JUDGMENT : Partha Sarathi Chatterjee, J. Preface : 1. The present writ petition challenges the validity of the order dated April 4th, 2012, passed by the learned Tribunal in O.A. 310 of 2010. In this order, the Tribunal declined to intervene in the dismissal order vide. no. F7-1/98-99 dated November 5th, 2009, as well as the order of the appellate authority dated August 3, 2010. Petitioner’s case: 2. The petitioner’s case, as unfurled in the writ petition, is that the petitioner started his career with the postal department in 1974 as an EDDA. By 1979, he was promoted to the position of Postman, and later, in 1989, he was further promoted to the post of Postal Assistant. 3. In 1992, he had been performing the duties of S.B. Counter Postal Assistant at Ranigunj Head Post Office, which fell under the jurisdiction of the Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Asansol Division, Burdwan. 4. As S.B. Counter Postal Assistant, he was responsible for receiving money from depositors and disbursing deposits to S.B. account holders based on the pay-in slip and withdrawal form, respectively. His role does not encompass the preparation of pay-in slips or MIS pass-books. 5. One P.L. Ganguly, a Postal Authorized Agent used to collect cash from the depositors and complete the Form no. SB-3 either with the depositor or independently, and proceed to open the MIS account. 6. On 18.01.1996, two joint accounts vide. MIS Account nos. 2777 and 2778 were opened by Nataraj Pramanik and Arati Pramanik, each with a deposit of Rs.6,000/- and another MIS Account vide. no. 2781 was opened by one Lal Mohan Mondal on 23.1.1996 with a deposit of Rs. 6,000/- through P.L. Ganguly. 7. Mr. Ganguly received Rs. 66,000/-, 60,000/- & 60,000/-respectively against those three accounts and even, in the MIS pass books and Ledger Cards, the amounts of Rs. 66,000/-, 60,000/- & 60,000/-respectively were recorded as deposited in those three accounts by interpolating of the digits, namely, ‘6’ and ‘0’ but these deposits were not reflected in the records of the postal department. 8. From the entries recorded in those MIS Accounts and Ledger Cards, it revealed that the interest payments for those three accounts were recorded approximately 22 to 23 times by a counter other than the S.B. Counter, even on Sundays and postal holidays. However, these transactions were not reflected in the postal accounts. Mr. 8. From the entries recorded in those MIS Accounts and Ledger Cards, it revealed that the interest payments for those three accounts were recorded approximately 22 to 23 times by a counter other than the S.B. Counter, even on Sundays and postal holidays. However, these transactions were not reflected in the postal accounts. Mr. Ganguly used the seal of the department to perpetrate these misdeeds. 9. Subsequently, it was discovered that the documents, including SB-3 (Index Cards), pertaining to those three accounts were not found within the department. 10. However, eventually, Mr. Ganguly realized that he might face charges of cheating or fraud. He convinced the three depositors to return the interest payments and provide declarations stating that they had deposited Rs. 6,000 each. As a result, the department did not incur any financial loss. 11. Suddenly, in connection with this incident, a charge-sheet was slapped upon the petitioner by the respondent no. 4 on the following allegation: “It is alleged that Sri B.K. Paul, while working as SB/MIS Counter PA, Raniganj H.O. on 18.1.96 and on 23.1.96, accepted applications for opening of new Ranignaj H.O. MIS Account no. 2777 and 2778 on 18.1.96 and MIS Account no, 2781 on 23.1.96. He entered the amount of deposit in MIS LOT of the said MIS Accounts on the respective dates as RS. 6000/- each. While he delivered the MIS passbooks of the said three Accounts to the concerned depositors in which the deposited amount were entered as Rs. 66000/- in MIS Account no. 2777 dated 18.1.96, Rs. 60000/- in MIS Account no. 2778 dated 18.1.96 and Rs. 6000/- in MIS Account no. 2781 dated 23.1.96. Thus, the said Sri B.K. Paul is found to be responsible for total short credit worth 1,68,000/- in the said three accounts. On the other hand he is also responsible for payment of undue monthly interest in respect of those three accounts for the period from 20.7.96 to 7.11.98 causing loss to the Govt. to the tune of Rs. 48945/- and thus, Sri Paul is found to have acted in violation of Rule -25(9) of P.O. S.B. Man. Vol-I and Rules 3(1)(i) and 3(1) (ii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.” 