JUDGMENT : Biren Vaishnav, J. 1. This first appeal has been filed by the original plaintiff under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging the legality and validity of the order passed by the learned 7th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Bhavnagar below Ex. 14 in Summary Suit No. 11 of 2014. By an order dated 15.12.2015, the learned Civil Judge has entertained the defendant’s application under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismissed the summary suit on the ground that the suit was barred by Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (‘The partnership Act’ for short). 2. Facts in brief are as under: 2.1 It was the case of the plaintiff – appellant that during the course of business transactions, since the year 2009, with the opponents, for the year 2009-10 the defendant – opponents had made payments of Rs.1,18,18,142/- against a total outstanding of Rs.1,44,12,937/-. Therefore, Rs.25,94,795/- were outstanding. Similarly for the year 2010-11, during the course of business transactions when the defendants had ordered goods amounting to Rs.7,85,52,604/- from the appellants and the goods were delivered to them, after a lot of dilly dallying, the opponents paid an amount of Rs.1,77,60,840/-. 2.2 It is the case of the appellants in the plaint that on 29.03.2011, on a request made by the defendants the appellants came to Vadodara for collecting payments. On 31.03.2011, they were compelled to enter into one settlement as a result of which the defendant – opponents transferred Rs.74,51,000/- out of the total amount of Rs.1,77,60,840/-. The appellant’s case therefore in the plaint was that they are entitled to Rs.1,03,09,845/- from the defendants. A summary suit was accordingly filed being Summary Suit No. 11 of 2014. On a summons issued by the trial court, the defendants – opponents herein filed an application for Leave to Defend under Order 37 Rule 3(5) which was allowed on 22.06.2015. On that very date they filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short ‘the CPC’) interalia stating that in view of the fact that the firm was an unregistered partnership firm on the date of filing of the suit, the suit was barred under the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act. The application was allowed giving rise to the present appeal. 3. Mr. The application was allowed giving rise to the present appeal. 3. Mr. Hriday Buch, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the order entertaining and allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC is bad. Reading Section 69 of the Partnership Act, Mr. Buch would submit that what is evident from the plaint when read in juxtaposition with the provisions of Section 69 is that the provisions would arise only when the suit is for a business transaction arising out of a contract of the firm which is not the case on hand. He would submit that what is evident from reading the order impugned before this court is that the transaction in question even according to the trial court was entered into the period prior to 01.04.2011, and when the trial court itself had observed that based on the compromise deed executed, when it was prima facie a case that the business was entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendants where the plaintiff was the owner of a proprietary firm, merely because the firm was subsequently converted into a partnership, that itself would not bar the suit on the ground that the firm was unregistered. 3.1 Mr. Buch would submit that the transactions that occurred on 31.03.2011 were business transactions between the proprietary firm and the defendants and the dispute essentially was of transactions in the nature of contracts for enforcing a right arising from a contract as a proprietary firm and therefore merely because the suit was filed by an unregistered partnership firm will itself not bar the suit. In support of his submission, Mr. Buch would rely on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Purushottam and Another vs. Shivraj Fine Arts Litho Works and Others reported in (2007) 15 SCC 58 . Relying on paragraph no. 20 of the decision, Mr. Buch would submit that when the contract entered into by the plaintiff was as an owner of a proprietary firm, merely because it had subsequently become a partnership firm which was unregistered, contractual obligations which the defendants owed to the plaintiff as a proprietor was a contract which was not one entered into by the unregistered firm with a third party and also nor was it one entered into by an unregistered firm in the course of its business dealings with the defendants. Therefore, the bar under Section 69(2) cannot apply to the suit filed by the appellant – plaintiff. 