JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. The instant application has been filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure assailing the order dated 27.02.2020 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi, in Misc. Criminal Application No.146 of 2020 in connection with R.C. No. 17(S)/2013-R registered under section 420/120B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed for discharge of the petitioners from the criminal liability has been rejected by holding therein that there is sufficient prima-facie material available on record against the petitioner for the purpose of framing of charge for the alleged offences. Facts 2. The factual matrix leading to filing of the instant case in brief reads as under:- Prosecution case was initiated on written complaint by one Abhishek Kumar, alleging therein that the complainant and his mother had booked 2000 square feet of land of khata no. 155, plot no. 541 in Aishwarya Residency, II Phase, Pundag, Ranchi, of M/s. Sanjeevani Buildcon (P) Ltd. Complainant has paid Rs. 9 lakhs in connection with that but neither the land was provided to him nor his money was returned. After repeated demands Rs. 4.5 lakh was returned to him but the rest amount was not returned. Later on, two cheques of Rs. 2 lakhs and Rs.1,22,000/- respectively was given to the complainant which returned unpaid on presentation. Despite repeated demands of the complainant his money was not returned. On this written application an FIR dated 08.04.2012 was registered as Jagannathpur (Pundag) P.S. Case no. 96/12, for the offence under section 406, 420 and 34 of Indian Penal Code. 3. The aforesaid case was subsequently been transferred for investigation to the CBI, ACB, Ranchi by the State of Jharkhand vide notification dated 15.01.2013 and accordingly the CBI has re-registered the case vide case no. RC/17(S)/2013-R under sections 406, 420 and 34 of IPC. against M/s Sanjivani Buildcon Private Limited, its directors and other co-accused. 4. After investigation of the case, the Charge-Sheet No. 13/2014 dated 30.09.2014 was submitted against the present petitioner and other co-accused persons under Section 120B read with Sections 420, of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 5. against M/s Sanjivani Buildcon Private Limited, its directors and other co-accused. 4. After investigation of the case, the Charge-Sheet No. 13/2014 dated 30.09.2014 was submitted against the present petitioner and other co-accused persons under Section 120B read with Sections 420, of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 5. It is alleged that the petitioner before this Court was the then Halka Karmachari at the relevant point of time posted at Ratu circle and he was looking after the Halka covering village Pundag. It is alleged that the petitioner in the capacity of the then Halka Karmachari, Ratu Anchal, Ranchi, recommended mutation of excess land of 39.49 out of actual holding of 35.55 (19+16.55) dismal of land with the connivance of other accused persons. It is further alleged that 16.55 dismal land was purchased by Smt. Anamika Nandi of M/s Sanjeevani Buildcon Pvt. Ltd and as against this 39.49 dismal land was sold to 09 different persons. Out of these 09 cases mutations of 04 cases were done on the recommendation of present petitioner. 6. It is further alleged that the present petitioner along with other accused persons hatched criminal conspiracy with private persons and abused their respective official positions and in pursuance thereof did excess mutation. 7. Accordingly, the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner has been received and cognizance of offence has been taken. Thereafter, the present petitioner had moved before this Court for quashing of the order taking cognizance vide Cr.M.P. No. 2867 of 2014, which was dismissed vide order dated 18.10.2019. 8. Consequently, during the trial, a discharge petition was filed by the present petitioner but the same was dismissed vide order dated 27.02.2020 which is assailed herein by way of the instant revision application. Argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner 9. Learned senior counsel appeared on behalf of the petitioner submitted that petitioner has been made accused in the present case only on the ground that at the relevant point of time, the petitioner was working as Revenue Karamchari, and save and except, there is no material against the petitioner which shows petitioner’s involvement in the present crime. 10. It is further argued by learned Senior counsel that the petitioner being Halka Karmchari had no authority to order for mutation and he was only the recommending authority. 10. It is further argued by learned Senior counsel that the petitioner being Halka Karmchari had no authority to order for mutation and he was only the recommending authority. Further, there is no material to show that he derived any pecuniary advantage by alleged act of favourably recommending for mutation. 11. It is contended that the role of Karamchari is defined under Section 13 of The Bihar Tenant’s Holdings (Maintenance of Records) Act, 1973 and as per the provision of law this petitioner (Halka Karamchari) was duty bound to report the matter of transfer and it was for the Circle Officer to pass appropriate order after considering all relevant paper under Section 14 (1) which inter alia included the report under Sections 11, 12 & 13 of the Act 1973. 12. It is further submitted that on submission of the application by the applicant for mutation of land, the petitioner had verified right, title and possession of the vendor and the same was also verified from the statutory record (Register-II) in which names of recorded raiyats are mentioned and the recorded raiyats are still in possession of the land. 13. The learned Senior counsel has further submitted that in order to constitute an offence under Section 13 (1) (d), the elements of actus reus and mens rea both are to be present and in the instant case there is no element of mens rea involved and accordingly, provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not attracted and to buttress this limb of argument, he relied in the case of C.K. Jaffer Sharief v. State (Through CBI), (2013) 1 SCC 205 . 