JUDGMENT : (Suman Shyam, J) Introduction :- This batch of writ petitions instituted by several Venture Educational Institutions, individual as well as groups of teaching and non-teaching staffs of Venture Educational Institutions from the State of Assam, lay challenge to several provisions of “The Assam Education (Provincialisation of Services of Teachers and Re-organisation of Educational Institutions) Act, 2017” (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2017”) as well as the provisions of “The Assam Education (Provincialisation of Services of Teachers and Re-organisation of Educational Institutions) (Amendment) Act, 2018” (here-in-after referred to as the Amendment Act of 2018). The writ petitioners are basically aggrieved due to failure on the part of the State Government of Assam to provincialise their services. Since the vires of the Act of 2017 as well as the Amendment Act of 2018 are under challenge in these writ petitions, hence, by the order dated 27/04/2023 passed in W.P.(c) 2729/2019 and the batch of connected writ petitions, all these 80 writ petitions were bunched together and posted for analogous hearing. During the course of hearing, for the sake of convenience, these writ petitions had been further sub-divided and classified into multiple groups numbered and referred to as Group 1 to 23, based on the different provisions of the Statute that are involved there-in. 2. Since, different provisions of the Act of 2017 and the Amendment Act of 2018 are under challenge in this batch of writ petitions, hence, at the outset the provisions of the Statute under challenge are reproduced herein below for ready reference :- “THE ASSAM EDUCATION (PROVINCIALISATION OF SERVICES OF TEACHERS AND RE-ORGANISATION OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS) ACT, 2017 2(h) “District Scrutiny Committee” means the District Scrutiny Committee constituted under Section 12 for each District to recommend names of Venture Educational Institutions along with the names of teachers and tutors whose services are considered eligible for provincialisation under this Act. 2 (i) “DISE Code” means District Information System for Education Code prepared by the Sarba Siksha Abhijan, Assam and as available in the records of the National University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi. 2 (j) “employee” means and includes all serving teachers and tutors as the case may be, of Venture Educational Institutions who have been appointed and joined in the concerned Venture Educational Institution before the 1st day of January, 2011 and whose services are being or would be provincialised under this Act. 2 (j) “employee” means and includes all serving teachers and tutors as the case may be, of Venture Educational Institutions who have been appointed and joined in the concerned Venture Educational Institution before the 1st day of January, 2011 and whose services are being or would be provincialised under this Act. 2 (t) “Teacher” means Teachers, Assistant Teachers, Classical Teachers and also includes Lectures, Assistant Professors, Associate Professors, Professors, Principal, Vice-Principal, Demonstrator, Headmaster, Assistant Headmaster, Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent and any person of the teaching faculty working in the Venture Educational Institution having required educational and professional qualification as per norms and standards fixed by the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (Central Act No. 35 of 2009), National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 (Central Act No. 73 of 1993), University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (Central Act No. 3 of 1956) and the relevant rules and regulations framed thereunder and any other Act as the case may be, as applicable on the day of provincialisation and whose services are provincialised under this Act in the post of teacher or in any other post in the teaching faculty but, not as tutor under this Act. 2 (u) "tutor" means and includes Teachers, Assistant Teachers, Classical Teachers and also includes Lecturers, Assistant Professors, Associate Professors, Professors, Principal, Vice Principal, Demonstrator, Headmaster, Assistant Headmaster, Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent in a provincialised educational institution under this Act who are not eligible for provincialisation of their services and whose services cannot be provincialised in the post of Teacher under this Act due to lack of his/her educational and professional qualifications required as per the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993, University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and the relevant rules and regulations framed thereunder and any other Act, as the case may be, as applicable on the date of provincialisation, however, his/her service is provincialised as tutor with separate terms and conditions of service, to be notified by the competent Administrative Department: Provided that a tutor shall not be eligible to hold the post of Professors, Principal, Vice-Principal, Headmaster, Assistant Headmaster, Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent, as the case may be, in an educational institution provincialised under this Act. 2 (x) "Venture High School" means High School imparting education up to class X and established by the people of the locality prior to 1.1.2006 which has received permission from the State Government and recognition from the Board of Secondary Education, Assam on or before 1.1.2006 and whereof the services of the teachers have not been provincialised under any Act enacted by the State legislature so far. 2 (za) "Venture ME School" including "Venture ME Madrassa " means an Upper- Primary School imparting education from class VI up to class VIII and established by the people of the locality prior to 1.1.2006 which has received recognition from the competent authority on or before 01.01.2006 and captured in the DISE Code up to 2009-10 and whereof the services of the teachers have not been provincialised under any Act enacted by the State legislature so far: Provided that the DISE Code shall have to be issued on or before 2009-10 and DISE Code issued there after shall not be considered for the purpose of provincialisation of services of any employee of the institution; 2 (zb) "Venture Lower Primary School" or "Venture LP School " means a School imparting education up to Class V and established by the people of the locality prior to 1.1.2006 whose name figure in the DISE Code up to 2009-10 and prior to that and whereof the services of the teachers have not been provincialised under any Act enacted by the State legislature so far: Provided that the DISE Code shall have to be issued on or before 2009-10 and DISE Code issued thereafter shall not be considered for the purpose of provincialisation of services of any employee of the institution; 3. Eligibility criteria for selection of educational institution for provincialisation of services of teachers/tutors:- (1) Subject to the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the following categories of Venture Educational Institutions shall be eligible for being considered for provincialisation of the services of their teachers and tutors:- (i) The Venture Educational Institutions which have been established and had obtained the required permission, recognition, affiliation, concurrence, as the case may be, up to the last and highest class required for the concerned institution from the respective competent Authority or Authorities on or before 1.1.2006: Provided that the order for such permission, recognition, affiliation, concurrence etc. shall have to be issued on or before 01.01.2006 and any order issued thereafter with any retrospective effect, shall not be considered for the purpose of provincialisation of services of any teacher and tutor, as the case may be, of the institution; (ii) The land, building and other infrastructure of such Venture Educational Institutions in case of Venture Primary and Upper Primary Schools shall be as far as practicable at par with the provisions under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and Rules framed there under; Venture Educational Institutions in the case of Venture Secondary and Higher Secondary Schools and Junior Colleges shall be as far as practicable at par with the provisions under Assam Non-Government Educational Institutions (Regulation and Management) Act., 2006 and Rules framed thereunder, and in case of Degree Colleges, same shall be as per norms set by University Grants Commission. (iii) The concerned Venture Educational Institution must have land in the name of the Institution with clear and exclusive title and possession over the land before 01.01.2006 and no lease or rent or donor agreement executed at any point of time, shall not be considered in any manner for this purpose: Provided that in case of institutions situated in Forest area, Forest Possession Certificate from the competent Forest Authority certifying that the institution has been in possession of Forest Land prior to 01.01.2006 and in case of institutions situated in Tea Gardens, certificate from Tea Garden Authority certifying that the institution has been in possession of Tea Garden Land prior to 01.01.2006, shall have to produced by the concerned educational institution before the District Scrutiny Committee constituted under section 13. (iv) Venture Educational Institutions has a minimum total enrolment of 30 students if it is a Venture Primary or Upper Primary School as on the date of coming into force of this Act; (v) The Venture Educational Institutions has a minimum total enrolment of 25 students in class-X, if it is a Venture High School; 25 students in Class-Xll if it is a Venture Higher Secondary School or a Venture Junior College; 30 students in the Final year of Three Year Degree Course. If it is a Venture Degree College, as on the date of coming into force of this Act; (vi) In case of a Venture High School or a Venture Higher Secondary School or a Venture Junior College or a Venture Degree College, the concerned Venture Educational Institution must have a consistent good academic performance which would mean that at least 30% of the candidates appearing for the final examination as a whole must have passed in the last three consecutive examinations held during previous three consecutive years prior to the date of coming into force of this Act. (vii) In addition to the provision under clause (v) above, at least 10 students must have appeared in the last final examination in any subject in case of Venture High School, Venture High Madrassa, or Venture Higher Secondary School or Venture Junior College. At least 15 students in any subject must have appeared in case of Venture Degree College in the last final examination. (viii) In case of Venture ME School, there must be one Science teacher or tutor to teach Science and Mathematics subject. In case of Venture High School, there must be one teacher or tutor to each core subject i.e. Mathematics, Science, English, MIL and Social Studies; (ix) For provincialisation of services of additional teacher or tutor, as the case may be, for a particular subject including the core subjects, in addition to the post mentioned in Section 3(1)(vii), in any Venture High School or Venture High Madrassa or Venture Higher Secondary School or Venture Senior Secondary School, the minimum students appearing in the last final examination of the highest class of the said school for that particular subject must exceed eighty for one additional post and one hundred fifty for the second additional post. Further, for provincialisation of services of additional teacher or tutor, as the case may be, for a particular subject, in addition to the posts mentioned in Section 3(1)(vii), in a Venture Degree College, the minimum students appearing in the last final examination of the highest class for that particular subject must be more than one hundred fifty for one additional post. (x) Two numbers of teachers and/or tutors of the Venture LP School shall be provincialised under this Act and their services shall be merged with the Base School identified in respect of the area wherein the said venture school was situated. (x) Two numbers of teachers and/or tutors of the Venture LP School shall be provincialised under this Act and their services shall be merged with the Base School identified in respect of the area wherein the said venture school was situated. After so merger in the Base School, the minimum number of teacher as specified in the schedule of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (Central Act No. 35 of 2009) shall be followed. The deficit in number of post of teacher in the Base School shall be filled up in accordance with the norms and standards of the said Act and following the provision of relevant Act and Rules in force for filling up of vacant post. (xi) In case of Venture Upper Primary School there shall be minimum three teachers or tutors at least one teacher each for (a) Science and Mathematics (b) Social Studies and (c) Languages: Provided that for additional posts it shall be considered in accordance with the norms and standard stipulated in the Schedule under sections 19 and 25 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (Central Act No. 35 of 2009). (xii) The enrolment shall be verified with the data as per DISE Code 2009-10 or before as available in the records of the National University of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi. There shall be physical verification of students and checking of records of attendance of students of last three years. (xiii) In case of mixed medium school for provincialisation of teacher and/or tutor each medium of instruction of such school shall be treated as a separate school except for the post of Head of the institution who shall be the Head of the Institution in respect of both the schools. (xiii) In case of mixed medium school for provincialisation of teacher and/or tutor each medium of instruction of such school shall be treated as a separate school except for the post of Head of the institution who shall be the Head of the Institution in respect of both the schools. (2) In case of a Venture Degree College and a Venture Higher Secondary School or a Venture Junior College the eligibility criteria specified in sub-section (1) above regarding date of recognition, affiliation or concurrence, minimum enrolment and performance would mean in respect of each of the subjects with or without 'Major' as the case may be, and the services of the teachers appointed or engaged in connection with such subject or subjects shall be considered for provincialisation under the provisions of this Act, only if the specified eligibility criteria as per University Grants Commission Act, 1956, National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 and relevant rules and regulations framed thereunder, as the case may be, as applicable on the date of provincialisation, are satisfied and having sufficient enrolment in the concerned School or Colleges including in the concerned subject. (3) The concerned Venture Educational Institution must have the required infrastructure as specified by the concerned University to which the College is affiliated in case of Venture Degree Colleges; and as specified in the Schedule of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 as far as practicable and having DISE Code for the year 2009-2010 or prior to that in case of Venture Primary or Upper Primary School and in case of all other Educational Institutions, the concerned institution must have the required infrastructure as specified in section 10 of the Assam Non-Government Educational Institutions (Regulation and Management) Act, 2006 as far as practicable. (4) Subject to the provisions of the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations made by the concerned affiliating University, in case of a Venture Degree College; subject to the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, in case of a Venture Primary or Venture Upper Primary School ; and, in case of all other institutions, subject to the provisions of the Assam Non-Government Educational Institutions (Regulation and Management) Act, 2006, if an educational institution which does not fulfill the eligibility criteria as stated hereinabove on the date of coming into force of this Act, such institution, shall not be eligible to be considered for provincialisation of the services of its teachers, but, may be allowed to run as a Private Institution or a Non-Government Educational Institution as before subject to fulfillment of other statutory norms in force. (5) If any Venture Educational Institution established and administered under Article 30 of the Constitution of India prefers to come under the ambit of this Act and if the services of teachers of such institutions are provincialised under this Act, such institutions shall not remain under the ambit of the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution of India with effect from the date of such provincialisation. (6) (a) The Government of Assam shall identify Base School for the purpose of provincialisation of services of teachers of the Venture Educational Institutions so as to fulfill the norms and standards required for providing educational institutions within a specified area as follows:- (i) at least one Lower Primary School within a radius of 1 Km; (ii) at least one Upper Primary School within a radius of 3 Kms; (iii) at least one High School or High Madrassa within a radius of 5 Kms; and (iv) at least one Higher Secondary School or Junior College within a radius of 7 Kms. (b) If any Provincialised School already exists within the aforesaid radius, the existing Provincialised School shall be identified as the Base School at the exclusion of a Venture Educational Institution within the said radius: Provided that in case of two or more existing provincialised Educational Institutions within the radius of the area as specified in clause (a), the District Scrutiny Committee shall identify only .one of such educational institutions as the Base School, considering the existing infrastructure and other amenities and facilities available in such educational institution. (7) All the Teachers including Tutors and the students of an Educational Institution provincialised under this Act shall be merged with the Base School, to fulfill and maintain norms and standard of Educational Institution including Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR) and all other Statutory requirements for the purpose to reorganize in education sector in all levels. The Base School can be an existing provincialised School or it may be a Venture Educational Institution eligible for provincialisation under this Act having adequate infrastructure: Provided that the existing provincialised School shall be preferred over a Venture Educational Institution for identification as a Base School. (8) Educational institution which are running professional courses and private institution run with the fees realised from the students shall not be considered for provincialisation of services of the teachers under this Act. (9) Save and except an institution covered under Article 30 of the Constitution of India which is already getting financial assistance or grants-in- aid from the Government, no other Private or Non-Government educational institution shall be entitled to get any aid or assistance from the State Government in any form with effect from the date of coming into force of this Act. (10) If any eligible Venture Educational Institution intends to remain outside the purview of provincialisation of services of their teachers and/or tutors under this Act, such institution shall give their option in writing expressing their intention to remain outside the purview of this Act, before the District Scrutiny Committee within one year from the date of coming in to force of this Act. 4. Teachers and/or tutors to be Government servants:- (1) Subject to fulfillment of all other provisions of this Act, the services of the teachers and/or tutors of all Venture Educational Institutions eligible under section 3 shall be deemed to have been provincialised on the date of publication of the provincialisation order by Notification in the Official Gazette and they shall become employees of the State Government with effect from such date. (2) The teachers and/or tutors to be provincialised under this Act,- (i) must have been working as a teacher in the concerned Venture Educational Institution that have been fully recognized up to the last and highest class required for such Institution by the competent authority on or before 01.01.2006; (ii) must have minimum educational and professional qualifications as laid down under different Acts, Rules and Regulations as mentioned under section 6 or any other relevant statutory provisions, as the case may be; (iii) must have rendered at least six years continuous service as on 1.1.2017 from the date of joining in the concerned Venture Educational Institution which must be on 31.12.2010 or prior to that date. (iv) in case of teachers and/or tutors of the Schools for special subject like Sanskrit, Arabic, Hindi, Craft Teacher, Music Teacher and other Classical Teachers, the number of students appeared in the concerned final examination like HSLC and HS (10 + 2) conducted by the SEBA or the ASHEC, as the case may be, shall not be less than 10 students in each class per year during last three years. 6. Educational and Professional qualification of teachers:- (1) The services of teachers in a Venture Educational Institution from the Primary level up to the Degree Level, shall be considered for provincialisation in the post of teachers or relevant teaching faculty in appropriate nomenclature, as the case may be, subject to fulfillment of the eligibility criteria relating to educational and professional qualifications as laid down under the following Acts, Rules and Regulations:- (a) The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and its Rules; (b) The National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 and its Regulations in force at the time of provincialisation of services. (c) The Assam Secondary Education (Provincialised) Service Rules, 2003, as amended in 2012; (d) The University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and University Grants Commission Regulations on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education, 2010, framed thereunder, as the case may be. (c) The Assam Secondary Education (Provincialised) Service Rules, 2003, as amended in 2012; (d) The University Grants Commission Act, 1956 and University Grants Commission Regulations on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education, 2010, framed thereunder, as the case may be. (2) The services of a teaching employee in a Venture Educational Institution shall be considered for provincialisation as teacher only if they have the requisite academic and professional qualifications prescribed under the relevant Acts, Rules or Regulations as mentioned in sub-section (1) of this section which are applicable for the time being in force, otherwise their services shall be provincialized as tutor. (3) In case of teachers for special subjects like Sanskrit, Arabic, Hindi, Craft Teacher, Music Teacher, and any other Classical Teachers, the qualification should be as per the qualification prescribed by the relevant statutory Rules of the State Government in force, 7. Educational and Professional qualification of tutor:- (1) The tutor must acquire the prescribed educational and professional qualifications within a period of five years from the date of publication of the order of provincialisation of services of the teachers and or tutors of the concerned Venture Educational Institutions in the Official Gazette and after acquirement of required qualification, they shall be upgraded to the post of teacher in appropriate cadre. (2) If such tutor fail to acquire such prescribed qualifications within a period of five years from the date of publication of the order of provincialisation in the Official Gazette, their cases shall not be considered for up-gradation to the post of teacher after the lapse of a period of five years from the date of publication of provincialisation order in the Official Gazette and they shall continue to function as tutor as per same terms and conditions which were applicable to them before provincialisation of the concerned Venture Educational Institution. 8. Terms and conditions of service:- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the Rules made hereunder all rules including service rules and rules of conduct and discipline which are applicable to State Government servant of corresponding ranks, shall be applicable to all teachers of educational institution whose services have been or to be provincialised under the provisions of this Act. (2) The teachers whose services have been provincialised under this Act shall get full scale of pay and such emoluments as salary and allowances as per norms of the State Government applicable to the employees of the corresponding rank with effect from the date of provincialisation of their services, as if they are fresh appointees and they cannot claim any benefit whatsoever in respect of past services rendered by them before provincialisation and in respect of pension, they shall be governed by the New Pension Scheme applicable to the State Government teachers of the corresponding rank. (3) For the tutors whose services are provincialised as tutors under this Act, their scope of work and other condition of service shall be notified by the concerned administrative department separately. The emoluments for tutor shall be paid at the rate as specified in the Schedule appended to this Act subject to the condition that the enhanced emoluments after 2(two) years as per schedule shall be admissible in respect of a tutor on submission of a satisfactory performance report by the head of the concerned educational institution to the Drawing and Disbursing Officer after completion of 2(two) years service from the date of provincialisation. In the event of subsequent acquirement of educational and professional qualification by such tutors within 5 years from the date of provincialisation of the services of teachers in the concerned Venture Educational Institution, they shall be eligible for upgrading their posts as teachers. In the event of failure in acquiring required qualification within five years from the date of provincialisation of the Venture Educational Institutions, he shall continue as a tutor only under the terms and conditions of service including their salary and allowances as may be notified by the Government under sub-section (4) of this section. (4) The scope of work and other terms and conditions of service of the tutors shall be notified by the respective administrative departments separately. (5) The teachers, who have completed sixty years of age as on the date of coming into force of this Act, shall be deemed to have retired with effect from that date and they shall have no claim whatsoever from the State Government as regards their pay allowances and retirement benefits for services already rendered by them in such educational institutions before the date of provincialisation. (6) The teachers and tutors provincialised under this Act shall hold personal posts to be created for provincialisation of their services. These posts shall be outside the cadre which shall stand abolished on cessation of services by the concerned teacher or tutor as the case may be, due to retirement, death, resignation or any other reason whatsoever. 