JUDGMENT : SHOBA ANNAMMA EAPEN, J. 1. A Division Bench of this Court, by an order of reference, directed to place this Criminal Appeal before the Full Bench so as to consider the question whether the expression ‘stock’ in the definition of ‘drug-offender’ in Section 2(i) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [hereinafter referred to as, ‘KAA(P)A’], takes within its sweep, the possession by itself, of the drug. The Division Bench doubted the correctness of the findings in Ansar T.A. v. State of Kerala and Others, 2017 (2) KHC 413 , wherein reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court rendered by a Single Judge in Ashraf v. Inspector General of Police, 2014 (3) KLT 722 to contend that mere possession of small quantity of narcotic drug by itself would answer the definition of a ‘drug-offender’ under Section 2(i) of KAA(P)A, wherefore, the detenu is liable to be considered as a ‘goonda’ as per Section 2(j) of KAA(P)A and consequently, a ‘known goonda’ under Section 2(o) of KAA(P)A. In the Reference Order, the Division Bench leaned in favour of the view expressed by this Court in Luciya Francis v. State of Kerala, 2023 (5) KHC 255 , wherein it was found that mere possession of a narcotic substance cannot be construed as part of stock unless it is manifested with evidence of intention to sell and further found that the word ‘stocks’ occurring in Section 2(i) of KAA(P)A must be in such nature kept in possession not for personal use. If any element of commercial motive surfaces, no doubt, such ‘stocks’ shall be classified as acts affecting public order. Hence, doubting the judgment in Ansar T.A (supra), the matter was referred to this Full Bench and we are called upon to answer the same. 2. Reference to the following relevant provisions is essential to analyse the issue: “2. If any element of commercial motive surfaces, no doubt, such ‘stocks’ shall be classified as acts affecting public order. Hence, doubting the judgment in Ansar T.A (supra), the matter was referred to this Full Bench and we are called upon to answer the same. 2. Reference to the following relevant provisions is essential to analyse the issue: “2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) “anti-social activity” means acting in such manner as to cause or is likely to cause, directly or indirectly, any feeling of insecurity, danger or fear among the general public or any section thereof, or any danger to the safety of individuals, safety of public, public health or the ecological system or any loss or damage to public exchequer or to any public or private property or indulges in any activities referred in clauses (c), (e), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m), (n), (q) and (s) of this section. xxx xxx xxx (i) “drug-offender” means a person who illegally cultivates, manufactures, stocks, transports, sells or distributes any drug in contravention of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (Central Act 61 of 1985) or in contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly does anything abetting or facilitating any such activity. xxx xxx xxx (j) “goonda” means a person who indulges in any anti-social activity or promotes or abets any illegal activity which are harmful for the maintenance of the public order directly or indirectly and includes a bootlegger, a counterfeiter, a depredator of environment, a digital data and copyright pirate, a drug offender, a hawala racketeer, a hired ruffian, rowdy, an immoral traffic offender, a loan shark or a property grabber. xxx xxx xxx (o) “ known goonda “ means a goonda who had been, for acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act: (i) found guilty, by a competent court or authority at least once for an offence within the meaning of the term ‘goonda’ as defined in clause (j) of section 2; or (ii) found in any investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer, or other authority or competent court on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in two separate instances not forming part of the same transaction, to have committed any act within the meaning of the term ‘goonda’ as defined in clause (j) of section 2. Provided that an offence in respect of which a report was filed by a police officer before a lawful authority consequent to the seizure, in the presence of witnesses, of alcohol, spirit, counterfeit notes, sand, forest produce, articles violating copyright, narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, or currency involved in hawala racketeering may be included for consideration though the report had resulted from an action initiated by a police officer. Explanation:- An instance of an offence involving a person, which satisfies the conditions specified in the definition of known rowdy referred to in clause (p) of section 2 can also be taken into consideration as an instance, along with other cases, for deciding whether the person is a known goonda or not.” The afore provisions outline the essential definitions for booking an offender under KAA(P)A. To qualify as an ‘anti-social activity’ and a ‘drug-offender’ under the KAA(P)A, the definitions of ‘goonda’ and ‘known goonda’ must be satisfied. 