12. The respondents chose not to pursue any action against Mr. P.L. Ganguly and even the private respondents, who could have adduced evidence to unearth the truth, were not included as witnesses in the charge-sheet. Vol-I and Rules 3(1)(i) and 3(1) (ii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.” 12. The respondents chose not to pursue any action against Mr. P.L. Ganguly and even the private respondents, who could have adduced evidence to unearth the truth, were not included as witnesses in the charge-sheet. 13. The petitioner submitted his written statement of defence denying all allegations levelled against him. However, the department decided to proceed against him and appointed an Inquiry Officer (in short, IO) and a Presenting Officer. 14. The petitioner and his defence representative inspected certain documents intended to be used against him and requested supply of some additional documents to prepare his defence. The IO granted such request and sent requisition to the department but upon receipt of such requisition, the SSPO vide. his letter dated 25.8.2003 explicitly informed the IO that those additional documents were not available at Raniganj H.O. 15. However, the Management adduced oral testimonies of two witnesses, Jagadish Chakraborty and Basudev Mondal (examined as SW-1 and SW-2) and although tendered seventeen documents as evidence, but failed to produce a crucial document, SB-3. The SW-1 deposed that the depositors explicitly acknowledged that they had deposited Rs. 6,000/- each and returned excess interest payments, which were credited to the Government Account via ACG-67. SW-1 and also indicated that without SB-3, it could not be determined whether the alterations in MIS passbooks occurred after they were handed over to the depositors. 16. The inquiry officer after assessment of the evidence brought on record by the Management, concluded that the charge of violation of Rule 25(9) of P.O. SB. Man. Vol-I and Rule 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(ii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 was not proved. 17. Before the order of dismissal was issued to the petitioner, he preferred an original application being OA no. 1287 of 2005 to challenge the order of dismissal before the learned Tribunal. However, the learned Tribunal dismissed the OA with liberty to the petitioner to prefer statutory appeal assailing the order of dismissal. 18. The Disciplinary Authority (respondent no. 4) (in short, the DA) disagreed with the findings returned by the IO and held that the charges against the petitioner were established. The authority imposed a punishment of dismissal from service, stating that the MIS passbooks were tampered with. 18. The Disciplinary Authority (respondent no. 4) (in short, the DA) disagreed with the findings returned by the IO and held that the charges against the petitioner were established. The authority imposed a punishment of dismissal from service, stating that the MIS passbooks were tampered with. It was noted that although the depositors changed their statements regarding the amounts deposited, it was highly unlikely that they themselves altered the entries in the MIS passbooks. Mr. Ganguly received Rs. 66,000/-, Rs. 60,000/-, and Rs. 60,000/- from the depositors. Mr. Ganguly was claimed to be very friendly with the CO (the petitioner) and three other charged officials. Therefore, it was concluded that all four of them conspired to defraud the Government. Upon detection of irregularities, the amounts were promptly returned to the depositors to avoid legal action. Additionally, it was found that ledgers were filled in only after being requisitioned by the Division Office. This fact did not exclude the possibility of the petitioner's active role in destroying or altering the SB-3/ledger cards. 19. The petitioner preferred the statutory appeal against the order of dismissal but the appeal failed. 20. The petitioner assailed both the order of punishment and the order of the appellate authority before the learned Tribunal in OA 320 of 2007. By an order dated 28.04.2009, the learned Tribunal allowed the OA setting aside both orders. It observed that according to the extant rules, since the DA disagreed with the findings of the IO, he should have provided tentative reasons and afforded an opportunity of hearing of the charge official. Consequently, the matter was remanded to DA from the stage when the inquiry report was submitted. 21. Pursuant to the order dated 28.04.2009, the DA passed an order of disagreement dated 11.9.2009, which was assailed in OA 1434 of 2009. However, the OA no. 1434 of 2009 was dismissed citing the reason that it was pre-mature. 22. However, in terms of the order dated 28.04.2009 passed in OA 320 of 2007, a hearing was granted to the petitioner on 5.11.2009 but by passing an order on that date, the DA passed the same order that appeared to have been pre-determined. 