JUDGMENT : (Raja Vijayaraghavan, J.) The petitioner herein is the wife of Shyam (“the detenu” for the sake of brevity). Proceedings under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [for short ‘KAAP Act’] was initiated against the detenu and Ext.P1 order has been passed. Records reveal that the detention order was confirmed by the Government by order dated 16.08.2024 after obtaining the opinion from the Advisory Board. The petitioner had earlier approached this Court and filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as WP(Crl)No.951/2024 challenging Ext.P1 order. In the said writ petition, the following contentions were raised by the petitioner. (i) There is unexplained and inordinate delay between the last prejudicial activity attributed to the detenu and the date of passing detention order, and thus the live-link between the purpose sought to be achieved by the preventive detention and the initiation of the proceedings has been snapped. (ii) The sufficiency of bail conditions imposed by the Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram while granting bail to the detenu in Crime No.270/2024, for preventing the detenu from involving in further crimes, have not been considered by the Detaining Authority in the impugned order. (iii) The first crime reckoned by the Detaining Authority for classifying the detenu as a ‘known rowdy’ has been settled between the accused and the de facto complainant. (iv) The second crime of murder attributed to the detenu was actually a motor accident as revealed from the claim petition filed by the legal heirs of the deceased before the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal as O.P (MV) No.494/2023. (v) The Detaining Authority has not considered the sufficiency of the proceedings initiated against the detenu under section 107 Cr.P.C. to prevent the detenu from involving in further anti-social activities. (vi) The Government has not explained the reasons for the rejection of the representation submitted by the petitioner against the preventive detention of the detenu, in the communication dated 23.08.2024. 2. By Ext.P3 judgment dated 26.09.2024, this Court adverted to all the contentions raised by the petitioner and dismissed the writ petition holding that there was absolutely no reason to interfere with the said order. It is thereafter that the instant writ petition is filed on 14.10.2024 with a prayer to quash Exts.P1 and P2 and to set the detenu at liberty. 3. Sri. It is thereafter that the instant writ petition is filed on 14.10.2024 with a prayer to quash Exts.P1 and P2 and to set the detenu at liberty. 3. Sri. M.H Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the principle of res judicata cannot be made applicable in habeas corpus matters. He would rely on the observations made by the Apex Court in Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India & Ors. 1981 KHC 571, Kamal alias Kamal Deep Meena v. State & Ors. 2013 KHC 2680 and Nisha Salim v. State of Kerala & Ors., 2009(2)KHC1014 to substantiate his contentions. According to the learned counsel, this writ petition was necessitated as certain valid grounds were not raised when the earlier writ petition was filed and some of the grounds arose only after the disposal of the earlier petition. He would raise the following contentions to advance his point. a) The detention order was issued on 26.06.2024, and in terms of the provisions of Section 3(3), the order has to be forthwith communicated to the State Police Chief and the Government. He would refer to the observations made by the Apex Court in Hetchin Haokip v. State of Manipur and Others, (2018) 9 SCC 562 to substantiate his contentions. The said requirement was not complied with in its letter and spirit. b) For the purpose of classifying the detenu as a known rowdy, 3 crimes were considered. He points out that insofar as the 3rd crime is concerned, the same was quashed by this Court based on a settlement after the disposal of the writ petition. Then, what remains is only two crimes out of which in respect of the 1st crime, the detenu is arrayed as the 2nd accused and the only role attributed to him is that he had harbored the prime accused. The said case is not liable to be reckoned for classifying the detenu as a known rowdy. c) Under Article 22(4) of the Constitution of India, the mandate is that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a period longer than 3 months unless the Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. c) Under Article 22(4) of the Constitution of India, the mandate is that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a period longer than 3 months unless the Advisory Board has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. In the case on hand, based on the opinion submitted by the advisory board, the confirmation order was passed by the Government on 16.08.2024, well within the period of three months from the date of execution of the detention. However, the confirmation order was served on the detenu, who is undergoing detention only on 10.10.2024, much beyond the period of three months. This, according to the learned counsel, would not satisfy the mandate under Section 22(4) of the Constitution of India and on the sole ground, the order is liable to be held as vitiated. d) After the judgment was rendered by this Court on 26.09.2024, the petitioner submitted Ext.P5 representation before the Government on 4.10.2024. However, the said representation has not been promptly considered by the Government. This according to the learned counsel would infringe the rights guaranteed to the detenu under the constitution. 4. While vehemently opposing the submissions of the learned counsel and challenging the maintainability of the writ petition, Sri. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor would refer to the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment dated 20.02.2024 in WP(Crl) 109/2024 and also by a Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India 1967 KHC 679, and it is urged that a writ of habeas corpus, raising the very same ground cannot be entertained. He would point out that all the contentions raised by the petitioner in the earlier writ petition were considered and the same was emphatically rejected by this Court. It is also submitted that the representation submitted by the petitioner after the disposal of the writ petition was also considered and its fate was communicated. The learned counsel would then submit that the mandate under Article 22(4) is only to the effect that the confirmation order has to be passed within three months and some delay here and there in communicating the order cannot amount to the violation of the constitutional mandate. 5. The learned counsel would then submit that the mandate under Article 22(4) is only to the effect that the confirmation order has to be passed within three months and some delay here and there in communicating the order cannot amount to the violation of the constitutional mandate. 5. We have considered the submissions advanced and we have gone through the records. 6. In Nisha Salim v. State of Kerala and Ors., 2019 (2) KHC 1014, this Court after referring to all previous precedents had held that when the grounds raised in the new writ petition are essentially the same, though couched in different terminology, such a writ petition cannot be maintained. It appears that a few contentions have been taken by the petitioner which was not raised before this Court earlier. In that view of the matter, despite the strong objection as regards maintainability raised by the learned government pleader, we decided to hear the matter on its merits as the liberty of an individual was involved. 7. The first contention of the petitioner is that the requirement under Section 3(3) of the Act has not been complied with. In Hetchin Haokip v. State of Manipur and Others, (2018) 9 SCC 562 , the question before the Apex Court was with regard to the meaning and scope of the word “forthwith”, occurring in Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980. It was held that the expression “forthwith” must be interpreted to mean a reasonable time and without any undue delay. It was further held that the detaining authority must furnish the report at the earliest possible time. Any delay between the date of detention and the date of submitting the report to the State Government must be due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the authority and not because of administrative laxity. In the said case, it was held that the delay of five days to report the detention would be violative of the rights guaranteed to the detenu and would vitiate the detention order. In the case on hand, the records reveal that the order was communicated on the next day itself. In that view of the matter, the said contention raised by the learned counsel is liable to be rejected. 8. In the case on hand, the records reveal that the order was communicated on the next day itself. In that view of the matter, the said contention raised by the learned counsel is liable to be rejected. 8. The second contention is that Crime No. 303 of 2023 registered inter alia under Sections 120B, 302, 201, 212 of the IPC ought not have been reckoned. The specific contention of the learned counsel is that only a person who either by himself or as a member of a gang commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any offence under Section 153A and Section 153B of Chapter VIII and Chapter XV, XVI, XVII & XXII of the IPC or offences under the provision of the Arms Act, 1959 or the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 can be classified as a ‘rowdy’. It is pointed out that Section 120B comes under Chapter V-A, which Chapter is not included in Section 2(t) of the KAAP Act. According to him, in the above case, his role is limited to that of harbouring the offenders and punishable under Section 212 of the IPC which offence falls under Chapter XI of the IPC and is not included in Section 2(t) of the KAAP Act. We have gone through the records relating to the aforesaid crime. However, on a perusal of Exhibit P1, the final report in the said crime, we find that the prosecution case is that the accused which includes the detenu hatched a criminal conspiracy to murder one Ranjith and in pursuance to the same the accused Nos. 1 and 3 drove a lorry bearing registration No. KL-20/J-0244 owned by the detenu mowed down the deceased while he was riding a bike and thereby committed the offence. It is also alleged that the petitioner harbored the accused in order to screen them from punishment. The role of the detenu is that of a main conspirator and that of a person who harboured the main assailants. Section 2(t) of the KAAP Act includes a person who abets the commission of any offences under the Chapters made mention of in the said provision and a reading of Section 120B of the IPC would reveal that a party to a criminal conspiracy if found guilty, can be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted the offence. In that view of the matter, the contention of the petitioner that Crime No. 303 of 2023 cannot be reckoned for the purpose of classifying the detenu as a ‘known rowdy’ cannot be sustained. Furthermore, identical contentions were raised concerning Sections 34 and 149 which come under Chapter II and Chapter VII of the IPC respectively and such contention was repelled in Kiran Shaji v. State of Kerala and Ors., 2018 (4) KHC 465 . 