3. It is also important to examine the relevant provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘the NDPS Act’) for a comprehensive understanding: “8. Prohibition of certain operations: No person shall: (a) cultivate any coca plant or gather any portion of coca plant. (b) cultivate the opium poppy or any cannabis plant. 3. It is also important to examine the relevant provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘the NDPS Act’) for a comprehensive understanding: “8. Prohibition of certain operations: No person shall: (a) cultivate any coca plant or gather any portion of coca plant. (b) cultivate the opium poppy or any cannabis plant. (c) produce, manufacture, possess, sell, purchase, transport, warehouse, use, consume, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or tranship any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, except for medical or scientific purposes and in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder and in a case where any such provision, imposes any requirement by way of licence, permit or authorisation also in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation: Provided that, and subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the prohibition against the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of ganja or the production, possession, use, consumption, purchase, sale, transport, warehousing, import inter-State and export inter-State of ganja for any purpose other than medical and scientific purpose shall take effect only from the date which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf: Provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to the export of poppy straw for decorative purposes. xxx xxx xxx 20. Punishment for contravention in relation to cannabis plant and cannabis: Whoever, in contravention of any provisions of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder: (a) cultivates any cannabis plant. (b) produces, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses cannabis, shall be punishable: (i) where such contravention relates to clause (a) with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. (ii) where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b): (A) and involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both. (ii) where such contravention relates to sub-clause (b): (A) and involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both. (B) and involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. (C) and involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that the Court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees. 21. Punishment for contravention in relation to manufactured drugs and preparations: Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses any manufactured drug or any preparation containing any manufactured drug shall be punishable: (a) where the contravention involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both. (b) where the contravention involves quantity, lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. (c) where the contravention involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees. 22. 22. Punishment for contravention in relation to psychotropic substances: Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses any psychotropic substance shall be punishable: (a) where the contravention involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both. (b) where the contravention involves quantity lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. (c) where the contravention involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.” In the afore sections in the NDPS Act, the term ‘stock’ does not find a place. However, mere possession of the drug is an offence under the NDPS Act. 4. The petitioner challenges Ext.P2 detention order issued by the second respondent - District Magistrate, Kasargod, confirmed by the State of Kerala, under Section 3 of KAA(P)A, against the husband of the petitioner, viz. Mr. Abdul Rumaid @ Rumais @ Rumaid @ Roomi. Following are the five cases considered for the ongoing detention: S. No. Police Station Crime No. and Section Date of Occurrence Court No. and Court Name/Present Stage 1 Kumbala Police Station 718/2017 U/s. 341, 323, 324 r/w 34 of IPC 30.10.2017 CC No. 144/2018; JFMC II, Kasaragod. Pending Trial 2 Kumbala Police Station 267/2019 U/s. 143, 147, 506(II), 364, 364(A), 365, 342, 326, 302, 109, 201 r/w 149 of IPC 23.05.2019 SC No. 22/2020; Additional District & Sessions Court II, Kasaragod. Pending Trial 3 Kumbala Police Station 359/2020 U/s.3(1) r/w 25(1B)(a) and 5(1) (a) r/w 27(1) of Arms Act, 1959 02.07.2020 JFMC II, Kasaragod. Pending trial 4 Badiadka Police Station 141/2021 U/s. 363, 365, 323, 324, 308 r/w 34 of IPC 27.03.2021 SC No. 48/2023; Additional District and Sessions Court-III, Kasaragod. Pending Trial 3 Kumbala Police Station 359/2020 U/s.3(1) r/w 25(1B)(a) and 5(1) (a) r/w 27(1) of Arms Act, 1959 02.07.2020 JFMC II, Kasaragod. Pending trial 4 Badiadka Police Station 141/2021 U/s. 363, 365, 323, 324, 308 r/w 34 of IPC 27.03.2021 SC No. 48/2023; Additional District and Sessions Court-III, Kasaragod. Pending trial 5 Excise Enforcement & Anti Narcotic Special Squad