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2024 DIGILAW 1425 (ALL)

Ved Prakash v. State

2024-05-27

SIDDHARTHA VARMA, VINOD DIWAKAR

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. Upon an incident having taken place on 18.4.1981 whereby Shyam Singh had died, a first information report was got lodged by his wife – Kailashpati. The first information report had stated that the brother of Shyam Singh, namely, Balveer Singh accompanied by his four sons, namely, Vijayvir Singh alias Vijay, Ved Prakash, Chandra Prakash alias Pappu and Rajesh alias Raju and the brother-in-law of Balveer, namely, Surendra (sala) had reached the house of the deceased. The motive assigned in the first information report was that the deceased Shyam Singh had executed a Will in favour of his three daughters and, therefore, the accused Balveer Singh and his four sons wanted to do away with him. In the first information report, it was very categorically stated that the four sons of Balveer Singh and his brother-in-law were armed with lathis and swords. Specifically, it has been stated that Chandra Prakash, Rajesh alias Raju, Ved Prakash had swords whereas Balveer Singh and Surendra had lathis in their hands. At the time of the incident, another brother of the deceased, namely, Kripal Singh had reached the spot. Apart from the brother, Dharmveer Singh son of Chiranjeet Chauhan and Bhagwana Singh son of Kathera Singh had also reached at the place of incident. The first information report states that not only there were three eye-witnesses present but many others of the area had also reached the spot. The first informant in the first information report had stated that the first information report was written on the dictation of the first informant by her daughter – Vimla. 2. After the lodging of the first information report, the Police got into action and various relevant materials found on the spot were recovered and kept in Police custody. The accused Chandra Prakash, it was alleged, had also made a confessional statement before the Police on 18.4.1981 itself and had also under Section 27 of the Evidence Act got recovered the sword as was used in the incident. The sword was recovered in the presence of two eye-witnesses, namely, Ram Singh and Ashok Kumar Tyagi. 3. Upon completion of the investigation, the Police submitted its charge sheet and the court of sessions, thereafter, on 3.8.1981 framed charges against the accused Shyam Singh, Chandra Prakash alias Pappu, Ved Prakash, Balveer Singh, Rajesh alias Raja and Surendra Singh. 4. The sword was recovered in the presence of two eye-witnesses, namely, Ram Singh and Ashok Kumar Tyagi. 3. Upon completion of the investigation, the Police submitted its charge sheet and the court of sessions, thereafter, on 3.8.1981 framed charges against the accused Shyam Singh, Chandra Prakash alias Pappu, Ved Prakash, Balveer Singh, Rajesh alias Raja and Surendra Singh. 4. When the trial commenced, from the side of the prosecution 7 prosecution witnesses were produced and examined. 5. Upon the conclusion of the Trial, the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Bijnor, convicted the accused, namely, Chandra Prakash alias Pappu, Ved Prakash and Rajesh alias Raju for the offences under Sections 302/34 IPC and they were thereafter sentenced for rigorous imprisonment for life. By the same order, Surendra Singh, Vijayvir Singh and Balveer Singh were acquitted. Thereafter, the instant Criminal Appeal was filed challenging the judgment and order dated 27.1.1982 passed by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Bijnor. 6. The P.W. -1 who was the doctor who had conducted the postmortem proved the port-mortem report and categorically mentioned as to how the injuries which had resulted in the death of the deceased had been inflicted on the body of the deceased. 7. The P.W. -2 is the wife of the deceased and she is an eye-witness of the incident and she gives the entire eye-witness account saying that the deceased – Shyam Singh and she herself were sleeping in the veranda of their house and a functional lantern was there in the veranda. She had also stated that in the eastern side of the veranda, her brother-in-law (dewar), namely, Kripal Singh was also sleeping. She has stated that Balveer Singh, the accused, was her brother-in-law (dewar) and Vijay, Ved Prakash, Chandra Prakash and Rajesh were his sons and Surendra was the brother-in-law (sala) of Balveer Singh. She recognized all the six accused who were present in the court. She thereafter, in her testimony, gives the reason for the murder of her husband. She had stated that because of the fact that her husband executed a Will in favour of her daughters, the accused could not tolerate the transfer of the property in the name of the daughters and, therefore, the murder had taken place. She thereafter, in her testimony, gives the reason for the murder of her husband. She had stated that because of the fact that her husband executed a Will in favour of her daughters, the accused could not tolerate the transfer of the property in the name of the daughters and, therefore, the murder