JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, A.C.J. The appellant has challenged the writ Court’s order dated 18th May 2023 passed in W.P(S) No.7007 of 2019 primarily on the ground that the restrictions upon the powers of the writ Court are not absolute and the writ Court can interfere with the order passed in a disciplinary proceeding on the ground of mala fide perversity, proportionality and other well-known grounds of the like nature. 2. The appellant who was appointed on the post of Assistant on 4th September 1995 was served a charge-memo dated 8th May 2013 on the allegation of misappropriation of Rs.79,92,465/- through 29 cheque leafs fraudulently taken out from the Nazarat. This is the case set up by the appellant that he was transferred from Nagar Untari Block to Garhwa where he tendered his joining on 21st January 2012 and worked as Nazir in the Nazarat. He was handed over charge of general cash register but other registers including the cheque book register were not given to him. On 5th May 2012, he gave a written information to the Block Development Officer that several leafs from the cheque book were missing from the Nazarat and on that basis a First Information Report vide Garhwa PS Case No. 141 of 2012 was registered under sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. In that criminal case, the appellant was taken into custody on 7th May 2012 and was put under suspension vide order dated 8th May 2012. Before the Inquiring Officer, the appellant took a similar stand that except cash register other important registers including the cheque book register were not handed over to him. To corroborate this stand, the appellant produced the report dated 1st June 2012 submitted by the Enquiry Committee constituted by the Deputy Commissioner at Garhwa. However, the Inquiring Officer submitted a report on 9th September 2014 holding that the appellant’s conduct was not beyond suspicion. The appellant controverted the adverse findings therein by submitting his reply to the second show-cause notice dated 12th March 2015. However, the disciplinary authority passed an order of dismissal from service on 2nd July 2018 and the appellate authority dismissed his appeal by an order dated 21st October 2019. 3. The appellant controverted the adverse findings therein by submitting his reply to the second show-cause notice dated 12th March 2015. However, the disciplinary authority passed an order of dismissal from service on 2nd July 2018 and the appellate authority dismissed his appeal by an order dated 21st October 2019. 3. Before the writ Court, the appellant laid a challenge to the inquiry report and continuation of the domestic inquiry on the ground that the allegations against him both in the domestic inquiry and the criminal proceedings were the same and similar and therefore the domestic inquiry was required to be postponed till a final decision in the criminal case. The inquiry report dated 9th September 2014 was criticized on the ground that it was cryptic and reflected non-application of mind on the part of the Inquiring Officer and the same was based on conjectures and surmises. 4. The writ Court after referring to the judgments in “Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran” (2015) 2 SCC 610 , “State of Bihar & Ors. v. Phulpari Kumari” (2020) 2 SCC 130 , “Pravin Kumar v. Union of India & Ors.” (2020) 9 SCC 471 , “SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava” (2021) 2 SCC 612 , and “UCO Bank v. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj” (2022) 5 SCC 695 formed an opinion not to interfere with the punishment order. While dismissing the writ petition, the writ Court recorded the following reasons for not interfering with the punishment order passed against the appellant: “8. Be that as it may, having gone through rival submissions of the parties and on perusal of the records, it appears that the petitioner has been found guilty of charges and the charges have been duly proved in the regular departmental proceeding. The order of Disciplinary authority has been affirmed by the appellate authority. This Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, restrains itself from reappreciating the evidences, which has already been appreciated in the enquiry by the disciplinary authority and, thereafter, providing full opportunity, punishment order has been passed. The Court cannot substitute the findings which has come from the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , has held that :- “12. The Court cannot substitute the findings which has come from the Enquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , has held that :- “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 10. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 10. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Phulpari Kumari, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130 , it has held thus:- “6. The criminal trial against the respondent is still pending consideration by a competent criminal court. The order of dismissal from service of the respondent was pursuant to a departmental inquiry held against her. The inquiry officer examined the evidence and concluded that the charge of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the respondent was proved. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error in reappreciating the evidence and coming to a conclusion that the evidence on record was not sufficient to point to the guilt of the respondent: 6.1. It is settled law that interference with the orders passed pursuant to a departmental inquiry can be only in case of “no evidence”. Sufficiency of evidence is not within the realm of judicial review. The standard of proof as required in a criminal trial is not the same in a departmental inquiry. Strict rules of evidence are to be followed by the criminal court where the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, preponderance of probabilities is the test adopted in finding the delinquent guilty of the charge. 