NDPS 03/2023 U/s. 22(b) & 25 of NDPS Act, 1985 27.01.2023 Under Investigation 5 Excise Enforcement & Anti Narcotic Special Squad NDPS 03/2023 U/s. 22(b) & 25 of NDPS Act, 1985 27.01.2023 Under Investigation 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the last reported prejudicial activity, which led to detention, was an NDPS crime, Crime No. 03/23 booked on 27.01.2023, involving 0.6906 grams of Methamphetamine, which is considered a small quantity. According to the learned counsel, the offence does not meet the definition of ‘anti-social activity’ under Section 2(a) of KAA(P)A, nor does it qualify the detenu as a ‘known goonda’ as defined in Section 2(o) of KAA(P)A. It was further contended that the act in question does not meet the definition of ‘goonda’ as per Section 2(j) of KAA(P)A, because it lacks the elements of anti-social activity and does not fit the description of a ‘drug-offender’. If so, the last crime cannot be considered and thus, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the date of detention order is snapped. Thus, the writ petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus to direct the fourth respondent to produce the body of Mr. Abdul Rumaid and to release him forthwith, and also a direction to set aside Exts.P2 and P4 orders. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on the judgment of this Court in Luciya Francis (supra), sought for setting aside the impugned orders. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there should be a live link between the last prejudicial activity and the detention order. A mere registration of a crime under the NDPS Act does not justify initiating KAA(P)A proceedings against the detenu. The learned counsel for the petitioner further argues that the small quantity of Methamphetamine found, 0.6906 grams, does not constitute an anti social activity under the KAA(P)A since the crime does not meet the criteria to be considered as anti social activity. The learned counsel for the petitioner further argues that the small quantity of Methamphetamine found, 0.6906 grams, does not constitute an anti social activity under the KAA(P)A since the crime does not meet the criteria to be considered as anti social activity. The learned counsel submits that the detenu cannot be labelled as a ‘known goonda’ as defined in Section 2(o) of KAA(P)A. It is argued that to be considered a ‘known goonda’, the individual must have committed offences of a certain nature and that the afore crime does not fit this definition. The contraband seized, being a small quantity indicative of personal use, does not meet the criteria of a ‘drug-offender’ under Section 2(i) of the Act. In support of the contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on a catena of decisions, viz. Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2023) SCC Online SC 1003; Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad City, 1988 (2) KLT Online 1149 (SC); Rashidmiya @ Chhava Ahmedmiya Shaik v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad, (1989) 3 SCC 321 ; K.K. Saravana Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2008 (4) KLT SN 84 (C. No. 74) (SC) etc. 7. The learned Government Pleader refuted the contentions of the petitioner relying on the judgments in Ansar T.A. (supra) and Devaki v. State of Kerala & Others, 2014 KHC 518 . Paragraph 8 of the judgment in Ansar T.A. (supra) reads as follows: “8. We take note of the fact that the detaining authority has relied on crimes detailed as 3 to 6 in the chart for arriving at the objective satisfaction that the detenu is a “known goonda.” Those crimes are registered under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the “NDPS Act” for brevity). In all these cases except one, the prosecution allegation is that the petitioner had possessed Ganja. In the solitary case registered under section 27 of the Arms Act, the allegation is that he was found consuming ganja in the open. In all these cases except one, the prosecution allegation is that the petitioner had possessed Ganja. In the solitary case registered under section 27 of the Arms Act, the allegation is that he was found consuming ganja in the open. We are unable to accept the contention of the counsel that the aforesaid crimes cannot be taken into account to characterize the petitioner as a “known goonda.” The contention appears to be that possession of ganja is not included in Section 2 (i) of the KAAPA which defines a drug offender and in that view of the matter, he cannot be termed as a goonda. We are unable to agree. Section 2 (i) of the KAAPA clearly defines a “drug offender” as one who illegally cultivates, manufactures, stocks, transports, sells or distributes any drug in contravention of the NDPS Act, 1985 or in contravention of any other law for the time being in force, or who knowingly does anything by abetting or facilitating such activity. Being found in possession of a narcotic drug would definitely attract the vice of Section 2(i) of the KAAPA, as the definition is couched in such wide language. Even a person who acts in contravention of any other law relating to Narcotic Drug or a person who abets or facilitates activity in drugs will fall within the ambit of the term “drug offender” as defined. Further, each of the activity in section 2(i) of the KAAPA would take in possession of the Narcotic Substance as well. As held by this Court in Ashraf v. Inspector General of Police, 2014 (3) KHC 695 : 2014 (2) KLD 517 : 2014 (3) KLT 722 , the mere absence of the word “possession” in the definition of the term “drug offender” in KAAPA is not decisive to exclude a person found to be in possession of any drug in contravention of the NDPS Act, 1985 or any other law for the time being in force. We are therefore not impressed with the said contention and the same is rejected.” 