23. The petitioner preferred statutory appeal against the order dated 5.11.2009 but the appeal was decided against the petitioner by an order dated 03.08.201o. 24. 23. The petitioner preferred statutory appeal against the order dated 5.11.2009 but the appeal was decided against the petitioner by an order dated 03.08.201o. 24. The matter was again carried in an original application, OA 310 of 2010 but the same was dismissed by an order dated April 4th, 2012. Consequently, the present writ petition has been presented to question the justifiability of the order dated 4.4.2012. 25. The parties have exchanged their affidavits, as directed. Respondents’ case: 26. The respondents’ case, as projected in affidavit-in-opposition, is that the learned Tribunal, after considering all aspects and taking into account the judgments, reported at (2006)5 SCC 673 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Kishore Yadav), (1995) 6 SCC 749 (B.C. Chaturvedi DPI & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.), (1994) 3 SCC 357 (Union of India & Ors. v. Upendra Singh), (2006) 1 SCC 589 (State of Rajasthan v. Md. Ayab Naaz) , (2010) 2 SCC 772 (State of UP v. Saroj Kr. Sinha) & 1997 SCC (L & S) 1806( Union of India & Anr. v. Ganayutham), passed an order dated 04.04.2012 with logical observations and refused to interfere in the case. 27. As the Counter PA, the petitioner was responsible for collecting applications for opening new MIS accounts, processing the relevant documents, and delivering the MIS passbooks to the depositors. However, the petitioner entered different amounts which were actually credited to the Government Account. Therefore, the petitioner was responsible for the misappropriation of Rs. 1,68,000/- due to the short credit of that amount. 28. Even though the transactions were conducted through a SAS agent, the petitioner was still responsible for ensuring that correct amounts were recorded in the MIS passbooks before they were delivered to the depositors. Therefore, the petitioner concocted a story to place the blame squarely on Mr. Ganguly but miserably failed in his attempt. 29. There was no convincing proof as to who actually manipulated the figures in the pass books but admittedly, it was responsibility of the petitioner to hand over the passbooks to the depositors. Out of three passbooks, there were no visible mark of alteration in MIS Account nos. 2777 & 2781 but in MIS passbook of Account no. 2778, there was overwriting. 30. The petitioner inevitably conspired with Mr. Out of three passbooks, there were no visible mark of alteration in MIS Account nos. 2777 & 2781 but in MIS passbook of Account no. 2778, there was overwriting. 30. The petitioner inevitably conspired with Mr. Ganguly and other employees and as such, interests were paid against three accounts and the petitioner cannot shirk his responsibility in such incidents. 31. During preliminary investigation, all depositors admitted that they had deposited Rs. 66,000/-, 60,000/- & 60,000/- respectively and they used to draw interests @ 715/-, 650/- and 650/- respectively for almost 24 months continuously. Subsequently, to cover up the misdeeds, the depositors were persuaded to turn around from their earlier stand to give a declaration that they had actually deposited Rs. 6000/- each. Similarly, to avoid legal action, excess payments were credited to Government Account. 32. According to Rule 25(9) of POSB Manual, Vol-I, it was responsibility of the Counter PA to hand over the MIS passbooks to the depositors after completion of all formalities, including ensuring that correct amounts were recorded therein. Therefore, the petitioner cannot disown his liability in the misdeeds. 33. All reasonable opportunities were provided to the petitioner to defend and upon assessment of evidence, the DA has rightly issued the order of dismissal and following the precedents set by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the issue, the learned Tribunal refused to intervene into the matter. Contents of Affidavit-in-reply: 34. As counter PA, the petitioner examined the application forms (SB-3) and pay-in-slips and an entry of deposit of Rs. 6000/- in respect of all three MIS Accounts was recorded in Long Book on the respective dates, leaving the space blank for Account Number. Thereafter, those application forms and pay-in-slips were transferred to Ledger Assistant for opening accounts in Ledger Cards. 