24. Repeal and savings:- The Assam Venture Educational Institutions (Provincialisation of Services) Act, 2011 as amended vide the Assam Venture Educational Institutions (Provincialisation of Services) (Amendment) Act, 2012 and the Assam Venture Educational Institutions (Provincialisation of Services) (Amendment) Act, 2013, which have been struck down by the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court vide order dated 23.09.2016 in WP(C) No. 3190/2012, and all rules, orders, notifications issued thereunder, shall stand repealed, however, all the teachers whose services were provincialised prior to 23.9.2016, shall continue and their cases shall be reviewed as per the eligibility norms set forth for provincialisation under this Act. THE ASSAM EDUCATION (PROVINCIALISATION OF SERVICES OF TEACHERS AND RE-ORGANISATION OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS) (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2018 Amendment of Section 3. In the principal Act, in Section 3, in sub-section (1), for the existing clauses (i), (vii) and (ix), the following shall be substituted respectively, namely:- (i) The Venture Educational Institutions which have been established and had obtained the required permission, recognition, affiliation, concurrence, as the case may be, required for the concerned institution from the respective competent Authority or Authorities on or before 01-01-2006: Provided that the permission for 1st year HS classes in respect of Higher Secondary School (erstwhile Junior College), recognition from Board of Secondary Education, Assam for class-IX in respect of High School, concurrence for TDC Part-I in respect of Degree College received from the Government on or before 01-01-2006 shall be treated as the permission, concurrence or recognition as the case may be, for the purpose of provincialisation of services of teachers and/or tutors under this Act: Provided further that the order for such permission, recognition and concurrence shall have to be issued on or before 01-01-2006 and any order issued thereafter with any retrospective effect, shall not be considered for the purpose of provincialisation of services of any teacher and tutor, as the case may be, of the institution. (vii) For provincialisation of services of one teacher or tutor, as the case may be, in each subject including the core subjects, in case of Venture High School or Venture High Madrassa or Venture Higher Secondary School or Venture Senior Secondary School, at least 10 students must have appeared in the last final examination in that particular subject from that institution. Further, for provincialisation of services of maximum limit of three teachers or tutors in a particular subject, as the case may be, in case of a Venture Degree College, at least 15 students in that particular subject, must have appeared in the last final examination from that college.” 3. It is to be noted herein that the category of teachers/schools asserting their rights as well as the grounds of challenge in the different writ petitions differ from one another. Notwithstanding the same, the facts involved in the individual writ petitions are not of much significance as we do not intend to embark on a process of adjudication of the rights of the individual writ petitioners, asserted on the basis of the facts involved in the respective writ petitions. However, for a better understanding of the nature and characteristic of the controversy as well as the gamut of issues raised in the writ petitions, we deem it appropriate to briefly refer to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, based on the projections made in the various writ petitions, as hereunder :- Submissions :- GROUP – 1 [Challenge to Sec.2(u), 4(2)(iv), 6, 7 & 24 of the Act of 2017] 4. WP(C) No.2729/2019 [Mohor Ali Sheikh and others vs. State of Assam & others] has been instituted by a batch of “Craft Teachers” engaged in different Venture High Schools/High Madrassas in the State of Assam. According to the writ petitioners, they had been rendering services as Venture High School/High Madrassa teachers for the last 12 to 26 years. They are also holding Diploma from Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs). According to the writ petitioners, by virtue of rendering long years of service in the venture educational institutions they were eligible for provincialisation of their services under the Act of 2011 as they fulfilled the requirement of the law as prescribed under the Act of 2011. They are also holding Diploma from Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs). According to the writ petitioners, by virtue of rendering long years of service in the venture educational institutions they were eligible for provincialisation of their services under the Act of 2011 as they fulfilled the requirement of the law as prescribed under the Act of 2011. It is also their contention that the names of these writ petitioners were actually recommended for provincialisation by the competent authorities by following the prescription of the Act of 2011. According to these writ petitioners, by following the same procedure, services of approximately 42 thousand employees serving in the venture educational institutions had already been provincialised under the Act of 2011. However, while the proposal for provincialisation of their services were pending finalization before the concerned authorities, the Act of 2011 was struck down by this Court as unconstitutional. Subsequently, by enacting the Act of 2017, the ‘cut-off’ date of 01.01.2006 has been sought to be enforced with retrospective effect and with greater force. thus completely taking away the avenue for provincialisation of the services of the petitioners with retrospective effect. As such, the writ petitioners have assailed the Act of 2017, more particularly sections 2(u),4(2) (iv), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017 as unconstitutional being violative of their fundamental rights. 5. While addressing arguments on behalf of the writ petitioners in this group of writ petitions, Mr. K. N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel has contended that Section 4, read with Section 2(h) of the repealed Act (i.e. Act of 2011) had a deeming provision, by virtue of which, the services of the writ petitioners, who were otherwise eligible under the Act for being provincialised, ought to be deemed to have been provincialised by operation of law during the currency of the Act of 2011. According to Mr. K. N. Choudhury, an indefeasible right of the petitioners for being provincialised had vested upon them under the Act of 2011 based on the procedure initiated by the department for provincialisation of the services of his clients and therefore, by enacting the Act of 2017 the State cannot take away such vested rights of his clients. By referring to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. para 33, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111 Mr. By referring to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. para 33, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111 Mr. Choudhury has argued that when a statute creates a legal fiction, it would be the duty of the Court to give effect to such fiction. Since the Act of 2011 is not a validating legislation, hence, according to Mr. Choudhury, the provisions of the statute cannot apply retrospectively and to that effect, the vested right of the writ petitioners to be provincialised also cannot be taken away with retrospective effect by relying upon any of the provisions contained in the Act of 2017. Relying on another decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of P.D. Agarwal vs. The State of U. P. reported in (1987) 3 SCC 622 Mr. Choudhury has argued that any law which purports to take away the vested right of the citizens with retrospective effect would infringe upon the fundamental rights of the citizens guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and hence, would be unconstitutional. 6. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Union of India vs. Tushar Ranjan Mohanty reported in (1994) 5 SCC 450 Mr. Choudhury has further argued that the legislative power of the State cannot be used to justify arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional acts of the State. Mr. Choudhury has also relied upon and referred to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Railway Board vs. C. R. Rangadhamiah reported in (1997) 6 SCC 623 to contend that a rule which seeks to reverse from an anterior date, a benefit which had been granted or availed, can be assailed on the ground of the same being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, to the extent it operates retrospectively. According to Mr. Choudhury, in view of the provisions of Section 6(c) of the Assam General Clauses Act, 1915 read with Section 24 of the Act of 2017, the right of the petitioners to be considered for provincialisation of their services have been saved and such right cannot be abridged by enacting the subsequent legislation in the form of the Act of 2017. As a matter of fact, Mr. As a matter of fact, Mr. Choudhury, has submitted that in view of the steps taken by the departmental authorities for provincialisation of the services of the writ petitioners by following the prescription of the Act of 2011, it is a clear case of deemed provincialisation of the services of his clients and therefore, the respondents are duty bound to issue individual orders of provincialisation of services of the petitioners under the Act of 2011 itself by treating them at par with those 42,000 (approx) similarly situated teachers of venture institutions whose services were provincialised under the Act of 2011. In support of his above arguments Mr. Choudhury has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab vs. Mohar Singh Pratap Singh [ AIR 1955 SC 84 ] and Jindal Oil Mills vs. Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. [ AIR 1969 SC 1225 ]. 7. WP(C) 8148/2018 : The 52 writ petitioners in this writ petition were all engaged as “Music Teachers” in different venture educational institutions across the State of Assam. As per the projection made in the writ petition, the petitioners have been appointed/engaged as Music Teachers on various dates, during the period from 1994 till about 2005. Therefore, according to the petitioners, all of them were eligible and qualified for provincialisation of their services under the Act of 2011. It has been asserted that the writ petitioners are neither “dropped” nor “excess” teachers and as per the requirement of music teachers in every school under the Schedule of the Act of 2011, all of them were entitled to be considered for provincialisation of their services under the said Act. The petitioners have also claimed that the respective district scrutiny committees, constituted as per Section 10 of the Act of 2011, have not only verified the credentials of the petitioners but have also made recommendations in their favour paving the way for provincialisation of their services during the currency of the Act of 2011. Under such circumstances, the respondents cannot now deny the benefit of provincialisation of services of the writ petitioners by enacting the Act of 2017. Under such circumstances, the respondents cannot now deny the benefit of provincialisation of services of the writ petitioners by enacting the Act of 2017. What would, however, be significant to note herein is that in this writ petition no writ in the nature of mandamus has been prayed for by the petitioners for directing the authorities to issue order of appointment in their favour based on the report submitted by the District Scrutiny Committee dated 06.06.2016 recommending provincialisation of services of the 214 Music Teachers who were shown to be eligible for being provincialised under the Act of 2011. 8. By referring to the materials available on record Mr. Manish Goswami, learned counsel for the writ petitioners has argued that on 28.07.2014 a notification under Section 14 of the Act of 2011 was issued, laying down the qualification and eligibility criteria for provincialisation of services of music teachers. Thereafter, on 15.02.2016 a further notification was issued under section 14 of the Act, thus reiterating the earlier position. On 06.06.2016 the district scrutiny committee had submitted its report recommending the provincialisation of services of 214 music teachers who were found to be eligible for being provincialised under the Act of 2011 and the names of the writ petitioners find place in the aforesaid list. Mr. Goswami further submits that on 22.06.2016 and 24.08.2016 two letters were issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of Assam, Secondary Education Department, pertaining to the follow up action that had been undertaken by the State for provincialisation of services of those 214 music teachers in terms of the recommendations dated 06.06.2016. Notwithstanding the same, no order of provincialisation of services of these writ petitioners (Music Teachers) has been issued till date. Mr. Goswami, therefore, submits that taking advantage of the striking down of the Act of 2011 the State is now seeking to deny the benefit of provincialisation of services to the writ petitioners for no valid reason. According to Mr. Goswami, the services of his clients were provincialised under the Act of 2011 for all practical purposes and therefore, a vested right had accrued upon the petitioners which cannot be taken away retrospectively by enacting the Act of 2017 since the same would amount to violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In support of his above arguments, Mr. In support of his above arguments, Mr. Goswami has also relied upon and referred to the decisions in the case of P. D. Agarwal (supra) and Tushar Ranjan Mohanty (supra). The learned counsel for the writ petitioners has further argued that his clients stand on the same footing as the 42,000 (approx) employees whose services were provincialised under the Act of 2011 inasmuch as there is no rational basis for the State to differentiate between those teachers serving in the venture schools whose services were provincialised and his clients. Therefore, submits Mr. Goswami, refusal on the part of the State to provincialise the services of the writ petitioners, who have rendered long years of dedicated services as music teachers, would be highly unjust, unreasonable and unfair and hence, violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners by the Constitution of India. 9. In the context of his above arguments Mr. Goswami has also referred to Sections 4(2)(iv) and 6(3) of the Act of 2017 to contend that these provisions are both onerous and oppressive inasmuch as the writ petitioners cannot be reasonably expected to comply with the conditions laid down by the above provisions since it would not be within their domain and control to do so. The net result of enactment of Section 4(2)(iv) of the Act of 2017, according to Mr. Goswami, would be that even if the writ petitioners acquire the necessary eligibility criteria, the chances of provincialisation of their services would still be uncertain and contingent upon a particular school having at least 10 students in the previous three years in Classes-X to XII which is a completely unfair stipulation. According to Mr. Goswami, Section 6(3) is nothing but a provision to discriminate and exploit the skilled persons such as the writ petitioners available to the State. Since the expression “equivalent qualification” is not a defined expression under the Assam Secondary Education (Provincialised Schools) Service Rules, 2018, the same is working to the disadvantage of the writ petitioners leading to their discrimination. To conclude his arguments, Mr. Goswami has submitted that the rights of his clients to be provincialised had crystalised under the communication dated 06.06.2016 issued by the Scrutiny Committee during the currency of the Act of 2011 and therefore, a writ of mandamus be issued for implementation of the recommendations made in favour of the writ petitioners in the said communication. 10. Goswami has submitted that the rights of his clients to be provincialised had crystalised under the communication dated 06.06.2016 issued by the Scrutiny Committee during the currency of the Act of 2011 and therefore, a writ of mandamus be issued for implementation of the recommendations made in favour of the writ petitioners in the said communication. 10. WP(C) No.3110/2019, WP(C) No.9157/2019, WP(C) No.6945/2021, WP(C) No.6989/2021, W.P.(C) No 6409/2021, WP(C) No.2225/2022 and WP(C) No.6045/2022 :- The writ petitioners in all these writ petitions are also serving as music teachers and are amongst the 214 music teachers who were engaged in the venture schools in Assam, whose candidatures were recommended by the district scrutiny committee vide letter dated 06.06.2016, for provincialisation of their services. These writ petitioners, who are represented by Mr. A. R. Bhuyan, learned counsel, have adopted the arguments advanced by the petitioners’ counsel in WP(C) No.8148/2018. 11. WP(C) No.7955/2019 :- The petitioners in this writ petition were also engaged as music teachers in various venture schools. Save and except the writ petitioner Nos.12 and 13 the names of all the other petitioners find place in the list prepared and forwarded by the district scrutiny committee on 06.06.2016. Mr. G. Uddin, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the petitioner Nos.12 and 13 have subsequently submitted representation before the authorities to consider their case for provincialisation since they have rendered long years of service as music teachers. However, according to Mr. Uddin, his clients are not aware of the outcome of their representations. The learned counsel has adopted the submissions of the petitioners’ counsel in WP(C) No.8148/2018 in support of the other claims of the writ petitioners. 12. WP(C) No.6409/2021 :- The writ petitioners in this petition were also appointed as music teachers and their names also find place in the list of 214 music teachers issued on 06.06.2016. Mr. A. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the petitioners has adopted the arguments advanced by the petitioners’ counsel in WP(C) No.8148/2018. GROUP – 2 [Challenge to Sec 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018] 13. WP(C) No.7955/2017 :- This writ petition has been instituted by 43 Venture Schools assailing the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 which lays down that a Venture Institution which has not received the order of permission/recognition on or before 01.01.2006 would not be entitled for provincialisation of the services of their employees. WP(C) No.7955/2017 :- This writ petition has been instituted by 43 Venture Schools assailing the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 which lays down that a Venture Institution which has not received the order of permission/recognition on or before 01.01.2006 would not be entitled for provincialisation of the services of their employees. Mr. R. Islam, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners has argued that the process of regularization of the services of teachers in various other venture schools including the writ petitioners herein was initiated by the authorities prior to 01.01.2006. However, while the permission/recognition was communicated to a number of schools prior to 01.01.2006, in the case of the writ petitioners, the communication was received after 01.01.2006 although the venture schools were established during the years 1991, 1992 to 1999. Mr. Islam, therefore, submits that in view of the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 the petitioners would now be disentitled from the benefit of provincialisation under the Act of 2017 for no fault on their part. The learned counsel further submits that the impugned proviso seeks to take away the vested right of the petitioners with retrospective effect and therefore, the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 is liable to be struck down as unconstitutional. 14. WP(C) No.141/2018 :- As many as 19 M. E. Schools and M. E. Madrassas from the Karimganj District in the State of Assam have joined together to institute this writ petition. Mr. M. Khan, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners has submitted that his clients are also aggrieved by the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 as the same seeks to take away a right that had vested upon the petitioners, not only under the Act of 2011 but also under the Act of 2017, for provincialisation of their services. WP(C) No.673/2018 also raises similar grievance. 15. WP(C) No.3725/2018 and WP(C) No.163/2020 :- In these two writ petitions also the petitioners have assailed the constitutional validity of the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 on the ground that the said provision abridges the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners, both under the Act of 2011 as well as the Act of 2017. Mr. WP(C) No.3725/2018 and WP(C) No.163/2020 :- In these two writ petitions also the petitioners have assailed the constitutional validity of the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 on the ground that the said provision abridges the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners, both under the Act of 2011 as well as the Act of 2017. Mr. P. K. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that fixing 01.01.2006 as the cut off date is arbitrary and does not have any reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. 16. WP(C) No.6192/2018 :- 76 venture schools have approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition assailing the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 on identical grounds. In addition to the grounds urged on behalf of the petitioners in WP(C) No.7955/2017, Mr. Y.S. Mannan, learned counsel for the petitioners has further argued that recognition of venture L. P. Schools (high schools) ought to be treated from Class VIII and not Class IX as projected in the Amendment Act, which clearly curtails the rights of his clients. 17. WP(C) No.6210/2018 :- Mr. F. U. Barbhuiya, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the classification/distinction adopted by the State authorities for the purpose of provincialisation of services of the teachers of the venture schools by introducing the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 is discriminatory and hence, unconstitutional. By referring to the law laid down in the case of D. S. Nakara and others vs. Union of India reported in (1983) 1 SCC 305 and C. R. Rangadhamiah (supra) Mr. Barbhuiya has prayed for declaring the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 as constitutional. 18. WP(C) No.6595/2018 :- In this writ petition also the petitioners have challenged the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018. However, none has appeared to argue the matter at the time of hearing of this writ petition. 19. WP(C) No.1307/2020, WP(C) No.5504/2020 & WP(C) No.759/2021:- in these writ petitions also the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 is under challenge on similar grounds. The other writ petitions in this Group, projecting similar grievance, is WP(C) No.3725/2018. GROUP – 3 [Challenge to Sec. 3(xi), 8(3) of the Act of 2017] 20. 