9. The next contention concerns the service of the confirmation order on the detenu. Though the order was passed within 3 months, it was communicated to the detenu only on 10.10.2024. The question is whether this would violate Article 22(4) of the Constitution. Act 34 of 2007 is a law providing for preventive detention and was enacted to provide for the effective prevention and control of anti-social activities in the State of Kerala. As per the provisions of the Act, power has been conferred on the Government or an officer authorized under sub-section (2) of Section 3 to order the detention of the person if satisfied, on information received from a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police with regard to the activities of any ‘known goonda’ or ‘known rowdy’, with a view to prevent such person from committing any anti-social activity within the State of Kerala. An order passed under Section 3 shall not remain in force for more than 12 days unless the same is approved by the Government or by the Secretary (Home Department), as authorized. Section 9 of the Act provides that in every case, where a detention order has been made under the Act, the Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person, place before the Advisory Board, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected, and, in the case where the order has been made by an authorised officer, the report by such officer under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. Under Article 22 of the Constitution of India, no law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a period longer than three months, unless the Advisory Board, duly constituted, has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for detention. Under Article 22 of the Constitution of India, no law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a period longer than three months, unless the Advisory Board, duly constituted, has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for detention. Article 22(4)(a) clearly indicates that even if the order of detention does not prescribe any period, such an order of detention cannot be in force for a period beyond three months, unless the Advisory Board before the expiration of three months opines that there is sufficient cause for detention. In other words, if the Advisory Board does not give its opinion within a period of three months from the date of detention, the order of detention beyond the period of three months would become illegal and not otherwise. If within the period of three months, the Advisory Board opines that there was no sufficient cause for such detention, then the State Government would have to release the detenu forthwith. 10. In Abdul Karim v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 1 SCC 433 , the Apex Court has held that Article 22 prescribes the minimum procedure that must be included in any law permitting preventive detention and if such requirements are not observed, the detention infringes the fundamental right of the detenu guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. It has been further held that all the procedural requirements of Article 22 are mandatory in character and even if one of the procedural requirements is not complied with the order of detention would be rendered illegal. 11. In Pesala Nookaraju (supra), the Apex Court has held that the period of three months specified in Article 22(4)(a) of the Constitution of India is relatable to the period of detention prior to the report of the Advisory Board and not to the period of detention subsequent thereto. Further, the period of detention in terms of Article 22(4)(a) cannot be in force for a period beyond three months, if by then, the Advisory Board has not given its opinion holding that there is sufficient cause for such detention. Further, the period of detention in terms of Article 22(4)(a) cannot be in force for a period beyond three months, if by then, the Advisory Board has not given its opinion holding that there is sufficient cause for such detention. Therefore, under Article 22(4)(a), the Advisory Board would have to give its opinion within a period of three months from the date of detention and depending upon the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board, the State Government can under Section 12 of the Act, either confirm the order of detention or continue the detention of the person concerned or release the detenu forthwith, as the case may be. 12. In Smt. Pushpa v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1953 , one of the contentions raised to assail the order of detention passed under the COFEPOSA Act 1974, was that the order confirming the detention of the detenu after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board was invalid as the same had been confirmed beyond the prescribed period of three months, the delay being of three days. The Apex Court, after adverting to the facts, came to the conclusion that the detenu in the said case was detained on 27.1.1979, within three months and the order was drawn up and communicated to the detenu on 30.04.1979, which was three days after the period of three months had expired. The Apex Court held that delay, if any, in communicating the order of confirmation will not vitiate the order. In the case on hand, as the Government had confirmed the order of detention within three months, the detention cannot be held to be vitiated. 13. The last contention raised by the learned counsel is that Ext.P5 representation submitted by the detenu after the disposal of the earlier writ petition was not promptly considered. The learned Government Pleader has placed before us materials showing that the representation submitted by the detenu was considered and its fate was communicated to the detenu on 16.10.2024. In view of the discussion above, we are of the view that none of the contentions raised by the petitioner deserves merit. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.