JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. This Criminal Leave to Appeal and Appeal under Section 378 (iii) & (i) Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant-State, claiming the following reliefs: “It is, therefore, prayed that this leave to appeal may kindly be accepted. It is, further prayed that appeal filed by the appellant may kindly be allowed, acquittal order dated 13.02.98 may kindly be quashed and set aside and the accused respondent may kindly be convicted and sentenced accordingly.” 2. The matter pertains to an incident which occurred in the year 1996 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 1998. 3. Brief facts of the case, as pleaded by Mr. C.S. Ojha, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are that on 22.08.1996, a written report was submitted by one Bhanwar Singh (complainant) at around 10:45 a.m., stating that the preceding night at around 12:30 a.m., one Vagtaram Balai came to his house to call him, and when the complainant went outside his house, he saw Hariram Gurjar and Hema Regar standing there. At that time, Vagtaram informed that he heard the shouts coming from the side of a School and that it seemed to Vagtaram that a person is being subjected to beatings. Upon this, the said persons, namely, Bhanwar Singh, Vagtaram Balai, Hariram Gurjar and Hema Regar, departed, and when they reached upto Dang Ka Kuaa, they saw that near the house of one Sawai Ram Gurjar were near Bheruji Temple, Kundan Singh (accused-respondent) was beating Rajmal s/o Mohan Lal Gandhi with a wooden stick. 3.1. It was further stated in the report that Rajmal was crying loudly and begging accused-respondent Kundan Singh to let him go, on which the said group of persons, including the complainant, who were at a certain distance, requested the accused-respondent to release Rajmal, however, the complainant party was threatened by the accused-respondent and was asked not to intervene in the matter, upon which, the complainant party stopped making any endeavour to rescue the said Rajmal. But the complainant party did try to seek help from the other villagers, but when no one came for help, the members of the complainant party left the place of incident. 3.2. But the complainant party did try to seek help from the other villagers, but when no one came for help, the members of the complainant party left the place of incident. 3.2. It was also stated in the report that on 22.08.1996, Sawairam, Bhanwar Singh, Lal Singh, Nathu Singh and Mohan Singh saw the dead body of Rajmal (deceased), lying near the School; the dead body was lying naked and had injuries all over it and that blood was oozing out from his head. The deceased’s clothes and slippers were found lying on the road and that there were marks of him being dragged. The said act, as per the complainant, was alleged to have been committed by the accused-respondent, going by his (accused’s) suspicion pertaining to an illicit relationship between the deceased and his (accused’s) wife. 3.3. On the basis of the aforementioned report, an FIR bearing No.102/96 was registered against the accused-respondent and the investigation commenced accordingly. After investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet under Section 302 IPC. 3.4. The learned Trial Court framed charges against the accused-Kundan under Section 302 IPC; the said charges were read over to the accused-respondent, which he denied and claimed to stand due trial and the trial commenced accordingly. 3.5. During the course of trial, the prosecution produced 12 witnesses and exhibited documents (Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.24) in support of its case; in defence, 2 witnesses were produced along with 2 documents (Ex.D. 1-2) in support of their case; whereafter, the accused-respondent was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which he pleaded innocence and his false implication in the said criminal case in question. 3.6. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondent, vide the impugned judgment dated 13.02.1998, against which the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State, claiming the afore-quoted relief. 4. Learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the appellant-State submits that the learned Trial Court has erred in law in acquitting the accused-respondent vide the impugned judgment, despite there being a clear medical evidence as well as testimonies of four prosecution eyewitnesses supporting the prosecution story and that the accused-respondent had committed the crime in question. 4. Learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the appellant-State submits that the learned Trial Court has erred in law in acquitting the accused-respondent vide the impugned judgment, despite there being a clear medical evidence as well as testimonies of four prosecution eyewitnesses supporting the prosecution story and that the accused-respondent had committed the crime in question. As per learned Additional Government Advocate, during course of the said act, the deceased sustained several injuries, of which the head injury was found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death in question. 