JUDGMENT : Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J. 1. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree dated 8th August, 2003 passed by learned Judge, 8th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta in Title Appeal no. 12 of 2003, present Second Appeal has been preferred. By the impugned judgment and decree the court below affirmed the decree dated 19th August, 2002 passed by learned Judge, 6th Bench Presidency Small Causes Court Calcutta in Ejectment suit no. 1042 of 2000. 2. The respondent herein as plaintiff filed aforesaid Ejectment suit no. 1042 of 2000 against defendant/Appellant herein for recovery of khas possession. The defendant is a registered partnership firm and a monthly tenant under the plaintiffs in respect of the suit premises. Originally a tenancy agreement was entered in between the plaintiff/landlord and Gupta Auto Agency of which Omprakash Gupta was the sole proprietor. Thereafter, it has been converted into a partnership firm by dint of partnership deed dated 31st August, 1984 and the name of the partners are Omprakash Gupta, Sohan Lal Gupta, Rajendra Kumar Gupta, and Ajay Gupta. 3. In the plaint and the amended plaint it is alleged that the defendant is guilty of acts of waste and damages, detrimental to the suit premises and the defendant has made addition and alteration in the suit premises without prior consent of the plaintiffs and thereby violated clauses (m) (o) (p) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is further alleged that the defendant illegally transfer/assigned and or sublet the suit premises to (i) M/s Gupta Auto Agency (ii) M/s Ashoke Plastics (pvt) Ltd. (iii) M/s Chitralekha Housing Corporation (iv) M/s Jayantilal Jagdish prasad (v) M/s Ushakiron Housing Corporation (vi) M/s Indian Vegetable Products Limited (vii) M/s Fulford India Limited (viii) M/s Gupta Auto Agency Pvt. (ix) M/s pearl Ply Industries Pvt. Ltd. (x) Plaza Plastics Pvt. Ltd. 4. Further case of the plaintiffs is that tenancy of the defendant has been duly determined by a notice of ejectment dated 18.11.1986 thereby defendant was asked to quit and vacate the suit premises on the expiry of the last day of December 1986 but the defendant failed to vacate the same and as such the suit was filed. 5. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement interalia denying the plaintiffs case of subletting and/or causing damage to the suit premises. 5. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement interalia denying the plaintiffs case of subletting and/or causing damage to the suit premises. In the written statement defendant denied that the companies mentioned in para 4 of the plaint are in possession of the suit premises. On the contrary it is contended that the original tenancy in favour of sole proprietorship firm was converted into a Private Limited Company and the companies mentioned in para 4(ii) of the plaint has common directors and partners with the defendant itself and only some paper work is done in the suit premises with respect to some company. It is further stated in the written statement that the companies mentioned in the para 4(ii) to (viii) are neither in possession of the suit property nor they are occupying any portion of the suit property. In the additional written statement defendant also denied that they had sublet the suit premises to any of the aforesaid companies. Defendant further contended in additional written statement that Gupta Auto Agency which used to be a registered partnership firm was converted into a private limited company with their partners and family members as directors and share holders. The Pearl Poly Industries Pvt. Ltd. is a private limited Company with the partners of the defendant or their family members as its directors and share holders. Similarly the Plaza Plastics Pvt. Ltd. is also a private limited Company with the partners and family members of the defendants. Ashok Plastic Pvt. Ltd. is not there in the suit premises and only table work is done by Plaza Plastics Pvt. Ltd, and Pearl Poly Industries Pvt. Ltd. at the suit premises. It was also stated in the written statement that no consideration is received from or paid by the said companies to the defendant/appellant. Learned Trial Court after hearing both the parties decided the issue of subletting in favour of the plaintiff and the trial court further held that plaintiff has failed to prove the allegation of causing damage or addition or alteration by the tenant/defendant in respect of the suit premises and as such he decided the said issue regarding violation of clause (m) (o) (p) of section 108 of the T.P. Act against the plaintiff. The trial court further held that the issue as to legality validity and service of eviction notice upon the defendant has not been pressed seriously and as such said issue has been answered in favour of the plaintiff. 