19. WP(C) No.1307/2020, WP(C) No.5504/2020 & WP(C) No.759/2021:- in these writ petitions also the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 is under challenge on similar grounds. The other writ petitions in this Group, projecting similar grievance, is WP(C) No.3725/2018. GROUP – 3 [Challenge to Sec. 3(xi), 8(3) of the Act of 2017] 20. WP(C) No.3481/2018 :- The 48 writ petitioners in this writ petition who have been rendering services as Assistant Teachers for more than 15/20 years have approached this Court by filing the present writ petition challenging Section 3(1)(xi) and Section 8(3) of the Act of 2017 on various grounds. The case of the writ petitioners, in a nutshell, is that although their appointments as provincialised teachers were provisionally approved by the authorities, yet, in view of sections 3(1)(xi) and 8(3) of the Act of 2017 their services have not been provincialised. Mr. K. R. Patgiri, learned counsel for the writ petitioners has argued that these two provisions of the Statute are unconstitutional as the same seek to discriminate one set of employees against the other for no valid reason. GROUP – 4 [Challenge to Sec. 2(j),2(x), 2(u), 3(1)(i), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017] 21. WP(C) No.5351/2018 :- 77 writ petitioners, who are the teachers and staff of the venture educational institutions, have approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition challenging Sections 2(j), 2(x), 2(u), 3(1)(i), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017. Mr. D. Das learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Anjan Kalita, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners has invited the attention of this Court to the object clauses of the Act of 2011 as well as the Act of 2017 to submit that the statutory provisions under challenge do not have any reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved under the new Act. According to the petitioners’ counsel, by introducing an arbitrary cutoff date of 01.01.2006 for obtaining permission/recognition, the State has made an attempt to create two different classes of venture school teachers thus, discriminating one against the other. Contending that financial constraint cannot be a ground for the State to discriminate one set of teachers against the others, Mr. According to the petitioners’ counsel, by introducing an arbitrary cutoff date of 01.01.2006 for obtaining permission/recognition, the State has made an attempt to create two different classes of venture school teachers thus, discriminating one against the other. Contending that financial constraint cannot be a ground for the State to discriminate one set of teachers against the others, Mr. Kalita has argued that the offending sections of the statute are liable to be struck down by this Court purely on the ground of the same being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 22. The case projected by the 16 writ petitioners in WP(C) No.6278/2021 is similar to that of the petitioners in WP(C) No.5351/2018 and therefore, Mr. J. Hatimuria, learned counsel for the petitioners has adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Anjan Kalita in support of the prayer made in the writ petition by his clients. GROUP – 5 [Challenge to Sec. 2(x) of the Act of 2017 and Sec. 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018] 23. WP(C) No.5732/2018 :- This writ petition has been instituted by two venture schools established in the years 1988 and 1995, assailing Section 2(x) of the Act of 2017 and the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018. However, during the pendency of this writ petition, it appears that the petitioner No.1 got relief under some other scheme and therefore, by filing I.A.(Civil) No.1271/2022 the petitioner No.1 had prayed for striking off its name from the array of petitioners, which prayer was allowed by the Court. The case of the petitioner No.2 is that it had got recognition from the competent authority by the letter dated 18.12.2006 with effect from 01.01.2006. However, due to the cutoff date envisaged by the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018, the petitioner No.2 school has been denied the benefit of provincialisation. 24. Mr. S. Borthakur, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has argued that proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 is unconstitutional inasmuch as the cutoff date has been introduced arbitrarily, thus creating an artificial distinction amongst two categories of schools which were standing on equal footing. Mr. 24. Mr. S. Borthakur, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has argued that proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 is unconstitutional inasmuch as the cutoff date has been introduced arbitrarily, thus creating an artificial distinction amongst two categories of schools which were standing on equal footing. Mr. Borthakur further submits that there is no rational basis for the provisions with the object of the Act viz., curtailment of mushrooming of venture schools as until the enactment of the Act of 2011 and the Act of 2017, all the Venture School Teachers and Staff were placed on equal footing and continued to work as private employees. It has also been submitted by Mr. Borthakur that the deficiencies in the original Act i.e. the Act of 2011, which were noticed by the Division Bench in the earlier judgment, have neither been rectified nor adequately addressed under the new Act (Act of 2017). To sum up his arguments, Mr. Borthakur has submitted that instead of facilitating provincialisation of similarly situated venture schools, the Act of 2017 has created four different group of schools, thus, discriminating one against the other. According to Mr. Borthakur, the four groups are (i) the Venture Schools/Educational Institutions established on or before 01.01.2006 and which had also got permission before 01.01.2006; (ii) those Venture Schools/Educational Institutions which were established prior to 01.01.2006 but received the permission after 01.01.2006; (iii) those Venture Schools/Educational Institutions which were established prior to 01.01.2006 which had received the approval but still the services of their employees were not provincialised; and (iv) complete exclusion of those Venture Schools/Educational Institutions which were established prior to 01.01.2006 but had applied for permission after 01.01.2006. According to Mr. Borthakur, there is no rational basis for creating such classification of the Venture Educational Institutions in the State. 25. By referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Navtej Singh Zohar vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law and others reported in (2018) 10 SCC 1 Mr. Borthakur has further argued that the very basis of the classification amongst the venture schools/educational institutions runs counter to the object of the Act and therefore, the impugned legislation is hit by the vice of arbitrariness. Borthakur has further argued that the very basis of the classification amongst the venture schools/educational institutions runs counter to the object of the Act and therefore, the impugned legislation is hit by the vice of arbitrariness. By referring to the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Shayara Bano vs. Union of India and others (triple talak case) reported in (2017) 9 SCC 1 Mr. Borthakur has further submitted that arbitrary legislations can be struck down by the Court on the ground of the same being arbitrary. According to Mr. Borthakur, the provisions of the Act of 2017 and the Amendment Act of 2018, which are under challenge in this batch of writ petitions, are wholly arbitrary in as much as they do not have any reasonable nexus with the purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation and also tend to violate the fundamental right of equality of the venture schools and teachers, guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the same deserve to be struck down by this Court as unconstitutional. GROUP – 6 [Challenge to Sec. 2(j), 2(u), 3(1)(i), 6 & 7 of the Act of 2017] 26. WP(C) No.6015/2018 & WP(C) No.5825/2023:- These writ petitions have been instituted by Venture High Schools through the Secretary-cum- Headmaster of the respective schools. In both these writ petitions Sections 2(j), 2(u), 6 and 7 of the Act of 2017 as well as the proviso to Section 3(1)(i), Sections 6 and 7 of the Amendment Act of 2018 have been put under challenge on more or less identical grounds i.e. on the ground of discrimination and arbitrariness. The primary contention of Mr. F. U. Barbhuiya and Mr. N. M. Das, learned counsel representing the petitioners in these writ petitions is that merely because there is some delay in communicating the order of recognition/approval of these venture schools by the competent authorities, the petitioners cannot be held responsible for the same since the delay was attributable to the authorities of the State and not the petitioners. GROUP – 7 [Challenge to Sec. 2(zb), 2(u), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017] 27. WP(C) No.6736/2018 :- The 130 writ petitioners in the present proceeding are teachers of Venture L. P. Schools. GROUP – 7 [Challenge to Sec. 2(zb), 2(u), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017] 27. WP(C) No.6736/2018 :- The 130 writ petitioners in the present proceeding are teachers of Venture L. P. Schools. They have assailed Sections 2(zb), 2(u), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017 primarily on the ground that those provisions are discriminatory and violative of the constitutional rights of the petitioners. GROUP – 8 [Challenge to Sec. 2(j), 2(za), 2(u), 3(1)(i), 6,7 and 24 of the Act of 2017 ] 28. WP(C) No.6756/2018 :- 181 writ petitioners in this writ petition are M. E. School teachers. They have approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition challenging the provisions of Sections 2(j), 2(za), 2(u), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017 as well as the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018. GROUP – 9 [ Challenge to Sec. 2(Zb) of the Act of 2017] 29. WP(C) No.3058/2019 & WP(C) No.5176/2020 :- Section 2 (zb) of the Act of 2017 is under challenge in these two writ petitions instituted by a number of Venture Lower Primary Schools. According to the writ petitioners, the requirement of obtaining of DISE data ought not to have been made compulsory for provincialisation of services of the venture school teachers. It is also their case that the cutoff date of 01.01.2006 is arbitrary and illegal. GROUP – 10 [Challenge to Sec. 2(j), 4(2) and 4(3) of the Act of 2017] 30. WP(C) No.3297/2019 :- The two writ petitioners, who are serving as Assamese and Hindi Subject Teachers in different M. E. Schools, have approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition assailing Sections 2(j), 4(2) and 4(3) of the Act of 2017 inter-alia contending that introduction of a cut-off date for provincialisation of services of venture school teachers is arbitrary and discriminatory. It is also the contention of the writ petitioners that there is apparent repugnancy between the Act of 2017 as well as the NCTA Regulations thus rendering the Act of 2017 as ultra vires the Constitution. Mr. It is also the contention of the writ petitioners that there is apparent repugnancy between the Act of 2017 as well as the NCTA Regulations thus rendering the Act of 2017 as ultra vires the Constitution. Mr. B. P. Borah, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners has referred to the provisions of RTE Rules of 2011 so as to highlight the apparent repugnancy between the provisions of the Rules as well as the Act of 2017 with regard to various practices and procedures laid down therein pertaining to the procedure to be followed for grant of recognition to the venture school. GROUP – 11 [Challenge to Sec 2j), 2(u), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017 ] 31. WP(C) No.8497/2019 :- In this writ petition the 33 petitioners are the teaching and non-teaching staff of Junior Colleges [ now known as Higher Secondary Schools]. They have challenged the validity of sections 2(j), 2(u), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017 primarily on the ground that the same are discriminatory and violative of the fundamental rights of the writ petitioners. GROUP – 12 [Challenge to Sec. 2(u), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act] 32. WP(C) No.175/2020 :- The sole petitioner in this case has challenged Sections 2(u), 6, 7 and 24 of the Act of 2017. The writ petitioner is serving as assistant teacher in a venture school, who was initially engaged in the year 1998. The venture school in which he is serving, had received recognition in the year 1994 but his service has not been provincialised as assistant teacher till date although the services of other similarly situated teachers have already been provincialised. Mr. N. H. Laskar, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that since the petitioner is H. S. passed candidate, in view of Section 2(u) of the Act of 2017, the respondents have refused to provincialise the services of the petitioner on a retrospective application of the Act of 2017 in a manner which is impermissible in the eyes of law. GROUP – 13 [Challenge to Sec. 3(1)(xi) of the Act] 33. GROUP – 13 [Challenge to Sec. 3(1)(xi) of the Act] 33. WP(C) No.5593/2021 has been instituted by a group of Hindi Teachers whereas, WP(C) No.5416/2021 has been filed by a group of Arabic Teachers of Upper Primary Schools inter-alia assailing the provision of Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act of 2017 to contend that by introducing the aforesaid provision the avenues for provincialisation of services of the Hindi Teachers and the Arabic Teachers have been completely obliterated. Mr. B. C. Das, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners has invited the attention of this Court to the definition of provincialisation under the old Act as well as the new Act to argue that if the provision under challenge in these writ petitions are struck down then the same would establish parity in respect of the Hindi Teachers and Arabic Teachers with similarly situated teachers of other discipline. 34. While addressing this Court on the brief history of growth of the institutional set up of elementary education in the State of Assam vis-à-vis the Middle English Madrassas, Mr. Das has argued that these Madrasas are in existence in the State since early part of 20th Century and were involved in imparting general education mainly with a religious fervor. While the education imparted by these Middle English Madrassas were only upto the level of Class-III, secondary education used to be imparted from the Classes-IV to X. At the secondary stage, there were Middle English Schools, Middle Vernacular Schools and Middle English Madrassas which, according to Mr. Das, had imparted education upto Class-VI i.e. the middle level of secondary education. Mr. Das has further argued that these Middle English Madrassas were actually Middle English Schools which used to impart education in Islamic subjects over and above other subjects. The said practice has continued and in the present day, in addition to the general subjects that are taught in the Middle English Schools, Arabic language is taught only in the Middle English Madrassas. Since the Arabic language is taught compulsorily in these Middle English Madrassas, the requirement of Arabic Teachers cannot be completely dispensed with by altogether excluding them from the purview of provincialisation under the Act of 2017. 35. Likewise, submits Mr. Das, Hindi is taught as 3rd language in these middle level schools. Since the Arabic language is taught compulsorily in these Middle English Madrassas, the requirement of Arabic Teachers cannot be completely dispensed with by altogether excluding them from the purview of provincialisation under the Act of 2017. 35. Likewise, submits Mr. Das, Hindi is taught as 3rd language in these middle level schools. As per the National Education Policy, 2020, the three language formula, namely, 1st language of mother tongue, 2nd language in English and the 3rd language in Hindi is required to be pursued with a view to promote multi-languism and national unity. According to Mr. Das, the three language formula is being implemented in various schools across the State of Assam wherein Hindi is taught as a compulsory subject in the Upper Primary schools. As such, the services of Hindi Teachers could not have been dispensed with in such a fashin in the Upper Primary Schools by enacting the Act of 2017. 36. The learned senior counsel has further argued that the venture educational institutions were set up on a need based criteria and these institutions had imparted education to the students situated in remote corners of the State. These Venture Educational Institutions were allowed to function by the State since sufficient Government Institutions were not available at the relevant point of time. Therefore, the move to now deny sufficient avenue for provincialisation of service of the Hindi Teachers as well as Arabic Teachers under the Act of 2017 is wholly arbitrary, unconstitutional and hence, liable to be declared so by this Court. 37. In support of his above arguments Mr. Das has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shayera Bano Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2017)9 SCC 1 , State of Bihar and others Vs. The Bihar Secondary Teachers Struggle Committee, Munger and others reported in (2019) 18 SCC 301 , Rajneesh Kumar Pandey and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2021) 17 SCC 1 , Arun Kumar and others Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2007) 1 SCC 732 and Calcutta Gujrati Education Society and another Vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and others reported in (2003)10 SCC 533 . 38. Appearing for the writ petitioners in WP(C) No.1085/2022, who are serving as Assistant Teachers in various schools whose appointments had been made by the Managing Committees of the respective schools prior to 01.01.2011, Mr. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and others reported in (2003)10 SCC 533 . 38. Appearing for the writ petitioners in WP(C) No.1085/2022, who are serving as Assistant Teachers in various schools whose appointments had been made by the Managing Committees of the respective schools prior to 01.01.2011, Mr. K.N.Choudhury, learned senior counsel has submitted that although his clients were entitled to provincialisation of their service, in view of the ceiling imposed under section 3(1)(xi) of the Act of 2017, their services have not been provincialised. The learned senior counsel has further argued that NCTE (Determination of Minimum Qualification for Recruitment of Teachers in Schools) Regulation 2001 prescribes the minimum qualification for appointment of Teachers in the Elementary Schools. Since his clients fulfilled the norms under the said notification, the State cannot deny appointment to them merely on the ground that under the Act of 2017 they were not qualified to be appointed as Teachers. Mr. Choudhury further submits that in the absence of Rules framed under the Act, section 3(1)(xi) has provided un bridled power to the State which power has been misused by the authorities in this case. The other writ petitions belonging to this Group, projecting similar nature of grievance, are WP(C) No.536/2021, WP(C) No.3162/2021, WP(C) No.3662/2021, WP(C) No.5416/2021, WP(C) No.5810/2021, WP(C) No.117/2022, WP(C) No.688/2022, WP(C) No.909/2022, WP(C) No.1396/2022, WP(C) No.1402/2022, WP(C) No.1406/2022, WP(C) No.3544/2022, WP(C) No.3774/2022, WP(C) No.6380/2022, WP(C) No.5912/2021, WP(C) No.5918/2021, WP(C) No.5952/2021 and WP(C) No.5955/2021. GROUP – 14 [Challenge to Sec. 3(1)(vii), 4(2)(iv) and 24 of the Act of 2017] 39. WP(C) No.5040/2021 :- The three writ petitioners in this writ petition, who are serving as Lecturers in the Venture Educational Institutions established on 13.08.1990, have approached this Court assailing Sections 3(1)(vii), 4(2)(iv) and 24 of the Act of 2017 by means of which, a separate class of teachers have been created. Mr. B. Chakraborty, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the only ground on which his clients were not appointed as Teachers is on account of the fact that the school does not have at least 10 enrolments in last three years. The learned counsel, however, submits that enrolment of students in a school is beyond the control of the teaching staff and therefore, the same ought not to have been taken as a criteria for provincialisation of services of the teachers. The learned counsel, however, submits that enrolment of students in a school is beyond the control of the teaching staff and therefore, the same ought not to have been taken as a criteria for provincialisation of services of the teachers. GROUP – 15 [Challenge to Sec. 2(u), 4(2)(iv) and 24 of the Act of 2017] 40. WP(C) No.6311/2021 and WP(C) No.1287/2020 :- In this group of writ petitions challenge has been made to Sections 2(u), 4(2)(iv) and 24 of the Act of 2017. The 26 writ petitioners in these two writ petitions are working as Craft Teachers in High Schools/High Madrassas. It is their pleaded stand that the impugned provisions of the Act of 2017 has taken away their right of provincialisation in service. However, the petitioners’ counsel has not appeared to argue these matters during the course of hearing of the writ petitions. GROUP – 16 [Challenge to Sec. 2(j), 2(u), 3(1)(i),7 & 24 of the Act] 41. WP(C) No.6616/2021 :- The writ petitioners numbering 12 in total are working as Tutors in 8 venture High Schools situated in the district of Karbi Anglong. These petitioners have also alleged that the impugned provisions of the Act 2017 are highly discriminatory in nature and therefore, those are liable to be struck down by this court. However, none has appeared for the petitioners to argue the case during the course of hearing. GROUP – 17 [Challenge to Sec. 3(2) of the Act of 2017] 42. In WP(C) No.3003/2023 the petitioners, who are serving as Tutors (PGT)/PGT in different Senior Secondary Schools have challenged Section 3(2) of the Act of 2017 on the ground that the said provision introduces unreasonable classification amongst the teachers in a manner which is violative of fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. It is the case of the writ petitioner that although the Venture Educational Institution where they are serving had got the recognition/concurrence prior to 01.01.2006, yet, the subject concurrence in respect of the subjects taught by them was received after 01.01.2006 although the process was initiated much earlier. On such ground their services had not been provincialised. In other words, the petitioners were left out from the zone of consideration for provincialisation of their services only due to late receipt of subject concurrence. The other two writ petitions in this group are WP(C) No.5594/2022 and WP(C) No.6973/2021. On such ground their services had not been provincialised. In other words, the petitioners were left out from the zone of consideration for provincialisation of their services only due to late receipt of subject concurrence. The other two writ petitions in this group are WP(C) No.5594/2022 and WP(C) No.6973/2021. Groups-18 [Challenge to Sec 2(j), 2(u), 4(2)(iii),6, 7 & 24 of the Act] 43. WP(C) No.79/2022 :- The 144 writ petitioners, who are serving as teaching staff in different Senior Secondary Schools for periods ranging between 29 to 20 years, have approached this Court by filing the present writ petition assailing the validity of Sections 2(j), 2(u), 4(2)(iii),6, 7 & 24 of the Act of 2017 by urging that the said statutory provisions are unconstitutional and hence, liable to be struck down by this Court. The writ petitioners have also prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay them full salary and other financial benefits including pensionary benefits that has been made available to other similarly situated persons. Groups-19- [Challenge to Sec 8(3) of the Act of 2017] 44. WP(C) No.1959/2022 :- The 29 writ petitioners, who are serving in various Senior Secondary Schools (formerly known as Junior College) have approached this Court challenging Section 8(3) of the Act of 2017 on the ground that the same is ultra vires the constitution. The writ petitioners have also prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to provincialise their services as “Principal” instead of “Principal (Tutor)” with all consequential benefits with effect from the date of provincialisation of their respective Colleges. Groups-20 [Challenge to Sec 8(3) of the Act of 2017] 45. WP(C) No.2447/2022, WP(C) No.2446/2022 and WP(C) No.2656/2024 :- The 192 writ petitioners in these three writ petitions are also serving as teachers under various Senior Secondary Schools (formerly known as Junior Colleges) and have approached this Court by filing the three writ petitions challenging the validity of Section 8(3) of the Act of 2017 by urging that the said provision is unconstitutional. The writ petitioners have also prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to provincialise their services as “PG Teachers” instead of “Tutor” with all consequential service benefits. GROUP – 21 [Challenge to Sec. 3(1)(vi), 4(2)(iv) of the Act of 2017] 46. The writ petitioners have also prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to provincialise their services as “PG Teachers” instead of “Tutor” with all consequential service benefits. GROUP – 21 [Challenge to Sec. 3(1)(vi), 4(2)(iv) of the Act of 2017] 46. WP(C) No.525/2023 :- The 7 writ petitioners in this writ petition are serving as teachers in the Shrimanta Shankardev High School, Bongaigaon. They have approached this Court by jointly filing this writ petition assailing the validity of the Act of 2017. Mr. M. Dutta, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that although the schools where the writ petitioners are serving did fulfill the eligibility requirement prescribed by the Act 2011, yet, their services were not provincialised during the currency of the Act, By enacting the new Act, completely new criteria has now been prescribed which cannot be fulfilled by the petitioners at this point of time. Mr. Dutta has further argued that the modified criteria introduced by the Act of 2017 is manifestly arbitrary and hence, deserves to be struck down by this court only on such ground. Referring to the deeming provision in Section 4(1)(ii)and (iii) of the Act of 2011 Mr. Dutta has argued that this is a clear case where the accrued rights of the petitioners has been taking away with retrospective effect by enacting the Act of 2017. In support of his above arguments, Mr. Dutta has relied upon Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH Vs Steel Authority of India reported in AIR 1999 SC 3923 and I.T. Commissioner Vs Shah Sadia & Sons reported in (1987) 3 SCC 516 . 