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2024 DIGILAW 1392 (RAJ)

Amit Kumar S/o Shri Surender Singh v. State of Rajasthan

2024-10-09

SAMEER JAIN

body2024
ORDER : 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 528 of B.N.S.S. 2023 for quashing of FIR No. 571/2015 dated 17.08.2015 registered at Police Station Mathuragate, District Bharatpur for offences under Sections 420 & 406 of IPC. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that from the bare perusal of the contents of FIR and further proceedings/investigation, it can be inferred that the matter pertains to civil/contractual dispute and the FIR was wrongfully registered under the criminal jurisdiction. 3. It is further submitted that in the instant matter, it is alleged that an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Only), as an advance was paid to the petitioner under a contract/agreement, by the complainant however, it is alleged that after receiving the said amount, the terms of contract qua registration of the plots were not honored. 4. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the above-said, has relied upon the dictum encapsulated in the Hon’ble Apex Court judgment reported in Satish Mehra Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, (2012) 13 SCC 614 more particularly ‘Para-14’ which is reproduced herein: “14. The power to interdict a proceeding either at the threshold or at an intermediate stage of the trial is inherent in a High Court on the broad principle that in case the allegations made in the FIR or the criminal complaint, as may be, prima facie do not disclose a triable offence, there can be reason as to why the accused should be made to suffer the agony of a legal proceeding that more often than not gets protracted. A prosecution which is bound to become lame or a sham ought to be interdicted in the interest of justice as continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of the process of the law. This is the core basis on which the power to interfere with a pending criminal proceeding has been recognised to be inherent in every High Court. The power, though available, being extraordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfy the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. The power, though available, being extraordinary in nature has to be exercised sparingly and only if the attending facts and circumstances satisfy the narrow test indicated above, namely, that even accepting all the allegations levelled by the prosecution, no offence is disclosed. However, if so warranted, such power would be available for exercise not only at the threshold of a criminal proceeding but also at a relatively advanced stage thereof, namely, after framing of the charge against the accused. In fact the power to quash a proceeding after framing of charge would appear to be somewhat wider as, at that stage, the materials revealed by the investigation carried out usually come on record and such materials can be looked into, not for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused but for the purpose of drawing satisfaction that such materials, even if accepted in their entirety, do not, in any manner, disclose the commission of the offence alleged against the accused.” 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the State has taken a preliminary objection qua the maintainability of the petition and has submitted that the dispute/incidence qua issuance of cheque amounting Rs. 100,000/- occurred in the year 2010 and the FIR was made to be registered at a belated stage, in the year 2015. 6. It is further submitted that there are direct allegations leveled against the petitioner that the petitioner was absconding for a period of three years (Annexure-3). 7. Furthermore, it is submitted that the learned Special Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, after considering the relevant facts, has framed charges in the impugned order (Page-21). 8. Lastly, it is submitted that as the proceedings are challenged at a belated stage by the petitioner, the said petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 9. Heard and considered the rival arguments made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the instant matter, this Court is of the following view: 10.1 That the FIR was registered in the year 2015 at a belated stage. 10.2 That the petitioner was absconding for a period of three years, which is reflected from ‘Annexure-3’. 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the instant matter, this Court is of the following view: 10.1 That the FIR was registered in the year 2015 at a belated stage. 10.2 That the petitioner was absconding for a period of three years, which is reflected from ‘Annexure-3’. 10.3 That proceedings were ongoing and charges were framed, after consideration of the relevant facts by the learned Trial Court, which are challenged at a belated state by the petitioner, after conducting the proceedings before the learned Trial Court, for a long period of time. 10.4 That reliance can be placed upon the ratio passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sushilabai vs. State of Maharashtra, it is held that, if the petitioner fails to address convincingly, the reasons qua the inordinate delay in filing the petition, the inherent powers of the High Court, under Section 482 of Cr.P.C pari-materia to the provisions of 528 of B.N.S.S. should not be exercised sparingly, as otherwise, there would be no end to the litigation. 11. In light of the above-noted facts and circumstances and the judgment of Sushilabai (Supra), this Court is not inclined to entertain the present petition at this stage, on account of delay and laches. 12. Howsoever, it is made clear the issue of facts qua the nature of the instant dispute/proceedings (civil or criminal) and qua the relevance of judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, will remain open for consideration before the learned Trial Court, in further proceedings. 13. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.