35. Accordingly, the Ledger Assistant opened new Ledger Cards based upon those application forms and pay-in-slips, assigned Account Number and prepared passbooks. Then the Ledger Assistant placed those documents, viz. Ledger Cards, Passbooks & Pay-in-slips to the Assistant Postmaster (in short, APM), who was in charge of Postmaster then. Upon receipt of those documents, checked those documents and the entries entered therein and authenticated the Ledger Cards by affixing his signature and seal. 36. Then the Ledger Assistant placed those documents, viz. Ledger Cards, Passbooks & Pay-in-slips to the Assistant Postmaster (in short, APM), who was in charge of Postmaster then. Upon receipt of those documents, checked those documents and the entries entered therein and authenticated the Ledger Cards by affixing his signature and seal. 36. Thereafter, the APM returned the Ledger Cards to the Ledger Assistant for custody in the Ledger Binder, while the passbooks and pay-in-slips were returned to the petitioner for delivery to the authorised agent who deposited the amounts. 37. On receipt of passbooks and pay-in-slips from the APM, the Account Numbers were noted in the Long Book. The counter foils of the pay-in-slips were signed by the petitioner. The passbooks and the counter foils were then returned to Mr. Ganguly, tokens given to him at time of acceptance of deposited amounts were taken back. 38. Despite receipt of requisition, application forms (SB-3) duly signed by the depositors, and the original Leger Cards pertaining to those three accounts, as well as the MIS list of deposits and payments on the respective dates had not been provided to the petitioner, causing serious prejudice to him. 39. After careful assessment of evidence, the IO opined that the Ledger Cards were not original and the entries of deposit of Rs. 66,000/- , 60,000/- & 60,000/- in the Ledger Cards were vague. The Pay-in-slips, produced in their original form, clearly demonstrated that the depositors had actually deposited Rs. 6000/- each. Therefore, the allegation of short credit of Rs.1,68,000/- is unfounded and as the interests paid in excess were credited to Government Account, there cannot be any occasion for financial loss to the Government. The depositors had never lodged any complaint before any authority, nor had any FIR been lodged by the respondents. 40. From the findings of the IO, it is evident that before the passbooks were delivered to SAS Agent, Mr. Ganguly, there was no manipulation. Any manipulation in the passbooks, if any, was done by Mr. Ganguly or the depositors after the passbooks were handed over to Mr. Ganguly. Submissions: 41. Mr. Somenath Bose, learned advocate representing the petitioner, argues that the respondents proceeded with a pre-determined mind to somehow punish the petitioner. His next argument is that the order of dismissal is based on no evidence and is instated on presumption and assumption. Ganguly or the depositors after the passbooks were handed over to Mr. Ganguly. Submissions: 41. Mr. Somenath Bose, learned advocate representing the petitioner, argues that the respondents proceeded with a pre-determined mind to somehow punish the petitioner. His next argument is that the order of dismissal is based on no evidence and is instated on presumption and assumption. He asserts that it has been not proven that the petitioner acted in concert with Mr. Ganguly in committing the alleged misdeeds. 42. He argues that although the petitioner had been working as Counter PA on the relevant dates, but the pay-in-slips were prepared by Mr. Ganguly. Upon receiving the application forms (SB-3) and pay-in-slips, the petitioners completed the required actions. At that time, no anomalies in recording the amounts of deposits were detected before the passbooks were delivered to Mr. Ganguly. 43. He further argues that the IO concerned, after assessment of evidence, opined that the manipulations were done by outsiders. He contends that the depositors admitted that they had deposited Rs. 6000/- each and interests paid in excess were credited to Government Account. He claims the petitioner cannot be held responsible for payment of interests. 44. He argues that it is expected that administrative action must be fair and without bias. He contends that the incidents had allegedly occurred in 1996 but the disciplinary proceeding was initiated in 2001. According to him, unexplained delay in initiating the proceeding gives room for colourable exercise of power. The respondents committed mistake in not giving second show-cause notice before imposition of punishment. 