47. WP(C) No.4213/2023, WP(C) No.3038/2023, WP(C) No.3039/2023, WP(C) No.3040/2023, WP(C) No.3045/2023, WP(C) No.3084/2023, WP(C) No.3100/2023, WP(C) No.3414/2023, WP(C) No.3467/2023, WP(C) No.3479/2023, WP(C) No.3686/2023, WP(C) No.4217/2023 :- These writ petitions have been instituted by serving teachers of various schools assailing the provisions of Section 6(1), 6(2) and 8(3)of the Act of 2017 on the grounds that those are wholly arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. The petitioners in this group of writ petitions have also prayed for a direction to be issued by this Court to the respondents to provincialise their services as “PG Teachers” instead of “Tutor”. GROUP – 23 [Challenge to Sec 2(j)(t)(u), 3(1)(i)(vii)(ix), 3(2), 4(2)(ii) and 8(6) of the Act of 2017] 48. The petitioners in this group of writ petitions have also prayed for a direction to be issued by this Court to the respondents to provincialise their services as “PG Teachers” instead of “Tutor”. GROUP – 23 [Challenge to Sec 2(j)(t)(u), 3(1)(i)(vii)(ix), 3(2), 4(2)(ii) and 8(6) of the Act of 2017] 48. WP(C) No.2444/2024 :- This writ petition has been instituted by 49 petitioners who are serving as Lecturers under the different Venture Colleges which have the recognition of the Dibrugarh University and the Gauhati University. Mr. A. C. Borbora, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners has argued that all the petitioners were appointed in these venture Colleges on different dates between 1999 and 2010. Notwithstanding the same, by introducing a criteria of atleast 150 students in each College for receiving the sanction of additional posts on the basis of Section 3(1)(ix) in the Act of 2017, the State is making an attempt to permanently take away the right of the petitioners for their services to be provincialised. Contending that each post in the Venture Colleges ought to be treated as equal, Mr. Borbora has argued that the offending provisions of the statute has introduced a completely unreasonable classification amongst the similarly situated Lecturers for no valid reason. According to Mr. Borbora, the introduction of the cutoff date of 01.01.2006 by the proviso to Section 3(1)(i) of the Act is wholly arbitrary and superficial, the same not having any rational basis or reasonable nexus with the object of the statute. Contending that all the petitioners did meet the requirement of the statute for provincialisation of their services as per the criteria prescribed by the recognizing Universities namely, the Dibrugarh University and the Gauhati University and they also fulfill the norms laid down under the Act of 2017 Mr. Borbora submits that by the impugned enactment, the State has extended a discriminatory treatment to his clients thus depriving them of the vested right of being provincialised. On such count the petitioners have approached this Court by assailing the Sections 2(j)(t)(u), 3(1)(i) (vii)(ix), 3(2), 4(2)(ii) and 8(6) of the Act of 2017. In support of his above arguments Mr. Borbora has placed heavy reliance in the case of D. S. Nakara and others (supra) and Deepak Sibal vs. Punjab University reported in (1989) 2 SCC 145 . 49. Assailing Section 8(6) of the Act, Mr. In support of his above arguments Mr. Borbora has placed heavy reliance in the case of D. S. Nakara and others (supra) and Deepak Sibal vs. Punjab University reported in (1989) 2 SCC 145 . 49. Assailing Section 8(6) of the Act, Mr. Borbora has further argued that “The Assam College Employees (Provincialisation) Act, 2005” is still in existence and therefore, the provisions of the Act cannot be either ignored or negated by the Act of 2017, as amended up to date. Contending that provincialisation under the Act of 2005 is in respect of a post and not any individual, Mr. Borbora has argued that the recourse sought to be adopted by the State by enacting the Act of 2017, thus extending the benefit of provincialisation to individual teachers, is wholly impermissible in the eyes of law. To drive home his argument Mr. Borbora has also referred to the doctrine of severability, as envisaged in the decision of the Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of R.L.D. Chamarbaughwalla and another Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1957 SC 628 . 50. On the point of repugnancy of the statute with the provisions of the NCTE Act of 1993, Mr. Borbora has referred to the minimum qualification prescribed under the UGC Regulation to contend that there was no justifiable ground for the State to impose the impugned criteria by enacting the statutory provisions under challenge. 51. To sum up his arguments Mr. Borbora has contended that the Act of 2017 cannot override the provisions of (1) the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, (2) the National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 and (3) the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 since all these statutes enacted by the Parliament operate in the field of education. The learned senior counsel further submits that if the provisions of the Act of 2017 contradicts any of the provisions of the law made by the Parliament, then in that event, in view of the edict of Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution of India, such provisions of the 2017 Act would be liable to be struck down on the ground of repugnancy. 52. On the question of validity of Section 8(6) of the Act of 2017, Mr. 52. On the question of validity of Section 8(6) of the Act of 2017, Mr. Borbora has argued that there is no authority of the State to create and allow any incumbent to hold a personal post for the purpose of provincialisation of service as such a scheme would run counter to the Central Acts occupying the field. Mr. Borbora has concluded his arguments by submitting that Government policy must be fair, rational and in public interest. But the policy sought to be implemented by the impugned enactment is highly discriminatory. Contending that by enacting the Amendment Act of 2018 the State has made an attempt to deprive the long serving teachers of the benefit of provincialisation for no valid reason, Mr. Borbora has therefore, prayed for striking down the impugned provisions of the Act as ultra-vires the Constitution. 53. Responding to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners in the batch of writ petitions, Mr. D. Saikia, learned Advocate General, Assam appearing for the respondents has argued that a cutoff date for granting permission to the venture schools was not introduced for the first time under the Act of 2017 but such a criteria was in existence even under the Act of 2011. Contending that the State, having due regards to its resources, is entitled to prescribe a cutoff date for extending benefit of a particular legislation, Mr. Saikia has argued that when it is a question of extending pecuniary benefit to a large number of persons, there is always a cutoff date in which event, everybody cannot be satisfied in such matters. Contending that retrospective permission/recognition processed after 01.01.2006 has also been backed by introducing the amended provision of section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 Mr. Saikia has argued that several instances of fraud and/or malpractices indulged in by a number of venture institutions, so as to overcome the hurdle of the cutoff date of 01.01.2006 by adopting dubious means, has come to light which had prompted the insertion of Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018. Contending that such a provision had to be introduced by keeping in mind the public interest at large and so as to prevent any fraudulent transaction Mr. Saikia has argued that the provision of Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 does not call for any interference. 54. Mr. Contending that such a provision had to be introduced by keeping in mind the public interest at large and so as to prevent any fraudulent transaction Mr. Saikia has argued that the provision of Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 does not call for any interference. 54. Mr. Saikia has further argued that the Act of 2017 does not suffer from any legislative incompetence nor can the same be termed as arbitrary. The basic object of the Act is to streamline the educational set up in the State. Therefore, merely because some of the provisions of the Statute have turned out to be inconvenient to some the Venture Educational Institutions and the employees serving there-in, the same cannot be a ground for the court to strike down the Statute. Contending that the Act of 2017 has extended benefit to several Venture Educational Institutions, which were otherwise not entitled to any benefit from the State, Mr. Saikia has argued that there is no good ground for this court to interfere in the matter. In support of his above arguments, Mr. Saikia has relied upon and referred to the following decisions :- (1) (2005) 9 SCC 779 [Dolly Chhanda Vs. Chairman, JEE & Ors.] (2) (2005) 6 SCC 754 [ State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Amar Nath Goyal & Ors.] (3) (2008) 14 SCC 702 [Govt. of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. N. Subbarayudu & Ors.] (4) (2020) 17 SCC 401 [Hirendra Kumar Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad] (5) (2020) 14 SCC 625 [All Manipur Pensioners Association by its Secretary Vs. State of Manipur and others] (6) 2022 SCC OnLine page 425 [Shikhar Vs. National Board of Examination] Brief Historical and Legislative Background of the Controversy :- 55. Having regard to the nature of controversy and the core issues involved in this batch of writ petitions, we deem it appropriate to begin with a brief survey of the history of development of the education system in the State of Assam. 56. From the materials placed on record, the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties as well as the literature available in public domain it appears that during the pre-British era, an indigenous system of imparting education through the “Pathshalas” (for the Hindus), “Tools” (for the Brahmins), “ Muktabs” (for the Muslims) and “Satras” (for the Vaishnavas) was prevalent in the State of Assam. After the signing of the “Treaty of Yandaboo” in the year 1826 and the advent of the British in India, significant steps were taken for development of the modern educational system in the State. Under the initiative of Sir David Scott, who was the first representative of the East India Company, several schools were opened in Assam for imparting modern education. In the year 1882, the Hunter Commission laid significant stress on the involvement of local bodies in expanding the primary education system. It was argued that phase that the first college for imparting higher education viz., the iconic Cotton College was established in Guwahati in the year 1901. This well known College was named after Sir Henry Cotton, its founder, and was subsequently upgraded to the status of an University. 57. The Assam Local Self Government Act, 1915 gave wide power to the local bodies to manage the affairs of primary and middle level educational institutions. The Assam Primary Education Act, 1926 was passed with a view to make primary education compulsory. After independence, the Assam government continued with this effort to further strengthen the basic education in Assam and accordingly, the Assam Basic Education Act, 1954 was passed. This Act inter-alia provided for setting up of a State level Board to advise the Government on matters relating to control and management of government schools at the basic, elementary and MV level. This Act had also provided for constitution of School Boards at regional level. These School Boards were body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and were also competent to hold or transfer movable and immovable properties for the purpose of carrying out the duties and functions entrusted under the Act. The Assam Elementary Education Act, 1962, which had repealed the Assam Basic Education Act, 1954, was enacted with the object of development, expansion, management and control of elementary education in Assam. This Act also contained a similar provision for constituting a State Board for management and control of the basic schools. 58. It further appears that notwithstanding the above mentioned steps taken by the Government, until the middle part of the 20th Century, the number of Government schools in the State imparting modern education in the subjects of humanities, science and language were very few and far in between. 58. It further appears that notwithstanding the above mentioned steps taken by the Government, until the middle part of the 20th Century, the number of Government schools in the State imparting modern education in the subjects of humanities, science and language were very few and far in between. Due to the geographical barrier and financial constraints, access to such schools were available to only a chosen few. During that period there was dearth of state run schools in Assam in the Lower Primary, Upper Primary and High School level as well as qualified teachers. With a view to address this issue, in the year 1957, the Government of Assam had introduced a system of maintenance grant which was commonly known as deficit grant. The primary objective of the scheme was to extend the benefit of Government approved pay scale to the teachers so as to attract quality teachers. In the process, the teachers in the deficit grant schools got the benefit of the pay scale which was applicable to the teachers serving in the government schools. A few schools, which were not covered under the deficit grant, however, received a lumpsum ad-hoc grant from the government. 59. The two categories of schools referred to above were not sufficient to meet the growing demand for educational institutions in the state, more particularly in the Elementary, Lower Primary and Middle School Levels. As such, the local communities came up with schools in different localities with their own resources which came to be known as “Venture Schools”. For imparting education with a religious fervour, “Venture Madrassas” which were also established through community effort. While a large number of these institutions were run and managed privately, some of these venture institutions were covered under a Government scheme named as “deficit financing” and started receiving financial assistance from the Government [see : Md. Imdad Uddin Barbhuiya Vs. The State of Assam, to be represented by the Principal Secretary to the Government of Assam, Education (Secondary) Department and others : 2022 0 Supreme(Gau) 24]. 60. With a view to regulate the service conditions of teachers already employed in the Govt. aided Middle English Schools and Middle English Madrassas “The Assam Aided Middle English School [and Middle English Madrassa] employees Rules, 1960” was framed, which inter-alia laid down the procedure for recruitment, academic and other qualifications of the teachers and certain conditions of their service. 60. With a view to regulate the service conditions of teachers already employed in the Govt. aided Middle English Schools and Middle English Madrassas “The Assam Aided Middle English School [and Middle English Madrassa] employees Rules, 1960” was framed, which inter-alia laid down the procedure for recruitment, academic and other qualifications of the teachers and certain conditions of their service. Likewise, “The Assam Aided High and Higher Secondary Schools and High Madrassa Employees Rules, 1960” was framed for the higher schools. 61. Thereafter, on 19th of August, 1976 “The Assam Aided Higher Secondary, High and Middle English School Management Rules, 1976” was framed which was to operate in supersession of the Rules framed earlier under Section 11 of Chapter III of Assam Education Department Rules and Orders as well as any subsequent order there-under issued by the Governor of Assam. Thus, the Rules of 1976 had put in place a consolidated set of Rules which were made applicable to Govt. aided Schools at all levels. 62. In the meantime, with a view to provide for the management and control of elementary education and for free and compulsory elementary education in Assam, “The Assam Elementary Education Act, 1968 (Assam Act XVII of 1969) was enacted which was published in the Assam Gazette on the 9th of August, 1969 (herein after referred to as the Act of 1968). The Act inter-alia provided for establishing a State Level Board for elementary education to be headed by the Minister of Education, for management, improvement and expansion of elementary education in the State and also to advise the Government on matters relating to elementary education. Amongst the powers and functions of the State Board was included the responsibility to lay down principles or norms for sanction of non-recurring grants to Elementary Schools for maintenance of school buildings; provision of furniture, educational aids, supervision of the activities of the Regional Boards, laying down procedure and conditions of granting financial assistance to the schools of pre-elementary stage and also in the matters of recognition, amalgamation, expansion, opening and closing of elementary schools and to make financial allotments to the Regional Boards for carrying out their functions under the Act. Chapter VI of the Act had provided for creation of Elementary Education Fund which was to be maintained by the State Board. 63. Chapter VI of the Act had provided for creation of Elementary Education Fund which was to be maintained by the State Board. 63. For managing those schools which were not maintained and managed by the “local authorities” such as Municipal Board, Town Committee, Anchalik Panchayat and Gaon Panchayat, provision was made under the Act of 1968 for establishing a Regional Board. The Regional Board was required to function as per the regulations framed by the State Board and carry out activities such as establishment and take- over of elementary schools subject to financial allotments made by the State Board; to expand, re-distribute and amalgamate existing elementary schools; to appoint, transfer, discharge, dismiss or punish teachers and grade-IV employees in accordance with the rules and procedure prepared by the State Board; to raise funds for the “Elementary Education Fund” through donation and subscription. From an examination of the scheme of the Act of 1968 it appears that although there was some effort on the part of the State Government of Assam to streamline the functioning of Elementary Educational institutions within the State, yet, the State Board and the Regional Board did not have complete control and ownership over such educational institutions. It would be relevant to mention here-in that the Assam Elementary Education Act, 1962 was repealed by the Act of 1968. 64. The Assam Elementary Education (Provincialisation) Act, 1974 (herein after referred to as the Act of 1974) was passed with the objective of provincialising the services of the employees of the different categories of the State Board and Regional Boards of Elementary Education constituted under the Act of 1968 so as to bring them under the direct management and control of the State Government. With the publication of the Act of 1974, all the assets and liabilities of the State Board and the Regional Boards had also vested on the Government of Assam. Thus, the Act of 1974, more particularly Section 14 thereof, had laid down a robust foundation for a compulsory elementary education system upto a certain age in the State of Assam by exercising direct Government control upon those elementary education institutions which were earlier run and managed by the Regional Boards. 65. Thus, the Act of 1974, more particularly Section 14 thereof, had laid down a robust foundation for a compulsory elementary education system upto a certain age in the State of Assam by exercising direct Government control upon those elementary education institutions which were earlier run and managed by the Regional Boards. 65. In exercise of powers conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India “The Elementary Education (Provincialisation) Rules, 1977” was framed by the Governor of Assam for implementing the provisions of the Act of 1974, inter alia laying down the age, qualification, method of recruitment in the Lower Primary Schools and Upper Primary Schools. As per Rule 3(iii) (as amended), the minimum qualification of a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in the elementary school shall be as per notification issued by the State Government from time to time in conformity with NCTE norms. It was further provided that these qualifications shall be applicable to all category of elementary schools. 66. The Assam Secondary Education (Provincialisation) Act, 1977 (Assam Act XIX of 1977) (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1977) was enacted with the object of provincialising the services of employees in the various secondary schools in Assam covered by the deficit scheme with a view to take over the control and management of all employees of all the secondary schools coming within the purview of the Act. Section 2(iii) defines “deficit school” so as to mean and include a school receiving grant from the State Government under the deficit scheme of grant in aid. As per Section 2(x) secondary education means education imparted upto Class-XII in different types of schools including Middle English Schools, Middle Madrassa, High Schools, High Madrassas and Higher Secondary Schools. Section 2(xi) defines “Secondary School” to mean and include a school where secondary education is imparted and is covered by deficit or ad hoc system of grants-in-aid. Section 3 provides that all employees of all secondary schools coming under the purview of the Act shall become employees of the State Government of Assam with effect from the date of appointment subject to the terms and conditions laid down by the Rule. 67. Section 3 provides that all employees of all secondary schools coming under the purview of the Act shall become employees of the State Government of Assam with effect from the date of appointment subject to the terms and conditions laid down by the Rule. 67. The Assam Secondary Education (Provincialisation) Rules of 2003, which had repealed the earlier Rules corresponding to these Rules, were framed under the Act of 1977, laying down the Class, Cadre, Method of recruitment of Principals/Teachers in the Higher Secondary and Multipurpose Schools including their academic qualifications etc. These Rules were subsequently repealed by the Assam Secondary Education (Provinsialised Schools) Service Rules, 2018. The Rules of 2018 were made applicable to the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Senior Secondary Schools, Higher Secondary Schools, Assam High Madrassas and High Schools which were provincialised under the Act of 1977, Assam Venture Educational Institutions (Provincialisation of Services) Act 2011, Assam Junior Colleges (Provincialisation) Act, 2012 and Assam Education (Provincialisation of Services of Teachers and Re- organisation of Educational Institutions) Act 2017. Rule 10 lays down the academic & professional qualification for direct recruitment. As per Rule 10(2) , in addition to the academic qualifications prescribed by the Rules, a candidate shall have to appear and pass the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) with minimum 60% marks. Rule 10 lays down the academic & professional qualification for direct recruitment. As per Rule 10(2) , in addition to the academic qualifications prescribed by the Rules, a candidate shall have to appear and pass the Teachers Eligibility Test (TET) with minimum 60% marks. Schedule -III of Rule 10 of the Rules of 2018 lays down as follows :- “Schedule – III [See Rules 10(1)(2)] Minimum educational and professional qualifications for direct recruitment in the post of : (i) Post Graduate Teacher :- Post Graduation with at least 50% marks (or its equivalent) from recognized University and Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) from National Council for Teacher Education recognized institution, but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; (ii) Graduate Teacher :- Graduate/Post Graduate from recognized University with at least 50% marks in either Graduation or Post Graduation (or its equivalent) Bachelor of Education (B.Ed.) from National Council for Teacher Education recognized institution, but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; (iii) Under Graduate Teacher :- As per academic and professional qualification prescribed by the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) for the post of Teachers in Lower Primary and Upper Primary School, but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; (iv) Hindi Teacher :- Pravin/Ratna in Hindi with 50% marks and degree qualification with 50% or Post Graduate degree in Arts with 50% marks from any recognized University, but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; Or B.A. with 50% marks and having Hindi as one of the subjects with 50% marks or Post Graduate degree in Arts with 50% marks provided that he has passed B.A. with one of the subjects as Hindi with 50% marks in Hindi; And (v) B.T./B.Ed degree from any recognized University [Parangat to be treated as B.Ed degree only for the purpose of Hindi teaching], but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; (i) Classical Teacher (Sanskrit, Arabic, Urdu, Persian etc.) :- MM with 50% marks and degree qualification with 50% marks in concerned subject or post Graduate degree in Arts with 50% marks in concerned subject from any recognized University, but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; Or B.A. with 50% marks and having Arabic as one of the subjects with 50% marks or Post Graduate degree in Arts with 50% marks provided that he has passed B.A. with one of the subjects as Arabic with 50% marks in Arabic; And B.T/B.Ed degree from any recognized University, but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; (vi) (vi) Classical Teacher (Assamese Language, Manipuri Language) :- B.A. with Hons/Major in the concerned subject with 50% marks and B.T/B.Ed degree from any recognized University, but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; (vii) Music Teacher :- B. Music or equivalent with 50% marks in degree qualification from any recognized University, but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; (ii) Craft Teacher :- Diploma/Certificate from ITI in appropriate Grade with minimum 60% marks; (viii) Junior Assistant :- Graduate from any recognized University with one year Degree/Diploma in Computer application from Government recognized Institution, but degree obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; (ix) Library Assistant :- Graduate from any recognized University with Diploma in Library Science, but degrees obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid; (x) Grade – IV :- HSLC passed or as per Circular/Guidelines issued by the Personnel Department, but degree obtained from off-campus and distance education institution shall not be considered as valid.” 