cut-off date for application of the NPS in a particular establishment would apply in the given case or not. As already said in good measure, it would depend upon the relevant rules, in terms of which, the cut-off date for enforcement of the NPS is prescribed and enforced. It would also depend upon the facts of a particular case, if the rights of a candidate to be appointed have crystallized well before the cut-off date and joining the Establishment is nothing more than a forcefully resisted formality. In some cases, the rule may have a different bearing on this issue, like Rule 2(3) of the Rules of 1961. Reference in this connection must be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in P. Ranjitharaj v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 508. In P. Ranjitharaj (supra), 53 vacancies of Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade-II were advertised by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission vide an advertisement dated 09.11.2001. After the selection process was over, a final select list was sent by the Commission to the State Government carrying recommendation in favour of 51 persons, including those who were lower in merit to the appellants before their Lordships. Nevertheless, vide Government Order dated 24.09.2022, the persons lower in merit to the appellants were appointed. The appellants' name, however, were withheld for want of verification and clearance from the Commission. The Commission, on verification, granted clearance to the appellants and intimated the fact to the State Government on 03.09.2002, that is to say, much before appointments were made in favour of persons lower down in merit on 24.09.2002. The State Government, nevertheless, withheld the appellants' appointments and finally, they were appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade-II on 23rd of August, 2005 and 23rd of April, 2004 respectively. The State Government, nevertheless, withheld the appellants' appointments and finally, they were appointed as Assistant Public Prosecutor Grade-II on 23rd of August, 2005 and 23rd of April, 2004 respectively. In the meantime, videnotification dated 6th of August, 2003, an amendment was made to the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 with effect from 01.04.2003, where a proviso was added to Rule 2 in terms that the rules will not apply to government servants appointed on or after 01.04.2003 to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State, which are borne on pensionable Establishments. Therefore, the cutoff date for the OPS or the Pension Scheme was 01.04.2003. The persons lower down in merit and selected along with the petitioners, but appointed on 24.09.2002, got the benefit of the pension scheme under the unamended rule, whereas, the petitioners were deprived of it, because they were appointed in the year 2004-2005. It was in the context of these facts that the writ petitioners challenged denial of the OPS to them for the New Contributory Pension Scheme. The appellants failed before the High Court and on appeal by Special Leave, the Supreme Court, in P. Ranjitharaj held : 11. After we have heard counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the material available on record, in our considered view, the premise on which the High Court has proceeded is not sustainable for the reason that the appellants along with other applicants had participated in the self-same selection process pursuant to advertisement dated 9th September, 2001 held for the post of APP Grade II and verification was made by the Commission in the case of the present appellants on 3rd September, 2002. 12. In the given circumstances, when those who are lower in order of merit to the appellants were appointed by an order dated 24th September, 2002, the appellants have no right of say in the matter of appointment and no justification has been tendered by the State respondent as to why their names were withheld for two/three years, when their names were cleared by the Commission on 3rdSeptember, 2002 and sent to the State Government and finally appointments were made of the appellants on 23rd August, 2005 and 23rd April, 2004 respectively and the delay indeed in making appointments in the case of the present appellants in no manner could be attributable to them. 13. 13. In the given circumstances, when all other candidates who had participated along with the appellants pursuant to advertisement dated 9th November, 2001, on the recommendations made by the Commission were appointed on 24thSeptember, 2002 including those who are lower in the order of merit, there appears no reason for withholding the names of the present appellants and merely because they were appointed at a later point of time, would not deprive them from claiming to become a member of Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978, which is applicable to the employees who were appointed on or before 1st April, 2003. 