14. The learned Senior counsel has submitted that the law is well settled that for the purposes of attracting Section 420 of Indian Penal Code, dishonest intention should be since the very inception i.e., it should have been at the time of sale itself and it is not in dispute that at the time of sale of property involved in this case, the petitioner was nowhere in the picture and to buttress this limb of argument, he relied upon the case of Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of West Bengal, (2022) 7 SCC 124 . 15. 15. It is further argued by the learned Senior counsel for the that the impugned order is a non-speaking order as no reason has been given for rejection of discharge petition and the materials on the basis of which the prosecution is intended to be made has not been disclosed in the impugned order. 16. On the above said grounds, learned senior counsel prayed that the petitioner may be discharged from this case. Argument of the learned counsel for the CBI 17. Learned counsel for the CBI has vehemently opposed the prayer. It is submitted that the grounds which have been taken in the instant Criminal Revision application, had already been pressed into service by the petitioners in the quashing petition before this Court, as such, the same has attained its finality. 18. Learned Counsel appearing for the C.B.I submits that after proper investigation, charge sheet has been submitted, sanction for prosecution has been received, cognizance of offence has been taken by the learned court below and there is enough material collected during investigation showing more than prima-facie case to proceed against the petitioner. 19. It is further contended that the petitioner is Halka Karamchari and there is concrete evidence against him that while abusing his position, he in collusion with the land developer company, had mutated the excess land. 20. He further submitted that the other records of Circle Officer being maintained and in any case the area of mutation should not exceed the area of land if the area of mutation exceeds the area of land the respective Circle Officer, Circle Inspector and Karamchari are fully responsible. 21. He further submits that there are restrictions in discharging the petitioners and at this stage a roving enquiry is not required. To buttress this limb of argument he has put reliance upon the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and Others [ (2022) 12 SCC 657 ]. 22. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for the CBI has submitted that the order rejecting discharge petition may not be interfered with. Analysis 23. 22. On the aforesaid grounds, learned counsel for the CBI has submitted that the order rejecting discharge petition may not be interfered with. Analysis 23. In view of aforesaid submissions of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the contents of the instant revision petition as well as the impugned order and finds that it is not in dispute that the case was originally instituted by the local police on written complaint by one Abhishek Kumar, which was numbered as Jagannathpur (Pundag) P.S Case No. 96/2012. In the First Information Report, it was alleged that the complainant and his mother had booked a plot of land in the name of “Aishwarya Residency, Pundag” of M/s. Sanjeevani Buildcon (P) Ltd. They were allowed piece of land at Pundag at a consideration amount through registered sale deed but were neither given possession of land nor could mutation of the land at Nagri or Ratu Anchal be done in their favour. 24. At the request received from the Government of Jharkhand followed by notifications issued under the provisions of Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 the investigation of the case was taken over by Opposite party C.B.I for investigation. After investigation of the case, the Charge-Sheet No. 13/2014 dated 30.09.2014 was submitted against the petitioner and other co-accused persons under Section 120B read with Sections 420, of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 25. The categorical accusation against the present petitioner that the petitioner being Halka Karmachari at the relevant point of time posted at Ratu circle and he was looking after the Halka covering village Pundag and he recommended mutation of excess land with the connivance of other accused persons. 26. Accordingly, the cognizance of offence has been taken and aggrieved from the order taking cognizance the present petitioner had moved before this Court for quashing of the same vide Cr.M.P. No. 2867 of 2014, which was dismissed vide order dated 18.10.2019. 27. Consequently, a discharge petition was filed by the present petitioner but the same was dismissed vide order dated 27.02.2020 passed by the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi, in Misc. Criminal Application No.146 of 2020, which is the subject matter of the instant revision application. 28. 27. Consequently, a discharge petition was filed by the present petitioner but the same was dismissed vide order dated 27.02.2020 passed by the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi, in Misc. Criminal Application No.146 of 2020, which is the subject matter of the instant revision application. 