68. In exercise of power conferred under Section 7 of the Act of 1977, “The Assam Secondary Education (Middle English Schools and High Schools) (Provincialisation) Rules, 1979” was framed for provincialisation of the services of the employees of the secondary schools. The minimum eligibility requirements for provincialisation of service of an employee serving in the High Schools and Middle English School has been laid down in Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of 1979 respectively, which are reproduced herein below for ready reference :- “3. Eligibility of High Schools for Provincialisation.- The minimum requirement as on the fixed date for a High School to have the service of its employees provincialised shall be as given below : (i) Minimum enrolment shall be 120 in case of 3 class High School and 240 in case of 6 class High School; provided that this minimum shall be 70 in case of Secondary Schools meant only for female students and 140 in case of any school in the areas administered under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India ; (ii) Every such school must have- (a) a trained Graduate Teacher with at least 5 years teaching experience as Headmaster; (b) where there are 6 classes, an Assistant Headmaster who is graduate with minimum 3 years teaching experience ; (c) graduate teachers, excluding the Headmaster and the Assistant Headmaster equal to the number of Sections in the upper three classes and at least one of them must be a graduate in Science. In case of a school where there is co-education, there should be at least one graduate lady teacher ; (d) one graduate with classical subject in his degree course or holder of matric title for every classical subject ; (e) one Hindi teacher having qualification in Hindi equivalent to Bachelor's degree; (f) one office Assistant: Provided that the Government may relax any of the minimum requirements in the public interests in the areas prescribed in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. 4. Eligibility of Middle English Schools for provincialisation. - The minimum requirement as on the fixed date of a Middle English School to have the services of its employees Provincialised shall be as given below: (i) one intermediate passed or Matric-normal or Normal passed teacher for every section of Classes V to VIII. 4. Eligibility of Middle English Schools for provincialisation. - The minimum requirement as on the fixed date of a Middle English School to have the services of its employees Provincialised shall be as given below: (i) one intermediate passed or Matric-normal or Normal passed teacher for every section of Classes V to VIII. There should be at least 3 intermediate passed teachers amongst them ; (ii) the minimum total enrolment 70 relaxable up to 50 at the discretion of the Director of Public Instruction or the Director of Elementary Education as the case may be, in areas administered under Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India and other more backward areas as defined by the Government from time to time; (iii) Every such school must have- (a) a Headmaster who is a Graduate relaxable up to Intermediate, P.U. (two years) by the Government in exceptional cases ; (b) Assistant teachers who are either Normal Matric or Intermediate passed ; (c) minimum one teacher (including Headmaster) for each section ; (d) one Hindi teacher having qualification in Hindi equivalent to Intermediate Examination : Provided that the Government may relax any of the minimum requirements in the public interest in the areas prescribed in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.” 69. Rule 5 of the Rules of 1979 provides that upon publication of the notification of provincialisation of service of any employee in the High School or Middle English School, all the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder shall apply to them. 70. While the aforementioned Acts and Rules were framed for provincialisation of the services of employees in the M.E. Schools and High Schools, there was a similar move on the part of the Government to provincialise the services of the employees serving under the Venture Madrassas which were covered by the deficit finance scheme. Accordingly, “The Assam Madrassa Education (Provincialisation) Act, 1995 (herein after referred to as the Act of 1995) was enacted by the State Legislature providing for the same. Consequently, a number of Venture Madrassas covered by the deficit scheme, were provincialised under the Act of 1995. It appears that as many as 74 Madrassa were originally provincialised under the Act of 1995. Consequently, a number of Venture Madrassas covered by the deficit scheme, were provincialised under the Act of 1995. It appears that as many as 74 Madrassa were originally provincialised under the Act of 1995. Thereafter, the State had come up with “The Assam Venture Madrassa Educational Institutions (Provincialisation of Services) Act, 2011 (herein after referred to as the Act of 2011 (as amended in the years 2013-14). Under the aforesaid Act, some more Venture Madrassas were provincialised. The Act of 2011 was, however, repealed by the Assam Madrassa Education (Provincialisation of Services of Employees and Reorganisation of Madrassa Educational Institutions) Act, 2018. However, it appears that even after the repeal of the Act of 2011, these Madrassas continued to impart religious educational instructions despite being wholly maintained out of the State funds. 71. In the above context it would be pertinent to mention herein that by framing the “Assam Venture Sanskrit and Pali Educational Institutions (Provincialisation of Services) Act, 2012”, provisions were made for provincialisation of the services of the employees of the Venture Sanskrit and Pali Educational Institutions. The preamble of the Act mentions that the object of the Act was to restrict further establishment of such educational institutions in the State. 72. Pursuant to a decision of the Council of Ministers in its meeting held on 13.11.2020, a move was initiated by the Government of Assam to convert all the provincialised Madrassas into regular High Schools by withdrawing the teachings in the theological subjects imparted in these Madrassas. A decision to similar effect was also taken in respect of those Sanskrit Tools which were earlier provincialised under “The Assam Venture Sanskrit and Pali Educational Institutions (Provincialisation of Services) Act, 2012”. Consequently, the Assam Repealing Act of 2020 was passed by the State Legislature repealing the Assam Madrassa Education (Provincialisation) Act, 1995 as well as the Assam Madrassa Education (Provincialisation of Services of Teachers and Reorganisation of Educational Institutions) Act, 2018. In the result, the Madrassas were turned into High Schools functioning under the State Education Board with their religious teachings and instructions being withdrawn. The State Madrassa Education Board was also dissolved and all records, Bank accounts of the Board stood transferred to the Board of Secondary Education, Assam. In the result, the Madrassas were turned into High Schools functioning under the State Education Board with their religious teachings and instructions being withdrawn. The State Madrassa Education Board was also dissolved and all records, Bank accounts of the Board stood transferred to the Board of Secondary Education, Assam. Notwithstanding the Repealing Act of 2020, the functioning of the “Community Madrassa” or the “Qawmi Madrassas” and “Maktabs” continued as institutions coming under the purview of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. 73. The Assam Repealing Act of 2020 was put under challenge before this Court by filing WP(C) No.3038/2021. However, by the judgment and order dated 04.02.2022 the Division Bench of this Court had upheld the validity of the Assam Repealing Act of 2020 as well as the executive orders passed thereunder, in a decision rendered in the case of Md. Imdad Uddin Barbhuiya & others (supra). 74. For provincialisation of services of the employees of the non-Government Colleges which were in receipt of deficit grants-in-aid from the State, “The Assam College Employees (Provincialisation) Act, 2005 was enacted laying down the modalities of provincialisation of service of the employees of these Colleges belonging to both teaching and non-teaching category. As per Section 4 of the Act of 2005 these provincialised Colleges would be distinct from the Government Colleges in Assam but the condition of service of these provincialised employees shall be treated at par with the Government employees on and from the date on which the Colleges had been brought under the deficit system of grants-in-aid by following the criteria laid down in the Act. It would be pertinent to mention herein that as per Section 5 of the Act, the services of those employees who do not exercise the option provided under Section 3(d) to continue in the service of the existing institutions within the period of three months from the date of coming into effect of the Act, shall vest with the Government with effect from the date of provincialisation of the Colleges. 75. The “Assam Junior Colleges (Provincialisation) Act, 2012” contains similar provisions for provincialisation of services of the employees of Junior Colleges in Assam which were brought under the deficit system of grant-in-aid. 75. The “Assam Junior Colleges (Provincialisation) Act, 2012” contains similar provisions for provincialisation of services of the employees of Junior Colleges in Assam which were brought under the deficit system of grant-in-aid. As per Section 3 of this Act, subject to the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, all existing employees, both teaching and non-teaching of the Junior Colleges, as specified in the Schedule of the Act, shall become employees of the State Government upon provincialisation of the institutions, with effect from the date from which those institutions have been brought under the deficit system of grants-in-aid. Section 4 of the Act of 2012 laid down that the land, building and other properties owned or held by the Junior Colleges coming within the purview of the Act and whose employees were provincialised, shall vest in the State Government. 76. During the period from 1960 till 2011, various other Acts and Rules regulating the affairs of the various institutions in the field of education in Assam, had been notified. However, since those Acts and Rules would not have any direct bearing in these proceeding, hence, we do not deem it necessary to burden this judgment by referring to those Statues and Rules. However, from a careful analysis of the various statutes, rules and regulations as discussed above, it is apparent that since the year 1960 the Government of Assam had expanded its reach and control in the field of education, right from the primary level to the degree level, not only by regulating the affairs of the educational institutions brought under the system of deficit grants-in-aid from time to time but also by gradually taking over the control and management of these institutions by provincialising the services of the teaching and non-teaching staff of these educational institutions, thus converting them into full time Government employees. What would, however, be significant to note herein is that all these statutes, rules and regulations for provincialisation of the educational institutions and their employees were applied prospectively. 77. It further appears that prior to the year 2006, there was no regulatory frame work for controlling the growth and management of Non-Governmental Educational Institutions in the State. What would, however, be significant to note herein is that all these statutes, rules and regulations for provincialisation of the educational institutions and their employees were applied prospectively. 77. It further appears that prior to the year 2006, there was no regulatory frame work for controlling the growth and management of Non-Governmental Educational Institutions in the State. The Assam Non-Government Educational Institutions (Regulation and Management) Act, 2006 (herein after referred to as the Act of 2006) was enacted by the Assam Legislative Assembly with the object of regulating the establishment and management of Non-Government Educational Institutions in Assam. This Act had received the assent of the Governor of Assam on 12th January, 2007. From the statement of object and reasons of the Act, it appears that the primary objective of the Act was to curb the unplanned and mushrooming growth of Non-Governmental Educational Institutions at Primary, Secondary and Higher Secondary level in the urban and semi-urban areas of the State and also to regulate the establishment and management of all such Non-Governmental Educational Institutions i.e. Educational Institutions established and run by individuals, Association of Individual Society or Trusts, at Primary, Secondary and Higher Secondary level which were not receiving any grant-in-aid or financial assistance from the Government. These educational institutions are the Venture Educational Institutions established by the communities. 78. Section 4 of the Act of 2006 lays down that prior permission and registration would be necessary for establishing and running a Non-Governmental Educational Institutions. As per section 4(2), the Director of Secondary Education, Assam, would be the appropriate authority either to grant or refuse permission to the applicant for opening a Non-Governmental Educational Institution. Section 6 of the Act of 2006 lays down that the existing Non-Governmental Educational Institutions would be required to submit application for their registration before the concerned Director by furnishing full particulars and information and on payment of such fee, as may be prescribed, relating to the Institution sought to be registered within the stipulated period. Section 6 of the Act of 2006 lays down that the existing Non-Governmental Educational Institutions would be required to submit application for their registration before the concerned Director by furnishing full particulars and information and on payment of such fee, as may be prescribed, relating to the Institution sought to be registered within the stipulated period. Proviso to section 6 lays down that in the event of failure on the part of any existing Institution to register within one year from the date of coming into force of the Act, the Director shall issue notice to close down the Institution in a phased manner and there shall not be any admission in the lowest class of the School from the next academic year and such Institution shall be completely closed down after passing out of the students in the highest class of the Institution. 79. By the Constitutional 86th Amendment, Article 21-A was inserted in the Constitution making Right to Education of Children of the Age of 6 to 14 years by providing free and compulsory education, as a fundamental right . In order to give effect to Article 21-A of the Constitution of India, “The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009” (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2009) was enacted. The Act of 2009, more particularly Section 6, had cast a duty upon the appropriate Government and the local authority to establish schools within such area or limits of neighbourhood as may be prescribed within a period of three years from the commencement of the Act. The Act of 2009 recognizes the right of every child of the age of 6 to 14 years to free and compulsory education in a neighbourhood school till the completion of his/her elementary education. Section 38 of the Act of 2009 confers power upon the appropriate Government to make Rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act. 80. Section 18 of the Act of 2009 provides that no school to be established without obtaining certificate of recognition. Section 19 of the Act of 2009 lays down the norms and standards of schools to be set up in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 19(1) lays down that no school shall be established or recognised under Section 18, unless it fulfils the norms and standards specified in the Schedule. Section 19 of the Act of 2009 lays down the norms and standards of schools to be set up in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 19(1) lays down that no school shall be established or recognised under Section 18, unless it fulfils the norms and standards specified in the Schedule. Section 25 of the Act of 2009 lays down that within 03 years from the date of commencement of the Act, the appropriate Government and the local authority shall ensure that the Pupil-Teacher Ratio, as specified in the Schedule, is maintained in each school. The schedule to the Act lays down the norms and standards for a school as prescribed by Section 19 and 25 of the Act, which is reproduced here-in-below for ready reference: 81. In exercise of power conferred under Section 38 of the Act of 2009, “The Assam Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 (herein after referred to as the Rules of 2011) were framed, laying down the contours, inter-alia for recognition of schools for the purpose of Section 18 of the Act of 2009, which provides that no school shall be established without obtaining certificate of recognition. The Rules of 2011 were followed by framing of “Assam Venture Educational Institutions (Provincialisation of Services) Act, 2011, which Act was declared to be unconstitutional by a Division Bench of this Court by the judgment and order dated 23.09.2016 passed in WP(C) No.3190/2012 as mentioned herein above. Pursuant to the aforesaid judgment, the Act of 2011 was repealed by the State Legislature whereafter, the Assam Education (Provincialisation of Services of Teachers and Reorganisation of Educational Institutions) Act, 2017, as amended by the Amendment Act of 2018, has been enacted by the Assam State Legislature. The Act of 2017 and the Amendment Act of 2018 are under challenge in these proceedings. 82. The Act of 2011 contained certain specific provisions permitting provincialisation of the services of the employees of the venture educational institutions. However, a large number of employees of such venture educational institutions were aggrieved by Sections 4(2) and 10(4) as well as the schedule appended to the Act of 2011 whereby, the State had fixed the cap of maximum number of employees whose services could be provincialised in the relevant category in the existing venture institutions. However, a large number of employees of such venture educational institutions were aggrieved by Sections 4(2) and 10(4) as well as the schedule appended to the Act of 2011 whereby, the State had fixed the cap of maximum number of employees whose services could be provincialised in the relevant category in the existing venture institutions. Accordingly, as noted here-in-above, Sections 4(2) and 10(4) of the Act of 2011 were put under challenge by the aggrieved teachers in WP(C) No.3190/2012 [Sri Chandan Kumar Neog and 376 others vs. State of Assam and others, 2016 (5) GLT 296] and the batch of connected writ petitions. 83. It would be pertinent to mention herein that Section 4(2) of the Act of 2011 laid down that the services of all the teaching and non-teaching employees, who had completed 10 years of continuous service without a break in that venture educational institution, shall be provincialised with effect from the date on which they complete the required 10 years of service as stipulated under sub-section (1) provided that the number of employees in both teaching and non-teaching cadre in each of the institution, whose services are provincialised or is to be provincialised under the Act, shall not exceed the number as specified in the schedule appended to the Act, provided further that where the number of such employees serving in such venture educational institutions exceed the number as specified in the schedule, the provincialisation of the services of the employees shall be on the basis of seniority in the respective category in the concerned educational institution. The State Government shall have no liability whatsoever in respect of the excess employees. 84. Section 10(1) of the Act of 2011 envisaged constitution of a District Screening Committee in each district separately for elementary, secondary and for higher education so as to scrutinize the service records and other related issues of the serving teachers and staff of Venture Educational Institutions pertaining to provincialisation of their services. 84. Section 10(1) of the Act of 2011 envisaged constitution of a District Screening Committee in each district separately for elementary, secondary and for higher education so as to scrutinize the service records and other related issues of the serving teachers and staff of Venture Educational Institutions pertaining to provincialisation of their services. As per Section 10(4), the District Screening Committee was required to forward the verified list of eligible teachers, school-wise, in accordance with the number of posts specified in the schedule appended to the Act, to the concerned Director who, after making such further scrutiny, as may be required, was required to forward the same to the concerned department of the State Government for consideration and for issuing notification in respect of those institutions and employees, eligible for getting their services provincialised. 85. Section 4(2) of the Act of 2011 was primarily assailed on the ground that although sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act did not impose any ceiling in respect of the number of employees whose services could be provincialised, sub-section (2) of Section 4 had curtailed the scope of Section 4(1) by inserting the schedule to the Act and therefore, according to these writ petitioners, the statutory provision suffered from the vice of irrationality inasmuch as, it did not have any reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by enacting the provincialisation Act. By referring to Section 2(o), (p), (q), (r) and (s) which laid down a cutoff date of “01.01.2006” for receiving affiliation/permission/recognition from the competent authority in respect of “venture degree colleges”, “venture high schools”, “venture M. E. school” and “venture primary schools” it was argued that prescribing limitations/cutoff dates, thus imposing a cap on further establishment of venture educational schools in the given circumstances, would undermine the obligation of the State under Article 21-A of the Constitution of India. 86. In so far as the challenge to Section 10(4) of the Act of 2011 is concerned, the said statutory provision also assailed primarily on the ground that Section 10(4) did not have any reasonable nexus with the object of the Act sought to be achieved thereunder. This provision of the statute was challenged on the additional ground that the same was enacted in violation of the reservation laws relating to SC/ST category as well as women and candidates belonging to disabled groups. 87. This provision of the statute was challenged on the additional ground that the same was enacted in violation of the reservation laws relating to SC/ST category as well as women and candidates belonging to disabled groups. 87. It appears from the materials available on record that during the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, the learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Assam had made a submission before the Court, admitting that there were several shortcomings in the Act of 20211 as a result of which, the matter was being reviewed by the Government at the appropriate level. Thereafter, the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Secondary Education Department had filed an additional affidavit dated 22.09.2016 virtually admitting that there were some glaring irregularities in the Act of 2011. Based on such affidavit, the learned Additional Advocate General, Assam had also made a further submission before the Court that the Government of Assam has taken a decision to revisit the provincialisation Act, 2011 with a view to either repeal the law or to make comprehensive amendments to the Act so as to ensure that provisions of the Act conforms to the Constitutional requirements. 88. While it is not clear to us from the materials on record as to on what basis the departmental Secretary had filed an affidavit taking a stand that a plenary statute enacted by the State Legislature was defective, inviting the Court to declare the statute as unconstitutional, yet, it appears that such a stand was in fact taken by the State respondents before the Court. Taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the stand of the Government, as noted above, by the judgment and order dated 23.09.2016 passed in WP(C) No.3190/2012 and the batch of connected writ petitions, the Division Bench of this Court had declared the Act of 2011 as constitutionally invalid. The observations made in paragraphs 35 to 40 in the judgment dated 23.09.2016 are relevant for the purpose of this case and therefore, are being reproduced herein below for ready reference :- “35. The venture schools which were set up bonafide on need basis, in our perception, do serve the students in remote places and it may not be wrong to say that due to the inability of the State to discharge its constitutional obligations, the venture educational institutions were allowed to function. The venture schools which were set up bonafide on need basis, in our perception, do serve the students in remote places and it may not be wrong to say that due to the inability of the State to discharge its constitutional obligations, the venture educational institutions were allowed to function. We may also say that the State has been discharging its constitutional obligation through these venture educational institutions. In this backdrop, when the venture schools are taken over, the government in a sense is taking steps towards discharging is constitutional obligations. However the action of the State in taking over such schools with only a given number of teachers, when the number is not commensurate with the prescribed requirements of the RTE Act (the law framed for implementation of Article 21A), the relevant prescription is absolutely arbitrary. The spirit of Article 21A stands defeated in our perception if the mechanism prescribed under the RTE Act is not conformed to encourage those bonafide elements who have aided the State in discharging its constitutional obligation. 