45. He argues that even if it is assumed that the petitioner mistakenly entered erroneous entries, it can be argued that mere error of judgment is not misconduct. He asserts that the learned Tribunal overlooked these issues and came to an erroneous finding which cannot be sustained. To invigorate his submission, he relies on the judgments, reported at (2005) 6 SCC 636 ( P.V. Madhedavan v. Md. He asserts that the learned Tribunal overlooked these issues and came to an erroneous finding which cannot be sustained. To invigorate his submission, he relies on the judgments, reported at (2005) 6 SCC 636 ( P.V. Madhedavan v. Md. T.N. Housing Board), (2001) 2 SCC 330 ( State of Punjab v. V. K. Khanna & Ors.), (1995) 2 SCC 570 (State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Gayal), (2010) 11 SCC 71 (South Bengal State Transport Corporation v. Ashok Kumar Ghosh), (1975) 2 SCC 326 (Narayan Ganesh Dastane v. Sucheta Narayan Dastane), 2020 SCC OnLine 886 SC (State of Rajasthan v. Heem Singh), (1958) SC 300 (CB) (Khemchand v. Union of India & Ors.), AIR 1963 SC 1612 (State of Assam & Ors. v. Vimal Kumar Pandit), (1998) 7 SCC 84 (Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Kunj Behari Mishra), AIR 1964 SC 363 (Union of India v. H.C. Goel), AIR 1973 SC 253 (Hindustan Steel Limited v. State of Orissa), (2007) 4 SCC 566 ( Inspector Premchand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1994) 5 SCC 267 (Rashlal Yadav v. State of Bihar & Ors.), (1992) 4 SCC 54 ( State of Punjab v. Ram Singh Ex- Constable), (1997) SCC 409 ( Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. UOI and Ors.), (2023) live law (SC 49) ( Union of India and ors. v. Constable Sunil Kumar), (2015) 2 SCC 610 (Union of India v. P. Gunasekran), (1998) 7 SCC 4 (Punjab National Bank and Ors v. Kunj Behari Mishra), (1997) 2 SCC 491 ( State of Haryana v. Ratan Singh), 2022 live law SC 304 ( State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Umesh), (2011) 3 SCC 436 ( State of Orissa and Anr. v. Mamata Mohanty), (2011) 5 SCC 142 ( Chairman-cum-M.D. Coal India Limited and Ors. v. Ananta Saha and Ors.), AIR 1957 SC 425 ( Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand), AIR 1987 SC 2386 ( Ranjit Thakur v. UOI and Ors), (1992) 1 SCC 56 ( Jiwan Kumar Lohia and Anr. v. Durgadutt Lohia and Ors.). 46. In response, Mr. Arabinda Sen, the learned advocate representing the respondents, argues that the petitioner was afforded all opportunities to defend himself and as such, there was no flaw in decision making process. v. Durgadutt Lohia and Ors.). 46. In response, Mr. Arabinda Sen, the learned advocate representing the respondents, argues that the petitioner was afforded all opportunities to defend himself and as such, there was no flaw in decision making process. He contends that the DA by passing reasoned order disagreed with the findings of the IO and in terms of the order of the learned Tribunal, the petitioner was provided the disagreement note supported by tentative reasons and granted a hearing. 47. His next limb of argument was that this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence in disciplinary proceeding. The learned Tribunal considering all these aspects and following the ratio of the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, has rejected the OA, leaving no scope before this Court to intervene in this matter. Analysis: 48. Therefore, the allegation against the petitioner was that he, while working as a Counter PA, accepted applications for three MIS Accounts and entered deposit of Rs. 6000/- each in the MIS lots but in the MIS passbooks, he recorded deposits of Rs. Rs. 66,000/-, 60,000/- and 60,000/- respectively, resulting in a short credit of Rs. 1,68,000/-. Additionally, he was responsible for payment of undue monthly interests of Rs. 48,945 against these accounts. Thus, he acted in violation of P.O. S.B. Man. Vol-I Rule 25(9) and CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 Rules 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(ii). 49. As noted earlier, after evaluating the evidence, the IO found that the charge against the petitioner was not proven. However, the DA disagreed with this finding and issued a dismissal order without providing a disagreement note outlining tentative reasons or an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. However, in terms of the order of the Tribunal, these mandatory procedural requirements were fulfilled. Nonetheless, the disciplinary authority issued a fresh dismissal order, maintaining the original decision, which was upheld by the Appellate Authority. 