JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Ms. Nand Prabha Shukla, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record. 2. The present criminal appeal has been preferred against the Judgement and Order of conviction dated 13.03.2019 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.15, Kanpur Nagar in Sessions Trial No.361 of 2016 (State vs. Ajit Kushwaha) arising out of Case Crime No.0023 of 2016, Police Station Govind Nagar District Kanpur whereby the appellant has been convicted under Section 304B IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and under Section 498-A IPC two years simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5000/-and in case of default in payment of fine a further simple imprisonment of one month. The appellant has further been convicted under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act for two years simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.2000/-and in case of default a further simple imprisonment of 15 days. All the sentences shall run concurrently. However, the accused-appellant has been acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC. 3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the brief facts are as follows: On 18.01.2016 at 08:50 pm, the first informant Kamal Sen Mehta lodged a First Information Report bearing Case Crime No. 23 of 2016, under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act at Police Station Govind Nagar, District Kanpur Nagar against the appellant Ajit Kushwaha and 11 others alleging that the marriage of his youngest daughter Pooja Kushwaha was solemnized with Ajit Kushwaha on 31.05.2015. At the time of marriage, sufficient dowry was given but later on there was further demand of dowry of cash Rs.5 lacs to run the business and a car, which she often disclosed to her family. She was kept under starvation and was harassed. On 18.01.2016, the first informant called his daughter on telephone but there was no response. He immediately went to her in-laws’ place and found the door to be locked. The concerned police Station was informed, the Police reached and opened the door and found his daughter killed in a brutal manner. People in the vicinity disclosed that they saw the in-laws fleeing from the spot. Hence, the First Information Report was lodged. 4. During the course of investigation, the inquest proceedings were conducted in the presence of Naib Tehsildar on 18.01.2016 at 10.00 P.M. and the body was sent for autopsy. People in the vicinity disclosed that they saw the in-laws fleeing from the spot. Hence, the First Information Report was lodged. 4. During the course of investigation, the inquest proceedings were conducted in the presence of Naib Tehsildar on 18.01.2016 at 10.00 P.M. and the body was sent for autopsy. The postmortem of the deceased Pooja was conducted on 19.1.2016 at 1.55 P.M. 5. The investigation was conducted and a Charge Sheet No. 85/2016 dated 17.04.2016 was submitted against accused Ajit Kushwaha, Ram Lakhan Kushwaha, Premwati Kushwaha and Sameer under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act. Rest other co-accused were exonerated. 6. On 04.05.2016, the matter was committed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar to the Court of Sessions for trial. On 18.05.2016, learned Trial Court framed the charges against the accused Ajit Kushwaha, Ram Lakhan Kushwaha, Premwati Kushwaha and Sameer under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act and alternatively under Section 302 IPC. 7. The accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 8. To establish the prosecution case, total seven prosecution witnesses were examined. 9. P.W.1 Kamal Sen Mehta, the father of the deceased in his examination-in-chief deposed that Pooja Kushwaha was his third daughter. Her traditional marriage ceremony took place at Kashmir, Govind Nagar at Kanpur Nagar on 31.05.2015 with Ajit Kushwaha after giving sufficient dowry. Just after the marriage, there was a demand of dowry of cash Rs. 5 lacs and a car. They even tortured and gave beatings to his daughter and kept her under starvation. Whenever she visited her parental house, she used to disclose to her family members about the harassment caused by her in-laws. Before the traditional marriage ceremony, his daughter and Ajit Kushwaha performed the love marriage on 15.1.2015 at Arya Samaj Temple. Subsequently, on being pressurized by the close relatives, the traditional marriage ceremony was organised on 31.05.2015. On 18.01.2016, when he called his daughter Pooja Kushwaha on her telephone, she did not attend the call. Then he went to her in-laws place where he found the door to be looked. He informed the police, the police reached the spot and got the door opened and saw Pooja lying on bed and brutally killed. Severe blows were found on the head and face of the deceased. Then he went to her in-laws place where he found the door to be looked. He informed the police, the police reached the spot and got the door opened and saw Pooja lying on bed and brutally killed. Severe blows were found on the head and face of the deceased. There was swelling on the neck and blood was oozing out from the face and nose. It seemed that she was assaulted with heavy object and neck was pressed in order to kill her. The local residents informed that they saw the accused running from the place of occurrence. The said witness proved the written Tehrir and inquest report. During the cross-examination he deposed that he used to run a tailoring shop. His other daughter Monica was a widow. He had three daughters, the eldest one was Monica, then Sucheta Mehta and the youngest was Pooja. The in-laws of Sucheta lived nearby his house. Pooja used to take tuition of 25-30 children and earned Rs.35,000/-40,000/-. At the time of incident, Ajit used to work at Reliance Company. He further added that he was not happy with Arya Samaj marriage of his daughter. After the marriage, her in-laws demanded of cash Rs. 5 lacks to run the business or a car. 10. P.W.2 Monica, the elder sister of the deceased in her examination-in-chief supported the version of the first informant. Just before a week of the incident, her parents and in-laws of the deceased went to the Police Station Govind Nagar to settle the matrimonial dispute. Thereafter on 18.01.2016, her father received a call that due to non-fulfilment of dowry demand, Pooja had been killed by her in-laws. When she reached at her in-laws place, she saw Pooja lying dead on her bed and the blood was oozing out from her nose and mouth. There were injuries on her neck, cheek, lips and other parts of the body. No family members of her in-laws were present at the spot. In her cross-examination, she asserted the prosecution version. 