6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree the defendant appellant preferred first appeal before the court below. However, plaintiff did not prefer any cross appeal against rejection of his ground for eviction for violating clause (m) (o) (p) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and as such the court below heard both the parties in respect of legality and validity of the Trial Courts judgment of eviction on the ground of subletting only. Learned Appellate Court after hearing both the parties held that the Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence in respect of plaintiffs’ allegation of subletting and thereby the court below did not find any ground for interference with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and thereby the court below had affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 7. Being aggrieved by the order of the court below namely First Appellate court, Mr. Anirudha Chatterjee learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the trial court came to a definite finding that Gupta Auto Agency is not guilty of subletting however based on the finding, Ashok Plastic despite being not registered in the suit premises and not in possession thereof, held that the defendant has sublet the suit premises to rest of the companies. Learned First Appellate Court without considering the finding of the trial court in respect of Gupta Auto had affirmed the judgment. He further contended that the sole proprietorship business was converted into a partnership firm by the deed of partnership executed between Omprakash Gupta, Sohan Lal Gupta, Rajendra Kumar Gupta, and Ajay Gupta as partners of the said firm. All the said partners are related by blood and are family members. 8. He further submitted that all the companies have common directors and shareholders as of Gupta Auto Agency along with their family members. M/s. Gupta Auto agency is a tenant under the respondents plaintiffs. Mr. Chatterjee strenuously argued that there is no averment in the plaint that the defendant/appellants had parted with exclusive possession of the suit premises with the said companies. M/s. Gupta Auto agency is a tenant under the respondents plaintiffs. Mr. Chatterjee strenuously argued that there is no averment in the plaint that the defendant/appellants had parted with exclusive possession of the suit premises with the said companies. On the contrary plaintiffs witness PW-1 in his examination in chief had admitted that the Gupta Auto Agency was converted from a sole proprietorship to a partnership firm. Therefore, the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that the defendant/appellant has parted with exclusive possession or there is any monetary transaction between the defendants/appellants and the alleged sub tenants. 9. He further contended that the documentary evidences produced by the plaintiff are all secondary evidence within the meaning of section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act. He strenuously argued that during trial it has been clearly established that Omprakash Gupta as well as all the other initial partners are actively associated with the control over Ashoke plastics Pvt. Ltd., Pearl Poly industries, plaza plastics and their respective businesses. He also pointed out that during trial the defence witness clearly stated that all directors and shareholders of Ashok Plastic, Pearl Poly and Plaza Plastic are his family members and only some table work is done by Ashok Plastic on same table that is used by defendant and no separate space is provided to the said companies and no rent also received from them. He further contended that the Chitralekha Housing Corporation may have a Bank Account in the address of suit premises but it has no office in the suit premises. Defence witness DW-1 Omprakash Gupta being a partner of Chitralekha Housing further stated that Chitralekha Housing has substantial control over the business of the said corporation and actively participates in the same so the question of subletting does not arise. Others do not have any office in the suit premises. 10. Referring a judgment reported in A Mahalaxmi Vs. Bala Venkatram reported in (2020) 2 SCC 531 , Mr. Chatterjee contended that subletting means transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the property in favour of the third party and to constitute a case of subletting there must be a parting of legal possession which means possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others and that must have been done without obtaining the consent in writing from the land lord. 11. 11. Referring the judgment reported in AIR 1968 SC 933 (Associated Hotels of India Ltd. Vs. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh) he contended that the onus to prove subletting is on the landlord. In this context he further contended that where a tenant became a partner of a partnership firm and allows the firm to carry out the business in the premises while he himself retains the legal possession thereof, the act of the tenant does not amount to subletting. In this context he relied upon (2002) 9 SCC 516 , (1987) 3 SCC 538 . He strenuously argued that in view of case law reported in (1987) 4 SCC 161 , the first ingredient that has to be established in such cases is that the alleged sub tenant is in exclusive possession of part of the premises and the tenant retains no control over that part of the premises and the second ingredient to prove sub-tenancy is that right to occupy the portion is given in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. 