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2024 DIGILAW 1395 (RAJ)

Achalprakash, S/o. Mohanlal v. Labhchand, through Lrs. - Narendra Arya, (S/o. (Late) Sh. Labhchand)

2024-10-10

REKHA BORANA

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ORDER : (Rekha Borana, J.) 1. The present Second Appeal pertains to the category of ‘Specifically Fixed Matters’. 2. The present second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 11.01.1993 passed by the Additional District Judge No.2, Jodhpur in Civil First Appeal No.105/1986 whereby the judgment and decree dated 16.04.1984 passed by the Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate No.2, Jodhpur in Civil Original Suit No.405/1981 had been reversed. Vide the judgment and decree dated 16.04.1984, learned Trial Court decreed the suit for cancellation of sale-deed dated 21.09.1971 in favour of the plaintiffs and cancelled the sale-deed in question. However, learned First Appellate Court, while allowing the appeal preferred on behalf of defendant No.1 Labhchand, set aside the said judgment and decree. 3. While admitting the present second appeal on 23.07.1997, four substantial questions of law were framed, which have been referred to in the subsequent paras. 4. The facts are that a suit for cancellation of sale-deed dated 21.09.1971 was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs with an averment that vide the said sale-deed, the residential house of the plaintiffs was sold out by their father Mohanlal (defendant No.2) to Labhchand (defendant No.1) without permission of the Court, which was essential in terms of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1956’). It was submitted that the house in question is an ancestral property, in which the plaintiffs too had a share and their father could not have sold out the said property without the permission/leave of the Court, as the plaintiffs were minors at that point of time. It was further averred that there was no legal necessity or any antecedent debt because of which defendant No.2 was required to sell out the property. With the said submissions, it was prayed that the sale-deed dated 21.09.1971, being in contravention of Section 8 of the Act of 1956, be cancelled. 5. The case of defendant No.1 Labhchand, the purchaser, was that firstly, the property was a self-acquired property of Mohanlal and secondly, the property was sold out by Mohanlal as Karta of the joint Hindu family to repay the debt owed by him to one Karamjeet. The property been sold out to repay a legal debt did not require any permission of the Court and was perfectly valid. 6. The property been sold out to repay a legal debt did not require any permission of the Court and was perfectly valid. 6. Written statement was filed by defendant No.2 Mohanlal also, wherein he averred that he intended only to mortgage the property but defendant No.1, in collusion with Karamjeet, got the sale deed executed. He further averred that the amount as received from the said mortgage/sale was not utilised for the benefit of the family or the estate. However, no evidence was led by the defendant No.2 in support of his pleadings. 7. On basis of the pleadings as made by the parties, the learned Trial Court framed the following seven issues : 1- vk;k oknxzLr edku ekSjrh gksus ls la;qDr ifjokj dh laifr gS\ 2- vk;k oknxzLr edku esa oknhx.k dh gd o fgLlk gS\ 3- vk;k izfroknh la[;k 2 Jh eksguyky ds vdsys dks oknxzLr edku fnukad 21-09-71 dks izfroknh la[;k 1 ykHkpan dks cspus dh dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha Fkk\ 4- vk;k oknxzLr edku dk cspku fnukad 21-09-71 oknhx.k ds bUVªsLV ds fo#/k gksus ls voS/k gS\ 5- vk;k izfroknh la[;k 2 dks oknhx.k dk ukckfyxku dh rjQ ls cspku djus ls ifgys l{ke U;k;ky; ls vuqefr ysuk vko';d Fkk\ 6- vk;k izfroknh la[;k 1 oknhx.k ls dEisUlVjh dksLV : 1000@& ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ 8. Substantial questions No.1 & 3 as framed in the present second appeal are as under : “1. Whether the finding recorded by the learned trial court to the effect that the sale-deed executed by Mohan Lal, was not to pay the antecedent debt of father has been set aside by the learned first appellate court without meeting cogent and convincing reasons given by the learned trial court? 3. Whether the plaintiff-appellants being minors have legal justification to get the sale-deed declared void within the meaning of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship act, which was executed on their behalf without obtaining permission of the Court?” 9. While discussing the evidence led by the parties on the aspect whether the sale-deed was executed by Mohan Lal to pay his antecedent debt, the learned Trial Court observed that Mohanlal as well as Karamjeet in their cross-examination, could not point out any reason as to why the debt was taken by Mohanlal and as to what was the need which necessitated Mohanlal to sell out the property. Learned Trial Court therefore, concluded that it could not be proved by defendant No.1 that the property was sold out for the benefit of the minors or their estate. 