3.2 Mr. Buch would also rely on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Developers Through its partner Sunilbhai Somabhai Ajmeri vs. Aksharay Developers & Ors. Rendered in Civil Appeal No. 785 of 2022 to submit that when the contract in question is entered into by a firm by the third party which is for the enforcement of a statutory or a common right, a suit cannot be held to be barred under Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act. 4. Mr. Abhisst Thaker, learned counsel appearing for the original defendants – respondents herein would take us through the plaint filed by the appellant – plaintiff. Reading the plaint, he would submit that in the entire plaint, what is evident is that the appellant – Hetal Steel Corporation as is evident from the title of the suit had filed a suit as a partnership firm. The plaint when it is read as a whole asserted that the plaintiff partnership firm was entitled to an amount which arose out of business transaction as a result of contract entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Obviously therefore, it was a contract arising out of the business transactions between the partnership firm and the defendants. Admittedly, the firm was an unregistered partnership firm and therefore the trial court cannot be faulted to oust the appellant on the ground that the suit was barred under Section 69(2) of the Act. 4.1 Mr. Thaker, learned advocate would extensively read the order of the trial court before us to submit that what is evident from the documents produced on record was that the appellant’s - plaintiff’s firm was an unregistered partnership firm and when the trial court came to the conclusion that by right of a compromise deed the prior bills of the proprietary firm was settled and the firm was registered only on 07.04.2015 after filing of the suit, the suit was clearly barred under Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act. In support of his submissions, he would rely on a decision in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Kochhar Construction Work and Another reported in (1998) 8 SCC 559 and Farooq vs. Sandhya Anthraper Kurishingal and Others reported in (2018) 12 SCC 580 . In support of his submissions, he would rely on a decision in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Kochhar Construction Work and Another reported in (1998) 8 SCC 559 and Farooq vs. Sandhya Anthraper Kurishingal and Others reported in (2018) 12 SCC 580 . Reliance was also placed on a decision of the Single Bench of this court in the case of Laljibhai Ramjibhai Hamirani vs. Lavjibhai Haribhai Mandanka reported in 2009 (2) GLH 11 . 5. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the respective parties, we need to enter into and appreciate the facts in light of the pleadings made in the plaint. Reading of the plaint indicates from the title thereof that the appellant – Hetal Steel Corporation filed the suit titled as Hetal Steel Corporation, a partnership firm through its partner Hiren alias Rajubhai Shah. The suit was filed against the present opponents – defendants before the trial court. The plaint indicated that it was the case of the plaintiff that it was a partnership firm and the plaintiff was a partner thereof and is aware of the dispute involved in the claim. Reading the plaint it would indicate that it was the case of the plaintiff that he had entered into a contract over the years 2009-10 and 2011-12 wherein certain business transactions for supply of steel had happened between the plaintiff and the defendants. It was the case of the plaintiffs that over a period of time for the outstanding dues some payments periodically were made by the defendant. That a settlement was entered into on 31.03.2011 at Vadodara and thereafter by virtue of a forced settlement entered into, the defendants had paid an amount of Rs.74,51,000/- and the plaintiffs were infact entitled to the remaining amount of Rs.1,03,09,845/-. 5.1 Reading the plaint therefore makes it clear that the assertion in the plaint was that the firm was entitled to claim an amount of Rs.1 crore and odd as outstanding out of business transaction entered into by it with the defendants over a period of time. It is in light of these assertions in the plaint that the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act have to be appreciated. The decision relied upon by Mr. It is in light of these assertions in the plaint that the provisions of Section 69 of the Partnership Act have to be appreciated. The decision relied upon by Mr. Buch, learned counsel for the appellant when read i.e. Purushottam (supra), the facts of the case would indicate that true it is that Purushottam who was an erstwhile sole proprietor running the business of Dinesh Paper Mart filed the suit after having been taken over by a partnership firm, the suit clearly indicated that it was a suit for outstanding dues as a proprietor. It was in the facts of that case therefore that while allowing the appeal of the plaintiffs and reversing the orders under Order 7 Rule 11, the court observed that it was evident that the case of the plaintiff was that the contract was entered into by the firm which was an erstwhile proprietor and the amount was claimed which was due to the proprietor. The bar of Section 69(2) therefore did not apply. 5.2 The Apex Court while dealing with the arguments and question of law with regard to Section 69(2) of the Act referred to a decision in the case of Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. vs Ganesh Property [ (1998) 7 SCC 184 ]. Para 22 of the decision in the case of Purushottam (supra) indicates thus : “22. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. (supra) this court after noticing Sec. 69 of the Act observed : "A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows that the suit filed by an unregistered firm against a third party for enforcement of any right arising from a contract with such a third party would be barred at its very inception. To attract the aforesaid bar to the suit, the following conditions must be satisfied: (i) That the plaintiff-partnership firm on the date of the suit must not be registered under the provisions of the Partnership Act and consequently or even otherwise, the persons suing are not shown in the Register of Firms as partners of the firm, on the date of the suit. (ii) Such unregistered firm or the partners mentioned in the sub-sec. must be suing the defendant-third party. (iii) Such a suit must be for enforcement of a right arising from a contract of the firm with such a third party". (ii) Such unregistered firm or the partners mentioned in the sub-sec. must be suing the defendant-third party. (iii) Such a suit must be for enforcement of a right arising from a contract of the firm with such a third party". 5.3 Reading the above paragraph would indicate that to attract the bar to the suit under Section 69 what is to be borne in mind is that the conditions to be satisfied are that the plaintiff partnership firm on the date of the suit must not be registered under the provisions of the Partnership Act. Secondly, such unregistered firm must be suing the defendant – third party and thirdly such suit must be for enforcement of a right arising from a contract of the firm. 6. Perusal of the plaint in the facts of the case would indicate that admittedly the suit was by a plaintiff which was a partnership firm which was unregistered. The transactions that were alleged to have occurred between the parties nowhere suggest from the plain averments of the plaint as it is read to indicate that the contract was arising out of a business transaction between the erstwhile proprietor Hetal Corporation. The plaint therefore plain and simple would indicate that the contract that was the matter of dispute for which the cause of action had occurred was a contract for enforcement of a right arising from a contract of the firm with such a third party. 7. We would also like to refer to the relevant paragraph of the judgement in the case of Purushottam (supra) namely paragraphs no. 8-11 thereof which reads as under : “8. The question as to whether the subsequent registration of the firm would cure the initial defect in the filing of the suit arose for consideration in D.D.A. V/s. Kochhar Construction Work and Anr. (1998) 8 SCC 559 . This Court held that in view of the clear provision of the Act it was not possible to subscribe to the view that subsequent registration of the firm may cure the initial defect, because the proceedings were ab initio defective as they could not have been instituted since the firm in whose name the proceedings were instituted was not a registered firm on the date of the institution of the proceedings. This Court also noticed the difference of opinion amongst the High Courts and concluded thus:- "4. This Court also noticed the difference of opinion amongst the High Courts and concluded thus:- "4. Counsel for the respondents, however, invited our attention to two decisions which take a view that subsequent registration of the firm can cure the initial defect provided the registration is before the period of limitation has run out. Our attention was drawn to M.S.A. Subramania Mudaliar V/s. East Asiatic Co. Ltd. and Atmuri Mahalakshmi V/s. Jagadeesh Traders. However, the High Court of Patna in Laduram Sagarmal V/s. Jamuna Prasad Chaudhuri and the High Court of Madras in T. Savariraj Pillai V/s. R.S.S. Vastrad & Co. take a contrary view and hold that the suit is incompetent ab initio. We have considered these decisions, but in the light of the plain language of Sec. 69 of the Partnership Act read with Sec. 20 of the Arbitration Act and in view of the decision of this Court reported in Shreeram Finance Corpn. We are clearly of the opinion that proceedings under Sec. 20 of the Arbitration Act were ab initio defective since the firm was not registered and the subsequent registration of the firm cannot cure that defect." The same view was also reiterated in U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. V/s. Jain Construction Co. And Anr. (2004) 7 SCC 332 . 9. These decisions squarely answer the first submission of Shri V.A. Mohta. The submission must therefore be rejected. 