JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal under section 100 of the CPC is from plaintiffs in the original suit. Respondents herein were the defendants in the original suit. The appellants assail the concurrent judgments of the courts below. 2. Sri Palatla Venkateswara Rao is the younger brother of Smt. Pakanati Annapoornamma. The younger brother filed O.S.No.21 of 1990 seeking for specific performance of an agreement for sale dated 07.02.1969 praying the court to direct his elder sister/ the defendant to execute registered sale deed in his favour in terms of the agreement for sale and he also sought for a permanent injunction from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. His elder sister came up with a counter claim wherein she disputed the agreement for sale with his brother and contended that he was in permissive possession of the plaint schedule property looking after the property on her behalf and was paying to her the profits from the property after making due deductions of expenses and in the recent past, he stopped doing that and therefore he should be directed to pay Rs.12,675/- to her towards rent or damages. During the pendency of the suit, the sole defendant died and her legal representatives, 2nd and 3rd defendants were brought on record. 4th defendant claiming to have got the estate bequeathed in his favour by the deceased under a registered will also came on record. During the pendency of the suit, the sole plaintiff also died. His legal representatives came on record as plaintiff Nos.2 to 5. The suit went for trial before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Peddapuram. The learned trial court framed the following issues for trial for finding the truth of the disputed facts : 1. Whether the suit agreement of sale dated 07.02.1969 is true, valid and supported by consideration and is binding on the defendant? 2. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule property under the suit agreement of sale as contended by him or whether he is in possession of them for management on behalf of defendant? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of the suit agreement of sale and for the relief of permanent injunction prayed for? 4. Whether the defendant is entitled for profits on the plaint schedule property for the years 87-88, 88-89 and if so to what amount? 5. 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of the suit agreement of sale and for the relief of permanent injunction prayed for? 4. Whether the defendant is entitled for profits on the plaint schedule property for the years 87-88, 88-89 and if so to what amount? 5. To what relief? 3. There was evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and Exs.A1 to A33 and Exs.C1 and C2. As against it, there was evidence of DWs.1 to 5 and Exs.B1 to B11. On considering the entire evidence on record and the contentions raised on both sides, the learned trial court held that, the agreement for sale dated 07.02.1969/Ex.A1 was not true and was not valid and was not supported by consideration and was not binding the defendant or her successors. It observed that plaintiff was in possession of the property but his possession was not under Ex.A1 agreement for sale. It held that as the agreement for sale was not proved, the plaintiff was not entitled for specific performance. It refused to grant any perpetual injunction in favour of the plaintiff. It believed the version of the defendants and their evidence and found that their counter claim for rent or damages is true and allowed the counter claim directing the plaintiffs to pay Rs.12,675/- to the defendants. It directed the plaintiffs to pay the suit costs. 4. Aggrieved plaintiffs invoked Section 96 of the CPC challenging the trial court judgment dated 17.11.1998 in O.S.No.21 of 1990. The said appeal in A.S.No.229 of 1998 was before the learned Principal District Judge, Rajahmundry, East Godavari District. In the said appeal, the plaintiffs not only impugned the judgment of the trial court dismissing their suit for specific performance but they also impugned granting the relief for money in the counter claim laid by the defendants. Be it noted a single appeal was filed as against the suit as well as the counter claim. It seems before the learned first appellate court no objection was taken about maintainability of one appeal as against a judgment that dealt with suit as well as counter claim. Before this court also, no such questions have been raised or argued. The learned first appellate court on considering the record and the submissions argued before him, framed two points for consideration:- 1. Whether Ex.A1 agreement of sale dated 07.02.1969 is true and valid? 2. Before this court also, no such questions have been raised or argued. The learned first appellate court on considering the record and the submissions argued before him, framed two points for consideration:- 1. Whether Ex.A1 agreement of sale dated 07.02.1969 is true and valid? 2. Whether the defendants proved counter claim of Rs.12,675/-? 5. On a fresh analysis of the evidence, the learned first appellate court found that the observations of the learned trial court about failure on part of plaintiffs in proving the agreement for sale was correct and it reiterated various suspicions and circumstances which made it to disbelieve genuineness of Ex.A1 and finally confirmed the judgment of the learned trial court so far as dismissal of the prayer for specific performance of the agreement for sale. However, it was convinced about the challenge raised against the relief granted in the counter claim and held that the learned trial court erred in granting the money decree since there was no consumable evidence to arrive at such quantification of damages or rent. Accordingly, it set aside the trial court’s judgment in the counter claim with reference to Rs.12,675/-. 6. As against those concurrent judgments which refused the relief of specific performance and injunction, the plaintiffs have come up with this appeal under Section 100 CPC. During the pendency of this appeal, 3rd respondent died and his legal representatives were brought on record as respondent Nos.4, 5 and 6. 7. A learned Judge of this court on 06.09.2000 admitted the second appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the courts below were justified in refusing performance especially when consideration was passed and the same was acknowledged? 2. Whether the courts below were justified in refusing performance in the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the close relationship of the parties? 3. Whether the courts below were justified in holding that the performance is belated? 4. Whether the courts below were justified in coming to the conclusion that non-filing of declaration under the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act is fatal in non-suiting the plaintiff? 