12. He also contended that mere occupation is not sufficient to infer either sub tenancy or parting with possession and thereby he relied upon (1989) 3 SCC 5 . Accordingly the plaintiff landlord was duty bound to prove that the tenant has parted with possession of the demised premises for monetary consideration by creating sub-tenancy. In this context he also relied upon (2010) 1 SCC 217 . Mr. Chatterjee also relied upon (2005) 1 SCC 481 and (1988) 3 SCC 57 in support of his case. 13. Accordingly he contended that plaintiff miserably failed to prove that there exists any monetary transaction between the parties or that the alleged sub tenants are in exclusive possession of the suit premises. However both the courts below had erred in law ignoring that parting with exclusive and meaningful possession with monetary transaction must be proved to substantiate a case of subletting. Both the courts below also committed mistake in observing that the burden is lying upon defendant to disprove plaintiff’s case. Infact the onus shifts to tenants to prove the nature of occupation when the third party continues to possess the tenanted premises. Accordingly he has prayed for setting aside the judgment passed by the courts below. 14. Mr. Both the courts below also committed mistake in observing that the burden is lying upon defendant to disprove plaintiff’s case. Infact the onus shifts to tenants to prove the nature of occupation when the third party continues to possess the tenanted premises. Accordingly he has prayed for setting aside the judgment passed by the courts below. 14. Mr. Saptanghsu Basu learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that section 13(1) (a) of West Bengal Tenancy Act 1956 attracts when the tenants transfer assigns or sublet in whole or in part the premises held by him without the written consent of the land lord and the landlord then would be entitled to a decree of eviction. However, nowhere in the said provision it is stipulated that sub-tenancy has to be in lieu of some monetary consideration. Relying upon judgment reported in 1989 (2) SCC 383 , AIR 1998 SC 1240 and 2003 (4) CHN 140 he emphasised that it is not mandatory for the plaintiffs being the land lord to show that subletting has been made in lieu of some monetary consideration. Referring a case reported in (1989) 2 SCC 383 he contended that in the said cases the tenant has sub let the suit premises in favour of a club without any monetary consideration but the Supreme Court upheld the view of the first appellate court and the High Court that the tenant had parted with possession of a portion of suit premises. Similarly in the case reported in AIR 1998 SC 1240 the bank had sublet the suit property in favour of a trade union without any monetary consideration but the Apex Court held that since payment of rent of monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises was sublet. 15. Mr. 15. Mr. Basu referring a judgment reported in 2003 (4) CHN 140 contended that the facts of the said case are almost identical with the present case and the Division Bench of this Court held where the tenant had parted with possession of the suit property in favour of three companies, all of which have registered office in the suit property were liable to be evicted under section 13(1) (a) of the Act of 1956. He further contended that in the case reported in AIR 1988 SC 1240 , it was held that production of affirmative evidence by the land lord showing payment of monetary consideration by the subtenant to the tenant is not necessary for proving subletting and the inference as to subletting can be drawn from proof of delivery of exclusive possession of the premises or part thereof by the tenant to the subtenant. 16. Mr. Basu in this context strenuously argued that plaintiffs herein have clearly demonstrated that the companies to which the suit premises has been sublet to by the tenant have their registered office in the suit premises and the same is reflected in the annual returns of the companies which are marked as exhibit 4 (10), 5 (4), 6 (a) and 6 (b) which are the documents filed by the plaintiff. 17. Mr. Basu referring the case reported in AIR 1974 SC contended that if the landlord is able to prove parting of the exclusive possession, then inference of sub tenancy can reasonably be drawn. Here annual returns of the companies clearly depict the exclusive possession of the sub tenants and the plaintiffs have thus discharged the duty of proving parting of exclusive possession and now the onus to disprove this contention of the plaintiffs has shifted on the appellant in which they have failed miserably. 