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2024 DIGILAW 1386 (ALL)

Yasmeen Talat Usmani v. State of Uttar Pradesh

2024-05-23

J.J.MUNIR

body2024
JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. This writ petition has been instituted by the widow of a deceased employee of the Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, Lucknow (for short, 'the Corporation'), praying that a mandamus be issued directing the respondents to refund the deducted sum of Rs.5,62,745/-out of the gratuity payable to her for her deceased husband's services, along with interest at the admissible rate. 2. The petitioner's husband was a Patrolman, a Class-IV employee, appointed against a regular vacancy on 01.04.1976, after following the procedure prescribed. He was promoted to the post of a Technician Grade-II (for short, 'TG-II') in the office of the Executive Engineer, Pashchimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Bulandshahr. In the year 2007, the petitioner's husband was TG-II In-charge in the Division of the Executive Engineer and while still in harness, he passed away on 24.07.2007. The respondents say that some receipt book was issued to the deceased employee for the purpose of ensuring collection of revenue from consumers. The deceased employee, after collecting the dues of the Pashchimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (for short, 'the Distribution Corporation') from consumers, deposited it in the Distribution Corporation's account. Later on, the Executive Engineer issued a letter dated 17.05.2007 to the petitioner's husband, directing him to submit his explanation and return the receipt books, and something called an RR Statement etc. The details of receipt books, with their number and date of issue, were given in the letter issued to the deceased employee. The petitioner's husband deposited the revenue receipt books on 17.05.2007. The Executive Engineer proceeded to issue a letter dated 22.05.2007 to the deceased employee, informing him that a total sum of Rs.6,65,985/-was recovered by him on the basis of receipts available from consumers, but a sum of Rs.1,26,576/-alone was deposited in the Distribution Corporation's account. The balance sum of Rs.5,40,467/-be deposited, failing which penal action would be taken against him. 3. The allegation levelled against the deceased employee was that some receipt books for revenue collection were issued to the employee to facilitate collection on behalf of the Distribution Corporation, but when the receipt books were returned, the discrepancy, as aforesaid, in the sum of money collected in revenue from consumers and that deposited, was detected. On these allegations, the Assistant Accounts Officer got an FIR lodged against the deceased employee on 31.05.2007. On these allegations, the Assistant Accounts Officer got an FIR lodged against the deceased employee on 31.05.2007. On the selfsame allegations, the deceased employee was placed under suspension vide order dated 01.06.2007. Surprisingly, the order of suspension does not say if it is passed pending or in contemplation of inquiry or pending criminal investigation, though it says that the employee is being placed under suspension finding him prima facie guilty of embezzling a sum of Rs.5,40,467/-. 4. It is the petitioner's case that the allegation against the petitioner's husband, about non-deposit of the entire revenue collected from consumers, is baseless and he did not commit any embezzlement of the Distribution Corporation's moneys. It is averred that no inquiry in this regard was conducted or the liability determined in any departmental proceedings against the deceased employee. It was only an allegation and nothing more. The FIR, that was registered against the petitioner's husband, did not lead to any charge-sheet being filed against him in Court. He died on 24.07.2007, and the Investigating Officer submitted a Final Report on 02.06.2009. It was accepted by the Court on the same day. It must be remarked that the Final Report was submitted as the accused was dead and no proceedings could be taken. 5. On 27.06.2007, the Superintending Engineer wrote a letter to the Executive Officer saying that the sum of Rs.5,40,467/-, which appears prima facie embezzled by the employee, be recovered from the petitioner's husband and departmental proceedings initiated against him. Apparently, by that time, the employee was already dead, a fact of which the Superintending Engineer does not appear to have been aware. It is averred that the letter dated 27.06.2007 from the Superintending Engineer shows that, until the petitioner's husband's demise on 24.07.2007, no departmental proceedings had ever been initiated against him. The further case of the petitioner is that no charge-sheet was issued to the employee during his lifetime, or any action taken against him in accordance with law to recover the sum of money that was alleged to have been embezzled by him. On 07.10.2009, the Executive Engineer wrote a letter to the Panel Lawyer, representing the respondents, seeking his advice in the matter. The letter said that the petitioner's husband had caused a loss of Rs.5,63,000/-, but no liability had been fixed and the Police had submitted a Final Report. On 07.10.2009, the Executive Engineer wrote a letter to the Panel Lawyer, representing the respondents, seeking his advice in the matter. The letter said that the petitioner's husband had caused a loss of Rs.5,63,000/-, but no liability had been fixed and the Police had submitted a Final Report. The learned Panel Lawyer gave opinion that the sum of money aforesaid can be recovered from the funds payable to the deceased employee's heirs. 6. The petitioner made a number of applications, seeking payment of death-cum-retirement benefits, including family pension and gratuity, but none were paid for a long time. One of these representations dated 23.06.2010 is annexed to the writ petition. A letter dated 27.09.2010 was written by the Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division-II, Distribution Corporation to the Superintending Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division-I, Bulandshahr, saying that there are no outstandings against the petitioner, except the sum of Rs.5,62,745/-, on account of revenue collected from the consumers, but not deposited by the deceased employee. An entry to that effect had been made in his pension papers with a request that after deducting the said sum of money from the gratuity payable to the petitioner, the necessary papers be made available to the Executive Engineer. 