50. The order of the learned Tribunal, currently under scrutiny in the present writ petition, states that the learned Tribunal declined to intervene in the matter, citing reasons that no procedural lapses were evident in conducting the disciplinary proceeding. Citing precedents from the Hon’ble Apex Court (as referenced in paragraph no. 26 above), the Tribunal concluded that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary inquiries is very limited. Citing precedents from the Hon’ble Apex Court (as referenced in paragraph no. 26 above), the Tribunal concluded that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary inquiries is very limited. It emphasized that Courts or tribunals cannot re-evaluate the evidence or act as an appellate body over the decisions of the DA and the Appellate Authority (in short, AA). 51. The main thrust of argument of Mr. Bose, is that the respondents proceeded with a pre-determined mind and the order of dismissal is perverse, being based on no evidence. Conversely, Mr. Sen, strenuously contends that there was no flaw in decision making process. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence nor sit in appeal over the decision of DA and AA. Therefore, in the present writ petition, we are called upon to adjudicate these issues. 52. Needless to observe that the basic concept of fair play in action is squarely applicable in administrative, judicial and quasi-judicial field. When an authority assumes jurisdiction to discharge quasi-judicial function, it is required to act fairly, impartially, and without any bias or pre-conceived notion. If the Court finds that authority has acted arbitrarily, with closed mind and in violation of rules of natural justice or statutory rules, the Court can extend the compass of judicial review to render justice. 53. The scope of judicial review grounded on illegality, irrationality say, Wednesbury unreasonableness and procedural impropriety. The doctrine of reasonableness gives way to doctrine of proportionality also. Judicial review of administration action aims to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. The basic requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is fairness in Sate action. Admittedly, scope of judicial review is generally confined to decision making process but if it is found that decision is perverse, irrational or grossly disproportionate, that decision will come under the purview of judicial review. 54. In case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that the Court or Tribunal may intervene if the proceeding against a delinquent officer is held in derogation of the principles of natural justice or statutory rules governing the inquiry. If the conclusion and findings of the disciplinary authority are not supported by evidence or are so unreasonable that no rational person would reach the same, the Court or Tribunal may intervene and mould the relief to suit the specific circumstances of each case. 55. If the conclusion and findings of the disciplinary authority are not supported by evidence or are so unreasonable that no rational person would reach the same, the Court or Tribunal may intervene and mould the relief to suit the specific circumstances of each case. 55. To address the issues effectively, let us review the procedure required to be adhered to by the postal department staff, including Counter Assistant (CA) at the time of opening an account including MIS Account. 56. The procedure for opening an account by a Counter Assistant (CA), as outlined in the Post Office Small Savings Scheme Manual, Part-II, 10th Edition, 1997 (supplied by the petitioner's advocate), involves verifying entries on the application form (SB-3) and pay-in-slip. After collecting the deposit amount and stamping both parts of the pay-in-slip with the date, the CA makes an entry in the Long Book and notes the serial number of the entry on the SB-3. Thereafter, the CA transfers the SB-3 and pay-in-slip to the Ledger Assistant and then a token is issued to the depositor. 57. The Ledger Assistant refers to the Index to Ledger Cards, notes the next number therein and enters the number in the pass book, ledger card, SB-3 and pay-in-slip. The Ledger Assistant then prepares the ledger card (SB-75) and pass book with the entry of deposit and particulars of depositor, nominee etc. 58. The passbook, SB-3, pay-in-slip, Index to ledger cards, and ledger card should then be transferred to the Post Master for checking and authentication. The Post Master compares the entries, signs on page 1 of the passbook, and initials against the entry of deposit. Thereafter, the Post Master authenticates the ledger card, and then transfers the ledger card and Index to ledger card to the Ledger Assistant, and the passbook, SB-3, and pay-in-slip to the CA. 59. The CA, upon receiving the passbook, SB-3, and pay-in-slip, should compare the deposit amount in the passbook with pay-in-slip and the long book. He then notes the account number in the long book. He then delivers the pass book and the counter foil of pay-in-slip to the depositor after collecting the token from him. Therefore, it is clear and evident that a Counter PA is not tasked with recording the deposit amount in the passbook. (Whether Para 60 to Para 67 is required ?) 