36. It is also questionable whether the mode of entry into government service facilitated by the Provincialisation Act can ignore the applicable reservation laws relating to SC/ST category, women and disabled groups. The role of the authorities in the field of education in the Sixth Schedule areas of Assam is also undermined by the 2011 Act. 37. The appointment of teachers in the venture institutions is not competition based and is opaque and therefore quality of education is bound to suffer if this is allowed to continue. This naturally will negatively impact the next generation of our State. Moreover, the norms and qualification prescribed by the competent authorities like the UGC, NCTE, SEBA, etc. is the major casualty in application of the Provincialisation Act. 38. When such substantial defects are perceived, in a given context, the court can strike down only the offending provisions. However when unconstitutionality is noticed in the major provisions starting from the Preamble to the Schedule of the Provincialisation Act, striking down the offending portion will practically de-capacitate the 2011 Act. In other words, the statute itself will become inoperable although the ultra vires declaration is limited to some segments of the Act. 39. Therefore, we feel that a piecemeal exercise will not serve the purpose. In other words, the statute itself will become inoperable although the ultra vires declaration is limited to some segments of the Act. 39. Therefore, we feel that a piecemeal exercise will not serve the purpose. But at the same time, to suggest how the Provincialisation Act should be re- shaped would be intruding into the domain of the legislature. Moreover amendment exercise might have to be preceded by a consultative process with all the stakeholders and this is surely the responsibility of the State. That apart it is certainly difficult to separate the bad from the good portion of the Provincialisation Act. Under these compulsions, being convinced with the arguments of the petitioners, we declare that the Assam Venture Educational Institutions (Provincialization of Services) Act, 2011 is constitutionally invalid. As the State has decided to bring in a fresh legislation, considering the likely time needed for the process, we direct the State to do their exercise as committed in the additional affidavit, expeditiously and preferably in the next 6(six) months. It is ordered accordingly. 40. With the above order, the cases stand allowed without any order on cost in the manner indicated.” 89. The State Government of Assam, through the Secretary, Education (Secondary) Department had thereafter, preferred a Review Petition numbered and registered as Review Petition No.167/2016 arising out of WP(C) No.5825/2012 seeking clarification as to whether, the verdict of the court rendered on 23.09.2016 would have prospective effect without any implication for the already provincialised schools/posts or, on account of declaration that the Act of 2011 was unconstitutional and void, all actions taken under the struck down legislation, since inception, would be set at naught. Review Petition No.167/2016 was disposed of by the Division Bench by the judgment and order dated 02.01.2017 with the following observations and directions :- “17. In the backdrop of the above discussion, let us now examine whether equitable consideration should be applied in the present context. Because of the legal deficiencies in the Provincialization Act 2011 the legislation was declared as constitutionally invalid. The State conceded to the legal defects and has decided to bring a fresh Act to deal with the teachers and staff of the venture educational institutions of Assam. Therefore, provincialisation of more persons under the proposed legislation, is expected in due course. Because of the legal deficiencies in the Provincialization Act 2011 the legislation was declared as constitutionally invalid. The State conceded to the legal defects and has decided to bring a fresh Act to deal with the teachers and staff of the venture educational institutions of Assam. Therefore, provincialisation of more persons under the proposed legislation, is expected in due course. If that be the future scenario, those whose services were regularized through due process under the recently repealed legislation, deserve to be protected in the interregnum (since the new Act can legitimately address this contingency) as the litigants who challenged the vires of the Provincialisation Act, never desired disruption of the concluded rights of those, who benefited under the repealed Act. 18. The State in their application have stated that the group they are concerned with are those who have retired and are drawing pension, another category who are now Govt. employees and are receiving regular scale of pay and people of same class, who have moved on in their careers and in life. There are around 41,634 employees for whom vested rights are already created under the 2011 enactment but through retrospective application of our 23rd September, 2016 judgment, they may not only lose their govt. jobs but will also be disentitled to pension and salary. Moreover, the question of recovery of the already disbursed salary and pension may emerge. The harsh impact of the retrospective application will be crippling for the already provincialised ground and their livelihood and in turn life itself, will be adversely impacted. All such debilitating consequences will occur without any opportunity or hearing to this category. Many families, dependent on the earnings of the provincialised staff are enjoying a measure of social and economic security, and they all will be thrown to the streets, without any fault on their part. 19. In the above circumstances, we are of the considered view that the rights of the employees who have been benefited under the struck down statute can be taken care of by giving retrospective effect to the proposed legislation, if the legislature so desires. Till then it is ordered that the services of the provincialised category and their status as govt. employees shall not be disturbed and they will continue to receive all the benefits which they are getting under the Provincialisation Act, 2011, since struck down by the judgment under review. Till then it is ordered that the services of the provincialised category and their status as govt. employees shall not be disturbed and they will continue to receive all the benefits which they are getting under the Provincialisation Act, 2011, since struck down by the judgment under review. With this observation and direction, the matter stands disposed of.” 90. Pursuant to the judgement and order dated 23.09.2016 passed by the Division Bench of this Court, the Act of 2017 was enacted by the Assam State Legislative Assembly by repealing the Act of 2011. The Act of 2017 had received the assent of the Governor of Assam on the 6th of April, 2017 whereafter, it was published in the official Gazette on 11.04.2017. 91. The Act of 2017 was thereafter amended by the Amendment Act of 2018 which had received the assent of the Governor of Assam on 9th May, 2018 and was published in the Assam Extraordinary Gazette on 16.05.2018. By the Amendment Act of 2018. 92. The Act of 2017 had introduced, for the first time, the concept of “tutor” as provincialised teachers with a fixed pay. However, the Act of 2017 lays down certain other conditions for provincialisation of the employees of the Venture Institutions which, according to the writ petitioners, are nothing but re-introduction of similar unconstitutional provisions in the statute as were present in the Act of 2011. Situated thus, several provisions of the Act of 2017 including Section 3 of the Amendment Act of 2018, have been put under challenge in this batch of writ petitions. 93. It would be pertinent to mention herein that the National Council for Teachers Education (NCTE) Act, 1993 was enacted by the Parliament. The Act was notified in the Official Gazette on 29th of December, 1993. Section 12A of the Act confers power upon the Council to determine minimum standards of education of school teachers for the purpose of maintaining standard of education in the schools. In exercise of powers conferred under Section 32(2) read with section 12A of the Act of 1993 the National Council for Teachers Education (Determination of Minimum Qualifications for Persons to be Recruited as Education Teachers and Physical Education Teachers in Pre-Primary, Primary, Upper Primary, Secondary, Senior Secondary or Intermediate Schools or Colleges) Regulations, 2014 has been framed which was notified on 12th of November, 2014. The Schedule to the said notification lays down the educational qualification norms that would be applicable to the teachers of the aforesaid categories. 94. Likewise, the UGC Regulation on minimum qualification framed in exercise of power conferred under Clause (e) and (g) of sub-Section (1) of Section 26 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, which was published in the official gazette on 30th of June, 2010 prescribes the minimum qualification for appointment of teachers and other academic staff in Universities and Colleges. The eligibility criteria for provincialisation of services of teachers in schools and Colleges in Assam under the provision of Section 6(1) of the Act of 2017 apparently adheres to the qualification norms laid down in the aforesaid Regulations. Notwithstanding the same, the relevant provisions of the Act of 2017 have been put under challenge by taking the plea of repugnancy of the provisions of the Act with the Rules framed in exercise of powers conferred under the Central Act on the grounds stated herein-above. Relevant Principles of Statutory Interpretation :- 95. At the very outset, it must be noted herein that the Act of 2017, as amended up-to-date, is a plenary legislation enacted by the Assam State Legislative Assembly. The grounds on which a plenary legislation can be struck down by the Court is well settled in view of the number of judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India whereby, it has been categorically laid down that a statute can be struck down by the Court only on the twin grounds of (i) lack of legislative competence and (ii) the same being violative of the rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India. In addition to the above, it has also been held by the Supreme Court that a plenary legislation, if found to be manifestly arbitrary, would also become vulnerable. [See : (1) Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. (2018) 10 SCC 1 ; (2) Joseph Shine vs. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 ; (3) Justice K. S. Puttuswamy and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors (2017)10 SCC 1 ] 96. While summing up the law applicable in this domain, a three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made the following observations in the case of Manish Kumar Vs. Vs. Union of India and Ors (2017)10 SCC 1 ] 96. While summing up the law applicable in this domain, a three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made the following observations in the case of Manish Kumar Vs. Union of India and others reported in MANU/SC/0029/2021 : (2021) 5 SCC 1 :- “CHALLENGE TO PLENARY LEGISLATION; GROUNDS 47. The grounds on which plenary law can be challenged are well established. In the first two decades decisions of this Court unerringly point to three grounds which render legislation vulnerable. A law can be successfully challenged if contrary to the division of powers, either the Parliament or the State Legislature usurps power that does not fall within its domain thus, rendering it incompetent to make such law. Secondly, a law made contravening Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India would be visited with unconstitutionality and declared void to the extent of its contravention. Needless to say, a law within the meaning of Article 19 of the Constitution would remain valid qua a non-citizen (see in this regard The State of Gujarat and others v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad and Others. MANU/SC/0092/1974 : (1974) 4 SCC 656 ).. Thirdly, apart from Fundamental Rights, the supremacy of the Constitution vis-a-vis the ordinary legislation, even when the law is plenary legislation, is preserved with a view that legislation must be in conformity with the other provisions of the Constitution. 48. While on breaches of the Fundamental Right, furnishing a plank of attack against plenary law, it is necessary to notice a challenge to law under Article 14, was essentially confined to the law, being class legislation. In other words, a law, if it manifested reasonable classification for treating different persons or things differently, the law would pass muster. Interestingly, even while the theory of reasonable classification had come to be proclaimed in the first year of the Republic, and what is more followed in State of West-Bengal v. Anwar Ali MANU/SC/0033/1952 : AIR 1952 SC 75 , the following doubts were expressed by Justice Vivian Bose: “82. I can conceive of cases where there is the utmost good faith and where the classification is scientific and rational and yet which would offend this law. I can conceive of cases where there is the utmost good faith and where the classification is scientific and rational and yet which would offend this law. Let us take an imaginary cases in which a State legislature considers that all accused persons whose skull measurements are below a certain standard, or who cannot pass a given series of intelligence tests, shall be tried summarily whatever the offence on the ground that the less complicated the trial the fairer it is to their sub- standard of intelligence. Here is classification. It is scientific and systematic. The intention and motive are good. There is no question of favouritism, and yet I can hardly believe that such a law would be allowed to stand. But what would be the true basis of the decision? Surely simply this that the judges would not consider that fair and proper. However much the real ground of decision may be hidden behind a screen of words like 'reasonable', 'substantial', 'rational' and 'arbitrary' the fact would remain that judges are substituting their own judgment of what is right and proper and reasonable and just for that of the legislature; and up to a point that, I think, is inevitable when a judge is called upon to crystallise a vague generality like Article 14 into a concrete concept. Even in England, where Parliament is supreme, that is inevitable, for, as Dicey tells us in his Law of the Constitution: "Parliament is the supreme legislator, but from, the moment Parliament has uttered its will as law-giver, that will becomes subject to the interpretation put upon it by the judges of the land, and the judges, who are influenced by the feelings of magistrates no less than by the general spirit of the common law, are disposed to construe statutory exceptions to common law principles in a mode which would not commend itself either to a body of officials, or the Houses of Parliament, if the Houses were called upon to interpret their own enactments.” But the following caveat by the learned Judge is worth noticing: “83. This, however, does not mean that judges are to determine what is for the good of the people and substitute their individual and personal opinions for that of the government of the day, or that they may usurp the functions of the legislature. This, however, does not mean that judges are to determine what is for the good of the people and substitute their individual and personal opinions for that of the government of the day, or that they may usurp the functions of the legislature. That is not their province and though there must always be a narrow margin within which judges, who are human, will always be influenced by subjective factors, their training and their tradition makes the main body of their decisions speak with the same voice and reach impersonal results whatever their personal predilections or their individual backgrounds. It is the function of the legislature alone, headed by the government of the day, to determine what is, and what is not, good and proper for the people of the land and they must be given the widest latitude to exercise their functions within the ambit of their powers, else all progress us barred. But, because of the Constitution, there are limits beyond which they cannot go and even though it falls to the lot of judges to determine where those limits, lie, the basis of their decision cannot be whether the Court thinks the law is for the benefit of the people of not. Cases of this type must be decided solely on the basis whether the Constitution forbids it.” (Emphasis supplied) 49. The seed of this idea had a muted growth. It was in the decision of this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, MANU/SC/0380/1973 : (1974) 4 SCC 3 that this Court laid bare a new dimension in the majestic provisions of Article 14. This Court took the view that arbitrariness and fairness are sworn enemies. The guarantee of Article 14 is not confined in other words to it being a prohibition against equals being discriminated against or unequals being treated alike. State action must be fair and not arbitrary if it is to be pass muster in a court of law. It is essentially following the dicta laid down as aforesaid that this Court in the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India, MANU/SC/1031/2017 : (2017) 9 SCC 1 , wherein one of us (Justice Rohinton F. Nariman), speaking for the majority, held as follows: “101. It is essentially following the dicta laid down as aforesaid that this Court in the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India, MANU/SC/1031/2017 : (2017) 9 SCC 1 , wherein one of us (Justice Rohinton F. Nariman), speaking for the majority, held as follows: “101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0406/1984 : (1985)1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (TAX) 121] stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” (Emphasis supplied)” 97. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation of statute that a statute must be read as a whole and in its context so as to gather the true intent of the Legislature. In Justice G. P. Singh’s “Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edition” it has been stated in page 3 on the subject of “Intention of the Legislature”:- “A statute is an edict of the Legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the ‘intention’ of its maker. A statute is to be construed according ‘to the intent of those that make it’ and ‘the duty of judicature is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature – the mens or sentential legis’. The expression intention of the Legislature’ is a shorthand reference to the meaning of the words used by the Legislature objectively determined with the guidance furnished by the accepted principles of interpretation. The expression intention of the Legislature’ is a shorthand reference to the meaning of the words used by the Legislature objectively determined with the guidance furnished by the accepted principles of interpretation. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the Legislature, in other words the ‘legal meaning’ or ‘true meaning’ of the statutory provision. The task is often not an easy one and the difficulties arise because of various reasons. To mention a few of them : Words in any language are not scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning, and language is but an imperfect medium to convey one’s thought, much less of a large assembly consisting of persons of various shades of opinion. It is impossible even for the most imaginative Legislature to forestall exhaustive situations and circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statute where its application may be called for. The function of the courts is only to expound and not to legislate. The numerous rules of interpretation or construction formulated by courts are expressed differently by different judges and support may be found in these formulations for apparently contradictory propositions.” 98. The above rule of interpretation of statute, which has by now become formally established, as would be evident from the various decisions of the Supreme Court including the decisions in the case of Phillips India Ltd. vs. Labour Court reported in (1985) 3 SCC 103 and Osmania University Teachers Association vs. State of A.P. reported in (1987) 4 SCC 671 lays down that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute. As per the Principles of Statutory Interpretation of G. P. Singh, this rule is referred to as an “elementary rule” by Viscount Simonds; a “compelling rule” by Lord Somervell of Harro and a “settled rule” by B. K. Mukherjee, J. 99. In the aforesaid volume of Principles of Interpretation of Statute it has been observed as follows :- “When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. In the aforesaid volume of Principles of Interpretation of Statute it has been observed as follows :- “When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The rule stated by TINDAL, CJ in Sussex Peerage case is in the following form : “If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver”. The rule is also stated in another form : “When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself”. The results of the construction are then not a matter for the court, even though they may be strange or surprising, unreasonable or unjust or oppressive. “Again and again, said VISCOUNT SIMONDS, LC., “this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used”. As said by Gajendragadkar, J. : “If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act”. 100. By referring to the Rule in Heydon’s case; purposive construction : mischief rule, the principles applicable to the said rule have been succinctly stated in G.P. Singhs Principles of Statutory Interpretation as follows :- “(b) Rule in Heydon’s case: purposive construction : mischief rule When the material words are capable of bearing two or more constructions the most firmly established rule for construction of such words “of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law)” is the rule laid down in Heydon’s case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, p.7b : 76 ER 637) which has now attained the status of a ‘classic’. Rep. 7a, p.7b : 76 ER 637) which has now attained the status of a ‘classic’. The rule which is also known as ‘purposive construction’ or ‘mischief rule’, enables consideration of four matters in construing an Act : (1) What was the law before the making of the Act, (ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law did not provide, (iii) What is the remedy that the Act has provided, and (iv) What is the reason of the remedy. The rule then directs that the courts must adopt that construction which “shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”. The rule was explained in the Bengal Immunity Co. vs. State of Bihar by S.R. Das, CJI as follows, “It is a sound rule of construction of a statute firmly established in England as far back as 1584 when Heydon’s case was decided that for the sure and true interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered : 1st – What was the common law before the making of the Act, 2nd – What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, 3rd -- What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and 4th – The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle intentions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.” 101. Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes [Twelfth Edition] has observed that “it will be the duty of the judge to make such construction of statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy”. Analysis & Decision :- 102. Having enunciated the principles of interpretation of statute, as above, we would now proceed to deal with the core controversy involved in this batch of writ petitions. 103. Analysis & Decision :- 102. Having enunciated the principles of interpretation of statute, as above, we would now proceed to deal with the core controversy involved in this batch of writ petitions. 103. As has been noted herein above, the Act of 2011 was declared as un- constitutional by a Division bench of this court by the judgement and order dated 23.09.2016 in Chandan Kumar Neog and others (supra). In that proceeding, the State had taken a stand virtually admitting that there were certain defects in the Act of 2011 which requires rectification. However, according to the State, what were those defects in the Act of 2011 is not clearly spelt out. Taking note of such stand of the State Government, the Division Bench of this Court had passed the judgment and order dated 23.09.2016 declaring the Act of 2011 as unconstitutional. 104. Since the petitioners have urged that although the Act of 2017 was enacted as a remedial legislation so as to rectify the defects in the Act of 2011, yet, instead of remedying the situation, the new Act has, in fact, taken away the rights that had accrued upon the various Venture Educational Institutions under the previous Act, although the Act of 2011 has already been effaced, it will be necessary for us to briefly refer to the relevant provisions of the Act of 2011, which was repealed by the Act of 2017. We, therefore, propose to begin by reproducing some of the relevant provisions of the Act of 2011 herein under. 105. Section 2(t) of the Act of 2011 had laid down the definition of Venture Educational Institution to mean and include Venture Degree College, Venture Higher Secondary School, Venture High School, Venture ME School and Venture Primary School situated within the State of Assam. 106. 105. Section 2(t) of the Act of 2011 had laid down the definition of Venture Educational Institution to mean and include Venture Degree College, Venture Higher Secondary School, Venture High School, Venture ME School and Venture Primary School situated within the State of Assam. 