11. P.W.3 Sarvjeet Mehta, the elder brother of the deceased in his examination-in-chief asserted the version of his father and sister. 12. P.W.4 Rakesh Kumar, Nayab Tehsildar who posted at Kanpur Nagar proved the inquest proceedings of the deceased Pooja. According to the opinion of the Panchas, the deceased appeared to have died due to throttling. 11. P.W.3 Sarvjeet Mehta, the elder brother of the deceased in his examination-in-chief asserted the version of his father and sister. 12. P.W.4 Rakesh Kumar, Nayab Tehsildar who posted at Kanpur Nagar proved the inquest proceedings of the deceased Pooja. According to the opinion of the Panchas, the deceased appeared to have died due to throttling. The blood was oozing out from the nose and mouth, there were injuries on the left side of the neck and contusion on the face. 13. P.W.5 Dr. Sangam Singh Sachan, who was posted as Medical Officer, at Community Health Centre, Kanpur deposed that on the alleged date, he was on duty at the post mortem house and had conducted the autopsy According to the post-mortem report, following ante-mortem injuries were found on the body of the deceased: 1. Contusion 12 x 4 cm left side head above left ear. 2. Contusion 3 x 2 cm., back of head over occipital region. 3. Laceration and contusions on inner side of upper and lower lips inner side 4. Contusion 3 x 2 cm. left side of cheek. 5. Contusion 4 x 2 cm. right side face, 4 cm below angle of mouth right side. 6. Abraded contusion 13 x 4 cm. front of neck. On dissection echymosis present in subcutaneous area. Blood and blood clot in neck tissues. Hyoid bone was fractured. The cause of death was Asphyxia due ante-mortem throttling. 14. He deposed that the injury nos. 1 to 5 would have been caused with kicks and fists and injury no. 6 must have been caused due to throttling. 15. P.W.6 Constable Milan Kumar in the examination-in-chief stated that he was posted as CCTNS on 18.01.2016 at Police Station Govind Nagar. He proved the Chik FIR (Exhibit Ka-9) which was entered on the same day and Rapat No. 43 at 20:50 hours and also proved the GD Entry. 16. P.W.7 Vishal Pandey, the Circle Officer/Investigating Officer stated in his examination-in-chief that after lodging of the FIR, he took over the investigation, made a spot inspection, prepared the site plan, recorded the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., collected the inquest and the post mortem report, recorded the statement of the accused and arrested them on 22.01.2016. 16. P.W.7 Vishal Pandey, the Circle Officer/Investigating Officer stated in his examination-in-chief that after lodging of the FIR, he took over the investigation, made a spot inspection, prepared the site plan, recorded the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., collected the inquest and the post mortem report, recorded the statement of the accused and arrested them on 22.01.2016. On 26.03.2016, he recorded the statement of Monica, the sister of the deceased and Sarvjeet Mehta, the brother of the deceased and Udai Kumar, the witness of the inquest. On 31.03.2016, he recorded the statement of the other witnesses and on the basis of incriminating material, he submitted the charge sheet against the accused Ajit Kushwaha, Ram Lakhan Kushwaha, Premwati Kushwaha and Sameer Kushwaha. He proved the site plan as Exhibit Ka-1 and the charge sheet as Exhibit Ka-12, which was in his hand writing and signed by him. 17. After the prosecution evidence, the statement of the accused were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and three defence witnesses were also examined, namely, Manju Maurya, Parasu Ram and Vikram Singh as DW-1, 2 and 3 respectively. 18. The accused in their statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. stated that the charge sheet was submitted on incorrect facts. He stated that he solemnized love marriage with the deceased and there was no demand of dowry of cash Rs. 5 lacs or a car nor she was harassed. It was an intercaste love marriage against their parent’s will at Arya Samaj. His parents used to live in the village while he and his wife Pooja lived at Labour Colony, Dada Nagar, Kanpur. Her friends visited to meet her even after the marriage. On 17.01.2016, he had to go to Lucknow to attend the birthday celebration of his sister’s son but Pooja did not agree to accompany him, so he went alone and returned back on the next day and found her dead. 19. D.W.1 Manju Maurya was the real sister of the accused Ajit Kushwaha who on oath stated that the birthday of her son was celebrated on 17.1.2016 at Lucknow and Ajit also joined the celebration and returned on the next date. On 19.01.2016, she came to know that when Ajit came to Lucknow to attend the function on the same night, some unknown persons killed Pooja by throttling her neck. 20. On 19.01.2016, she came to know that when Ajit came to Lucknow to attend the function on the same night, some unknown persons killed Pooja by throttling her neck. 20. D.W.2 Parasu Ram who was the Gram Pradhan of Village Damraas stated that the co-accused Ram Lakhan used to live in his village and looked after his agriculture land. His younger son aided him in his work. His wife too remained at the village while Ajit Kushwaha his elder son used to live at Dada Nagar Colony at Kanpur. 21. D.W.3 Vikram Singh in his defence stated that he was an auto driver and on 17.01.2016 at around 1:00 pm he went to drop Ajit Kushwaha at the Bus Station, while on the way Ajit disclosed that he was going to Lucknow at his sister’s house. 22. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned A.G.A. for the State and after perusal of the record, we find that the prosecution witnesses have asserted in their testimonies that the marriage of Pooja was solemnised with Ajit Kushwaha on 31.05.2015. The alleged incident took place on 18.01.2016, which occurred within seven years of the marriage. There was demand of dowry of cash Rs.5 lacs to run the business and a car. 23. As far as unnatural death of the deceased Pooja Kushwaha at her matrimonial home is concerned, it has been stated by the prosecution witnesses that when they reached her in-laws house, they found the door to be locked. On information, the local police reached the spot and opened the door and found the dead body of Pooja Kushwaha lying killed in a brutal manner. In such circumstances, the deceased died an unnatural death in suspicious circumstances at her matrimonial home. The appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. stated on oath that on 17.01.2016, he went to Lucknow to attend the birthday party of his sister’s son and returned back on 18.01.2016 and then came to know about the death of his wife Pooja. P.W.-2 Monica, the sister of the deceased in her examination-in-chief deposed that a week before the incident, her parents and the in-laws of Pooja went to the police station for the settlement of the matrimonial dispute which indicates that there were estranged relationship between them. According to the post mortem report, six antemortem injuries were found on the body of the deceased. According to the post mortem report, six antemortem injuries were found on the body of the deceased. The cause of death was Asphyxia due to ante mortem throttling. The hyoid bone was also found fractured. 24. While discussing about the demand of dowry for business purpose etc., the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bachani Devi and another vs. State of Haryana (2011) 4 SCC 427 has held that : “If a demand for property or valuable security directly or indirectly has nexus with marriage such demand would constitute demand for dowry. Cause or reason for such demand isimmaterial.” 25. Dowry Demand as referred in Section 304-B IPC which reads as under: “304-B. Dowry death-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called ‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation-For the purposes of this sub-section, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” 26. The essential ingredients which need to be proved in order to attract the offence of dowry death is as follows: (i) Death is caused in unnatural circumstances. (ii) Death must have occurred within seven years of the marriage of the deceased. (iii) It needs to be shown that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. 27. Coming to the first ingredient, the post mortem report suggests that the deceased died due to Asphyxia as a result of ante-mortem throttling. There were six ante-mortem injures around the head and face. The door was found locked and it could be opened after the intervention of the Police and the dead body of deceased was found lying on the bed, killed in a brutal manner. There were six ante-mortem injures around the head and face. The door was found locked and it could be opened after the intervention of the Police and the dead body of deceased was found lying on the bed, killed in a brutal manner. Therefore, it is proved beyond doubt that the deceased died an unnatural death at her matrimonial house. 28. The second ingredient is also proved as the marriage between the deceased and the appellant took place on 31.05.2015 and death of the deceased took place on 18.01.2016 which is within seven years of time frame. 29. The third ingredient was also proved. From the perusal of record, it transpires that P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3 in their testimony asserted that accused appellant demanded cash Rs.5 lacs to run the business and a car. Soon after the marriage, she was subjected to harassment and was kept under starvation. Whenever, she visited her parental house she used to disclose the atrocities caused to her at the matrimonial house. A week before the incident, the parties went to the police station for settlement of the matrimonial dispute. Thus, the deceased was subjected to harassment, soon before her death in connection with the dowry. 30. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act raises a presumption against the accused which reads as under: “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in conn3ection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation- For the purposes of this section, ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” 31. A reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act shows that there must be material to show that soon before the death of woman, such woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand of dowry, then only a presumption can be drawn that a person has committed the dowry death of a woman. It is then up to the appellant to discharge this presumption. 32. It is then up to the appellant to discharge this presumption. 32. From the evidence as discussed about the incident of dowry death has been proved safely relying on the presumption as to dowry death against the appellant. 33. An overall appreciation of the evidence adduced, it is apparent that the appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. stated that he was not present in the house at the relevant point of time and a benefit of plea of alibi should be given to him. He claimed that he went to his sister’s house at Lucknow to celebrate the birthday of his sister’s son on 17.01.2016 and returned back on 18.01.2016 and found his wife killed in a brutal manner. But the appellant could not produce any evidence or photograph of birthday celebration nor the bus tickets round the trip. 34. It is well settled law, when a plea of alibi is taken by an accused, the burden of proof is upon him to establish the same by positive evidence after the onus as regards the presence on the spot is established by the prosecution. In this context, it may be usefully reproduce a few paragraph from the case of Binay Kumar v. State of Bihar (1997) 1 SCC 283 : JT (1996) 10 SC 79 : “22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an exception (special or general) envisaged in the Penal Code, 1860 or any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised in Section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant. Illustration (a) given under the provision is worth reproducing in this context: “The question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta on a certain date; the fact that on that date, A was at Lahore is relevant. 