60. He then delivers the pass book and the counter foil of pay-in-slip to the depositor after collecting the token from him. Therefore, it is clear and evident that a Counter PA is not tasked with recording the deposit amount in the passbook. (Whether Para 60 to Para 67 is required ?) 60. For a limited purpose, only to respond to the petitioner’s contention that the order of dismissal is perverse, being based on no evidence, let us examine the evidence presented by the Management. There cannot be any quarrel in accepting the proposition that the standard of proof in a disciplinary proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. 61. Admittedly, the accounts were opened through SAS agent, Mr. Ganguly. From the inquiry report, in transpires that the application forms (SB-3) were not presented as evidence. However, the pay-in-slips, MIS LOTs and other related documents confirmed that an amount of Rs. 6000/- each was credited to those three MIS Accounts, and those documents were duly checked, verified and signed by APM. No anomalies regarding deposit amounts on those dates in HO Summary were detected. 62. SW-1, Mr. Jagadishwar Chakraborty, confirmed that he had documented the statements of two depositors who admitted depositing Rs. 6000/- each. He examined the pay-in-slips for three accounts, showing deposits of Rs. 6000/- each. The MIS lots for these three accounts also corroborated this information. He testified that there were alterations in the recorded deposit amounts in the passbooks. 63. Indisputably, on the relevant dates, Mr. Ravindra Singh worked as Ledger Assistant but the IO noticed that ‘the handwriting of regular ledger PA differs with the entries appeared on the ledger cards’. The interests were paid on holidays. The IO opined that the original ledger cards were substituted. The depositors admitted that they had deposited Rs. 6000/- each in respect of those three accounts. Interests paid in excess were credited to the Government Account and as such, there was no financial loss to the Government. After assessing of this evidence, IO came to a finding that charge against the petitioner was not proved. 64. In the initial dismissal order, the DA noted that it was unlikely that the depositors themselves had tampered the passbooks. He suggested that the person who prepared the passbook was likely responsible for any tampering in the passbooks. After assessing of this evidence, IO came to a finding that charge against the petitioner was not proved. 64. In the initial dismissal order, the DA noted that it was unlikely that the depositors themselves had tampered the passbooks. He suggested that the person who prepared the passbook was likely responsible for any tampering in the passbooks. Additionally, due to the close relationship between the SAS agent and the CO (the petitioner), the DA did not rule out the CO's involvement. The DA also speculated that the agent might have collected deposits and obtained the depositors’ signatures on blank application forms (SB-3) and index cards. He also speculated that the agent possibly prepared SB-103 forms, passbooks, and ledger cards. Ultimately, the DA concluded that the agent, along with the CO, Sri R. Singh (Ledger Assistant), and APM-I, had colluded to deceive both the depositors and the government. He also did not rule out the possibility that the CO might have destroyed the SB-3 or ledger cards. 65. Therefore, it is evident that in his initial order, the DA did not evaluate any evidence rather, he based his findings on mere speculation and assumption. 66. In his subsequent dismissal order, the DA observed the in MIS passbook A/C no. 2781, there was no manipulation in the entries. The amount was written in figure and in words keeping a gap between the words, unlike in other writings. Based on the writing style, he inferred that the writings were done by the same person using same ball pen. Similar observation was made in respect of passbook A/C no. 2777. In passbook A/C no. 2778, there was overwriting due to mistake. He further inferred that the passbook A/c no. 2778 contained the original writing of ledger PA, where deposit amount was clearly recorded in words as ‘Sixty thousand only’. 