106. Sections 2(m) to 2(s) of the Act had provided the definition of provincialised school as well as the various venture institutions coming within the purview of the Act of 2011 as follows:- “(m) “Provincialised School” or ‘Provincialised College” means a Venture Educational Institution wherein the services of employees are provincialised under this Act; (n) “University” means the affiliating University in the state, namely; the Gauhati University, the Dibrugarh University, or the Assam University, as the case may be; (o) “Venture Degree College” means a Degree College imparting education beyond Higher Secondary stage established by the people of the locality prior to 1.1.2006 and which has also received affiliation from the concerned University and concurrence from the State Government on or before 1.1.2006 and not provincialised under any Act enacted by the State legislature so far; (p) “Venture High School” means High School including a High Madrassa imparting education upto class X and established by the people of the locality prior to 1.1.2006 which has received permission from the State Government and recognition from the Board of Secondary Education, Assam on or before 1.1.2006 and not provincialised under any Act enacted by the State legislature so far; (q) ’’Venture Higher Secondary School” means a Higher Secondary School imparting education upto Class XII and established by the people of the locality prior to 1.1.2006 which has received permission from the State Government prior to 01.01.2006 and not provincialised under any Act earlier enacted by the State legislature so far and it includes a Junior College established by the people of the locality prior to 1.1.2006 which has received concurrence from the Government and permission from the Assam Higher Secondary Education Council on or before 01.01.06; (r) “Venture ME School” including “ME Madrassa” means an Upper-Primary School imparting education upto Class VIII and established by the people of the locality prior to 1.1.2006 which has received recognition from the competent authority on or before 01.01.2006 and not provincialised under any Act enacted by the State legislature so far; (s) “Venture Primary School” means a Primary School imparting education upto Class V and established by the people of the locality prior to 1.1.2006 and not provincialised under any Act enacted by the State legislature so far” 107. The object clause of the Act of 2011 had laid down that it was an Act “to provincialise the services of the employees of the venture educational institutions in the State of Assam and to restrict further establishment of such educational institutions in the State”. 108. Section 3 of the Act of 2011 laid down the eligibility criteria for selection of educational institutions for provincialisation of services of its employees pertaining to the different cadres of Venture Educational Institutions. Section 3(1) to (6) are reproduced here-in-below for ready reference: “3. (1) Subject to the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the following categories of Venture Educational Institutions shall be eligible for being considered for provincialisation of the services of its employees :- (i) the Venture Educational Institutions which have been established and had obtained the required permission or recognition or affiliation or concurrence, as the case may be, from the respective competent Authority or Authorities before 1.1.2006; (ii) it has a minimum enrolment of 25 students in the highest class i.e. Class-V, if it is a Primary School; Class-VIII, if it is an upper-Primary School; Class-X, if it is a High School; and Class-XII, if it is a Higher Secondary School or a Junior College; and Final year of Three Year Degree Course, if it is a Degree College, as on the date of coming into force of this Act; (iii) in case of a High School or a Higher Secondary School or a Junior College or a Degree College, the concerned educational institution must have a consistent good academic performance which would mean that at least 30% of the candidates appearing for the final examination must have passed in any three examinations held since 01.01.2006. (2) In case of a Degree College and a Junior College, the eligibility criteria specified in sub-section (1) above regarding date of recognition, affiliation or concurrence, minimum enrolment and performance would mean in respect of each of the subjects with or without ‘Major’ as the case may be, and the services of the employees appointed or engaged in connection with such subject or subjects shall be considered for provincialisation under the provisions of this Act, only if the specified eligibility criteria are satisfied. (3) The concerned educational institution must have the required infrastructure (i) in case of Degree College as specified by the concerned University to which the College is affiliated; (ii) if it is primary or Upper Primary School as specified in Item-2 of the Schedule of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and in case of all other educational institutions, the concerned institution must have the required infrastructure as specified in section 10 of the Assam Non-Government Educational Institutions (Regulation and Management) Act, 2006. (4) An institution, which does not have the required infrastructure specified in sub-section (3) above, may be considered as eligible for provincialisation of the services of the employees, provided such institution acquires the required infrastructure within two years from the date of commencement of this Act. (5) Subject to the provisions of the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations made by the concerned affiliating University, in case of a Degree College and subject to the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, in case of a Primary or Upper Primary School and in case of all other institutions, subject to the provisions of the Assam Non-Government Educational Institutions (Regulation and Management) Act, 2006, an educational institution which does not fulfill the eligibility criteria as on the date of coming into force of this Act or does not acquire eligibility under sub-section (4) above within the two years period as aforesaid shall not be eligible to be considered for provincialisation of the services of its employees, but may be allowed to run as a Private Institution or a Non-Government Educational Institution. (6) Save and except an institution covered under Article 30 of the Constitution of India which is already getting some financial assistance or grants-in-aid, no Private or Non-Government educational institution shall be entitled to get any aid or assistance from the State Government in any form with effect from the date of coming into force of this Act.” 109. Section 4 of the Act of 2011 inter-alia laid down that the services of the employees of all eligible venture educational institutions under Section 3, who have already completed 10 years of services in such educational institutions without any break would be liable to be provincialised. Section 4(1) and (2) of the Act of 2011 is reproduced herein below for ready reference :- “4. Section 4(1) and (2) of the Act of 2011 is reproduced herein below for ready reference :- “4. (1) The services of the employees of all eligible Venture Educational Institutions under section 3 and who have already completed ten years of services in such Educational Institution without any break from the date of affiliation, recognition, concurrence or permission as the case may be, of the concerned educational institutions as on the date of coming into force of this Act, shall be deemed to have been provincialised and they shall become employees of the State Government with effect from that date. (2) The services of all the teaching and non-teaching employees, who have not yet completed ten years of continuous services without break in that Venture Educational Institutions as under sub-section (1) shall be provincialised with effect from the date on which they complete the required ten years of service as stipulated under sub-section(l): Provided that the numbers of employees in both teaching and non- teaching cadre in each of the institution, services of whom are provincialised or to be provincialised under this Act, shall not exceed as specified in the Schedule appended to this Act: Provided further that where the number of such employees serving in such Venture Educational Institutions exceeds the numbers as specified in the Schedule, the provincialisation of the services of the employees shall be on the basis of seniority in the respective category in the concerned educational institution. The State Government shall have no liability whatsoever in regard to such excess employees.” 110. From an analysis of the above provisions of the repealed Act of 2011, it is apparent that the requirement of establishing the venture school/college prior to 01.01.2006 along with affiliation from the concerned University and concurrence from the State Government on or before 01.01.2006 was there even under the Act of 2011. 111. It would, however, be significant to note herein that from the materials placed before us we find that although the Act of 2011 was put under challenge in the earlier round, yet, section 3(1) of the Act introducing the cut-off date of 01.01.2006 was neither specifically put to challenge nor has the Division Bench recorded any finding a to the validity of the said provision. The fact remains that nearly 42,000 Venture Educational Institutions have received the benefit of provincialisation under the Act of 2011 which was holding the field for about four years before being declared by this Court as unconstitutional. The Act of 2011 has since been repealed. Therefore, there is no scope for this Court to re-open the issue of validity of the “cut-off” date of 01.01.2006 inserted by the repealed Act to the extent the same has been continued in the Act of 2017. 112. A conjoint reading of Sections 3(1)& (2) and 4(1) & (2) of the Act of 2011 leaves no room for doubt that there was a deeming provision under section 4 of the repealed Act according to which, subject to fulfillment of conditions of the Act, the venture educational institutions described in Section 3 whose employees have completed 10 years of service without a break from the date of affiliation, recognition, concurrence or permission, shall be deemed to have been provincialised and shall become Government employees with effect from that date. As per Section 4(2), those teaching and non-teaching employees who had not completed 10 years of continuous service without a break, their services will be provincialised with effect from the date of completion of 10 years of service. 113. Thus, it can be seen that subject to fulfillment of the conditions laid down in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 2011, the teaching and non-teaching staff of those Venture Educational Institutions coming under the purview of section 3 of the repealed Act would automatically be clothed with the eligibility for their services to be provincialised under the Act of 2011. 114. Section 5(1) of the Act of 2011 had laid down the terms and conditions of service of the employees, according to which, subject to the provisions of this Act and the Rules made there-under, all rules including service rules and rules of conduct of corresponding ranks, shall be applicable to all employees of the educational institutions whose services have been or would be provincialised under the provisions of this Act. 115. Section 6 of the Act of 2011 had made it clear that with effect from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (4) of section 10, the administration, management and control of all provincialised educational institutions coming within the purview of this Act shall vest in the State Government. 116. 115. Section 6 of the Act of 2011 had made it clear that with effect from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (4) of section 10, the administration, management and control of all provincialised educational institutions coming within the purview of this Act shall vest in the State Government. 116. From the record available before this court, we find that a number of Venture Educational Institutions and/or the teaching and non-teaching staff serving under them had, in reality attained the requisite eligibility for their services to be provincialised under the Act of 2011. In some cases [ ref: 214 music teachers ] we find that even the District Scrutiny Committee constituted under Section 10 of the Act of 2011 had verified their credentials whereafter, recommendation were also made on 06.06.2016 in favour of provincialisation of their services. Pursuant to such recommendation, these teachers had acquired the status of Government employees under the Act of 2011 for all practical purposes with only the issuance of formal orders of provincialisation of their services remaining pending with the Government. Therefore, we are of the opinion that a valuable right had undoubtedly accrued in favour of those eligible teachers/music teacher for issuance of formal order of provincialisation of their service under the Act of 2011. Notwithstanding the same, their services were not provincialised apparently due to repealing of the Act of 2011. 117. Likewise, there are other categories of Venture Educational Institution which were established before 01.01.2006, they fulfilled the eligibility norms prescribed under the Act of 2011 and had applied for recognition/permission/affiliation before the concerned authority prior to 01.01.2006 and had also received the permission/recognition from the concerned authority. But merely because, the date of communication of such recognition/permission/affiliation was beyond 01.01.2006, the benefit of provincialisation of service was not extended to these venture institutions. 118. But merely because, the date of communication of such recognition/permission/affiliation was beyond 01.01.2006, the benefit of provincialisation of service was not extended to these venture institutions. 118. Having regard to the Scheme of the Act of 2011 and the various provisions contained therein, we are of the unhesitant opinion that in case of those Venture Educational Institutions, which were established before 01.01.2006, had fulfilled the eligibility norms prescribed under the Act of 2011 and had applied for recognition/permission/affiliation before the concerned authority prior to 01.01.2006, a vested right had accrued in their favour to receive the benefit of provincialisation under the Act of 2011.In the absence of any allegation of fraud, misrepresentation or mal-practice on their part, the right so accrued to these Venture Educational Institutions and their teaching/non-teaching staff for provicialisation under Act of 2011 , in our opinion, could not have been denied to them merely on the ground that there was delay in communicating the grant of permission/recognition/affiliation, as the case may be, by the concerned authority. 119. As has been noted here-in-before, the State has taken a stand before the Division Bench in the earlier round of litigation that there were certain defects in the pre-existing statutes (Act of 2011), which calls for rectification. As such, considering the fact that according to the State the Act of 2017 has been enacted so as to rectify certain defects in the repealed Act and having regard to the fact that the new Act prescribes the procedure for provincialisation of the services of the Venture Educational Institutions and their employees thus conferring certain benefits upon them, it is apparent that the Statute has a benevolent object. Therefore, the Act of 2017 can be treated as a remedial statute. As such, the provisions of the Act of 2017, in our view, would call for liberal construction. 120. As per Blacks Law Dictionary [Eighth Edition] a Remedial Statute is a law that affords a remedy. These Statutes are also called Curative Statute. 121. Laying down the principles for interpretation of remedial statutes, it has been observed in the 11th Edition of Interpretation of Statutes by Amita Dhanda , as follows:- “Remedial Statutes and their Interpretation Remedial statutes correct defects in the pre-existing law, statutory or otherwise. The purpose of such statutes is to keep pace with the views of society. 121. Laying down the principles for interpretation of remedial statutes, it has been observed in the 11th Edition of Interpretation of Statutes by Amita Dhanda , as follows:- “Remedial Statutes and their Interpretation Remedial statutes correct defects in the pre-existing law, statutory or otherwise. The purpose of such statutes is to keep pace with the views of society. They serve to keep the system of jurisprudence up to date and in harmony with new ideas or conceptions of what constitutes just and proper human conduct. Their legitimate purpose is to advance human rights and relationships. Unless legislations perform such functions, they are not entitled to be known as remedial legislations nor to be liberally construed. Manifestly a construction that promotes improvements in the administration of justice and the eradication of defects in the system of jurisprudence should be favoured over one that perpetuates a wrong. It seems proper to assume that the lawmakers intended to advance our laws forward as far as our conception of justice and proper conduct extend. For this reason alone, if for no other, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal construction. In most of the cases, applying the rule that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed, ‘remedial’ is employed to mean the converse of legislation imposing criminal or other severe penalties. Therefore, where the burdens imposed by a statute are limited to compensatory damages, the statute is frequently regarded as remedial. Similarly, legislation providing for the remission of penalties has often been accorded a liberal construction on the ground that such legislation is remedial in nature. And it is not uncommon to find decisions referring to ‘remedial’ statutes in the conflicts sense as meaning the converse of penal legislation. Sutherland observes: “But the mere fact that a statute is given liberal interpretation because is a remedial statute is of little value in statutory construction unless the term ‘remedial’ has some sort of restrictive meaning. For, if all laws are ‘remedial’ (and certainly all statutes are enacted to remedy some defect in existing laws), the rule amounts to nothing more than a statement that all legislations is to be liberally construed. Possibly the trend, today favours a liberal construction of all legislation with the view to effectuating the legislative purpose. For, if all laws are ‘remedial’ (and certainly all statutes are enacted to remedy some defect in existing laws), the rule amounts to nothing more than a statement that all legislations is to be liberally construed. Possibly the trend, today favours a liberal construction of all legislation with the view to effectuating the legislative purpose. Traditionally, however, the courts have been more discriminating, and in selecting a liberal or strict construction the emphasis has usually been placed upon the persons, things or interest effected by the statute. An examination of the decision will show that the courts have assumed that the term ‘remedial’ has a limited meaning in two respects. They are: (i) usually ‘remedial’ is used in connection with legislation which is not penal or criminal in nature, in that such laws do not impose criminal or other harsh penalties. (ii) the term ‘remedial’ is often employed to describe legislation which is procedural in nature in that it does not affect substantive rights.” In Construction and Interpretation of Laws, Blackstone observes in relation to the doctrine under consideration that. ‘It may also be stated generally that the courts are more disposed to relax the severity of this rule (which is really a rule of strict construction) in the case of statues obviously remedial in their nature or designed to effect a beneficent purpose’. Remedial statutes are liberally construed, and in cases of doubt or ambiguity that construction is adopted which will best advance the remedy provided and help to suppress the mischief against which it was aimed. Starting from antiquity, this rule has often been invoked by courts, though within well defined limits, to prevent statutes from becoming nullities or failing to achieve their purposes on account of unskillful or inartistic drafting.” 122. The Act of 2017 begins with an object clause which reads as follows :- “An Act “to provincialise the services of the teachers of the venture educational institutions and also to reorganize and streamline the educational institutions upto degree level in the State of Assam”. 123. The Act of 2017 begins with an object clause which reads as follows :- “An Act “to provincialise the services of the teachers of the venture educational institutions and also to reorganize and streamline the educational institutions upto degree level in the State of Assam”. 123. The Preamble of the Act of 2017 reads as follows :- “Whereas it is expedient to provincialise the services of the teachers of the venture educational institutions and also to reorganize and streamline the educational institutions upto degree level in Assam so as to conform to the prevailing statutory norms and standards with a further objective to restrict any further growth of such venture educational institutions in the State of Assam.” 124. In the case of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Basant Nahata reported in (2015) 12 SCC 77, the Supreme Court has observed that when the language of the statute is capable of more than one meaning than the preamble or the statement of objects and reasons can be looked into. 125. In Gujarat Ambuja Exports Ltd. and another Vs. State of Uttarakhand and others reported in (2016) 3 SCC 601 , the Supreme Court has held that preamble of a statute cannot control the enacting part. However, the preamble, read with provision of a statute, makes the legislative scheme clear and can be used to determine the true meaning of the enacting provision. 126. In another recent decision rendered in the case of X. Vs. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others reported in AIR 2022 SC 4917 , the Supreme Court has made the following observations in the context of purposive interpretation of statute:- “31. The cardinal principle of the construction of statutes is to identify the intention of the legislature and the true legal meaning of the enactment. The intention of the legislature is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the statute, with a view to understanding the purpose or object of the enactment, the mischief, and its corresponding remedy that the enactment is designed to actualise. Ordinarily, the language used by the legislature is indicative of legislative intent. The intention of the legislature is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the statute, with a view to understanding the purpose or object of the enactment, the mischief, and its corresponding remedy that the enactment is designed to actualise. Ordinarily, the language used by the legislature is indicative of legislative intent. In Kanailal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhu Khan, Gajendragadkar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) opined that “the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself.” But when the words are capable of bearing two or more constructions, they should be construed in light of the object and purpose of the enactment. The purposive construction of the provision must be “illumined by the goal, though guided by the word.” Aharon Barak opines that in certain circumstances this may indicate giving “an unusual and exceptional meaning” to the language and words used. Before we engage in the exercise of purposive construction, we must caution that a court’s power to purposively interpret a statutory text does not imply that a judge can substitute legislative intent with their own individual notions. The alternative construction propounded by the judge must be within the ambit of the statute and should help carry out the purpose and object of the Act in question. 32. The interpretation of a subordinate legislation should be consistent with the enabling Act. A subordinate legislation must be reasonable and in consonance with the legislative policy. It should be interpreted in a meaningful manner, so as to give effect to the purpose and object of the enabling Act. The interpretation which is in consonance with the statutory scheme and gives effect to the statute must be adopted. 33. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, it is stated that a statute must be read in its context when attempting to interpret its purpose. Context includes reading the statute as a whole, referring to the previous state of law, the general scope of the statute, surrounding circumstances and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. 