28. Before adverting in to merit of the case this Court thinks fit to discuss the principle of discharge as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 29. There are two important components of discharge - (a). after hearing the submissions of the accused and (b). not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 30. The Hon’ble Apex Court while hearing the issue of ‘hearing the submissions of the accused’ has dealt with the same in the case of State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi [ AIR 2005 SC 359 : (2005) 1 SCC 568 ], wherein at paragraph 18 it has been held as under:- “18. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reliance on Articles 14 and 21 is misplaced. The scheme of the Code and object with which Section 227 was incorporated and Sections 207 and 207-A omitted have already been noticed. Further, at the stage of framing of charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. If the contention of the accused is accepted, there would be a mini-trial at the stage of framing of charge. That would defeat the object of the Code. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel for the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence. By way of illustration, it may be noted that the plea of alibi taken by the accused may have to be examined at the stage of framing of charge if the contention of the accused is accepted despite the well-settled proposition that it is for the accused to lead evidence at the trial to sustain such a plea. The accused would be entitled to produce materials and documents in proof of such a plea at the stage of framing of the charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on behalf of the accused. The accused would be entitled to produce materials and documents in proof of such a plea at the stage of framing of the charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on behalf of the accused. That has never been the intention of the law well settled for over one hundred years now. It is in this light that the provision about hearing the submissions of the accused as postulated by Section 227 is to be understood. It only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The expression “hearing the submissions of the accused” cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the stage of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police.” [Emphasis supplied] 31. The second component i.e., ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’, has been dealt with by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal & Anr. [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 ], wherein at paragraphs 7 it has been held as under:- “7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus: “If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not 8 sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.” 32. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. [ (2008) 2 SCC 561 ] wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as under:- “11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [ (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised. 14. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised. 14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [ (2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) “7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 33. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191 . For ready reference Paragraph no.10 to 17 of the said judgment are quoted below:- “10. By the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction has set aside the order passed by the learned Special Judge framing the charge against the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act and consequently has discharged the accused for the said offence. What has been weighed with the High Court while discharging the accused is stated in paras 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order, which are reproduced hereinabove. 11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to. 11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. 11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) ‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.’ ” 12. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.’ ” 12. We shall now apply the principles enunciated above to the present case in order to find out whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in discharging the accused for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. 13. Having considered the reasoning given by the High Court and the grounds which are weighed with the High Court while discharging the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and has acted beyond the scope of Section 227/239 CrPC. While discharging the accused, the High Court has gone into the merits of the case and has considered whether on the basis of the material on record, the accused is likely to be convicted or not. For the aforesaid, the High Court has considered in detail the transcript of the conversation between the complainant and the accused which exercise at this stage to consider the discharge application and/or framing of the charge is not permissible at all. 14. As rightly observed and held by the learned Special Judge at the stage of framing of the charge, it has to be seen whether or not a prima facie case is made out and the defence of the accused is not to be considered. After considering the material on record including the transcript of the conversation between the complainant and the accused, the learned Special Judge having found that there is a prima facie case of the alleged offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, framed the charge against the accused for the said offence. The High Court materially erred in negating the exercise of considering the transcript in detail and in considering whether on the basis of the material on record the accused is likely to be convicted for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act or not. 15. As observed hereinabove, the High Court was required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not. At the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. 