8. A perusal of Sections 8, 20, 21 and 22 of the NDPS Act reveals the conspicuous absence of the word ‘stock’, whereas the word ‘possession’ is specifically enumerated, suggesting a legislative intent to differentiate between the two. We are therefore not impressed with the said contention and the same is rejected.” 8. A perusal of Sections 8, 20, 21 and 22 of the NDPS Act reveals the conspicuous absence of the word ‘stock’, whereas the word ‘possession’ is specifically enumerated, suggesting a legislative intent to differentiate between the two. Section 2(i) of KAA(P) Act defines a ‘drug-offender’ as one who deals with ‘stocks’ , but notably excludes ‘possession’ from the definition. Interestingly, the term ‘stocking’ encompasses possession, whereas possession does not necessarily imply stocking. The exclusion of ‘possession’ from KAA(P)A is deliberate. To fall within the definition of ‘goonda’, the offending act must concurrently qualify both ‘anti-social activity’ and ‘drug-offender’. The absence of ‘possession’ in the definition of ‘drug-offender’ under Section 2(i) of the KAA(P)A, implies that mere possession of contraband will not constitute an offence unless it is accompanied by evidence of intention to sell. As per the definition of ‘drug-offender’ in KAA(P)A, the acts therein denote a commercial activity in a drug, in contravention of the NDPS Act or in contravention of any other law for the time being in force. To categorize a person as a ‘known goonda’ in relation to the alleged NDPS Act offences, they must meet the definition of ‘goonda’ as specified under the relevant legislation. Undoubtedly, commercially-driven activities will be classified as acts affecting public order if they compromise public tranquility or societal harmony. Mere possession of narcotic drugs is an offence under the NDPS Act. For petty drug offences, possession is not inherently commercial; intention to sell or distribute must be evidential to impact public order. 9. The possession of drugs is classified as ‘small’ or ‘intermediary’ and ‘commercial’ quantity as per Sections 20, 20(A), (B) and (C), 21(a), (b) and (c), 22(a), (b) and (c) of the NDPS Act. The small, intermediary and the commercial quantities depend on the weight of the contraband of the narcotic and psychotropic substance. 10. Now, we proceed to consider the arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner based on the legal maxims, Ejusdem generis and Noscitur a sociis, to buttress his contention that detention of the detenu is illegal since the live link between the fourth crime and the detention stands snapped due to efflux of time insofar as the alleged fifth crime is no crime at all. The nature of the fifth crime, thus, assumes importance. 11. The nature of the fifth crime, thus, assumes importance. 11. Admittedly, the last prejudicial activity, i.e., the fifth crime, reckoned for the purpose of the detention is that the detenu was found in possession of contraband of 0.6906 grams of Methamphetamine. The said quantity satisfies the description of ‘small quantity’ stipulated under the NDPS Act. As regards Methamphetamine is concerned, upto 2gms it is a small quantity, and 50 gms and above it is commercial quantity. Quantity that comes in between is intermediary quantity. The contention put forth by the learned counsel is that the possession of a ‘small quantity’ of the said contraband, which is only sufficient to meet personal use, though may be a crime under the NDPS Act, does not justify the detenu being termed as a ‘goonda’ as per Section 2 (j) of the KAA(P)A. He draws further strength from the dictum in Luciya Francis (supra) in the said respect and reasons that, possession of a small quantity of contraband is neither an ‘antisocial activity’ nor one attracting the definition of ‘drug-offender’ under Section 2 (i) of KAA(P)A. He contends that to fit in the definition of a ‘drug-offender’ under KAA(P)A, mere possession of the contraband would not suffice, and what is mandated is that the person should be ‘stocking’ it with the intention to sell the same. The learned counsel, based on the dictum in Luciya Francis (supra), submits that the word ‘stocks’ occurring in Section 2 (i) of the KAA(P)A must be of such a nature as when the contraband is kept in possession with a commercial motive and not for personal use. The detaining authority is bound to examine the nature of offence in relation to the public order while passing detention orders, and also whether one might have kept such substances for personal use. If any element of