7. In furtherance of the letter dated 27.09.2010, the petitioner's family pension and all other dues were sanctioned and paid, but the sum of Rs.5,62,745/-was deducted from the gratuity payable to her on account of her husband's services illegally. The total sum of gratuity payable was a sum of Rs.8,33,052/-, from which the deduction was illegally made. 8. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the aforesaid illegal deduction, made a representation dated 28.10.2010 to the Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division-II, Bulandshahr, demanding payment of the sum of Rs.5,62,745/-, illegally deducted from the gratuity payable. It is the petitioner's case that since no liability had been fixed while the deceased was alive and no inquiry held during his lifetime, determining the liability, the respondents have no right to deduct the sum of money from the gratuity payable to the petitioner, merely on the basis of an allegation. It is specifically pleaded that neither departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner's husband, nor any inquiry conducted nor a show cause notice issued in this regard to the petitioner's husband, after he was placed under suspension. It is specifically pleaded that neither departmental proceedings were initiated against the petitioner's husband, nor any inquiry conducted nor a show cause notice issued in this regard to the petitioner's husband, after he was placed under suspension. It is averred that without conducting disciplinary proceedings, affording due opportunity to the deceased employee while alive, no deduction can be made from his gratuity. The deduction is castigated as illegal. The fact of embezzlement is denied by the petitioner, who claims refund of the sum of money deducted from the gratuity paid to her on account of her husband's services. 9. It is also averred that the deceased employee was never terminated or removed from service during his lifetime and for the said reason, no deduction could be made from his gratuity in violation of Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short, 'the Act of 1972'). There is also reliance placed on a Board Order dated 10.03.1997, an order of the former State Electricity Board, said to be still in force, which prohibits recovery from the death-cum-retirement dues of a deceased employee, where the liability has not been fixed during his lifetime after issue of a show cause. Attention of the Court is also invited to the otherwise very obvious proposition of law, which the aforesaid Board Order incorporates that upon the death of an employee, departmental proceedings or judicial proceedings pending against him would abate. 10. A notice of motion was issued in the case on 18.10.2023 and a counter affidavit filed in Court on behalf of respondent No. 4 on 28.11.2023. Respondent No. 2, represented by Mr. Raj Kumar Mishra, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Abhishek Srivastava, learned Counsel, made a statement that they waive their right to file a counter affidavit as they were proforma parties. A rejoinder affidavit was also filed. When the matter came up before the Court on 13.12.2023, the parties having exchanged affidavits, it was admitted to hearing, which proceeded forthwith and concluded on that day. Judgment was reserved. 11. Heard Mr. Bhagwan Dutt Pandey, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ridham Gupta, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Kaushalendra Nath Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Distribution Corporation, Mr. Raj Kumar Mishra, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Abhishek Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation and Ms. Judgment was reserved. 11. Heard Mr. Bhagwan Dutt Pandey, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ridham Gupta, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Kaushalendra Nath Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Distribution Corporation, Mr. Raj Kumar Mishra, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Abhishek Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Corporation and Ms. Amrita Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State. 12. This Court having heard learned Counsel for the parties finds that for a fact it is not disputed that during his lifetime, the petitioner's husband was not found guilty on any charge of embezzlement, either in departmental proceedings or by a Court of law. There is no material on record to show that except for the respondents' stand that he had not accounted for a sum of Rs.5,40,467/-that he had collected in revenue from consumers, an order was ever made by any competent officer of the Distribution Corporation, holding the petitioner's husband liable for the aforesaid sum of money. This could have been done during the petitioner's husband's lifetime in more than one ways. This liability could have been determined in consequence of disciplinary proceedings taken against the petitioner's husband, where the Disciplinary Authority could have held him liable for the aforesaid loss caused to the Distribution Corporation. In addition, there could be some basis for the Distribution Corporation to recover from the petitioner's husband's death-cum-retirement benefits, if he had been held guilty of embezzling the sum of money in question by a Court of competent criminal jurisdiction after trial. There was still this possibility of holding the petitioner's husband liable during his lifetime, in some kind of a summary proceeding by issuing a show cause notice to the employee and asking him to demonstrate why the sum of money in question be not recovered from him. In that case, after due opportunity, an order directing recovery passed against the petitioner's husband, could then be made the basis of recovery from the death-cum-retirement benefits due to the deceased's employee in the petitioner's hands. 13. A perusal of the stand taken in the counter affidavit does not show that any such course of action was taken by the Distribution Corporation during the lifetime of the petitioner's husband. No order passed after hearing the petitioner's husband, fixing liability against him, is in existence. 