10. Learned First Appellate Court, while reversing the said finding, relied upon the statements of Karamjeet, who not only appeared in the witness box but also got exhibited the receipt for an amount of Rs.2,660/- (Exhibit-A2), vide which, the debt of Rs.2,660/- was repaid by Mohonlal to him. Learned First Appellate Court specifically observed that the said receipt was of 22.09.1971 i.e. of very next date of the date of sale deed i.e. 21.09.1971. The said receipt specifically mentioned the property to be mortgaged with Karamajeet and after repayment of the due amount, the original title deed was handed-over to Mohanlal by Karamjeet. The Court specifically observed that the said evidence remained uncontroverted and by leading the said evidence, defendant No.1 specifically discharged his burden to prove that the property was sold out by Mohanlal to repay his antecedent debt. 11. On the aspect whether any permission of the Court was required before executing the sale deed, learned First Appellate Court, while relying upon the judgment in re: Krishnakant Maganlal; AIR 1961 Gujarat 68, concluded that no permission of the Court was required for such sale as it was nowhere the case of the plaintiffs that the sale was made for any illegal purpose or was not for repayment of any antecedent debt. 12. In the specific opinion of this Court, the finding as recorded by the learned First Appellate Court was totally in consonance with law and in conformity with the settled position of law. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Maya Devi Vs. Lalta Prasad; AIR 2014 SC 1356 , in a case of alienation of joint Hindu property by the father, the condition which must be satisfied is that the father acted like a prudent man and did not dispose off the property for an inadequate consideration. Further, as observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sunil Kumar and Anr. Vs. Ram Parkash & Ors.; AIR 1988 SC 576 , a father, Karta, in addition to the power of alienation has also the special power to sell or mortgage ancestral property to discharge his antecedent debt which is not tainted with immorality. Further, as observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sunil Kumar and Anr. Vs. Ram Parkash & Ors.; AIR 1988 SC 576 , a father, Karta, in addition to the power of alienation has also the special power to sell or mortgage ancestral property to discharge his antecedent debt which is not tainted with immorality. The above view also finds support from the Hon’ble Apex Court judgment in the case of Prasad and Ors. Vs. V. Govindaswami Mudaliar and Ors.; AIR 1982 SC 84 , wherein it was specifically held that the father in a joint Hindu family may sell or mortgage the joint family property including the sons’ interest, to discharge a debt contacted by him for his own personal benefit and such alienation binds the sons provided :(a) the debt was antecedent to the alienation and (b) it was not incurred for an immoral purpose. 13. In view of the above settled position of law, it been proved on record that the debt in question was an antecedent one and the property was sold out by the father to repay the said antecedent debt and not for any immoral purpose, the plainitffs being the sons of Mohanlal, were definitely bound by the sale in question and requirement as laid down in Section 8 of the Act of 1956 to seek permission of the Court, would definitely not apply. Both questions No.1 & 3 as framed are therefore, answered in the above terms. 14. Substantial question No.2 as framed in the present second appeal is as under : “2. whether the first appellate court committed a substantial error of law and procedure in holding that Mohan Lal was indebted to Karamjeet Singh to the extent of Rs.2660/- and the sale consideration was paid to Karamjeet Singh, if so its effect?” The finding as arrived by the learned First Appellate Court to the effect that Mohanlal was indebted to Karamjeet to the extent of Rs.2,660/- also does not deserve any interference as the said fact was admitted by Mohanlal himself in his written statement. Further, the fact of Karamjeet owing the amount to Mohanlal was not disputed even by the plaintiffs. Question No.2 as framed, is hence, answered in above terms. 15. Further, the fact of Karamjeet owing the amount to Mohanlal was not disputed even by the plaintiffs. Question No.2 as framed, is hence, answered in above terms. 15. Substantial question No.4 as framed is as under : “4 Whether the learned first appellate court has committed substantial error of law in shifting the burden of proof on the plaintiff-appellants to show that the ancestral property was not sold for legal necessity and for repayment of antecedent debt?” A bare perusal of the judgment dated 16.04.1984 as passed by the learned Trial Court makes it clear that burden of proof qua issues No.1 to 5 was laid on the plaintiffs. It was the learned Trial Court and not the First Appellate Court, which laid the burden qua the said issues on the plaintiffs. Further, no objection to the said aspect was ever raised by the plaintiffs before the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the learned First Appellate Court shifted the burden on the plaintiffs appellants to show that the ancestral property was not sold for legal necessity and for payment of antecedent debt. Question No.4 is hence, answered as such. 16. In view of the above observations, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the judgment and decree dated 11.01.1993 passed by the learned First Appellate Court. As a result, the judgment and decree dated 11.01.1993 as passed by the Additional District Judge No.2, Jodhpur in Civil First Appeal No.105/1986 is hereby affirmed and the present second appeal is hence, dismissed.