6.2. The High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of dismissal of the respondent by re-examining the evidence and taking a view different from that of the disciplinary authority which was based on the findings of the inquiry officer. 11. Similar issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Pravin Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2020) 9 SCC 471 , wherein Their Lordship has held as under :- “Scope of judicial review in service matter “25. The learned counsel for the appellant spent considerable time taking us through the various evidence on record with the intention of highlighting lacunae and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the present proceedings is quite high. The learned counsel for the appellant spent considerable time taking us through the various evidence on record with the intention of highlighting lacunae and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise was in vain, as the threshold of interference in the present proceedings is quite high. The power of judicial review discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority. It would be gainsaid that judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-making process, and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial review seeks to ensure fairness in treatment and not fairness of conclusion. It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome. [State of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373 , para 11 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 316] 12. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612 has held thus: “28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” 13. Of late, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of UCO Bank v. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj, (2022) 5 SCC 695 has held as under:- 17. Of late, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of UCO Bank v. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj, (2022) 5 SCC 695 has held as under:- 17. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is well circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has earlier been examined by this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] ; H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by a three-Judge Bench of this Court (of which one of us is a member) in SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava [SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 457] wherein this Court has held as under [SCC pp. 626-27, paras 24-28]: 24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry. 27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings. 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.” “14. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncement, writ petition is devoid of any merit and as such, same is hereby dismissed.” 5. Mr. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncement, writ petition is devoid of any merit and as such, same is hereby dismissed.” 5. Mr. Rajeev Ranjan Tiwary, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the writ Court committed a serious error in law in not recording a finding on the plea raised on behalf of the appellant and declined to interfere in the matter only on the ground that in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the writ Court must restrain itself from reappreciating the evidence laid in the domestic inquiry. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that no evidence was produced in the domestic inquiry against the appellant and not even any witness deposed against him but a finding of suspicious conduct has been recorded by the Inquiring Officer merely on assumptions. Plainly speaking, the plea urged on behalf of the appellant is that the writ Court overlooked an apparent perversity in the punishment order dated 2nd July 2018 which completely ignores the preliminary inquiry report dated 1st June 2012 wherein the Enquiry Committee recorded a clear finding that the cheque books, cheque register and other important documents in the Nazarat were not handed over to the appellant. On the other hand, Mr. Ravi Kerketta, the learned State counsel submits that the charges against the appellant were very serious in nature and being the Nazir the appellant was in the overall charge of the Nazarat and therefore cannot avoid the charge merely by saying that the important registers including the cheque book register were not handed over to him. 6. The powers of the writ Court to interfere with the findings recorded by the departmental authority are very limited. Except in cases where the departmental authority is found to have rendered a finding based on no evidence or by ignoring a vital piece of evidence or taking into consideration irrelevant material, the writ Court shall not interfere with the order of punishment passed in a properly constituted departmental inquiry. No doubt it is lawful for the departmental authority to pass an order of punishment against the delinquent government employee provided there is some evidence. No doubt it is lawful for the departmental authority to pass an order of punishment against the delinquent government employee provided there is some evidence. However, in a case in which the punishment of dismissal from service has been passed completely ignoring the materials on record such as the preliminary inquiry report, the Court must step in and remedy the mistake committed by the departmental authority. 7. In “Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.” (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : “6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority.” 