13. A perusal of the stand taken in the counter affidavit does not show that any such course of action was taken by the Distribution Corporation during the lifetime of the petitioner's husband. No order passed after hearing the petitioner's husband, fixing liability against him, is in existence. If there were such an order indeed, it would have been annexed to the counter affidavit. In the absence of a determination of liability for the petitioner's husband made during his lifetime by some method acknowledged in law, it does not appear to be at all permissible to recover from his widow, in whose hands the deceased employee's death-cum-retirement benefits have come. 14. The second point, on which parties have been much at issue, is a letter written by the petitioner to the Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division-II of the Distribution Corporation at Bulandshahr, where she has said that she assures the Engineer that if the Corporation pays the death-cum-retirement benefits due to her on account of her husband's services, she is ready to deposit, after receipt of her dues, any outstandings against her husband, payable to the Distribution Corporation in accordance with rules. Now, this application was apparently made by the petitioner when the death-cum-retirement benefits due to her husband, were all withheld. Apart from the fact that the concession may be a desperate attempt to secure some of her deceased husband's dues to bail herself and the family out of financial difficulties, the application does not authorize any deduction to be made. It says that once the Distribution Corporation pays all death-cum-retirement benefits due to her husband, she assures that she would pay the Distribution Corporation any outstandings against her husband in accordance with rules. This was never an acknowledgment of any liability or an authorization by the petitioner to the Distribution Corporation to deduct unilaterally a mere claim of theirs from the petitioner's husband's gratuity. 15. It is to be noticed that the petitioner's husband's liability to pay the sum of money in question on account of revenue receipts illegally retained by him, has never been adjudicated or determined by any Authority or Forum and held payable by the deceased to the Distribution Corporation. It is no more than an allegation. It is not possible to prove it now anyway once the deceased employee has left the mortal world. It is no more than an allegation. It is not possible to prove it now anyway once the deceased employee has left the mortal world. There is no firm basis to accept the Distribution Corporation's case that in fact the deceased owed a sum of Rs.5,62,745/-to the Distribution Corporation on account of illegally retained revenues that he had collected. The case has never travelled beyond an allegation to ripen into a determination by any competent Authority or Forum while the deceased was still around. 16. The third issue, that has been mooted by parties, is, if at all it is open to the Distribution Corporation to recover the sum of money that they claim as embezzled by the deceased from gratuity payable to the petitioner on account of the deceased's services. In this connection, reference may be made to the Act of 1972, where Section 4 is relevant. Sub-Sections (1) and (6) of Section 4 of the Act of 1972 provide: “4. Payment of gratuity: (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years: (a) on his superannuation. (b) on his retirement or resignation. (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease: Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any employee is due to death or disablement: Provided further that in the case of death of the employee, gratuity payable to him shall be paid to his nominee or, if no nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor, shall be deposited with the controlling authority who shall invest the same for the benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial institution, as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or disease resulting in such disablement. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or disease resulting in such disablement. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1): (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer, shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused. (b) the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited: (i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part. (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment. 17. A perusal of Clause (a) of sub-Section (6) of Section 4 would show that gratuity of an employee may be forfeited to the extent of damage or loss caused to the employer, if his services have been terminated for any act, willful omission or negligence, causing any damage or loss to or destruction of the employer's property. It may be wholly or partially forfeited, if the employee's services have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part. It can also be forfeited in whole or in part, if the employee's services have been terminated for an act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided such offence is committed in the course of his employment. This is more or less the phraseology of sub-Section (6) and its clauses to limit and define situations where gratuity payable to an employee may be forfeited, fully or in part. Else, the entitlement to receive gratuity is sacrosanct. Sub-Section (5) of Section 4 of the Act of 1972 does provide that the employee has the right to receive gratuity on better terms under an award or agreement or contract with the employer, that is to say, better than those provided under the Act of 1972. In case of employment under a State or State Corporation, there could be rules governing gratuity, that may offer better terms, or whatever that be. In case of employment under a State or State Corporation, there could be rules governing gratuity, that may offer better terms, or whatever that be. No such rules have been brought to the Court's notice on behalf of the respondents, which may entitle the employer to forfeit a part of the gratuity for loss caused to them merely for their saying. This the Court observes, because we have held elsewhere that no determination of liability against the petitioner's husband was ever made in any proceedings, known to law while he was alive. 