23. The Latin word alibi means “elsewhere” and that word is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he would have participated in the crime. 23. The Latin word alibi means “elsewhere” and that word is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he would have participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal case, in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused was present at the scene and has participated in the crime. The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The plea of the accused in such cases need be considered only when the burden has been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is incumbent on the accused, who adopts plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the court may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi.” 35. Applying the above principles in the facts of this case, we find that no credible evidence is lead by the defence to prove that accused had gone to attend the birthday party of his sister’s son. No school records are produced to show that the date of birth of his sister’s son was the day prior to the incident. No independent witness was produced to prove the appellant’s presence at Lucknow. There is no reason disclosed as to why the deceased had not joined the appellant. No school records are produced to show that the date of birth of his sister’s son was the day prior to the incident. No independent witness was produced to prove the appellant’s presence at Lucknow. There is no reason disclosed as to why the deceased had not joined the appellant. Taken cumulatively, we do not consider the plea of alibi to be established by the defence. 36. From the discussion above, it is evident that all the three ingredients of dowry death have been proved. The marriage of the deceased took place on 31.05.2015 and the death of the deceased took place on 18.01.2016, which is within seven years of time frame. From the perusal of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.3 who have asserted that there was demand of dowry of cash Rs. 5 lacs to run business and a car which the deceased disclosed to her family members whenever she visited her parental house. Matrimonial discord between the deceased and her husband was existing regarding which both the families approached the police station for the settlement of dispute. The deceased died an unnatural death in suspicious circumstances at her matrimonial home. Six ante-mortem injuries were found on her face and neck. The cause of death was Asphyxia due to ante-mortem throttling. After the incident, the house was found locked and after the intervention of the police, the house was opened where Pooja was found lying killed in a brutal manner. Therefore, all the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC have been satisfied pointing towards the guilt of the appellant. 37. Finally, coming to the question of sentence, we find that the trial court had awarded the life imprisonment to the accused appellant Ajit Kushwaha under Section 304-B IPC. Punishment under Section 304-B IPC varies from seven years to life imprisonment. When the court proceeds to award maximum permissible sentence for an offence, it is the cardinal principle of law that reasons have to be given for awarding such maximum punishment. We do not find any such reason given by the trial court. We otherwise find that there are no circumstances which may justify awarding of extreme punishment to the accused appellant Ajit Kushwaha in the facts of the present case. We do not find any such reason given by the trial court. We otherwise find that there are no circumstances which may justify awarding of extreme punishment to the accused appellant Ajit Kushwaha in the facts of the present case. Considering the evidence in his entirety, we are of the considered view that punishment of life under Section 304-B IPC to the accused appellant Ajit Kushwaha is not warranted. 38. In Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryana (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the Supreme Court has observed that though punishment under Section 304-B varies from 7 years to life but award of extreme punishment should not be as a matter of course and must be awarded in rare cases. In paras 7 and 8, the Hon’ble the Supreme Court observed as under: “7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that Section 304-B I.P.C. lays down that: "Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." The point for consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the instant case, A reading of Section 304-B I.P.C., would show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman that all that is necessary is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directly responsible for the death of the deceased or not by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassment and that if the unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the person who has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before her death shall presume to have caused the dowry death if it is shown that before her death, such woman had been subjected, by the accused, to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. Practically this is the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304-B I.P.C. also. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection With the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satisfied. In the instant case no doubt the prosecution has proved that the deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangulation, but there is no direct evidence connecting the accused. It is also important to note in this context that there is no charge under Section 302 I.P.C. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical evidence on the file in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr. Usha Rani, P.W. 6 and Dr. Indu Latit, P.W. 7 gave one opinion. According to them no injury was found on the dead body and that the same was highly decomposed. On the other hand, Dr. Dalbir Singh, P.W. 13 who also examined the dead body and gave his opinion, deposed that he noticed some injuries at the time of re-post mortem examination. Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304-B I.P.C. would be attracted. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201 I.P.C. have been established. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201 I.P.C. have been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was a dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under Section 304-B I.P.C. was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above Section 304-B I.P.C. only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case. 8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' R.I. would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B I.P.C. reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years' R.I. The other conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are, however, confirmed. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to the above modification of sentence.” 39. Recently in G.V. Siddaramesh V. State of Karnataka (2010) 3 SCC 152 , Hon’ble Apex Court while allowing the appeal filed by the accused only on the question of sentence altered the sentence from life term to 10 years on more or less similar facts. Hon’ble H.L. Dattu, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench held as under: (SCC p. 160, para 31) “31. In conclusion, we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant was rightly convicted under Section 304-B IPC. However, his sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the courts below appears to us to be excessive. In conclusion, we are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant was rightly convicted under Section 304-B IPC. However, his sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the courts below appears to us to be excessive. The appellant is a young man and has already undergone 6 years of imprisonment after being convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court. We are of the view, in the facts and circumstances of the case, that a sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section 304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The other conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are confirmed.” 40. In Kashmira Devi Vs. The State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2020 SC 652 , the principle laid down in Hem Chand (supra) has been reiterated and the court observed in para 24:- “24. Having arrived at the above conclusion the quantum of sentence requires consideration. The High Court has awarded life imprisonment to the appellant on being convicted under Section 304-B IPC. The minimum sentence provided is seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. In fact, this Court in the case of Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryana (1994) 6 SCC 727 has held that while imposing the sentence, awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life under Section 304-B IPC should be in rare cases and not in every case. Though the mitigating factor noticed in the said case was different, in the instant case keeping in view the age of the appellant and also the contribution that would be required by her to the family, while husband is also aged and further taking into consideration all other circumstances, the sentence as awarded by the High Court to the appellant herein is liable to be modified.” 41. Applying the principle of law as laid down in the aforementioned cases and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the deceased has been done to death on account of several injuries caused to her. The homicidal death has occurred just within an year of marriage. Applying the principle of law as laid down in the aforementioned cases and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the considered opinion that the deceased has been done to death on account of several injuries caused to her. The homicidal death has occurred just within an year of marriage. Once the plea of alibi is discarded and the presumption of Section 113-B is not discharged, the appellant will have to be awarded commensurate punishment in the case. We therefore hold that the appellant is liable to punishment of 14 years imprisonment, which shall meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, we modify the sentence of the appellant from life imprisonment to that of 14 years imprisonment. In our view, this case does not fall in the category of a ‘rarecase’ so as to award to the appellant life imprisonment especially when the Trial Court has not recorded any specific finding for acquittal under Section 302 IPC. 42. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the impugned judgment and order of conviction dated 13.03.2019 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.15, Kanpur Nagar in Sessions Trial No. 361 of 2016 (State vs. Ajit Kushwaha), stands modified. 43. The accused appellant Ajit Kushwaha is in custody since 22.01.2016 and has remained in jail ever since then. The actual period of incarceration undergone by him is about more than eight years. We are of the considered view that the sentence awarded to accused appellant Ajit Kushwaha under Section 304-B IPC be modified to the sentence of 14 years imprisonment. The fine and the default sentence shall remain maintained. The appellant Ajit Kushwaha shall serve out the remaining sentence if not already served provided he is not wanted in any other case. 44. In view of the above, the present criminal appeal consequently succeeds and is allowed in part to that extent. 45. The Trial Court records be returned back and consigned to record.