4.1. Learned Counsel further submits that there were four eyewitnesses to the incident in question, i.e. PW.3 Vagtaram Balai, PW.4 Hariram, PW.5 Hema Raigar and PW.7 Bhanwar Singh Chundawat; as per their testimonies, they have identified the accused-respondent by his voice to be the person committing the crime in question, when the accused-respondent was beating Rajmal (deceased). It was further submitted that such testimonies of the eyewitnesses were not duly considered by the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment of acquittal. 4.2. Learned Counsel also submits that as per the testimony of PW.8 Dr.Jaswinder Singh, who conducted the postmortem on the body of the deceased and prepared report thereof i.e. Ex.P-13, the deceased sustained fracture in the parietal bone of the right side of the skull and that the bone was broken into small pieces; fracture due to injury sustained on the temporal region was also found and a subdural haematoma below the fracture was detected in addition; multiple bruises and abrasions were also found on the body of the deceased. As per the said medical witness, the injuries were caused by a blunt weapon, and could have been caused by a lathi. As per the said witness, the injury resulting into subdural haematoma was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death in question. Thus, it was submitted that the said witness also supported the prosecution story. 4.3. Learned Counsel further submits that on the basis of the information given by the accused-respondent under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, recovery of his clothes, a wooden stick and an axe (Ex.P.- 7 and Ex.P.- 6) was made which were stained with blood, and the same clearly shows the knowledge of the accused as to the said recoveries. It was further submitted that the said recoveries along with the articles collected during investigation, including blood smeared soil, slippers, clothes of deceased, were sent for FSL, whereupon human blood on the said articles was detected. 4.4. Learned Counsel also submits that despite the prosecution proving its case beyond all reasonable doubts, the learned Trial Court, discarded all the material evidence placed on record before it, and thus, the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is not justified in law. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Mukul Krishna Vyas (Amicus Curiae) appearing on behalf of the accused-respondents, while opposing the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that the testimonies of all the eyewitnesses are not reliable; as per the said testimonies, PW. 3 heard the screaming sounds and thereafter PW.4, PW.5 and PW.7 went alongwith PW.3. However, upon a thorough examination, testimonies of PW. 7 was found to be in contradiction with that of PW. 3, PW.4 and PW.5. 5.1. Learned Counsel further submits that as stated by the aforesaid eyewitnesses, upon reaching the place of incident, they did not see the accused-appellant beating the deceased, rather they identified the accused-appellant on the basis of his voice and therefore, in the given circumstances, the said witnesses ought not to have been produced and examined as eyewitnesses to the incident in question. Moreover, it was only when the dead body of the deceased was found next morning, near the place of incident, the said persons connected the dots and identified the accused-appellant Kundan (merely on the basis of voice recognition) as the person, who committed the crime in question. Learned Counsel also submits that PW.3 had turned hostile during the trial. 5.2. Learned Counsel further submits that the deposition of the eyewitnesses was not natural, in the given circumstances. As per the testimonies so recorded during the trial, it is evident that despite them being together in a group of four, upon being threatened by the accused-appellant, who at the relevant time was all alone, they got scared and went back home. 5.2.1. As per the testimonies so recorded during the trial, it is evident that despite them being together in a group of four, upon being threatened by the accused-appellant, who at the relevant time was all alone, they got scared and went back home. 5.2.1. As per learned counsel, the record reveals that the aforesaid eyewitnesses neither tried to even rescue the deceased from the alleged brutal attack once, nor did they make their best endeavour to seek assistance of other persons in a densely populated village, nor did they try to catch hold of the accused - appellant, when he was fleeing from the place of incident; this part of the prosecution story, casts a shadow of serious doubt upon the prosecution story and the reliability of the said eyewitnesses. Learned Counsel further submits that the village, where the incident in question occurred, was densely populated, however despite the same, the prosecution has miserably failed to produce any independent witness; neither there were testimonies of the said eyewitness to the effect of informing the villagers about the incident in question, nor to the police, upon returning from the place of incident at the relevant time. 5.3. Learned Counsel also submits that the PW.11 Bhanwar Singh (investigating officer) contradicted the prosecution case, by stating that the information was received from Deogarh Police Station through wireless message that in the village named Daulaji ka Kheda, one ‘Rajmal Jain’ had been murdered and his body is lying on the spot of death; however on the other hand, it has been put on the record that the information was given by PW. 7 Bhanwar Singh through a written report. 