15. As observed hereinabove, the High Court was required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not. At the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. At this stage, it is to be noted that even as per Section 7 of the PC Act, even an attempt constitutes an offence. Therefore, the High Court has erred and/or exceeded in virtually holding a mini trial at the stage of discharge application. 16. We are not further entering into the merits of the case and/or merits of the transcript as the same is required to be considered at the time of trial. Defence on merits is not to be considered at the stage of framing of the charge and/or at the stage of discharge application. 17. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court discharging the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act is unsustainable in law and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly hereby quashed and set aside and the order passed by the learned Special Judge framing charge against the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act is hereby restored. Now the case is to be tried against the accused by the competent court for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, in accordance with law and its own merits.” 34. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu represented by Inspector of Police Vigilance and Anti-corruption Vs. N. Suresh Rajan and others [ (2014) 11 SCC 709 , it has been held that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the Court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. 35. In the case of State of Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru Vs. 35. In the case of State of Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru Vs. M.R. Hiremath (2019) 7 SCC 515 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the Court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. 36. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. [ (2013) 11 SCC 476 ], has held that at the time of framing of charge the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record to decide whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence. There is no need to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. Materials brought on record by the prosecution can be believed to be true, but their probative value cannot be decided at that stage. The accused is entitled to urge his contentions while entertaining the discharge application only on the material submitted by the prosecution, but he is not entitled to produce any material at that stage and the Court is not required to consider any such material. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial judge is empowered to discharge the accused, irrespective of the result of the trial. 37. At this juncture before examining the legality and reasonability of the impugned order, it will be purposeful to discuss the scope and applicability of section 228 of Criminal Procedure Code also. 37. At this juncture before examining the legality and reasonability of the impugned order, it will be purposeful to discuss the scope and applicability of section 228 of Criminal Procedure Code also. For ready reference the section 228 of Cr.P.C. is being quoted herein under:- “(1) If, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which (a) is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he may, frame a charge against the accused and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and thereupon the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall try the offence in accordance with the procedure for the trial of warrant- cases instituted on a police report; (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (2) Where the Judge frames any charge under clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claims to be tried.” 38. From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that the question of framing charge arises only when the court finds that the accused is not entitled to discharge in Sessions Cases and the provisions relating to discharge of the accused are very important and the Judge must consider first whether there are any sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh & others (2009) 3 SCC(Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of time. 40. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation [ (2010) 9 SCC 368 ] has been pleased to hold that at the stage of framing of charge it is not for the judge concerned to analyze all materials including pros and cons, reliability and acceptability etc.; the evidentiary value and its credibility and veracity has to be considered at the stage of trial. 41. Central Bureau of Investigation [ (2010) 9 SCC 368 ] has been pleased to hold that at the stage of framing of charge it is not for the judge concerned to analyze all materials including pros and cons, reliability and acceptability etc.; the evidentiary value and its credibility and veracity has to be considered at the stage of trial. 41. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. S. Selvi & Another, reported in (2018) 13 SCC 455 has categorically held that at the stage of discharge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth 12 even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. 42. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State through CBI Vs. Dr. Anup Kumar Srivastava has emphatically held that the legal position is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the trial Court is not to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is it for the Court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the offence alleged against the accused persons. At the stage of charge the Court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused persons. It is further held by the Hon’ble Apex Court framing of charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where the Court is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and documents placed therewith before the court. Taking cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by the court but framing of charge is a major event where the court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial. 43. Taking cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by the court but framing of charge is a major event where the court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial. 43. The Hon’ble Apex Court delineating the scope of Court’s powers in respect of framing of charges in a criminal cases one of those being Dipakbhai Jagdishchndra Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 16 SCC 547 , wherein the law relating to the framing of charge and discharge is discussed elaborately in paragraphs 15 and 23 and same are reproduced as under:- “15. We may profitably, in this regard, refer to the judgment of this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 wherein this Court has laid down the principles relating to framing of charge and discharge as follows: (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) “4. … Reading Sections 227 and 228 together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. … If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.” 23. At the stage of framing the charge in accordance with the principles which have been laid down by this Court, what the court is expected to do is, it does not act as a mere post office. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The court must indeed sift the material before it. The material to be sifted would be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting is not to be meticulous in the sense that the court dons the mantle of the trial Judge hearing arguments after the entire evidence has been adduced after a full-fledged trial and the question is not whether the prosecution has made out the case for the conviction of the accused. All that is required is, the court must be satisfied that with the materials available, a case is made out for the accused to stand trial. A strong suspicion suffices. However, a strong suspicion must be founded on some material. The material must be such as can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial. The strong suspicion cannot be the pure subjective satisfaction based on the moral notions of the Judge that here is a case where it is possible that the accused has committed the offence. Strong suspicion must be the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence” 44. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held in paragraph 27 which reads as under:- “27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge 14 and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution.” 45. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely infer that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused. 46. 46. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. It is our considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. 47. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order prima facie case is made out or not? 48. This Court deems it fit and proper to scrutinize the evidence collected in course of investigation by the investigating officer as has been recorded in the charge-sheet which is appended to the instant petition. 49. From the charge-sheet it is evident that there is specific accusation against the petitioner that mutation has been recorded in the excess of the land. It has come in the charge-sheet that the present petitioner was posted and functioning as Halka Karmachari, at Ratu Anchal, Ranchi during 2009-2010 and was looking after the Halka covering village Pundag and he in the capacity of the then Halka Karmachari, Ratu Anchal, Ranchi, recommended mutation of excess land of 39.49 out of actual holding of 35.55 (19+16.55) dismal of land. 50. It is further revealed that the 39.49 dismal of land was sold to different persons and mutations of 04 cases were done on the recommendation of present petitioner. 51. It is evident from the charge-sheet that in the aforesaid transaction mutation of 4 cases covering 17.33 dismal was already done at Ratu Anchal on the recommendation of present petitioner against actual holding of 16.55 decimal. 52. 51. It is evident from the charge-sheet that in the aforesaid transaction mutation of 4 cases covering 17.33 dismal was already done at Ratu Anchal on the recommendation of present petitioner against actual holding of 16.55 decimal. 52. It has also come in the charge-sheet that the site map enclosed with the sale-deed only showed the dimension of the sold area without any reference to the total plot or the village map and hence, on the basis of the map enclosed with the sale-deed, the plots could not have been identified and verified to prove that the purchaser had possession of the land and in order to extend pecuniary advantage to the directors of the said company, mutations were allowed on the report of Halka Karamcharies that the purchaser was in possession of the plot. 53. In the instant case it appears that the allegations levelled against the petitioner indicates full knowledge of the petitioner that excess land was sought to be mutated against actual area of land and this appears from the allegations that the petitioner while recommending for the purposes of mutation under various applications, allegedly suppressed the actual area of land, which ultimately led to recommendations for mutation of excess land of 39.49 out of actual holding of 35.55 decimals. 54. In view of the above facts, the Court finds that there are allegations against the petitioners of mutating more land than the area of the plot and it cannot be ruled out at this stage that the petitioners were not in connivance with the said M/s Sanjeevani Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. 