had taken place. She states that when the six accused entered the place of incident and when upon hearing certain noises, she got up, she saw Balveer Singh standing along with Surendra and Vijai who were having lathis in their hands. Chandra Prakash alias Pappu had a sword in his hand. Ved Prakash and Raju had tabals (a kind of a sharp edged weapon). Chandra Prakash alias Pappu had attacked/assailed the husband of the first informant who was sleeping. She states that on the injury being inflicted, the husband of the first informant got up and stood on the cot himself. When this happened, the other accused started hitting the deceased (the husband of the first informant) by lathis and tabal. She had stated that when a lot of hue and cry was created by the first informant then the other witnesses, namely, Kripal (dewar), Dharmveer and Bhagwan came on the spot. She had stated in the statement in chief itself that Kripal had joined hands with the accused. She, thereafter, had stated that after injuries were inflicted and her husband was killed, the accused ran away from the southern side. She further states that Abdul Karim and Rajesh were her servants. A day before the incident, they had told her that Balveer and his four sons were saying that they would get rid of Shyam Singh. She had stated that the report was got lodged by her and it was scribed by her daughter on her dictation. She had stated that whatever she had dictated was scribed by her daughter. In the cross-examination which took place, the P.W. -2 stood firm with her averments in the chief. 8. Upon a specific question being put as to whether, she was accompanied by one Basant Singh when she went to lodge the first information report, she denied this fact but had stated that, in fact, she knew one Basanta Ahir. In the cross-examination, she had also stated that she woke out of her sleep when her husband was, in fact, giving calls for being saved. In the cross-examination, she had also stated that she woke out of her sleep when her husband was, in fact, giving calls for being saved. She denied the fact that she did not know the actual age of Rajesh alias Pappu. She denied the fact that he was 13-14 years of age. 9. The P.W. -3, Rajesh who the first informant stated had informed a day prior to the incident that the accused Balveer Singh was planning to do away with her husband was declared hostile by the prosecution. 10. The P.W. -4, Bhagwan, another eye-witness, who according to the first informant had come to the place of incident upon the hue and cry being made, had also stated that he saw the entire incident with his own eyes. He had very categorically stated that when he had reached the place of incident beside him, there were Dharmveer and Kripal also at the place of incident and no other person was there. He further added to the statements he had made that after half and an hour other persons started coming to the spot. 11. The P.W. - 5 Ram Singh happens to be a witness who had witnessed the recovery of the swords. 12. The P.W. -6, Ijhar Hussain, is the constable who had taken the dead-body for the port-mortem. 13. The P.W. -7, Dharmveer Singh, the Investigating Officer, had also proved the first information report and, thereafter, had stated that the entire investigation had been done under his supervision. The statement of the accused were thereafter recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In the statement they had denied having committed the crime and had also denied their presence at the place of occurrence. 14. Learned Amicus Curiae for the appellants Ms. Aarushi Khare made the following submissions:- I. The appellants – Ved Prakash and Chandra Prakash had died and, therefore, the Appeal had already abated against them. So far as Rajesh @ Raju is concerned, she states that at the time of the incident, he was a juvenile. In fact, she states that when the Appeal was filed, he had given out his age as 12 years. When the appeal was pending, an application was moved on 6.9.2023 for declaring the appellant-Rajesh @ Raju a juvenile. So far as Rajesh @ Raju is concerned, she states that at the time of the incident, he was a juvenile. In fact, she states that when the Appeal was filed, he had given out his age as 12 years. When the appeal was pending, an application was moved on 6.9.2023 for declaring the appellant-Rajesh @ Raju a juvenile. Thereafter, the Principal Magistrate of the Juvenile Justice Board informed this Court by a communication dated 10.11.2023 that on 6.11.2023 the appellant – Rajesh @ Raju had been declared juvenile and that at the time of incident his age was 12 years 1 month and 18 days. She, therefore, submits that the trial as was undergone was of a juvenile who was in conflict with law and therefore it was not a proper trial. She, however, submits relying upon a judgment of Supreme Court reported in 2020 (10) SCC 555 : Satya Deo alias Bhoorey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh that in the event a trial had taken place of a juvenile who was in conflict with law alongwith other adult persons and at the stage of Appeal it was discovered that the