67. He further observed that ledger cards, which were duly attested by the supervisor concerned, were original. The entries in the ledger cards were made subsequently. He noted that as per Rule 25(9) of POSB Manual, Vol-I, it was duty of Counter PA (the CO) to check the passbooks before delivering them to the depositors. Therefore, the CO was aware of these irregularities but did not point out and thus, the charge was proved. 68. It is evident that in the second dismissal order as well, there was no assessment of evidence. Therefore, the CO was aware of these irregularities but did not point out and thus, the charge was proved. 68. It is evident that in the second dismissal order as well, there was no assessment of evidence. The DA did not analyse the evidence adduced by SW-1 and SW-2. As noted previously, the management did not produce the application forms (SB-3), and there was no discussion on other documentary evidence. Without reaching a specific factual conclusion that manipulations occurred in the passbooks before their delivery to depositors, the DA concluded that since it was the duty of the CO, as per existing rules, to verify entries in the passbooks, he must have been aware of irregularities crept therein but failed to report them and as such, the charge was proved. 69. In a departmental inquiry, the decision should be based on a careful consideration of all relevant factors and evidence. The charge was that the CO entered the amounts being Rs. 66,000/-, 60,000/- & 60,000/-in MIS Lots and passbooks, resulting in a short credit of Rs. 1,68,000/-. Additionally, he was responsible for excess payments of interests to the tune of Rs. 48,945/-. Therefore, at least, it should have been proved to be probable that it was the petitioner who entered such entries and played an active role in recording such entries or manipulation or in payment of interest. Be it noted that no charge of negligence in verifying the passbooks before delivering to the depositors or the agent were levelled against the petitioner. Conclusion: 70. Therefore, based on above discussion, we have no other alternative but to hold that the second dismissal order is based on no evidence and as such, the same cannot be sustained. The learned Tribunal below glossed over these issues and abruptly jumped to conclusion by mechanically paraphrasing certain judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and therefore, the order of the learned Tribunal also cannot be sustained. 71. We have been informed that the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation in 2013. Given these supervening circumstances, it would not be expedient to restore the disciplinary proceeding from the state of submission of the inquiry report and require the petitioner to undergo another protracted proceeding after such a long period since his retirement. 72. 71. We have been informed that the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation in 2013. Given these supervening circumstances, it would not be expedient to restore the disciplinary proceeding from the state of submission of the inquiry report and require the petitioner to undergo another protracted proceeding after such a long period since his retirement. 72. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion that it would not be proper to grant back-wages to the petitioner for the period during which he has not worked. But, as the petitioner was deprived of the employer’s contribution towards the Provident Fund, the payment of gratuity, pension and the leave encashment because of his dismissal from services, therefore, to serve the ends of justice we direct that the petitioner be provided notionally the benefit of continuity of service not for the payment of back-wages for the period during which he did not serve the department, but for the purpose of retirement benefits like employer’s contribution towards provident fund, payment of gratuity, pension and leave encashment etc. Order: 73. In view thereof, the order of the learned Tribunal dated 4.4.2012 passed in OA 310 of 2010, the order of dismissal dated 5th November, 2009 and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 3.8.2010 are quashed. The respondent nos. 1 to 4 are directed to pay the petitioner’s terminal benefits including pension, which would be calculated based on his last drawn pay as if he had been in service. The entire exercise of payment of retiral dues, as indicated above, shall be carried out by the said respondents within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order. 74. With these observations and order, this writ petition is, thus, disposed of, however, without any order as to the costs. 75. Parties shall be entitled to act on the basis of a server copy of this Judgement and Order placed on the official website of the Court. 76. Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.