55. The foremost argument as made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was then halka Kramchari and his role was confined to make recommendations for mutation only and he was duty bound to recommend in view of the provisions of Act 1973. To substantiate this limb of argument the learned counsel has taken aid of section 13 of Act 1973. 56. In this context the relevant provision of section 13 of the Act, 1973 is required to refer herein which reads as under:- “13. To substantiate this limb of argument the learned counsel has taken aid of section 13 of Act 1973. 56. In this context the relevant provision of section 13 of the Act, 1973 is required to refer herein which reads as under:- “13. Mukhiya, Circle Inspector or karamchari to report cases of partition of intestate or testamentary succession or acquisition by any other means to the Anchal Adhikari- A mukhiya, a Circle Inspector or a karamchari shall obtain information of cases of partition, intestate or testamentary succession or acquisition or interest by any other means in a holding or part thereof in course of his visits to the villages within his jurisdiction and shall forthwith furnish the same to the Anchal Adhikari in the prescribed form.” 57. It is evident from the aforesaid provision, that Karamchari is duty bound to obtain information of cases of partition, intestate or testamentary succession or acquisition or interest by any other means in a holding or part thereof in course of his visits to the villages within his jurisdiction and shall forthwith furnish the same to the Anchal Adhikari in the prescribed form and after submission of such report the Circle Officer to pass appropriate order after considering all relevant paper under Section 14 (1) of the Act 1973. 58. The word “or interest by any other means in a holding or part thereof in course of his visit to the villages within his jurisdiction” is bearing and answer of the argument of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner regarding the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of offence. 59. Here, in the instant case also allegation is that the recommendation for creation of mutation has been made over and above the excess area of land. 60. As per the allegation, it would be evident that if the petitioner would have collected the information regarding the interest by any other means in whole or part thereof then only the recommendation can be said to be proper and in that circumstances, there would not be an occasion to make the recommendation of creation of mutation of the excess land. 61. Thus, it is evident that the karamchari has specific role and has bounden duty to furnish his report regarding the land with utmost sincerity and honesty. 62. 61. Thus, it is evident that the karamchari has specific role and has bounden duty to furnish his report regarding the land with utmost sincerity and honesty. 62. However, in the instant case main allegation against the present petitioner is that in connivance with the private persons he facilitated the mutation of excess land. 63. Thus, in view of the above, at this stage, the argument advanced by the learned counsels for the petitioners are the subject matter of trial which cannot be appreciated at this stage. 64. Further, Learned counsel for the petitioner has put his reliance on the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in C.K. Jaffer Sharief (Supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that four persons while in London had assisted the appellant of that case in performing certain task connected with the discharge of duties as a Minister and in that view of the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that it is difficult to visualize as to how in light of that facts demonstrated by the materials revealed in the course of investigation, the petitioner of that case can be construed to have adopted corrupt or illegal or to have abused his position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any of the four of the accused persons and in that view of the matter, that order has been passed. 65. The fact of the present case is quite different and it is settled position of law that the judgment is to be passed on the basis of its applicability based upon the facts of each and every case. 66. Herein, the allegation against the petitioner is of mutating more land than the area of the plot. 67. This Court, therefore, is of the view that if based upon the material collected in course of investigation, chargesheet was submitted then it cannot be said that there is no material to proceed for trial. 68. The aforesaid aspect of the matter is to be looked into during trial since as per the requirement, if the prima facie material is there to proceed for charge, there cannot be any discharge. This is on the principle that if the material is there, the same is allowed to reach to the logical end by leading evidence by commencing the trial. 69. This is on the principle that if the material is there, the same is allowed to reach to the logical end by leading evidence by commencing the trial. 69. It is pertinent to mention here that the most of the plea which has been raised herein by the learned senior counsel has already been taken before the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the aforesaid Criminal Miscellaneous Petition (Cr.M.P. No. 2867 of 2014) which has already been dismissed vide order dated 18.10.2019. 70. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis and considering the principles of discharge, this Court is of the view that there is no infirmity in the impugned order to warrant interference by this Court. 71. Accordingly, Cr. Revision No.666 of 2021, is hereby dismissed.