5.4. Learned Counsel further submits that the PW.2 stated that during the course of investigation, 7 articles were collected and sealed, which included the alleged weapon ‘ axe’, however he later stated that 5 sealed articles were sent for FSL and that the ‘blood stained axe’ was not included in the same, thereby showing a gross procedural error in the case. 5.5. 5.5. Learned Counsel also submits that in support of its case, the prosecution relied upon the testimonies of 12 prosecution witnesses, out of which testimonies of eight witnesses is full of contradictions and that no independent witness has been produced by the prosecution during the trial, thereby weakening the prosecution case, and thus, the learned Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment of acquittal. 5.6. In support of such submissions, reliance has been placed on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court: (a) Devilal Vs state of Rajasthan (Criminal Appeal No.148/ 2010, decided on 08.01.2019); (b) Raja Nayakar vs State of Chattisgarh [ (2024) 3 SCC 481 ] (c) State of Rajasthan vs Devilal @ Devida & Ors. (D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 388/1995, decided on 24.04.2024); (d) State by Inspector of Police, Madras vs Rasalaiyan & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 204 of 1994 with Crl.R.C. No. 7 of 1994, decided on 06.02.2002); and (e) Malappa vs State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162 of 2011). 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case, along with the judgments cited at the Bar. 7. This Court observes that the incident in question occurred nearly three decades ago i.e. on 22.08.1996 and was reported by the complainant (PW.7) through a written report before the concerned police station, indicating therein that the accused-appellant had committed the crime in question against the victim i.e. Rajmal (deceased), owing to a mere suspicion of the latter having an illicit relationship with the accused’s wife. On the basis of the said report, an FIR was registered, followed by initiation of an investigation and filing of the charge-sheet against the accused-appellant, upon conclusion of the investigation. Thereafter, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused-respondent of the charges framed against him under Section 302 IPC vide the impugned judgment, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. 8. This Court further observes that there are four eyewitnesses to the incident in question i.e. PW. 3 Vagtatram Balai, PW. 4 Hariram, PW. 5 Hema Raigar and PW. 7 Bhanwar Singh Chundawat, who, as per the prosecution, reached the place of incident and identified the accused-respondent by his voice, when he was beating Rajmal (deceased). 8. This Court further observes that there are four eyewitnesses to the incident in question i.e. PW. 3 Vagtatram Balai, PW. 4 Hariram, PW. 5 Hema Raigar and PW. 7 Bhanwar Singh Chundawat, who, as per the prosecution, reached the place of incident and identified the accused-respondent by his voice, when he was beating Rajmal (deceased). This Court also observes that PW.3 had turned hostile during the trial and that none of the said witnesses, as per their testimonies rendered during the trial, stated to have witnessed the accused-respondent beating Rajmal (deceased) in the night of 21.08.1996, nor did they state to have identified who was being beaten, and therefore the said witnesses cannot be termed as eyewitnesses; instead the witnesses upon hearing the shouts of an altercation from a distance, presumed the accused-respondent to be the assaulter, on the basis of voice recognition. 9. This Court further observes that the manner in which the aforesaid eyewitnesses have rendered their testimonies during the trial, as harped upon on behalf of the accused-respondent, regarding their return from the place of incident to their respective house and sleeping thereafter, after witnessing the brutal attack allegedly made by the accused-respondent, and neither making an attempt to even catch him nor making any sincere endeavour to seek help from the village or informing the police about the alleged altercation, raise a serious doubt as to the credibility of the said eyewitnesses and furthermore, on the prosecution case, which based wholly on the said testimonies. 