10. The second submission urged on behalf of the appellants is also squarely answered by a judgment of this Court reported in Addanki Narayanappa and Anr. V/s. Bhaskara Krishnappa (D) & Ors., (1966) 3 SCR 400 . This Court held: "5. It seems to us that looking to the scheme of the Indian Act no other view can reasonably be taken. The whole concept of partnership is to embark upon a joint venture and for that purpose to bring in as capital money or even property including immovable property. Once that is done whatever is brought in would cease to be the exclusive property of the person who brought it in. It would be the trading asset of the partnership in which all the partners would have interest in proportion to their share in the joint venture of the business of partnership. Once that is done whatever is brought in would cease to be the exclusive property of the person who brought it in. It would be the trading asset of the partnership in which all the partners would have interest in proportion to their share in the joint venture of the business of partnership. The person who brought it in would, therefore, not be able to claim or exercise any exclusive right over any property which he has brought in, much less over any other partnership property. He would not be able to exercise this right even to the extent of his share in the business of the partnership. As already stated, his right during the subsistence of the partnership is to get his share of profits from time to time as may be agreed upon among the partners and after the dissolution of the partnership or with his retirement from partnership of the value of his share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or retirement after a deduction of liabilities and prior charges." 11. The High Court has, therefore, rightly held that the partnership having come into existence of which Plaintiff No.1 was a partner, and he having transferred to the said partnership all his assets and liabilities of his proprietary concern, he had no subsisting exclusive right to enforce the liability against the defendants since such rights as he had as the proprietor vested in the partnership. He could not therefore either file a suit or claim any relief in the suit filed by the partnership asserting his right as the erstwhile proprietor. The second submission also fails.” 7.1 Reading of the paragraphs above would indicate that even in a case after the rights have been transferred to a partnership, a proprietary concern would have no subsisting exclusive right to enforce the liability against the defendants since such rights as a proprietor vested in the partnership. Obviously, therefore, when the suit or the plaint is read, the plaintiff appellant herein was asserting his right, though as an erstwhile partner, no such factual assertion is on record. The third party against whom the suit for enforcement has been filed therefore is not made aware of the fact that the transaction is sought to be enforced against him is by a firm which is unregistered. The third party against whom the suit for enforcement has been filed therefore is not made aware of the fact that the transaction is sought to be enforced against him is by a firm which is unregistered. The suit in our opinion therefore is clearly barred under Section 69 of the Partnership Act. 8. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Developers would not apply to the facts of the case because the dispute inter se between the parties as arising out of a passing of transaction in a trade mark suit and it was in light of those facts that the Apex Court held that if a suit between a partnership firm and a third party is for enforcement of a common or statutory right, the suit would lie even if the firm is unregistered. The facts of the present case indicate otherwise. Reading of the plaint as it is would indicate that it was clearly a case of the plaintiff that as a partnership it had entered into transactions of supply of steel to the defendants – opponents herein for the period in question. Nowhere it was asserted in the plaint that these transactions or business rights were arising out of a contract when the plaintiff was a proprietor and therefore when the suit was filed based on a contract against third party and the averments indicating that the suit was projected to be one by a partnership firm, clearly being an unregistered partnership firm which was registered only subsequent to the filing of the suit on 07.04.2015, the suit was clearly barred. 9. We therefore do not find any fault or flaw in the order of the trial court in entertaining and allowing the application of the defendants under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. The suit of the plaintiff was clearly barred under Section 69 of the Partnership Act on the facts stated in the plaint which projected that the transaction that had arisen were out of a contract for enforcement of a right arising from a contract of the firm with such a third party. The plaint clearly exhibiting that the suit was for enforcement of such a right was clearly barred. The test set out in the case of Purushottam (supra) where the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Raptakos Brett & Co. The plaint clearly exhibiting that the suit was for enforcement of such a right was clearly barred. The test set out in the case of Purushottam (supra) where the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Raptakos Brett & Co. (supra) is referred to are the three conditions which are satisfied in the facts of the case and therefore we do not find any reason to interfere in the order so passed. 10. On the face of it, therefore, when the plaint discloses that the cause of action for enforcement of a right has arisen from a contract of the firm in the facts of the case on reading of the plaint, we are of the opinion that the appeal is without any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.