18. Mr. Basu further argued that though plaintiff’s specific case is that the aforesaid entities to whom portion of suit premises were sub-let are closely associated with the family members but it appears that the directors of Pearl Poly and Plaza Plastic have no nexus with the tenant/defendant firm and none of the partners are directors of the said companies but they are in occupation of the suit premises according to exhibit 4 (10),5(4), 6(b) and 6(a) and as such it is clear case of parting with possession by the defendant. 19. 19. He further contended that section 146 of the Companies Act 1956 imposes the duty on a company to disclose the address of the registered office in their annual return and the annual return of the Pearl Poly and Plaza Plastic reflects the address of it’s registered office at the suit premises. The certified copy of annual return of Ashok Plastic Pvt. Ltd as on 28.09.1995 also shows that the registered office of the said company is at the suit premises. 20. He also argued that it further appears that the partners of Gupta Auto Agency hold 1210 equity shares i.e. 24.5% whereas the other shareholders who are rank outsiders to the plaintiffs hold 3730 equity shares i.e. 75.50%. Therefore, it is clear that Gupta Auto Agency do not hold controlling share in the said company and they have allowed the company to function from the tenancy obtained by it which amounts to subletting. 21. Similarly, in the case of Chitralekha housing corporation one of the partners of Gupta Auto Agency namely Omprakash Gupta is a partner of the said firm who admitted in his cross examination as to the correctness of exhibit 9 and 10 pertains to the official address of Chitralekha and in cross-examination he also confirms that the said housing corporation has also a sitting arrangement between the said partnership firm and the partners of Gupta Auto Agency which is nothing but parting with possession or sub tenancy in law. 22. Mr. Basu further contended that it is needless to mention that once a company has a registered office in a particular premises, to which all communication and notices are to be addressed, it is bound to comply several provisions of companies Act. The register of members is to be kept there under section 163 and the right of inspection has to take place therein, the register of directors is also to be kept therein under section 303, the accounts book are to be maintained there unless the directors decide otherwise and the register of mortgage and charges and copies of registered documents are also to be kept there under section 143 and the right of inspection of them to be exercised there under section 144 of the companies Act. Section 434 of the Companies Act mandates service of notice upon the companies at its registered office. Mr. Section 434 of the Companies Act mandates service of notice upon the companies at its registered office. Mr. Basu thereby argued the importance of a registered office of a company and as such it cannot be treated as a mere name’s shake address. The registered office of the companies is of immense significance and establishes parting with possession of the suit premises to the said companies. 23. Mr. Basu further argued that it is not material whether all the subtenants are related to each other or for that it cannot be said that appellant had never parted with possession or has not sub let the suit premises though it would reveal from the name of directors of Pearl Poly and Plaza Plastics that the defendant has no nexus with them. In this context he relied upon (1973) 2 SCC 597 and 89 CWN 447 to substantiate his contention that the relationship between the tenant and subtenant is not material even if it has been sublet to member of a family without taking consent from the land lord. In this context he further relied upon 1977 (2) CLJ 153. Relying upon a case reported in (2010) 5 SCC 306 he contended that each company is a separate and distinct legal entity and the mere fact that the two companies have common share holders or common board of directors will not make the two companies a single entity and accordingly he contended that the companies to whom the defendant/tenant had sublet the suit property are all separate entities even if directors/partners have a blood relationship. The companies having registered office in the suit premises are indicative of the fact that the tenant had parted with the possession of the suit property. Accordingly he has prayed for dismissal of the Second Appeal. Decision 24. A Division Bench of this court while admitted the appeal under the provision of Order XLI Rule 11 framed the following substantial questions of law. Accordingly he has prayed for dismissal of the Second Appeal. Decision 24. A Division Bench of this court while admitted the appeal under the provision of Order XLI Rule 11 framed the following substantial questions of law. (i) Whether the learned courts below committed substantial error of laws in passing a decree for eviction on the ground of subletting in favour of Ashoke Plastics Private limited, Pearl Poly Industries (Pvt) Limited, Plaza plastic (private) limited by totally overlooking the materials on record indicating