5. Whether the courts below were justified in ignoring the provisions of the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act in as much as any subsequent acquisition can also be brought within the fold of the said Act? 6. 5. Whether the courts below were justified in ignoring the provisions of the Agricultural Land Ceiling Act in as much as any subsequent acquisition can also be brought within the fold of the said Act? 6. Whether the courts below were justified in ignoring the oral and documentary evidence for non-suiting the plaintiff? 8. Kumari Akhila Naidu, the learned counsel representing on behalf of Sri N. Ravi Prasad, the learned counsel for appellants and Sri Palla Balu Anil Kumar, the learned counsel for respondents submitted arguments. 9. The earnest submission of the learned counsel for appellants is that the pleadings and evidence of PWs.1 and 2 are consistent in showing that the original defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property initially by way of an oral agreement on 02.02.1966 whereunder the sale consideration was fixed at Rs.23,000/- and she had received Rs.15,000/- as part sale consideration and delivered possession of the property to the original plaintiff and since then the original plaintiff continued to be in possession of the property and the original plaintiff paid the balance sale consideration of Rs.8,000/- to the original defendant on 07.02.1969 and further the original defendant on that day executed this unregistered agreement for sale under Ex.A1 and it was on that day, she had also delivered her original title deeds under Exs.A2, A3 to the plaintiff and since then the plaintiff continued his possession and enjoyment and continued to pay necessary land revenue evidenced by Exs.A4 to A30. Despite all that, the courts below erroneously dismissed the suit for specific performance. 10. Learned counsel for respondents fervently argued that the facts disputed and the evidence adduced were properly considered by both the courts below and the questions raised in this appeal do not arise from the material on record and even if they arise, none of the questions raised is a substantial question of law and the concurrent judgments of the courts below based on facts cannot be interfered with by this court in a second appeal especially when one does not find any perversity on part of the courts below. Learned counsel further argued that despite the contentions raised by the plaintiffs/appellants about agreement for sale, the truth emerged was properly detected by the courts below based on Ex.B1 and other circumstances and that Ex.B1 was a declaration filed by the plaintiff under A.P. Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act where the columns required the declarant to specify all those properties which have been in his possession either as a title holder or as a possessor under agreement for sale or under a mortgage or under any other capacity. That declaration did not disclose plaintiff mentioning the plaint schedule property as property under his possession in any capacity. That omission indicated that the agreement for sale alleged is a spurious document. Learned counsel further argued that the courts below have properly appreciated the remaining documents on record and arrived at correct conclusions and there is no warrant for interference. 11. In response, the learned counsel for appellants contends that the original plaintiff/PW.1 himself deposed as to why he omitted to disclose this plaint schedule property in his Ex.B1 declarations and that he stated that as he did not have a registered sale deed he thought it was not permissible for him to disclose them and the law permits him to declare them as his property at any time subsequent to Ex.B1 declaration also and therefore there was an error on part of the courts below in placing reliance on Ex.B1 and in denying the relief sought for. 12. After considering the rival arguments and the questions formulated as substantial questions of law, it emerges very clearly that the main thrust of appellants revolve around incorrect appreciation of the evidence by the courts below. While considering an appeal filed under section 100 of the CPC re – appreciation of evidence is ordinarily impermissible and beyond the scope of a second appeal as observed and consistently held as in Desh Raj V. Rohtash Singh, (2023) 3 SCC 714 . Be it noted, both the courts below fully considered the evidence on record. None of the grounds raised in this appeal either mention or the learned counsel has pointed out any perversity on part of the impugned judgments. Be that as it may. 13. Be it noted, both the courts below fully considered the evidence on record. None of the grounds raised in this appeal either mention or the learned counsel has pointed out any perversity on part of the impugned judgments. Be that as it may. 13. The property that fell in dispute described in the plaint schedule was owned and possessed by the original defendant under Ex.A2 registered sale deed dated 25.03.1960 and under Ex.A3 registered sale deed dated 11.07.1952. Evidence on record and the observations of the courts below indicated that the original defendant did not have any other property other than this property. Her husband worked as an engineer and died. The undisputed evidence also indicated that to the parents she was the eldest child and the original plaintiff was the youngest. That the original plaintiff had been under her care and protection and was living with her. On the death of her husband, the original defendant came to her native village and settled down there and as she did not have any male support, the original plaintiff was requested to manage the plaint schedule property. It is here the controversy. The possession of plaint schedule property by the original plaintiff was a fact asserted by plaintiff and admitted by the original defendant. The only question was according to the original defendant, the possession held was out of her command and it was on her behalf. The contention of the original plaintiff was that it was not in the way it was projected by the original defendant but he had come to possess this property by virtue of the oral agreement for sale which was followed by an unregistered written agreement for sale under Ex.A1. The original defendant filed a written statement disputing the execution of Ex.A1. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to lead evidence to the satisfaction of the law courts that Ex.A1 was executed by the original defendant. Though, the original defendant laid her challenge through her written statement placed before the learned trial court, she died before she was to depose before the court. Therefore, courts had no occasion to consider her evidence or her credibility. In the given circumstances, as the plaintiff was the one who intended the courts below to believe the truth of Ex.A1, it was for plaintiff to prove Ex.A1. Both the courts below disbelieved the case of the plaintiff. Therefore, courts had no occasion to consider her evidence or her credibility. In the given circumstances, as the plaintiff was the one who intended the courts below to believe the truth of Ex.A1, it was for plaintiff to prove Ex.A1. Both the courts below disbelieved the case of the plaintiff. On considering the material on record and the contentions on both sides, the following facts are to be stated by this court. 14. An agreement for sale such as Ex.A1 does not require attestation. However, Ex.A1 indicates attesters being present and subscribing their signature/ thumb impression. They were not examined. As according to PW.1 one attester died and whereabouts of other attesters were not known. One cannot raise a legal objection for not examining them. In these circumstances and also in view of the law contained in Section 72 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which says that an attested document not required by law to be attested may be proved as if it was un-attested. Therefore, the proof or otherwise of Ex.A1 has to be considered under law not on the fact of examination or otherwise of attesting witnesses. The execution of Ex.A1 being denied by the original defendant, proof of her signature or thumb impression was required to be proved by the plaintiff as mandated in Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. To prove that, mere evidence of original plaintiff/ PW.1 could not be sufficient since he was one of the parties to Ex.A1 and since the other party to Ex.A1 denied the execution. Therefore, some more evidence was required. It was in that context, both the courts below had felt that failure to examine attesting witnesses was to be considered as a fact against the original plaintiff/ the present appellants. The bare minimum that was expected on part of the original plaintiff was to show to the court how the original defendant subscribes her signature and how her thumb impression was there and have them produced before the court and get her signature or thumb impression available on disputed Ex.A1 compared as against the undisputed or proved specimen signature or thumb impression. That was not done. That was not done. The other mode for proving the disputed signature is to have the evidence of a witness who normally had the occasion to see the original defendant signing and say whether what is there on Ex.A1 could be stated to be belonged to the original defendant. That was not done by plaintiffs before the courts below. Thus, there was absolutely no effort on part of the appellants to show to the court that Ex.A1 contained the signature or thumb mark of original defendant. The scribe of Ex.A1 testified as PW.2 and his evidence was discarded by both the courts below on the ground that he was expressing his ignorance on material facts such as - whether the attesting witness were present when Ex.A1 was made and whether attesting witness were present when Ex.A1 was executed by original defendant. Thus, the indifferent evidence of PW.2 was rightly discarded by both the courts below. This court does not find any irregularity or illegality on part of the courts below in appreciating these facts and circumstances. Thus, the formal proof of Ex.A1 itself did not occur before the courts below. In addition to that there were two other circumstances which have made the courts to think that it was improbable for original defendant to have executed Ex.A1 in favour of the original plaintiff. One fact is that as per the plaint allegations itself about an agreement for sale that occurred in 1969, the plaintiff did not choose to sue till 1990 (21 years gap) and the cause of suing was the applications moved by original defendant before the Revenue Authorities seeking for grant of Pattadar and title deed passbooks. Thus, even according to pleaded case of plaintiff, original defendant was asking the Government Officers to recognize her title over the property and to recognize her possession over the property and was asking for necessary passbooks. The other circumstance is that asserting her possession and title, she had executed Ex.B2 will in favour of defendant No.4. Thus, all throughout the conduct of original defendant indicated her control over the property and her assertion that she owned and possessed this property. The other circumstance is based on Ex.B1. This emerged more than a decade after Ex.A1 agreement for sale. Thus, all throughout the conduct of original defendant indicated her control over the property and her assertion that she owned and possessed this property. The other circumstance is based on Ex.B1. This emerged more than a decade after Ex.A1 agreement for sale. If really original plaintiff was put in possession of plaint schedule property under oral agreement for sale dated 02.02.1966 which was thereafter followed by written agreement for sale dated 07.02.1969, he would have certainly disclosed his possession over this property when he made his declarations under Ex.B1. It was proved on evidence that he did not disclose his possession over this property in his Ex.B1. Thus, as a matter of fact, it is seen that the original plaintiff through his own conduct indicated to the whole world and the Government authorities that he was not in possession and was not holding any rights over suit schedule property. The lame excuse the original plaintiff was offering was about his legal entitlement to disclose them subsequently is of no consequence since it is not the question of law that fell for consideration before the courts below. It is a question of fact. The fact being very clear as indicated earlier. The contention of appellants that he could make his declaration subsequent to Ex.B1 indicating title and possession after obtaining a registered sale deed has not raised any legal issue and has not shown any perversity in the judgments of the courts below in considering that fact. The absolute silence of the original plaintiff for more than two decades in not obtaining a regular registered sale deed just by spending money for stamp and registration is a sure indication adding improbability to his case. In these circumstances, this court finds no merit in any of the grounds urged in this appeal and the judgments of the courts below are truly in accordance with evidence on record and the law relevant for consideration in such cases. All the points are answered against the appellants. 15. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, judgment dated 10.07.2000 of learned Principal District Judge, Rajahmundry, East Godavari in A.S.No.229 of 1998 is confirmed. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.