JUDGMENT Dinesh Pathak, J. Heard Shri. S. S. Nigam, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri. Karshit Nigam, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri. Jagdish Pathak, learned counsel for all the respondents and perused the record on board. 2. The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the undated order passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-I, Regional Office, Varanasi (respondent no.3) under Section 7-B of the Employees' Provident Fund and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 (in brevity 'Act, 1952') whereby review petition filed on behalf of the petitioner against the order dated 26.12.2023 passed under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952 has been rejected. 3. Facts culled out from the record are that the proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952 has been initiated against the establishment (present petitioner) to determine the quantum of dues payable by it qua contractual employees/home workers for the period since August, 2008 to January, 2019. Accordingly, summon under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952 was issued to the establishment by Reference dated 15.10.2019 to appear before the authorized officer along with the supporting documents. Aforesaid proceeding was decided on the basis of the report submitted by Sumit Kumar Gupta, A.E.O., vide order dated 26.12.2023 passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II, Varanasi (respondent no.2). Having been aggrieved with the order dated 26.12.2023, the petitioner has preferred review petition dated 22.02.2024 under Section 7-B of the Act, 1952. Said review petition was finally rejected by respondent no.3 without mentioning the date of order (Annexure-1), which is under challenge before this Court. 4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that respondent no.3 has inherent lack of jurisdiction to pass the order impugned under Section 7-B of the Act, 1952 inasmuch as, vide order dated 09.03.2024 (Annexure-5), respondent no.3 was transferred from Regional Office, Varanasi to Head Office with immediate effect and the controlling authority was directed to relieve the transferred employee within three days, however, order has been passed in hasty manner without putting date on the order before relieving the office. It is further submitted that the order under challenge has been passed sans opportunity of hearing accorded to the petitioner which in violation of principles of natural justice and fair play. It is further submitted that the order under challenge has been passed sans opportunity of hearing accorded to the petitioner which in violation of principles of natural justice and fair play. It is submitted as well that the order dated 26.12.2003 has been passed under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952 on the basis of report submitted by Sumit Kumar Gupta, A.E.O., however, he has never visited on the spot (office of the establishment and other relevant places) to examine the quantum of dues for the period from August, 2008 to January, 2019. Learned Senior Counsel has laid emphasis on the reply dated 14.07.2023 submitted by the Provident Fund Organization under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (Page No.108 of the writ petition) to demonstrate that Sumit Kumar Gupta, A.E.O., has never visited the offices of the Contractor to assess the dues, if any. It is lastly submitted that the order impugned, being illegal and unwarranted under the law, is liable to be quashed. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the Provident Fund Organization has contended that under Section 7-B of the Act, 1952, there is no requirement of according opportunity of hearing to the review petitioner. It is further contended that the order impugned under Section 7-B of the Act, 1952 was passed on 13.03.2024 and in the afternoon of the same day, respondent no.3 was relieved from Regional Office to join Head Office. It is next contended that though the transfer order was passed on 09.03.2024, three days' time was granted to relieve from office, after excluding two holidays i.e. Saturday and Sunday (09.03.2024 and 10.03.2024) respectively, thus, the transfer order came into effect on 11.03.2024 and he has been relieved on 13.03.2024. It is lastly contended that the instant writ petition, being misconceived and devoid on merits, is liable to be dismissed. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on Rule 5(4) of C.C.S (Joining Time) Rules and Clause 1108 of Chapter 11 of Indian Railway Establishment Code. 6. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perusal of record, it is manifested that review application dated 22.02.2024 filed by the present petitioner under Section 17-B of the Act, 1952 has been dismissed by undated order passed by respondent no.3. 6. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and perusal of record, it is manifested that review application dated 22.02.2024 filed by the present petitioner under Section 17-B of the Act, 1952 has been dismissed by undated order passed by respondent no.3. I am skeptical of the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that order of review is annulled owing to lack of jurisdiction to pass an order on the review application after transfer order dated 09.03.2024 whereby respondent no.3 was ordered to be transferred with immediate effect and the controlling offices were directed to relieve the transferred officers within three days. Perusal of order impugned dismissing the review application evince that no date has been mentioned for passing the said order, however, learned counsel for the Provident Fund Organization has stated that the order was passed on 13.03.2024, on which date respondent no.3 was relieved in the afternoon. In my considered opinion, legality and validity of the order passed on the review application cannot be questioned on the ground that respondent no.3 was ordered to be transferred with immediate effect, vide transfer order dated 09.03.2024, thus, he had no jurisdiction to pass any order in any matter. After passing the transfer order and before relieving from the office, any authority cannot be treated to be functus officio. He may be subjected to disciplinary enquiry for insubordination ship, if any, for noncompliance of transfer order in time, however, any work done/conducted by the officer concerned during his office period cannot be annulled for want of jurisdiction. Decisions taken by an official, within the jurisdiction of his office and in the interest of public while discharging his official duty, holding the office by virtue of his valid appointment, are generally held valid and binding. Thus order impugned, passed by respondent no.3, cannot be questioned on this score. 