31. The principle discernible from P. Ranjitharaj is that if there is denial to join, despite due selection on a much earlier date, leading to delay and pushing the appointment to the wrong side of the cut-off date, with reference to enforcement of the NPS, delay on the Establishment’s part for no fault of the employee in permitting the selectee to join in time would not lead to deprivation of the right to be governed by the OPS. There is an element of discrimination in the ratio in P. Ranjitharaj, because similarly circumstanced employees lower in merit had been appointed, well within time and on the right side of the cut-off date, so as to avail the benefit of the OPS. The principle is, therefore, both about discrimination of similarly circumstanced persons and arbitrariness on the Establishment’s part in delaying the appointment, which the principle in P. Ranjitharaj holds to work back the rights of a selected candidate, prior to the cut-off date, even though the appointment was after the cut-off date. The prohibitive language of the proviso to Rule 2 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978 was held not to come in the way of considering the petitioner’s appointment with reference to a prior date, unlike the decisions of the learned Single Judges in Ravi Raj, Bharat Yadav and Satyesh Kumar Mishra. 32. The last decision to be pressed in aid by the respondents is the Supreme Court’s holding in Rajmati Devi. The facts in Rajmati Devi can best be recapitulated in the words of their Lordships, that figure in paragraph No. 2 of the report. These read : 2. The husband of respondent No. 1 herein joined the Bihar Research Society, an autonomous society registered under Societies Act, as a peon. The facts in Rajmati Devi can best be recapitulated in the words of their Lordships, that figure in paragraph No. 2 of the report. These read : 2. The husband of respondent No. 1 herein joined the Bihar Research Society, an autonomous society registered under Societies Act, as a peon. The said society was taken over by the Government of Bihar vide Bihar Research Society (Taking Over) Act, 2007. By resolution dated 31.08.2005, the State abolished the Old Pension Rules i.e., Bihar Pension Rules, 1950 and replaced the same with New Pension Scheme i.e., Bihar Government Servant Contributory Pension Scheme, 2005, w.e.f. 01.09.2005. As per the New Pension Scheme, the employees appointed after 31.08.2005 shall be governed by the new contributary pension scheme under which the government employees appointed after 31.08.2005 shall not be entitled to the pension/family pension. The Bihar Research Society (Taking Over) Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2007) came into force on 02.03.2009 resulting in taking over of the Institute/Society where the husband of respondent No. 1 was working. The husband of respondent No. 1 died on 23.03.2013 while in service. The employees of the aforesaid Society were taken into government service vide order dated 25.03.2014 w.e.f. 02.03.2009. A corrigendum came to be issued by the State of Bihar amending the employment order dated 25.03.2014 substituting the word “appointed” with the word “absorbed”. Clause 6 was inserted by the corrigendum stating that prior to date of acquisition, the service would not be calculated as government service. That respondent No. 1 filed the writ petition before the High Court praying for family pension and other retiral benefits. By judgment and order dated 02.09.2015, the learned Single Judge allowed the said writ petition and directed the State to pay the family pension to respondent No. 1 from the date of her husband's death i.e., 23.03.2013. 33. On these facts, the writ petitioner-respondent was held entitled to family pension by the learned Single and the State’s Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the Patna High Court failed. On appeal by Special Leave to their Lordships, the judgment of the High Court was reversed. It was held in Rajmati Devi thus : 11. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the husband of respondent No. 1 came to be absorbed in the government service in the year 2014 w.e.f. 02.03.2009. On appeal by Special Leave to their Lordships, the judgment of the High Court was reversed. It was held in Rajmati Devi thus : 11. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the husband of respondent No. 1 came to be absorbed in the government service in the year 2014 w.e.f. 02.03.2009. Till 02.03.2009, he remained the employee of the Bihar Research Society, of which he was an employee and working. The Old Pension Rules, 1950 came to be abolished and the New Contributory Pension Scheme came to be introduced w.e.f. 01.09.2005. Under the New Contributory Pension Scheme, there is no provision for pension/family pension. As per the Scheme, all those who are appointed after 31.08.2005 shall be governed by the New Contributory Pension Scheme. Therefore, at the time when the husband of respondent No. 1, who died in the year 2013, was absorbed, the Old Pension Rules were abolished and the New Contributory Pension Scheme was in existence. As per the corrigendum issued in the appointment order and as per clause 6, the prior service rendered by the concerned employee prior to his absorption shall not be treated as a government service. Therefore, the husband of respondent No. 1 can be said to be a government servant and in government service w.e.f. 02.03.2009 only. Therefore, the husband of respondent No. 1 was governed by the New Contributory Pension Scheme under which there is no provision for the pension/family pension. Therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error in directing the appellant to pay the family pension to respondent No. 1 applying the Old Pension Rules, which were appliable prior to 31.08.2005. The aforesaid aspect has not been considered by the High Court at all and the learned Single Judge simply considered that on the death of the husband of respondent No. 1, who died in harness while in service, respondent No. 1 is entitled to the family pension under family pension scheme. However, the High Court has not at all considered that on coming into force the New Contributory Pension Scheme, no government employee appointed after 31.08.2005 shall be entitled to any other benefit except under the New Contributory Pension Scheme. However, the High Court has not at all considered that on coming into force the New Contributory Pension Scheme, no government employee appointed after 31.08.2005 shall be entitled to any other benefit except under the New Contributory Pension Scheme. In that view of the matter, respondent No. 1 shall not be entitled to the family pension under the Old Pension Rules, which were not appliable at the time when the husband of respondent No. 1 came to be absorbed in the government service w.e.f. 02.03.2009. 