that in all those companies, the partners of the original defendant are the partners or directors and they are holding the major portion of share (ii) Whether the learned courts below committed substantial error of law in passing a decree for eviction on the ground of subletting in favour of Chitralekha Housing Corporation by totally overlooking the evidence of PW1 that that he was a partner of the said corporation and no suggestion to the contrary has been given to him in cross-examination; (iii) In the absence of any evidence adduced by the plaintiffs showing that Chitralekha Housing Corporation has actual possession over any part of the property, whether the learned courts below committed substantial error of law in disbelieving the uncontroverted statement of DW-1 that Chitralekha Housing Corporation was only permitted to use the address of the premises for their bank accounts and for the purpose of communication with regard to their business and that DW1 was very much one of the partner for record. 25. Some of the well-recognised exceptions where the second appellate court can interfere with the concurrent findings of the court below has been laid down in Nazir Mohammed Vs. J. Kamala and others reported in (2020) 19 SCC 57 and such exceptions are (i) The courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence. (ii) The courts have drawn wrong inference from proved facts by applying the law erroneously or (iii) The courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. 26. In the present second appeal as I have already stated that the only ground agitated is ground of subletting. (ii) The courts have drawn wrong inference from proved facts by applying the law erroneously or (iii) The courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. 26. In the present second appeal as I have already stated that the only ground agitated is ground of subletting. Appellants main grievance in this second appeal inter alia are as follows:- (i) there is no single averment in the plaint which would indicate that the defendant appellant have parted with exclusive possession of the suit premises nor there is any evidence to prove that the defendant/appellant had parted with exclusive possession in lieu of monetary transaction. (ii) the documents relied by the plaintiff/land lord are all secondary evidence. Subletting means transfer of an exclusive rights to enjoy the property in favour of the third party and assignment means a transfer or making over to another the whole of any property real or personal in possession or in action or of any estate or right therein, which is completely absent in the present context. (iii) Mere factum that the tenant entered into a partnership for carrying on business or that some of the companies only used to share the table used by the defendant, does not amount to sub-tenancy. (iv) The defence witnesses have specifically pleaded and proved that the directors/shareholders of the concerned companies are family members of the defendant and no separate space is provided to the said companies. (v) The onus shifts to tenant to prove the nature of the occupation of a third party only if the tenant proved to have parted with possession in respect of the suit premises but if he continues to hold legal possession in the tenanted premises, onus does not shift upon him but both the courts below have drawn wrong inference holding that the defendants failed to discharge his burden to prove the nature of possession of the companies at the suit premise. 27. 27. Before going to further details let me reproduce section 13 (1) (a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 which runs as follows:- 13(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely :- (a) where the tenant or any person residing in the premises let to the tenant without the previous consent in writing of the landlord transfers, assigns or sub-lets in whole or in part the premises held by him; 28. It is to be mentioned that said section does not specifically states about payment of premium by the sub tenant to the tenant but it deals with mainly three situations firstly transfer assigns or sublet and secondly such transfer, sublet or assignment may be in respect of whole or in respect of part of the tenanted premises and thirdly such transfer assignment or subletting has been made without the written consent of the land lord. 29. In the present context in original written statement in para 6 defendant denied possession of the other companies but did not specifically denied the possession of Ashoke Plastic Pvt. Ltd. though in the additional written statement he denied possession of any of the companies. It is not in dispute in the present context that the companies mentioned above have their registered office at suit premises which also reflected from the annual return which are marked as exhibit during trial. It is also not in dispute that the partnership deed dated 31st August, 1984 of the defendant/firm recorded the name of the partners as (i) Omprakash Gupta (ii) Sohan Lal Gupta (iii) Rajendra Kumar Gupta (iv) Ajoy Gupta. It further appears that the directors of Pearl Poly Industries are Dipak Gupta, Atul Gupta Minakshi Gupta and the directors of Plaza Plastic are Deepak Gupta and Minakshi Gupta who are strangers to the plaintiffs as they are not the partners of the defendant/company. Accordingly the defendant company cannot have any control over Pearl Poly and Plaza Plastic as the said companies have separate entity with several directors having registered office in the suit premises. Accordingly the defendant company cannot have any control over Pearl Poly and Plaza Plastic as the said companies have separate entity with several directors having registered office in the suit premises. So far as Ashoke Plastic Pvt. Ltd. is concerned the exhibited documents shows that the partners of Gutpa Auto Agency hold 1210 equity share i.e. 24.5% whereas the other shareholders who are outsiders hold 3730 equity shares i.e. 75.50% and as such it cannot be said that Gupta Auto Agency has any controlling shares in the said company though the defendants have allowed the said company to function showing its registered office in the suit premises. 30. Learned Trial Court while dealt with the issue of subletting observed that the nature of business as well as the director of Ashoke Plastic Pvt. Ltd. Cannot be said to be identical with the defendants company and it cannot be said also that defendant has any control over it and he further held that the principle laid down AIR 1986 SC 1564 does not apply in the case of Ashoke plastic which was not formed by the defendant partner of Gupta agency. So far as pearl poly industries is concerned Trial Court held defendant Omprakash Gupta has no control over the said company and the annual return marked exhibit shows that Pearl Poly Industries is carrying on business from the suit premises. In this context he further observed that though DW-1 stated that no separate space is provided to Plaza Plastic but from the certified copy of annual return marked exhibit-4 it appears that its registered office is at suit premises and as such he observed that the said company is in occupation of a portion of the suit premises and in this context he relied upon the principle laid down in the case reported AIR 1989 SC 1416 . So far as Chitralekha Housing is concerned, DW-1 stated that he is a partner of a company and Chitralekha housing has got a sitting arrangement in the suit premises. Exhibit 9 and 10 also states that their address is at the suit premises and defendant could not produce any document in support of his partnership over Chitralekha housing. Accordingly the Trial Court came to a conclusive finding after scanning the documentary and oral evidence that the defendant has sublet the suit premises to the said companies. 31. Exhibit 9 and 10 also states that their address is at the suit premises and defendant could not produce any document in support of his partnership over Chitralekha housing. Accordingly the Trial Court came to a conclusive finding after scanning the documentary and oral evidence that the defendant has sublet the suit premises to the said companies. 31. When the matter came up before the last court of facts i.e. the court below it held that DW 1 has admitted that the said Ashoke Plastic is in occupation of a room and documents do not suggest that the appellant/Gupta Auto Agency has controlling share in the Ashoke Plastic so the sharing possession of the suit premises by the appellant with Mrs. Ashoke Plastic suggests sub tenancy. As regards occupation of the suit premises by Pearl Poly Industries the court below affirmed the Trial Court’s observation that the company is carrying business at the suit premises and that the appellant has no control over the said company. Regarding Plaza Plastic, court below after scanning documentary and oral evidence, as a last court of facts observed that the Trial Court rightly held that the company having separate directors upon which appellant had no control over the company though the company uses the suit premises as its registered office. Regarding Chitralekha Housing he referred exhibit 10 which is a letter written by Chitralekha to Calcutta Electric Supply corporation with regard to shifting of service cable and DW-1 stated in evidence that Chitralekha Housing has no office in the suit premises but there was arrangement of sitting in the suit premises and the DW-1 also admitted the correctness of both exhibit 9 and 10 and accordingly Court below held after appreciation of evidence that Trial Judge correctly found presence of Chitralekha housing at the suit premises and he further held that Trial Judge committed no error in holding that the appellant failed to discharge in his evidence that the premises was not sublet to Chitralekha. 32. It needs to be mentioned herein that by the amendment of 1976, the scope of section 100 of the CPC has been narrowed down. The High Court would have jurisdiction of interfering under section 100 CPC only in a case where substantial question of law are involved. 