18. If one were to go by the mandate of Section 4(6), which this Court thinks would apply in the present case, the deduction being made from gratuity, the right to forfeit gratuity or a part thereof, postulates the essential fact of termination of the employee's services for any act or omission envisaged under Section 4(6). The petitioner's husband was admittedly never terminated from service while alive. Not even a charge-sheet relating to disciplinary proceedings was issued to him, though he was placed under suspension in contemplation of inquiry. Departmental proceedings had to go a long way and end in termination of service in order to attract Clause (a) of sub-Section (6) of Section 4, where the charge of causing loss to the Corporation on account of embezzlement alleged, was held proved. If the petitioner's husband had been charge-sheeted by the Police and convicted on a charge of criminal breach of trust, it would have attracted Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act of 1972 to authorize a partial or wholesome forfeiture of gratuity payable to the deceased in the petitioner's hands. This contingency also never came about, because the FIR, alleging embezzlement, lodged by the respondents, resulted in a Final Report as the deceased passed away. In these circumstances, this Court does not think that it was at all open to the respondents to recover any sum of money from the deceased's gratuity payable to the petitioner. 19. In this connection, reference may be made to a Bench decision of this Court in Bankey Bihari Chauhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2015 (3) ADJ 305 (DB). The facts in Bankey Bihari Chauhan (supra) show that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a bus conductor of the State Road Transport Corporation and a charge-sheet issued to him. His reply was not found satisfactory and a show cause notice followed. The facts in Bankey Bihari Chauhan (supra) show that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against a bus conductor of the State Road Transport Corporation and a charge-sheet issued to him. His reply was not found satisfactory and a show cause notice followed. After considering the employee's reply, the Disciplinary Authority found him negligent in the performance of his duties, which had resulted in financial loss to the State Road Transport Corporation in the sum of Rs.2,19,846/-. The State Road Transport Corporation passed an order to recover it from the gratuity payable to the employee. It was in the context of the aforesaid facts that their Lordships of the Division Bench held: “7. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh Gill v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited, (2007) 1 SCC 663 , it has been held that termination of services for any of the causes enumerated in sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act is imperative before the gratuity can be forfeited. The same principle has been followed in a more recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava, 2013 (2) ESC 554 (SC). 8. In the present case, it is not in dispute that services of the appellant were never terminated. The appellant continued to be in service and retired on attaining the age of superannuation. In the circumstances, the basic pre-condition for the forfeiture of gratuity under Section 4 (6) of the Act was not fulfilled. We may also note that Regulation 63 of the Regulations provides for penalties and clause (4) thereof provides for the recovery from pay or deposit at the credit of an employee of the whole or part of a pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of an order. The Regulations must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of the Act and cannot override the express statutory provision. In any event, it is clear that even Regulation 63 contains no such provision of recovery from gratuity. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the action for recovery from gratuity was contrary to law and in the teeth of the express provision of the Act.....” 20. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union Bank of India and others v. C.G. Ajay Babu and another, (2018) 9 SCC 529 . Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union Bank of India and others v. C.G. Ajay Babu and another, (2018) 9 SCC 529 . In C.G. Ajay Babu (supra), it was held: “15. Under sub-section (6)(a), also the gratuity can be forfeited only to the extent of damage or loss caused to the Bank. In case, the termination of the employee is for any act or wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to the employer or destruction of property belonging to the employer, the loss can be recovered from the gratuity by way of forfeiture. Whereas under clause (b) of sub-section (6), the forfeiture of gratuity, either wholly or partially, is permissible under two situations: (i) in case the termination of an employee is on account of riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part, (ii) if the termination is for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude and the offence is committed by the employee in the course of his employment. Thus, clause (a) and clause (b) of sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act operate in different fields and in different circumstances. Under clause (a), the forfeiture is to the extent of damage or loss caused on account of the misconduct of the employee whereas under clause (b), forfeiture is permissible either wholly or partially in totally different circumstances. Clause (b) operates either when the termination is on account of: (i) riotous, or (ii) disorderly, or (iii) any other act of violence on the part of the employee, and under clause (ii) of sub-section (6) (b) when the termination is on account of any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude committed during the course of employment. 