8. In the domestic inquiry, the department laid documentary evidence such as First Information Report vide Garhwa PS Case No.141 of 2012, seizure-memo prepared in the criminal case, photo copy of the general cash register, photo copy of cheque register, written statements of Krishna Kumar Yadav and Pramod Kumar and the bank statements. This is the statement of Pramod Kumar that he was the in-charge of Nazarat and earlier to him Satish Kumar Singh was the in-charge of Nazarat and having custody of the cheque books and cheque book register. These materials/documents produced in the domestic inquiry would simply indicate that cheque leafs were missing and by utilizing the same an amount of Rs.79,92,465/- was misappropriated. However, no witness was examined by the department to demonstrate that the cheque books were handed over to the appellant or that he had the custody of the cheque books in which 29 cheque leafs were found missing. However, no witness was examined by the department to demonstrate that the cheque books were handed over to the appellant or that he had the custody of the cheque books in which 29 cheque leafs were found missing. The Inquiring Officer referred to the preliminary inquiry report dated 1st June 2012 submitted by the Enquiry Committee constituted by the Deputy Commissioner but did not consider the findings recorded therein. In the said report, the Enquiry Committee recorded a categoric finding that Satish Singh was the person who had the custody of the cheque books and cheque register and he was acting on the instructions of the Block Development Officer. 9. The Enquiry Committee has recorded the following findings: Hindi: “….From enquiry, it is also clear that from the account number 1426401237 of the Gramin Bank, none of the cheques from cheque nos. 122301 to 122400 were used. Meaning thereby that from the intact cheque book, cheque nos. 122396 to 122400 were missing. The aforesaid cheque book was handed over to Sri Pramod Kumar, Nazir on 17.08.2011. The signature of Sri Pramod Kumar, Nazir, was certified by Block Development Officer. Though no cheque has been encashed from the cheque book. In this regard, the report from the Bank has also been received (Annexure.......). Block has verified the general cash register. This register has been maintained till 21.01.2012. On this day, Pramod Kumar, Ex-Nazir, gave the charge of the general register to Sri Indu Bhushan Singh. In connection to Nazarat, the written charge list of different record and other important documents and cheque register, cheque book, etc. were not handed over. It is clear from the general cash register that after taking charge from Ex-Nazir, not a single page in the register was written by Sri Indu Bhushan Singh. Whereas, after that date, the transaction of the amount was done by the Block Office. Apart from the general cash register, other subsidiary cash register has also not been updated. It is clear that general cash register as well as other cash registers have also not been written from 2-2, 3-3 months. Block Development Officer has not certified these registers after 21.01.2012. Cheque register with respect to cheque book is also neither legally maintained nor updated, meaning thereby there is negligence on the part of Block Development Officer. It is clear that general cash register as well as other cash registers have also not been written from 2-2, 3-3 months. Block Development Officer has not certified these registers after 21.01.2012. Cheque register with respect to cheque book is also neither legally maintained nor updated, meaning thereby there is negligence on the part of Block Development Officer. Cheque book and cheque register was not in the custody of Block Nazir, whereas it was in the custody of non-government person namely Sri Satish Singh. Satish Singh on his own will was presenting the aforesaid cheques on the instruction of Block Development Officer. In these circumstances, on the connivance of the office employee and Satish Singh and other persons, made the cheque disappear and the said amount was disbursed. In this connection, on enquiry from Block Development Officer, it was told by him that the aforesaid cheque, his forged signature was done and illegal withdrawal was made. On the cheque, in reality, signature of Smt. Manisha Tirkey, Block Department Officer was real or fake can be enquired by the forensic report.” 10. Now ignoring the findings in the report dated 1st June 2012 the Inquiring Officer could not have recorded that the conduct of the appellant is beyond suspicion. Even so, the suspicion howsoever strong cannot be the foundation for holding the appellant guilty and awarding of punishment of dismissal from service. In “Gunasekaran” the Hon’ble Supreme Court indicated that the writ Court cannot enter into the merits of the inquiry report but then an apparent illegality in the inquiry report cannot be overlooked. In a departmental proceeding, the inquiry report has a vital importance inasmuch as the Inquiring Officer conducts a fact finding inquiry. In “Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.” (2006) 4 SCC 713 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that mere ipse dixit of the Inquiring Officer is not sufficient to hold the charge against a delinquent government employee proved. The inquiry report dated 9th September 2014 is mere ipse dixit of the Inquiring Officer and the findings therein are not based on any evidence produced against the appellant. The appellate authority who was exercising the powers under the statutory rules under Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 was enjoined in law to examine the factual aspects and render his independent findings. The appellate authority who was exercising the powers under the statutory rules under Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 was enjoined in law to examine the factual aspects and render his independent findings. However, the appellate authority also failed in his duty and did not advert to the preliminary inquiry report. 11. For the foregoing reasons, the orders contained in Memo No.692 dated 21st October 2019 and Memo No.303 dated 2nd July 2018 are set aside. 12. L.P.A No.547 of 2023 is allowed. 13. Consequently, W.P(S) No. 7007 of 2019 is allowed.