34. Now, Rajmati Devi was a case where the absorption of the petitioner's husband was effected in the year 2014 with effect from 02.03.2009. The petitioner’s husband became a government servant from a servant of the Society, upon being absorbed with effect from 02.03.2009, by adjustment videSection 5 of the Bihar Research Society (Taking Over) Act, 2007. The principle, on which the decision turned, was that until 02.03.2009, the petitioner’s husband was an employee of the Society. The Old Pension Rules, 1950 came to be abolished and the New Contributory Pension Scheme introduced with effect from 01.09.2005. The New Contributory Pension Scheme has no provision for pension or family pension. Under the NPS, any government servant appointed after 31.08.2005 would be governed by the New Contributory Pension Scheme. Their Lordships reasoned that at the time when the first respondent-husband died in the year 2013 after absorption in government service with effect from 02.03.2009, the New Contributory Pension Scheme was in force. He was governed by it and not by the OPS. The facts and terms of abolition of the OPS would show that there was absolutely no case in Rajmati Devi about any right to appointment to government service being crystallized on a date prior to the enforcement of the New Contributory Pension Scheme. Therefore, the principle in the said decision would hardly be attracted to the facts of the present case. This Court is of opinion that the decisions in Ravi Raj, Bharat Yadav, Satyesh Kumar Mishra, Smt. Neeta Srivastava, Smt. Sushma Yadav and Rajmati Devi are not at all attracted to the petitioner’s rights, that are determined in accordance with the NPS introduced with effect from 01.04.2010 in terms of the bipartite settlement and the joint note dated 27.04.2010 carried in the Bank’s circular dated 04.01.2012. The reason is that while there is no doubt that the circular relies on the terms of the bipartite settlement and the joint note dated 27.04.2010 says that the employees joining the service of the Bank on or after 01.04.2010 are eligible for the defined contributory pension scheme or the NPS, as distinguished from the OPS, which the learned Counsel for the petitioner claims, the moot question is – Can the petitioner be said to have joined the service of the Bank on or after 01.04.2010? For a fact, the petitioner joined on 21.08.2012, after the Supreme Court dismissed the Bank’s Special Leave Petition against the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. But, a look at the rights of the petitioner would show that a final letter of appointment was issued to him on 30.05.2008, which the petitioner says he promptly accepted on 12.06.2008. Thus, the petitioner’s rights to be appointed stood crystallized on 30.05.2008 and in no event, beyond 12.06.2008, when he transmitted his acceptance to the Bank. 35. The averments in paragraph No. 5, which include the one which says that the petitioner sent his acceptance by speed post on 12.06.2008 has not been denied in paragraph No. 7 of the counter affidavit, which says that the petitioner does not fulfill the maximum age criteria, as prescribed by the Bank. Therefore, the fact that the petitioner dispatched his acceptance to the appointment offered to him vide appointment letter dated 30.05.2008 is admitted by non traverse. 36. Here, this Court must remark that the assertion in paragraph No. 7 of the counter affidavit to the effect that the petitioner does not fulfill the maximum age criteria is a very irresponsible plea, given the fact that it is on the basis of the said stand that the respondents have delayed the petitioner joining his post way back on 12.06.2008, when he appeared before the General Manager, Bank of Baroda, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand Zone, Lucknow for joining and fought him right up to the Supreme Court, losing miserably on the said plea. It is not expected of the Bank that this kind of an irresponsible plea would be raised at this stage, having lost the issue throughout up to the Supreme Court. 37. It is not expected of the Bank that this kind of an irresponsible plea would be raised at this stage, having lost the issue throughout up to the Supreme Court. 