7. So far as the second submission qua not affording opportunity of hearing before passing the order impugned is concerned, it is evident from the record that the order impugned has been passed sans opportunity of hearing accorded to the petitioner. Even learned counsel for the respondents has not refuted the submissions as advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner in this respect. Even learned counsel for the respondents has not refuted the submissions as advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner in this respect. Section 7-B of the Act, 1952 provides an opportunity to the aggrieved person for filing a review application against the determination of dues from the employer under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952. For ready reference Section 7-B of the Act, 1952 is quoted herein below :- "7B. Review of orders passed under section 7A.-(1) Any person aggrieved by an order made under sub-section (1) of section 7A, but from which no appeal has been preferred under this Act, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of such order may apply for a review of that order to the Officer who passed the order: Provided that such officer may also on his own motion review his order if he is satisfied that it is necessary so to do on any such ground. (2) Every application for review under sub-section (1) shall be filed in such form and manner and within such time as may be specified in the Scheme. (3) Where it appears to the officer receiving an application for review that there is no sufficient ground for a review, he shall reject the application. (4) Where the officer is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, he shall grant the same: Provided that,- (a) no such application shall be granted without previous notice to all the parties before him to enable them to appear and be heard in support of the order in respect of which a review is applied for, and (b) no such application shall be granted on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence which the applicant alleges was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him when the order was made, without proof of such allegation. (5) No appeal shall lie against the order of the officer rejecting an application for review, but an appeal under this Act shall lie against an order passed under review as if the order passed under review were the original order passed by him under section 7A." 8. For the purposes to consider the opportunity of hearing in deciding the review application, as involved in the instant writ petition, Section 7-B(3) and (4) of the Act, 1952 are relevant. Sub Section 3 denotes that review application can be rejected by the officer concerned who has received the said application, in case, he came to conclusion that there is no sufficient ground for review. Under sub section 4, however, it is provided that officer concerned can allow the review application, provided that opportunity of hearing shall be accorded to all the concerned parties. Sub section 4 denotes the particular situation wherein review application is expected to be allowed as per opinion of the officer concerned, therefore, certainly as intended by legislation, opportunity must be accorded to all the parties concerned who are expected to be adversely affected owing to grant of review inasmuch as the previous order which has been sought to be reviewed, has been passed in their favour and they have right to support the previous order. Sub Section 3 of Section 7-B of the Act, 1952 does not denote any deterrent provision negating an opportunity of hearing to the applicant who has filed review application. It might possible that some facts or legal provisions which have been misread and misinterpreted in previous order, which has been sought to be reviewed, is required to be explained by the review applicant before the officer concerned who has received the application for review. 9. Counsel for the petitioner has tried to point out several discrepancies/short comings in the previous order under Section 7- A of the Act, 1952, however, it would not befitting for this Court to dwell in deep intending to examine the legality and correctness of the order passed under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952. 9. Counsel for the petitioner has tried to point out several discrepancies/short comings in the previous order under Section 7- A of the Act, 1952, however, it would not befitting for this Court to dwell in deep intending to examine the legality and correctness of the order passed under Section 7-A of the Act, 1952. Document which has been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner to prove that since 2008 to 2014, the petitioner has deposited all his contribution towards the E.P.F. and the Enforcement Officer namely Sumit Kumar Gupta, who has submitted the report, has never visited to the contractors and the offices of the establishment, are the issues which can more appropriately be examined by the officer concerned in exercise of his power under the Act, 1952. Prima facie, eagerness and hasty attitude shown by respondent no.3 in deciding the review application filed by the petitioner cannot be denied in light of the fact that transfer order dated 09.03.2024 had already been issued and, thereafter, despite full knowledge of the said order, he has deliberately decided the review application on the same day when he was allegedly relieved in the afternoon, as discussed above. However, the manner in which the review application has been decided at the eleventh hour before his relieving, that too, without mentioning the date of order is a matter of concerned and creates bona fide doubt qua correctness of the order under challenge. Case of Waves Food Ltd. v. Assistant Labour Commissioner reported in 2017 (154) FLR 891 relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner expounded that opportunity of hearing should be accorded to the applicant who has filed the review application before finally deciding the said application. 10. In this conspectus, as above, I am of the considered view that instant writ petition deserves to be partly allowed on limited point of opportunity of hearing. While deciding the review application under Section 7-B (3) of the Act, 1952, opportunity of hearing should be accorded to the person who has filed review application to enable him to strengthen the grounds taken in the review application. 11. Resultantly, instant writ petition succeeds and is partly allowed. Order impugned dated 15.03.2024 passed by respondent no.1 is hereby quashed. While deciding the review application under Section 7-B (3) of the Act, 1952, opportunity of hearing should be accorded to the person who has filed review application to enable him to strengthen the grounds taken in the review application. 11. Resultantly, instant writ petition succeeds and is partly allowed. Order impugned dated 15.03.2024 passed by respondent no.1 is hereby quashed. Review application filed by the petitioner is restored to its original number and parties are relegated before the authority concerned who shall decide the same afresh, after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Having considered the severity of the matter, it is expected that review application shall be decided in accordance with law, without granting unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties, expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the of production of certified copy of this order.