32. It needs to be mentioned herein that by the amendment of 1976, the scope of section 100 of the CPC has been narrowed down. The High Court would have jurisdiction of interfering under section 100 CPC only in a case where substantial question of law are involved. The words used in section 100 is “if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law” which clearly indicates the legislative intention that High Court will not be justified in interference unless it is satisfied that in the second appeal, the evidence have been grossly misappreciated either by the Trial Court or by the Court below. 33. In the present context no permission was taken by the defendant from the plaintiff for recording respective company’s registered office in the suit premises or allowing to do some table work in the suit premises by the defendant without taking consent from plaintiff is not in dispute but what is in dispute is whether the companies whose registered office is shown at the suit premises were infact inducted by the defendant as sub-tenant or they were merely permitted by the defendant to share table at the suit premises. 34. In fact the question as to whether the aforesaid companies only share table of the defendant in the suit premises without having any exclusive possession thereof and whether the defendant is receiving any premium for that from the alleged sub tenants, can never be a substantial question of law. In fact it is well settled that while dealing with second appeal, High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the concurrent finding of the courts below, unless it is shown that the observations are contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law or contrary to the law laid down by the Apex court or where the ultimate finding of the courts below are based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. However, in the present context I find from the judgment of the courts below, who are the courts of fact that their findings are based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. The first appellate court under section 96 is the last court of facts. Generally the High Court in second appeal cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court. 35. The first appellate court under section 96 is the last court of facts. Generally the High Court in second appeal cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court. 35. It is no doubt true that perversity in arriving at a factual finding give rise to a substantial question of law attracting intervention of the High court under section 100 of the CPC but in the present context going through the judgment passed by the courts below on the basis of appreciation of evidence, I do not find any manifest error or error apparent on the face of their observation. The question as to whether the defendant has parted with the possession of the suit premises generally does not give rise to any substantial question of law as it is entirely a matter to be decided on the appreciation of the evidence. 36. As regards the another essential requirements as to whether alleged sub tenant has paid any premium to the tenant or not, it is defendant’s own case that all the directors and partners are his family members. Learned Trial Court in this context relying upon AIR 1988 SC 1845 rightly came to a conclusion that such transaction of subletting in the guise of licence are in their very nature clandestine arrangement between the tenant and the sub tenant and there cannot be direct evidence. It is matter of common sense that even if there is any monetary consideration in the case of subletting which take place clandestinely among the close relatives to prevent detection, it is not very easy to prove the same by adducing evidence. Such transaction usually occur under a veil for which evidence may not be easily available and in such situation it will be just and proper to act under circumstantial evidence, on the basis of which decision is to be given by court of law. Such transaction usually occur under a veil for which evidence may not be easily available and in such situation it will be just and proper to act under circumstantial evidence, on the basis of which decision is to be given by court of law. Thus when it has been established that the concerned companies have their registered office in the suit premises and some of the directors have no nexus with the defendant company and when the percentage of share indicates that defendant company have no control over some of them and on the basis of such circumstances when the courts below came to a conclusion about creation of sub tenancy, such observation cannot be called as perverse or that the High Court’s interference in the second appeal is warranted upon such concurrent finding. 37. In such view of the matter I find that the concurrent findings of the courts below in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs does not call for any interference. 38. S.A. 79 of 2006 thus stands dismissed. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties, on priority basis on compliance of all usual formalities.