ORDER : Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa, J. The instant petition under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[for short ‘Cr.P.C’] has been filed by the Petitioner/Accused No.1, seeking quashment of the proceedings against her in C.C.No.1043 of 2019 on the file of the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Prohibition & Excise, Anantapuram for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 465, 466, and 471 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860[for short ‘I.P.C.’]. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as follows: a) Respondent No.2 herein has been working as Sub-Registrar-I at Ananthapuram Town. One B.Lakshmi Narasaiah has filed a petition before the Director & Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, A.P., Hyderabad vide G2/7470/2015 dated 06.08.2015 and requested to cancel the Sale Deed No.3496/2002 dated 29.04.2002 alleged to have been executed by Petitioner/Accused No.1 in favour of Accused No.2 alleging that the said property was already sold by Petitioner/Accused No.1 to him under a Registered Sale Deed No.5399/1988 dated 04.07.1988 for a valuable consideration of Rs.5,000/-. However, the Petitioner/Accused No.1, made dual registration without any manner of right, possession and enjoyment over the said property. b) Based on the petition filed by said Lakshmi Narasaiah, Respondent No.2 herein lodged a complaint with the Sub-Inspector of Police, IV Town Police Station, Ananthapuram and the same was registered as a case in Crime No.84 of 2016 for the offence under Sections 420, 465, 466, 468, and 471 read with 34 IPC. Police after due investigation filed charge sheet against Accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offence under Sections 420, 465, 466, and 471 read with 34 IPC. c) Aggrieved by the registration of the said case, the Petitioner/Accused No.1 filed the present petition seeking quashment of the proceedings against her. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 3. Heard Sri M.V.B.Srirama Murthy, learned counsel for Petitioner and Sri C.Panini Somayaji, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor representing the State/Respondent No.1 and Sri Harish Kumar Resineni, learned counsel for Respondent No.3/Accused No.2. Inspite of providing opportunity, none appeared for Respondent No.2/Complainant. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.1 would submit that it is a case of double registration of the subject property. It is alleged against the Petitioner that she has sold away the subject property to Accused No.2, which was already sold to one B.Lakshmi Narasaiah. Inspite of providing opportunity, none appeared for Respondent No.2/Complainant. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.1 would submit that it is a case of double registration of the subject property. It is alleged against the Petitioner that she has sold away the subject property to Accused No.2, which was already sold to one B.Lakshmi Narasaiah. Learned counsel would further submit that the Petitioner was employed in U.A.E, where her husband has been working and she left for Soudi on 30.10.2000 and returned to India on 16.05.2002, as such, at the time of alleged sale deed dated 29.04.2002, the Petitioner/Accused No.1 was not in India. Therefore, double registration of the subject property in favour of Accused No.2, does not arise. Learned counsel would pray for quashment of the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.1. 5. Learned counsel for Respondent No.3/Accused No.2 conceded to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.1. 6. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would fairly submit that the Petitioner was in Saudi from 30.10.2000 and returned to India on 16.05.2002 and would submit that the Court may pass appropriate orders. Point for Determination 7. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel representing both the parties, now the point that would emerge for determination is: Whether the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.1 in C.C.No.1043 of 2019 on the file of the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Prohibition & Excise, Anantapuram, are liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.? Determination by the Court 8. A bare perusal of Section 482 makes it clear that the Code envisages that inherent powers of the High Court are not limited or affected so as to make orders as may be necessary; (i) to give effect to any order under the Code or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or, otherwise (iii) to secure ends of justice. A court while sitting in Section 482 jurisdiction is not functioning as a trial court, court of appeal or a court of revision. It must exercise its powers to do real and substantial justice, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers must be invoked for compelling reasons of abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. 9. It must exercise its powers to do real and substantial justice, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers must be invoked for compelling reasons of abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles of criminal jurisprudence. 9. The decision rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana and others v. Bhajanlal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 is considered as the guiding torch in the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. At paras 102 and 103, the circumstances necessary to invoke this jurisdiction are spelt out as follows; “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.” (emphasis supplied) 10. In the case on hand, the allegation against the Petitioner/Accused No.1 is that she has sold away the subject property to Accused No.2 under a Registered Sale Deed No.3496/2002 dated 29.04.2002, which was already sold to one B.Lakshmi Narasaiah under a Registered Sale Deed No.5399/1988 dated 04.07.1988 for a valuable consideration of Rs.5,000/-. Whereas, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.1 that, the Petitioner was left for UAE as her husband was working there. Petitioner also secured employment over there. Whereas, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.1 that, the Petitioner was left for UAE as her husband was working there. Petitioner also secured employment over there. She was not in India during the relevant time, as such, the question of execution of alleged Registered Sale Deed in favour of Accused No.2 does not arise. The original passport of the Petitioner was placed on record to fortify their contentions. 11. A keen perusal of the entries made in the passport of the Petitioner/Accused No.1 would clearly show that the Petitioner was left for UAE on 30.10.2000 and returned to India on 16.05.2002. Whereas she alleged to have been executed the Sale Deed in favour of Accused No.2 on 29.04.2002. Further, the certificate dated 31.03.2004 given by AL-MANAR International School, Saudi Arabia would also disclose that she was working as a Teacher in the said school since November, 2000. No contra material was placed before the trial Court. Hence, it is vivid that the Petitioner was not in India on the alleged date i.e., 29.04.2002. Therefore, the question of execution of the alleged Sale Deed dated 29.04.2002 in India in favour of Accused No.2, and the commission of alleged offence by her, do not arise. 12. In view of the guideline No.3 in Bhajanlal’s case (supra), the allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of the alleged offence by the Petitioner/Accused No.1. This Court finds that there are justifiable grounds to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Therefore, as the very ingredients of the offending Sections are not attracted against the Petitioner/Accused No.1, in the above crime, criminal proceedings initiated in C.C.No.1043 of 2019 are liable to be quashed against her. 13. In result, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings against Petitioner/Accused No.1 in C.C.No.1043 of 2019 on the file of the Court of Judicial Magistrate of First Class for Prohibition & Excise, Anantapuram for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 465, 466, and 471 read with 34 IPC, are hereby quashed. Registrar (Judicial) is directed to return the original Passport of the Petitioner/Accused No.1, which was deposited with seal on 24.09.2024, on proper identification and undertaking of the Petitioner. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.