appellant – Rajesh @ Raju was a juvenile at the time of the incident then the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act of 2000”) were to apply. For that purpose, she relies upon the paragraph no. 16 of the judgment reported in 2020 (10) SCC 555 which is being reproduced here as under:- “16. Further, the provisions of the 2000 Act are to apply as if the juvenile had been ordered by the Board to be sent to the special home or institution and ordered to be kept under protective care under sub section (2) of Section 16 of the Act. The proviso states that the State Government or the Board, for any adequate and special reasons to be recorded in writing, review the case of the juvenile in conflict with law who is undergoing sentence of imprisonment and who had ceased to be a juvenile on or before the commencement of the 2000 Act and pass appropriate orders. The proviso states that the State Government or the Board, for any adequate and special reasons to be recorded in writing, review the case of the juvenile in conflict with law who is undergoing sentence of imprisonment and who had ceased to be a juvenile on or before the commencement of the 2000 Act and pass appropriate orders. However, it is the Explanation which is of extreme significance as it states that in all cases where a juvenile in conflict with law is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment on the date of commencement of the 2000 Act, the juvenile's case including the issue of juvenility, shall be deemed to be decided in terms of clause (1) of Section 2 and other provisions and Rules made under the 2000 Act irrespective of the fact that the juvenile had ceased to be a juvenile. Such juvenile shall be sent to a special home or fit institution for the remainder period of his sentence but such sentence shall not exceed the maximum period provided in Section 15 of the 2000 Act. The statute overrules and modifies the sentence awarded, even in decided cases.” and, therefore, she submits that even if the appellant is to be convicted, if the appeal is decided against him then he would be punished as per the Act of 2000. II. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that a perusal of the statement of P.W. -2 does not inspire confidence. She submits that in the first information report, the P.W. -2 had stated that she had come out of her sleep because of certain noises. Subsequently, in her statement before the Court, she says that when the husband of the deceased had raised a hue and cry, then she woke up. III. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the motive which the appellant had given, that the husband of the first informant had executed a Will in favour of his daughters and, therefore, the brother of the deceased had killed him does not have legs to stand. She states that when the brother was done away with, the Will would come into operation. This would in no manner help the accused persons. In fact, they stood to lose if the husband died. The motive as had been alleged was a weak motive. IV. She states that when the brother was done away with, the Will would come into operation. This would in no manner help the accused persons. In fact, they stood to lose if the husband died. The motive as had been alleged was a weak motive. IV. Learned counsel for the appellant states that Kripal, the brother of the deceased, who had witnessesed the incident did not appear in the witness box. Similarly, she states that the eye-witness – Dharamvir Singh also did not appear in the witness box. So far as the eye-witness account of Bhagwana Singh is concerned, she submits that it had various contradictions. She states that P.W. -2 had stated that in addition to Kripal, Dharmveer Singh and Bhagwana Singh, there were many other persons of the locality assembled but she states that at the time of incident only Kripal, Dharamveer Singh and Bhagwana Singh were there on the spot. V. Learned counsel further submits that the extra-judicial confession with regard to the servant is also not reliable as out of the two servants only one servant, namely, Rajesh appeared in the witness box and he also turned hostile. VI. Learned counsel for the appellant states that if the statement of Bhagwana Singh is looked into, it becomes clear that in two other cases, namely, in one case of State vs. Baljeet and in another case of State v. Battu, he was a police witness and, therefore, there was every possibility in this case also that he was appearing as a police witness. VII. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that as per Section 24 of the Children Act, 1960 and Section 18 of the Act of 2000 no joint trial of a juvenile and a person who was not a juvenile could have been undergone. VIII. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the appellant who was admittedly a juvenile at the time of incident could not have any mens rea and, therefore, could not be punished under Section 302 IPC. He was only acting on the directions of his father who had actual control and command over the will and thinking of the juvenile (minor). A father is a natural guardian and, therefore, it could not be said that the appellant was having the mens rea to commit the murder. She further submits that the father of the appellant had in fact been acquitted. A father is a natural guardian and, therefore, it could not be said that the appellant was having the mens rea to commit the murder. She further submits that the father of the appellant had in fact been acquitted. IX. Learned counsel for the appellant in the end submits that in the event the appeal is dismissed and the judgment of conviction is upheld then as per the judgment of (1981) 4 SCC 149 : Jayendra and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and (2000) 6 SCC 89 : Umesh Singh and another vs. State of Bihar, the sentence may be modified and the appellant may not be sentenced for life. She also states that as per Section 15 of the Act of 2000, there were 7 methods in which a juvenile could be dealt with and the appellant who was only about 12 years of age at the time of the incident could be given the minimum sentence possible. 15. Learned Additional Government Advocate Sri Amit Sinha in opposition has supported the judgment of the trial court and had submitted that the P.W. -2 was a reliable eye-witness and the account which she had given could not in any manner be rejected or doubted. 16. Learned AGA further submits that even a single eye-witness account which was reliable, could result in a conviction. 17. Learned AGA further submits that when the incident was admitted and when the eye-witness account which was a reliable one was there on record then definitely the conviction was the only conclusion to which the Court could come to. 18. Learned AGA further submits that the appellant be given maximum punishment as could be given after the Juvenile Justice Board had held that the appellant was a minor. 19. Learned AGA submits that the provisions of Section 24 of the 1960 Act and Section 18 of the Act of 2000 had no relevance in the instance case as the trial had taken place treating the appellant an adult. He, therefore, submits that those provisions could not be pressed at this point of time. 20. Having heard learned Amicus Curiae Ms. He, therefore, submits that those provisions could not be pressed at this point of time. 20. Having heard learned Amicus Curiae Ms. Aarushi Khare, this Court is of the view that the incident which had resulted in the criminal case being registered and which was tried by the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Bijnor was a case where there was a definite eye-witness account of P.W. -2 who was the wife of the deceased. No perusal of the record or the assessment of the evidence leads us to conclude that there was any error in the eye-witness account which had been rendered by the P.W. -2. It mattered little that P.W. -3 Rajesh who had claimed that the accused had made an extra-judicial confession had turned hostile or whether the brother of the deceased Kripal who was allegedly there on the spot has not appeared as a witness even though there were minor discrepancies in the statement of P.W. -2 who was an eye-witness would not make much difference. The fact of the matter remained with the incident was witness of P.W. - 2 and, there is no reason to disbelieve her. 21. Under such circumstances, the Appeal is dismissed vis-a-vis the appellant no. 2, Rajesh, so far as the conviction portion is concerned. However, so far as the sentence is concerned, we are of the view that when the appellant no. 2 Rajesh Kumar @ Raju was a juvenile at the time of incident, he would be governed by the provisions of Section 15 of the Act of 2000 as per the judgment of Supreme Court reported in 2020 (10) SCC 555 : Satya Deo @ Bhoorey vs. State of Uttar Pradesh. 22. Since the incident is of the year 1981, we are of the view that the appellant Rajesh @ Raju must be now a fairly elderly person. He was never a criminal before the incident had occurred and also at the time when he had committed the crime he was under the influence of his father and it could not be said that he was intentionally committing the crime. 23. We are also of the view that the appellant Rajesh was released on bail way back in the year 1982 and ever since then he has never misused the liberty of bail or has ever jumped the bail. 24. 23. We are also of the view that the appellant Rajesh was released on bail way back in the year 1982 and ever since then he has never misused the liberty of bail or has ever jumped the bail. 24. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that the minimum possible sentence be imposed upon him. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to fine him for Rs. 20,000/-which shall be equally distributed between the surviving heirs and legal representatives of Shyam Singh. 25. Since the appellants no. 1 and 3 had died during the pendency of the appeal vis-a-vis them stood abated. 26. For the hard work which has been put in by the learned Amicus Curiae Ms. Aarushi Khare, we quantify her fee as Rs. 30,000/- which shall be payable to her by the Legal Services Authority forthwith. The payment be got done under the supervision of the Registrar General of this court.