10. This Court also observes that as harped upon on behalf of the accused- respondent and discernible in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when seen in juxtaposition to the material on record, reflect material contradictions in the said testimonies; which are as follows: (i) As per the statement of PW.11 Bhanwar Singh (investigating officer), the information about happening of the alleged incident was received from Devgarh Police Station through wireless message; but on the other hand, the prosecution case is that the alleged incident was reported to the police vide the aforesaid report submitted by PW.7. (ii) The written report which was the basis of the investigation was not written by PW.7, but rather by some Mal Singh under the directions of the police authorities concerned; however, PW.11 stated to have not known whether the report was written by him or someone else. (iii) PW.2 in his examination-in-chief stated that the accused was arrested on the date of the incident itself i.e. on 22.08.1996; however the arrest memo shows the said arrest to be made on 23.08.1996. (iv) The recovery of weapons and clothes of the accused was said to be done on the same day as of the incident, however, Ex.P-6 and Ex.P-7, mention the date of recovery to be 23.08.1996, and the same, thus creates a doubt on the prosecution case. (v) The recoveries were made in absence of independent witnesses; that PW.2 and one Shobhmal cannot be considered as independent witnesses as both of them were the relatives of the deceased; furthermore, Shobhmal was not produced by the prosecution for examination during the trial. 10.1.In the given circumstances, the aforesaid contradictions are clearly fatal to the prosecution case, inasmuch as the same clearly indicates that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused-respondent beyond all reasonable doubts, and thus, the learned Trial Court has considered and analyzed the whole case and material record during the trial in the right perspective and in the attendant facts and circumstances. Hence, the well reasoned and speaking judgment passed by the learned Trial Court warrants no interference in the present appeal. 11. This Court further observes that the cause of death in question, as per the postmortem report Ex.P-13, is said to be two lacerated wounds on the head of the deceased; however, the said injuries, in the given circumstances, cannot be attributed to him, in the absence of any direct cogent evidence, reliable witnesses, and proper investigation. Moreover, it has also not been proved by the prosecution on the basis of sufficient evidence that there was any prior enmity between the accused-respondent and Rajmal (deceased). The prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the accused-respondent that the crime in question was committed by him, owing to his suspicion regarding the alleged illicit relationship of Rajmal (deceased) with the accused-respondent’s wife. 12. The prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the accused-respondent that the crime in question was committed by him, owing to his suspicion regarding the alleged illicit relationship of Rajmal (deceased) with the accused-respondent’s wife. 12. This Court further observes that the credibility of the scientific evidence put on record is skeptical on the ground that according to the testimony of PW.2, during the course of investigation, seven articles were collected, and sealed on 23.08.1996, for the forensic analysis including the alleged blood stained weapon ‘ axe’; however the said articles were submitted only on 27.08.96 further the aforementioned delay has remained unexplained. 13. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That not reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. This Court also observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment qua the accused-respondent and acquitted him of the charge under Section 302 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witness at a considerable length and duly analyzed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 14.1.Thus, in the aforesaid precedential backdrop, the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the Trial Court is very limited, inasmuch as, such determination of the Trial Court does not deserve reversal, unless it demonstrates a legally plausible view, and that, a mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal. 15. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference. 16. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 16.1. However, keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./Section 481 B.N.S.S, the accused-respondent is directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs.25,000/- and a surety bond, each in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondent, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as and when called upon to do so. 16.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. The record of the learned Trial Court be returned forthwith. 16.3. 16.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. The record of the learned Trial Court be returned forthwith. 16.3. This Court is thankful to Mukul Krishna Vyas, who has rendered his assistance as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of the accused-respondent, in the present adjudication.