commercial motive or danger to public health is evidenced, then alone shall ‘stocking’ be classified as an act affecting public order. The fifth crime, thus, according to the learned counsel, is not one that could be counted for declaring a person as ‘goonda’ under the KAA(P)A. 12. The contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner, thus, lingers on the interpretation and meaning that could be attributed to the word ‘stocks’ as used in Section 2 (i) of the KAA(P)A. 13. The contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner, thus, lingers on the interpretation and meaning that could be attributed to the word ‘stocks’ as used in Section 2 (i) of the KAA(P)A. 13. On this point, we are also benefited from the observations rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the Reference Order dated 19.10.2023 wherein Section 2 (i) of the KAA(P)A was examined in the light of the principles of Ejusdem generis as well as Noscitur a sociis and it was opined as follows: “As per the above definition, a person who illegally 1) cultivates, 2) manufactures, 3) stocks, 4) transports 5) sells or 6) distributes any drug is a ‘drug offender’. According to us, the common thread, which runs through the above referred acts, is a commercial activity in a drug, in contravention of the NDPS Act or any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, when we interpret the expression ‘stocks’, the same has to be understood as stocking any drug for the purpose of the said commercial activity, in synchronization with the other expressions used in the definition. In other words, the expression ‘stocks’ is liable to be interpreted in accord with the principles of ‘ejusdem generis’, as also, ‘Noscitur a Sociis’. Viewed from that angle, mere possession of a narcotic drug by a person - in the absence of anything indicating the sale of the drug, or any activity ancillary and incidental to sale, like cultivation, manufacture, stock, transport, distribution, etc. - may not indicate that the expression ‘stocks’ takes within its sweep the possession, by itself, of the drug.” 14. ‘Noscitur a sociis’ is a rule of interpretation in which ‘noscitur’ means to know and the meaning of ‘sociis’ is an association. The literal meaning of this maxim is ‘it is known by its association” or ‘to know from the association’. This phrase is also part of a longer Latin maxim ‘noscitur ex socio qui non cogiiositur ex se’ which reads ‘he who cannot be known from himself may be known from his associates’. This rule helps to interpret unclear or ambiguous legal language by considering the context in which words are used. However, its application is not universal and depends on the specific circumstances and legislative intent in each case. This rule helps to interpret unclear or ambiguous legal language by considering the context in which words are used. However, its application is not universal and depends on the specific circumstances and legislative intent in each case. The lex classicus that discussed this rule is State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 , wherein Justice Gajendragadkar had termed it as a rule that could be employed in circumstances where the legislative intent is unclear because it relates broad words with words of narrow meaning. 15. The rule of ‘ejusdem generis’ is termed as an offshoot of Noscitur a sociis and narrower in scope. Its employment in statutory interpretation is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court had occasion to revisit and affirm the same in K.C. Ninan v. Kerala State Electricity Board and others, 2023 SCC Online SC 663. It was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court therein as follows: “The rule of ‘ejusdem generis’ is a principle of construction. The rule is that when general words follow particular and specific words of the same nature, the general words must be confined to the things of the same kind as those specified. It applies when the following ingredients are present: (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category; (iii) that category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) a general term follows the enumeration and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent.” 16. As could be noted from above, some subtle differences do exist in the content of the said two maxims and regarding their area of operation. ‘Noscitur a sociis’ can be termed as broader than ejusdem generis since, in ejusdem generis, the meaning of the general word is extracted from the specific words written preceding it and the specific words must fall within a genus or at least they should have a similar meaning. ‘Noscitur a sociis’, on the other hand, is used when the word derives its meaning and content from the words in whose company it lies. ‘Noscitur a sociis’, on the other hand, is used when the word derives its meaning and content from the words in whose company it lies. It could be broadly stated that while ‘ejusdem generis’ envisages that if the statute specifically refers to a certain class of objects before making general references to that class, then the general statement would apply only to the same kind of objects that have been clearly specified, whereas ‘noscitur a sociis’ stipulates that when the meaning of a word is doubtful, then the same is to be understood from accompanying words or from its association with other words. 