37. It is also to be remarked that the plea in paragraph No. 5 of the writ petition that the petitioner appeared to join his duties before the General Manager, Bank of Baroda, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand Zone, Lucknow and upon his direction, underwent medical examination, where the doctor certified him fit, are also facts which have not been denied in paragraph No. 7 of the counter affidavit. Therefore, the only inference that can be drawn is that the petitioner was not only issued with a final appointment letter dated 30.05.2008, which was accepted by the petitioner on 12.06.2008, but also the petitioner reported to join his duties before the General Manager, Bank of Baroda on 12.06.2008. He underwent medical examination too, where he was found medically fit for Bank service. But, afterwards the impugned order dated 18.06.2008 was passed saying that the petitioner was overage and withdrawing the offer of appointment, which the petitioner had already accepted and reported for duty. The petitioner would have joined on 12.06.2008, or within a day or so thereafter. The petitioner could not join, because, by the impugned order dated 18.06.2008, the appointment letter was cancelled. The petitioner successfully challenged it before the Division Bench of this Court in writ petition, being Service Bench No. 1153 of 2010, which was allowed vide judgment and order dated 04.05.2012 in terms of the following orders : In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The order dated 18.06.2008 passed by the General Manager (H.R. & Marketing), Bank of Baroda (respondent no. 2), contained as Annexure no. 1 to the writ petition is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to permit the petitioner to join the duties in pursuance of the appointment order dated 30.05.2008. (emphasis by Court) 38. A perusal of the operative portion of the order at the end of the judgment dated 04.05.2012 passed by the Division Bench would show that the order cancelling the appointment letter issued to the petitioner was not only quashed, but a mandamus issued to the respondents, ordering them to permit the petitioner to join duties in pursuance of the appointment order dated 30.05.2008. Thus, this is a case where the petitioner’s rights are traceable to the appointment order dated 30.05.2008 by dint of the judgment of the Division Bench. This judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court, summarily dismissing the Bank’s Special Leave Petition vide order dated 23.07.2012 and directing the Bank to implement the order of the Division Bench within a period of four weeks from the date of their Lordships order dismissing the Special Leave Petition. The construction of the petitioner’s rights, in the backdrop of the fact that he had accepted the order of appointment way back on 12.06.2008 and reported for duty on the said date, read together with the effect of the judgment of the Division Bench dated 04.05.2012, spares no shadow of doubt that the petitioner’s appointment in the service of the Bank would have to relate back to 30.05.2008 notionally, though not actually. 39. The construction placed by the Bank on the terms of their Circular dated 04.01.2024, emphasizing the words “joining the service of the Bank on or after 01.09.2010” would render the judgment of the Division Bench, as approved by the Supreme Court, nugatory and otiose. The petitioner’s rights in this case would have to be held traceable on a notional basis to the date of the appointment letter and, for the most, on the date when he accepted it, that is to say, 12.06.2008, when he also reported for joining duties. The petitioner, must, therefore, be regarded, for the purpose of the pension scheme, to have joined the service of the Bank on the date of the letter of appointment or, at the most, on the date he accepted it, that is to say, on 12.06.2008 and reported for duty. Any other construction on the rights of the petitioner vis-à-vis applicability of the OPS would lead to a refusal by the Court to abate gross illegalities, manifest in the Bank’s action. In the view that this Court takes, the principle in P. Ranjitharaj laid down by the Supreme Court is clearly attracted. Any other construction on the rights of the petitioner vis-à-vis applicability of the OPS would lead to a refusal by the Court to abate gross illegalities, manifest in the Bank’s action. In the view that this Court takes, the principle in P. Ranjitharaj laid down by the Supreme Court is clearly attracted. The Bank may have taken the petitioner on their Establishment from the date of his effective joining and paid him salary from the said date, but notionally, his rights have to be worked out and traced back to the date of the letter of appointment and for the most, its acceptance, which is before the cut-off date i.e. 01.04.2010, when the defined contributory pension was introduced. The petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of the OPS in whatever manner it would work out to determine his rights, after resignation from the Bank’s service. 40. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. A mandamusis issued to respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to treat the petitioner notionally in service with effect from 30.05.2008 or, for the most, with effect from 12.06.2008 and grant all consequential terminal benefits that he is entitled to, upon resignation from service, in accordance with the OPS, within a period of six weeks of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Costs easy. 41. Let this order be communicated to the Chairman and Managing Director, Bank of Baroda, Baroda Corporate Centre, C-26, G-Block, Bandra Kurla Complex, Mumbai and the General Manager (HR and Marketing), Bank of Baroda, Baroda Complex Centre, C-26, G-Block, Bandra Kurla Complex, Mumbai through the Registrar General, Bombay High Court by the Registrar General of this Court. Let this order be also communicated to the Assistant General Manager, Allahabad Region, Bank of Baroda Regional Office, Dwarka Bhawan, Tagore Town, Allahabad (now Prayagraj) by the Registrar (Compliance).