17. Though the learned counsel for the appellant Bank has contended that the conduct of the respondent employee, which leads to the framing of charges in the departmental proceedings involves moral turpitude, we are afraid the contention cannot be appreciated. It is not the conduct of a person involving moral turpitude that is required for forfeiture of gratuity but the conduct or the act should constitute an offence involving moral turpitude. To be an offence, the act should be made punishable under law. That is absolutely in the realm of criminal law. It is not the conduct of a person involving moral turpitude that is required for forfeiture of gratuity but the conduct or the act should constitute an offence involving moral turpitude. To be an offence, the act should be made punishable under law. That is absolutely in the realm of criminal law. It is not for the Bank to decide whether an offence has been committed. It is for the court. Apart from the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the appellant Bank, the Bank has not set the criminal law in motion either by registering an FIR or by filing a criminal complaint so as to establish that the misconduct leading to dismissal is an offence involving moral turpitude. Under sub-section (6)(b)(ii) of the Act, forfeiture of gratuity is permissible only if the termination of an employee is for any misconduct which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, and convicted accordingly by a court of competent jurisdiction. 18. In Jaswant Singh Gill v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 663 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 584, it has been held by this Court that forfeiture of gratuity either wholly or partially is permissible under sub-section (6)(b)(ii) only in the event that the termination is on account of riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence or on account of an act constituting an offence involving moral turpitude when he is convicted. To quote Para 13: (SCC p. 670) “13. The Act provides for a close-knit scheme providing for payment of gratuity. It is a complete code containing detailed provisions covering the essential provisions of a scheme for a gratuity. It not only creates a right to payment of gratuity but also lays down the principles for quantification thereof as also the conditions on which he may be denied therefrom. As noticed hereinbefore, sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act contains a non obstante clause vis-a-vis sub-section (1) thereof. As by reason thereof, an accrued or vested right is sought to be taken away, the conditions laid down thereunder must be fulfilled. The provisions contained therein must, therefore, be scrupulously observed. Clause (a) of sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act speaks of terminationof service of an employee for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage. However, the amount liable to be forfeited would be only to the extent of damage or loss caused. The provisions contained therein must, therefore, be scrupulously observed. Clause (a) of sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act speaks of terminationof service of an employee for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage. However, the amount liable to be forfeited would be only to the extent of damage or loss caused. The disciplinary authority has not quantified the loss or damage. It was not found that the damage or loss caused to Respondent 1 was more than the amount of gratuity payable to the appellant. Clause (b) of sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act also provides for forfeiture of the whole amount of gratuity or part in the event his services had been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part or if he has been convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude. Conditions laid down therein are also not satisfied.” 19. In the present case, there is no conviction of the respondent for the misconduct which according to the Bank is an offence involving moral turpitude. Hence, there is no justification for the forfeiture of gratuity on the ground stated in the order dated 20-4-2004 that the “misconduct proved against you amounts to acts involving moral turpitude”. At the risk of redundancy, we may state that the requirement of the statute is not the proof of misconduct of acts involving moral turpitude but the acts should constitute an offence involving moral turpitude and such offence should be duly established in a court of law. 20. That the Act must prevail over the Rules on Payment of Gratuity framed by the employer is also a settled position as per Jaswant Singh Gill v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (2007) 1 SCC 663 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 584. Therefore, the appellant cannot take recourse to its own Rules, ignoring the Act, for denying gratuity.” 21. In view of whatever has been held by this Court and the position of the law authoritatively settled, we hold that it was not open to the respondents to recover the sum of Rs.5,62,745/-from the gratuity payable to the petitioner on account of death-cum-retirement benefits due to the petitioner's husband and now receivable by her. 22. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 22. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. A mandamus is issued to respondent Nos.2, 3, 4 and 5 to ensure amongst themselves immediate refund of the sum of Rs.5,62,745/-to the petitioner in account within a month of the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The said sum of money will carry simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum, reckoned from the month after death of the petitioner's husband, until realization. In the event, the said sum of money is not remitted in account to the petitioner within a month of receipt of a copy of this order by the respondents, it will carry simple interest at the rate of of 9% per annum beyond the period of one month as aforesaid, until realization. 23. There shall be no order as to costs. 24. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the Chairman, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited, Shakti Bhawan, 14 Ashok Marg, Lucknow, the Deputy General Manager, Electricity Distribution Circle, Western Area, Pashchimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Railway Road, Bulandshahr, the Executive Engineer, Electricity Urban Distribution Division, Pashchimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Railway Road, Bulandshahr and the Superintending Engineer, Electricity Distribution Circle-1, Pashchimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, Railway Road, Bulandshahr by the Registrar (Compliance).