17. Applying these principles to understand the terms used while defining the term ‘drug-offender’ as used in the KAA(P) Act, the term ‘stocks’ ought to derive its meaning from the associated words ‘cultivates, manufactures, transports, sells or distributes’ as used in the said section. We note that the word ‘stocks’ used in Section 2 (i) of the KAA(P) Act and its associated words, do not cover, convey, or take in, the possession of a small quantity for personal use and the words ‘cultivates, manufactures, transports, sells or distributes’ whose company the word ‘stocks’ keep, presupposes a commercial element. The word ‘stock’ relates to commerce and trade. Thus, we concur with the observation in the reference order reproduced above that in the absence of anything indicating the sale of the drugs, or any activity ancillary and incidental to sale, like cultivation, manufacture, transport, distribution, etc., the expression ‘stocks’ may not take within its sweep the mere possession, by itself, of the drug in ‘small quantity’ unless it is manifested with evidence of intention to sell. Thus, based on the enumerations in Section 2(i) of the KAA(P)A to constitute a ‘drug-offender’ and also taking note of the fact that admittedly the detenu was only in possession of a ‘small quantity’ of the contraband with no evidence even to prima facie find a commercial motive in him, the detenu cannot be termed as one falling within the sweep of the term ‘drug-offender’ under the said Act. 18. 18. As far as the personal liberty of a person is concerned, another Full Bench of this Court in Stenny Aleyamma Saju v. State of Kerala and others, 2017 (3) KHC 517 , while referring to the object of KAA(P)A enactment opined as follows, which was reiterated in the judgment in Luciya Francis (supra) that, “While invoking preventive detention laws, it poses threat to the personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and violate fundamental rights. Entire scheme of preventive detention is based on the bounden duty of the State to protect the interests of the country and welfare of people from the cranker of anti-social activities by anti-social elements affecting maintenance of public order and economic welfare of the country. The threat to the society from the proposed detenu should be such that his activities cannot be controlled or curtailed by using the ordinary means of prevention. No citizen can be put behind the bars on the presumption that he is likely to cause breach of peace in the locality or he may commit some crime in future if he is allowed to move freely.” 19. In a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Waheeda Ashraf and others v. Union of India and others, 2021 (3) KLT 74 , rendered by one among us [Dr. Justice A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar], it was observed in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 that: “Para 3: Our Constitution recognises the concept of Liberty - of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. This is borne out in its Preamble. In order to understand the true sense in which the concept of liberty was perceived by the framers of our Constitution, we have to first understand the nature of the Constitution itself. As observed by Granville Austin (Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution; Cornerstone of a Nation), “The Indian Constitution is first and foremost a social document for majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution by establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement. The core of the commitment to social revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in the fundamental rights and in the Directive Principles of State Policy. Together, they constitute the Conscience of the Constitution. The core of the commitment to social revolution lies in Parts III and IV, in the fundamental rights and in the Directive Principles of State Policy. Together, they constitute the Conscience of the Constitution. The provisions of Part III and IV have their roots deep in the struggle for independence and they were included in the Constitution in the hope that one day the tree of true liberty would bloom in India.” Para 4: Under our Constitution, therefore, personal liberty in its fullest sense is sought to be achieved through the guarantee of the fundamental freedoms in Part III. This was designed to fulfill the aspiration of the Indian people to enjoy the same extent of personal freedom in India, as were enjoyed by their colonial masters in England. More importantly, the thrust of the protection of fundamental rights is in respect of each individual so as to bring about an egalitarian society where all citizens were equally free. Liberty is therefore no longer the sole preserve of a select few in society. The guarantee against violation of fundamental rights is achieved not only through negative obligations imposed on the State, not to interfere with the liberties of citizens, but also through the positive obligation imposed on the State to protect the citizens rights from encroachment by society. Para 5:: Preventive Detention - a jurisdiction of suspicion: Art.21 of our Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. As an express limitation on legislative power, the Article envisages that the word “law” contained therein has the same meaning as the American phrase “due process of law” meaning thereby a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. Art.22 of our Constitution, however, carves out an exception in the case of preventive detention by making it clear that the procedural safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention, that are ordinarily available to persons in our country, are not applicable to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention. The latter, it must be noted, deprives a person of his liberty consequent to proceedings where there is no charge formulated, offense proved, or criminal conviction warranted by legal evidence. The latter, it must be noted, deprives a person of his liberty consequent to proceedings where there is no charge formulated, offense proved, or criminal conviction warranted by legal evidence. It is a jurisdiction of suspicion and is justified on the argument that preventive justice requires action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionable activities. Notwithstanding the disgruntlement of our people with similar laws under colonial rule, the decision to retain a provision for preventive detention was a deliberate one taken by the makers of our constitution. It therefore comes as no surprise that, notwithstanding that the concept of preventive detention runs counter to the principle of protection against arbitrary arrest and detention guaranteed in most democratic republics governed by the rule of law, and recognised by the United Nations under Art.9 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights to which India is a signatory, the Indian Government entered a reservation to Art.9 of the ICCPR by making it clear that it takes the position that the provisions of the Article shall be so applied as to be in consonance with the provisions of clauses (3) to (7) of Art.22 of the Constitution of India (Derek P. Jinks, ‘The Anatomy of an Institutionalised Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India’ - (2001) 22 Michigan Journal of International Law 311, 27).” 20. The detention of the detenu, which inherently restricts personal liberty, necessitates that preventive detention laws be utilised solely for preventive purposes, not as punitive measures or substitutes for criminal trials. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. KAA(P)A, which came into force on 13.12.2006, has been enacted for the effective prevention and control of certain anti-social activities in the State of Kerala. Unless a person is a ‘goonda’ he will not be a ‘known goonda’. Under Section 3(1) of KAA(P)A, a preventive detention order can be passed only against a ‘known goonda’ or a ‘known rowdy’ and only if he is likely to commit any anti-social activity. Even if the District Magistrate, as the detaining authority, is objectively satisfied that the individual is a ‘known goonda’ or a ‘known rowdy’, they cannot issue a preventive detention order without additional grounds beyond mere status. Even if the District Magistrate, as the detaining authority, is objectively satisfied that the individual is a ‘known goonda’ or a ‘known rowdy’, they cannot issue a preventive detention order without additional grounds beyond mere status. Prior to issuing a preventive detention order, the detaining authority must be subjectively satisfied that the individual’s continued freedom would likely result in further anti-social activities within their jurisdiction. When considering crimes or offences coming under Sections 20, 21 and 22 of the NDPS Act, for passing a preventive detention order under KAA(P)A, possessing a small quantity of narcotic drug alone does not attract the definitions of ‘anti-social activity’, ‘goonda’ and ‘known goonda’. To attract these definitions, there must be evidence of intention to sell. Mere possession of a small quantity of narcotic drugs, without evidence of intention to sell, has to be deemed for personal consumption and does not fall within the meaning of ‘stocks’ under Section 2(i) of KAA(P)A. We notice that, in the referred case, the period of detention as per Ext.P2 ended on November 12, 2023. We have already found that the detenu was only in possession of a ‘small quantity’ of the contraband with no evidence even to prima facie find a commercial motive in him. Thus, the detenu cannot be termed as one falling within the sweep of the term ‘drug-offender’ under the said Act. Hence, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. Since no other issue is left to be decided, the writ petition itself is being disposed of. 21. We say that the proposition of law laid down in Luciya Francis (supra) is good law and consequently, we hold that the judgment in Ansar T.A. (supra) is not good law. We answer the reference as above. The impugned orders are hereby quashed and the writ petition is disposed of, accordingly.