33. In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, it is stated that a statute must be read in its context when attempting to interpret its purpose. Context includes reading the statute as a whole, referring to the previous state of law, the general scope of the statute, surrounding circumstances and the mischief that it was intended to remedy. The treatise explains that: “For ascertaining the purpose of a statute one is not restricted to the internal aid furnished by the statute itself, although the text of the statute taken as a whole is the most important material for ascertaining both the aspects of ‘intention’. Without intending to lay down a precise and exhaustive list of external aids, Lord Somervell has stated: “The mischief against which the statute is directed and, perhaps though to an undefined extent the surrounding circumstances can be considered. Other statutes in pari materia and the state of the law at the time are admissible.” These external aids are also brought in by widening the concept of ‘context’ “as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, and the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy.” In the words of Chinappa Reddy, J.: “Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted.” 127. From a careful reading of the object clause as well as the preamble of the Statute (Act of 2017) we find that just like the repealed Act, the dominant intent of the Legislation is to provincialise the services of the teachers in the Venture Educational Institutions with a view to streamline the educational institutions in the State, which is undoubtedly a laudable objective. However, it will be significant to note herein that although the Act of 2017 seeks to also restrict further growth of venture institutions, we do not find any provision in the Act 2017 which, either directly or in-directly, aims at doing so. However, it will be significant to note herein that although the Act of 2017 seeks to also restrict further growth of venture institutions, we do not find any provision in the Act 2017 which, either directly or in-directly, aims at doing so. Rather, section 3(4) of the Act of 2017 provides that subject to fulfillment of the provisions of the Act of 2006, referred to here-in-above, the Venture Educational Institution which are not provincialised will be allowed to run as private institution or as non-government institution. As per section3(9) these private institutions would however, not be entitled to any aid or assistance from the Government with effect from the coming into effect of the of the Act. The only statute framed by the State so as to restrict the growth of non-governmental institution is the Act of 2006. As such, form a careful reading of the provisions of the Act of 2017 we find that the provisions contained therein do not have any reasonable nexus with only that part of the preamble of the Act viz “ to restrict any further growth of Venture Educational Institutes in the State” 128. It is also not clear as to how, such an objective of the statute of restricting the growth of venture educational institutes can be achieved with retrospective effect since the Act of 2017 does not restrict the functioning of the already established Venture Educational Institutions operating within the State. Expressions such a “restricting” in the context of “growth”, in their ordinary connotation, in our considered opinion, can only have a prospective operation. We also do not find anything on record to indicate reason for the choice of 01.01.2006 as the cut-off date. Be that as it may, since prescribing a “cut-off” date would lie within the realm of policy decision of the State, we find ourselves in agreement with the submissions of Mr. Saikia, learned AG, Assam, that having regard to the resource constraints faced by the State, it was permissible for the Legislature to prescribe a “cut-off” date for certain activities by enacting a Statute more so when the Statute has a beneficial object with financial implications. Moreover, in view of what has been observed here- in-above, we are of the opinion that the issue of legitimacy of the cut-off date of 01.01.2006 can neither be agitated nor gone into by this Court in the present proceedings. 129. Moreover, in view of what has been observed here- in-above, we are of the opinion that the issue of legitimacy of the cut-off date of 01.01.2006 can neither be agitated nor gone into by this Court in the present proceedings. 129. A plain reading of the provisions of the Act of 2017 makes it evident that the same is a Class Legislation, wherein a distinction is sought to be made between the pre and post 01.01.2006 Venture Educational Institutions for the purpose of their provincialisation under the Act of 2017. 130. In the case of D. S. Nakara (supra) one of the important questions arising for decision was that “would differential treatment to pensioners related to the date of retirement qua the revised formula for computation of pension attract Article 14 of the Constitution and an element of discrimination and therefore, would be liable to be declared unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14?” In that case the Supreme Court has held that classification has to be based on some rational principle and the rational principle must have nexus to the object sought to be achieved. 131. In the case of Budhan Choudhury and others Vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1955 SC 191 it has been held that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of the legislation. In order to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled. (1) The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are good together from others left out of the group and (2) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. 132. Taking note of the fact that reasonable classification test was introduced to the Indian jurisprudence in State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar reported in 1952 AIR SC 75, after examining the decisions rendered in several judgments on the aforesaid issue, the Supreme Court in a recent decision rendered in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sharma and others Vs. Taking note of the fact that reasonable classification test was introduced to the Indian jurisprudence in State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar reported in 1952 AIR SC 75, after examining the decisions rendered in several judgments on the aforesaid issue, the Supreme Court in a recent decision rendered in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sharma and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in (2024) 5 SCC 217 in the context of reasonable classification test, has observed as follows :- “For any classification to survive the test of Article 14 the classification must be based on intelligible differentia and it must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the law. At this stage it is important to note that the object sought to be achieved must also be lawful and if the object of the law itself is found to be discriminatory then such discrimination must be struck down. This has been held in a catena of judgments.” 133. In State of Punjab and others Vs. Amar Nath Goyal and others reported in (2005) 6 SCC 754 relied upon by Mr. Saikia, it has been held that fixing of “cut-off” would lie within domain of the Executive Authority and the court should not normally interfere with such cut–off date unless the same in found to be blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. 134. In another recent decision of the Supreme Court referred to by Mr. Saikia in Shikhar Vs. National Board of Examination reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 425 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary unless it is shown that it is un-reasonable, capricious or whimsical even if no reason are forthcoming as to the choice of the date. Therefore, fixing a ‘cut-off’ would not be per se illegal unless it offends Article 14. 135. Therefore, fixing a ‘cut-off’ would not be per se illegal unless it offends Article 14. 135. From an analysis of the various provisions contained in the Act of 2017, we also find that just like in the repealed Act, the Act of 2017 also mandates the requirement of establishing the venture schools/degree colleges as described in Sections 2(w) to (zd) prior to 01.01.2006 However, by adding a proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act of 2017, it has been laid down that in order to be eligible for provincialisation of the services of the “teachers” and “tutors” of those venture educational institutions, the permission/recognition/affiliation/concurrence etc. shall have to be issued on or before 01.01.2006 and any order issued thereafter, with retrospective effect, shall not be considered for the purpose of provincialisation of services of any ‘teacher’ and ‘tutor, as the case may be. Thus, by enacting Section 3(1)(i) in the Act of 2017 the venture educational institutions’, which were established prior to 01.01.2006 and had also had applied for permission, recognition, affiliation and concurrence prior to that date but had received the permission/concurrence/affiliation/recognition after 01.01.2006 have altogether been excluded from the purview of the Act for the purpose of provincialisation, regardless of the date on which they had submitted their application seeking permission/recognition/concurrence/affiliation from the competent authority. 136. Having inserted Section 3(1)(i) in the Act of 2017, a further restriction on these Venture Educational Institutions have been imposed by the Amendment Act of 2018 whereby, sub-clause (i) of Section 3(1) has been amended to provide that the order of permission, recognition and concurrence shall have to be issued on or before 01.01.2006 and any order issued thereafter with any retrospective effect shall not be considered for the purpose of provincialisation of services of any ‘teacher’ and ‘tutor. By amending clauses 3(vii) and (ix) the minimum number of students who have to appear in the last final examination from the venture degree college for provincialisation of service of one teacher or tutor has been laid down in the manner indicated herein above. ‘ 137. We have already held that it will be permissible for the State to prescribe a “cut-off” date for implementation of beneficial schemes having financial implication. ‘ 137. We have already held that it will be permissible for the State to prescribe a “cut-off” date for implementation of beneficial schemes having financial implication. The question that would, however, arise for consideration in these cases, is as to whether, such “cut-date” can be applied with retro-activity so as to take away any right vested under the repealed Statute ? 138. It would be pertinent to note here-in that as per section 3(1)(i), the permission for Higher Secondary Schools (erstwhile Junior College), High School recognized by the Board of Secondary Education, Assam (SEBA) and TDC part-I for Degree Colleges is to be granted by the Government of Assam for the purpose of provincialisation of the services of their teachers/tutors. The permission will be treated as valid only when the same is granted by the Government. The use of the expression “shall” in the proviso to the amended provision of Section 3(1)(i), clearly denotes that the responsibility of granting such permission has been entrusted upon the Government. Notwithstanding the same, the liability in case of delay in grant of permission beyond 01.01.2006, for any reason whatsoever, has been put on the applicant/Venture Educational Institutions, thus clearly shifting the responsibility upon such institutions to obtain the permission/recognition/concurrence from the Government in a manner, which in our view, runs counter to the scheme of the Statute itself. When the Statue clearly mandates that the permissions ‘shall’ be granted by the Government, the Venture Educational Institutions, which were established prior to 01.01.2006 and had submitted their applications within the cut-off date 01.01.2006, could not have been held responsible for any delay in issuing such permission by the Government. Therefore, fixing the liability upon the Venture Educational Institutions for the delay in grant of permissions even when the applications seeking such permissions, had been made in the prescribed format and within the period prescribed by the repealed Act of 2011, in our considered opinion would be wholly arbitrary, illegal and hence, liable to be declared so by this court. 139. We also find that Section 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2017 seeks to retrospectively take away the right of provincialisation of those venture institutions, which had acquired the eligibility as well as the status of provincialised institutions due to the operation of the deeming provisions under the Act of 2011. 139. We also find that Section 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2017 seeks to retrospectively take away the right of provincialisation of those venture institutions, which had acquired the eligibility as well as the status of provincialised institutions due to the operation of the deeming provisions under the Act of 2011. This we say so because of the fact that the Venture Educational Institutions which had fulfilled the eligibility conditions under the Act of 2011 and had submitted their applications seeking permissions from the government prior to 01.01.2006, were without any doubt standing on equal footing as the 42 thousand odd Venture Educational Institutions which were granted the benefit of provincialisation under the Act of 2011 before the same was repealed. Therefore, these institutions, in our view had a vested right to be considered for provincialisation under Act of 2011, at par with the other venture institutions, which were provincialised. Denying them the benefit accruing under the Act of 2011, that too with retrospective effect, in our opinion, would amount to hostile discrimination to those institutions and their teachers and hence, would militate against the basic principle of equality as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 140. Not only that, we also find that the amendments carried out to Section 3(1)(i) by the Amendment Act of 2018 also takes away even the remedy available to those genuine applicants who were aggrieved by the un-reasonable delay on the part of the government to grant necessary permission, leaving them with no opportunity to seek appropriate legal remedy in the matter. 141. It is to be noted herein that Section 13(1) of the Act of 2017 provides for a District Scrutiny Committee in each district separately for Elementary, Secondary and Higher education so as to scrutinize the service records and credentials of the serving teachers of the Venture Educational Institutions for the purpose of provincialisation of their services. Section 14 of the Act provides for an Appellate Authority, which would be empowered to hear appeals against any recommendation of the District Scrutiny Committee. Section 14 further provides that the State Government, in the concerned administrative department, shall be the Appellate Authority against any recommendation of the State Level Committee. 142. During the course of argument Mr. Section 14 of the Act provides for an Appellate Authority, which would be empowered to hear appeals against any recommendation of the District Scrutiny Committee. Section 14 further provides that the State Government, in the concerned administrative department, shall be the Appellate Authority against any recommendation of the State Level Committee. 142. During the course of argument Mr. Saikia, learned Advocate General, Assam has made a submission to the effect that several Venture Educational Institutions, which were actually set up after 01.01.2006, had resorted to fraudulent practices and misrepresented before the authorities to show that those institutions had not only been set up prior to 01.01.2006 but their application seeking permission were also submitted before the concerned authority prior to the cut- off date so as to avail the benefit under the Act of 2011. According to Mr. Saikia, in order to comprehensively deal with such fraudulent practices, the cut- off date of 01.01.2006 had to be enforced in stricter terms by carrying out amendments to the Act of 2017. We are unable to agree with such submission of the learned Advocate General, Assam. We say so because, the District and State level Scrutiny Committees created by the Act of 2017 are the statutory authorities specifically set up so as to carry out proper scrutiny of the credentials of any applicant seeking provincialisation. Therefore, if any doubt arises as to the genuineness of their claim, there is nothing preventing the department from referring those case for scrutiny by the statutory committees. The answer to such a malady, if any, cannot lie in retrospectively taking away the rights of the applicants to even submit their claims. 143. For the above reason, we find that Section 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2017 as well as the amended provision of Section 3(1)(i) of the Amendment Act of 2018 to the extent the same seeks to retrospectively take away the eligibility of those Venture Educational Institutions to seek provincialisation are highly discriminatory and offends Article 14 of the Constitution. By necessary implication, the aforesaid provisions take away the rights vested on these Venture Educational Institutions for being considered for provincialisation with retrospective effect, although the Act of 2017 does not specifically provide for the same. 144. By necessary implication, the aforesaid provisions take away the rights vested on these Venture Educational Institutions for being considered for provincialisation with retrospective effect, although the Act of 2017 does not specifically provide for the same. 144. It would be relevant to mention herein that Section 24 of the Act of 2017, which is the repealing provision of the Act of 2011, does not lay down that the rights and privileges that had accrued upon the Venture Educational Institutions under the Act of 2011 would stand extinguished with retrospective effect. Rather, Section 24 protects all action taken for provincialisation of services of teachers prior to 23.09.2016. Such action, in our considered opinion, would also mean and include actions taken by the Departmental Authorities in processing the application submitted by the respective Venture Institutions prior to 01.01.2006 seeking permission/affiliation/permission/concurrence as well as the decisions and recommendations of the District Scrutiny Committees, if any, recommending provincialisation of the services of the teaching and non-teaching staffs of the different Venture Educational Institutions. We are of the view that those employees, in whose favour, recommendations were made by the Scrutiny Committee had a vested right for their claims to be taken to its logical conclusion under the Act of 2011. As such, such vested rights of those employees could not have been taken away by the subsequent enactment of the Act of 2017. 145. Clause 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the effect of repeal of a statute. As per Clause 6(c), repeal of an Act shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed unless a different intention appears from the Act. The Assam General Clauses Act, 1915 contains a pari materia provision in the form of Section 6, which is reproduced herein below :- “6. Effect of repeal. The Assam General Clauses Act, 1915 contains a pari materia provision in the form of Section 6, which is reproduced herein below :- “6. Effect of repeal. Where any Act repeals any enactment hitherto made, or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not – (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) alter the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the Repealing Act had not been passed.” 146. From a plain reading of Section 6, it is clear that right, if any, including privileges that had vested under the Act of 2011, would stand protected under Section 6 of the Act of 2015 even after the repeal of the Act of 2011. 147. Article 13(2) of the Constitution of India provides that “the State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void”. The expression “this Part” used in Article 13(2) obviously refers to Part-III of the Constitution which contains the Fundamental Rights including the right of equality before law. 148. In Golak Nath Vs. State of Punjab reported in Air 1967 SC 1643 , the Supreme Court has observed that fundamental rights of the citizens cannot be taken away even by constitutional amendments, be it prospective or retrospective. 149. In N. P. Verghese Vs. ITO (1981)[27), the Supreme Court has held that a statute cannot be construed retrospectively if it takes away or abridges vested rights acquired under the existing law. 150. In the case of P. D. Agarwal (supra) relied upon by Mr. K. N. Choudhury, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, by relying upon the decision of the Court in the case of E.P. Royappa Vs. 150. In the case of P. D. Agarwal (supra) relied upon by Mr. K. N. Choudhury, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, by relying upon the decision of the Court in the case of E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1974) 4 SCC 3 and Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India reported in (1978)1 SCC 248 , that there should not be arbitrariness in State action which must ensure fairness and equality of treatment. It is open to judicial review as to whether any Rule or provision of any Act has violated the principles of equality and thereby invaded the rights of citizens guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 151. On the question of accrual of right, the Supreme Court has made significant observations in the case of Gajraj Singh and others Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and others reported in (1997) 1 SCC 650 wherein it has been observed in paragraph 42 as follows :- “42. There is a distinction between right acquired or accrued, and privilege, hope and expectation to get a right, as rightly pointed out by the High Court in the impugned judgment. A right to apply for renewal and to get a favorable order would not e deemed to be a right accrued unless some positive acts are done, before repeal of Act 4 of 1939 or corresponding law to secure that right of renewal. In Gujarat Electricity Board vs. Shantilal [ AIR 1969 SC 239 ], this Court had pointed out that before Section 71 of the Electricity Supply Act was amended the appellant had issued a notice under Section 7 thereof, exercising the option to purchase the undertaking. It was held that a right to purchase the electrical undertaking which has accrued to the Electricity Board was saved by Section 6 of the GC Act.” 152. In Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH (supra) the Apex Court had observed that there would be a presumption that the Legislature did not intend to limit or take away vested rights unless the language clearly points to the contrary. In Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH (supra) the Apex Court had observed that there would be a presumption that the Legislature did not intend to limit or take away vested rights unless the language clearly points to the contrary. While dealing with the aforesaid issue in the context of interpretation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act it was further observed that there are cases where a right did exist but then nothing was done to show that any Act was done or advantage taken of the enactment under which the right exist till it was repealed. In the present case we find that, as has been noted here-in-above, many Venture Educational Institutions and/or their teaching and non-teaching staffs had in fact taken significant steps asserting their rights as per the Act of 2011. Therefore, it cannot be said that these institutions and/or their employees had failed to assert their rights under the Act of 2011. 153. In the case of J. S. Yadav Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in (2011)6 SCC 570 the expression “vest” in the context of accrued right has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The observations made in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the said decision are reproduced herein below for ready reference :- “21. The word "vest" is normally used where an immediate fixed right in present or future enjoyment in respect of a property is created. With the long usage the said word "vest" has also acquired a meaning as "an absolute or indefeasible right". It had a "legitimate" or "settled expectation" to obtain right to enjoy the property etc. Such "settled expectation" can be rendered impossible of fulfilment due to change in law by the Legislature. Besides this, such a "settled expectation" or the so-called "vested right" cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the law. (Vide: Howrah Municipal Corpn. & Ors. v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 663 ). 22. Thus, "vested right" is a right independent of any contingency. Such a right can arise from a contract, statute or by operation of law. A vested right can be taken away only if the law specifically or by necessary implication provide for such a course.” 154. v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 663 ). 22. Thus, "vested right" is a right independent of any contingency. Such a right can arise from a contract, statute or by operation of law. A vested right can be taken away only if the law specifically or by necessary implication provide for such a course.” 154. In the case of State of Rajasthan and others vs. Basant Agrotech (India) Limited reported in (2013) 15 SCC 1 , dealing with the issue of retrospective effect of a legislation the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the Legislature has the authority to pass a law both retrospectively and prospectively within the constitutional parameters provided it did not take away or limit any vested right which accrued under any existing law. 155. In the case of Suhas H. Pophale Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and its Estate Officer reported in (2014) 4 SCC 657 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows :- “32. It has been laid down by this Court through a number of judgments rendered over the years, that a legislation is not to be given a retrospective effect unless specifically provided for, and not beyond the period that is provided therein. Thus, a Constitution Bench held in Garkiapati Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry reported in AIR 1957 SC 540 that in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to be retrospective, it cannot be so constructed, as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the act 45 Page 46 was passed. In that matter, the Court was concerned with the issue as to whether the appellant’s right to file an appeal continued to be available to him for filing an appeal to the Andhra Pradesh High Court after it was created from the erstwhile Madras High Court. The Constitution Bench held that the right very much survived, and the vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.” 156. As has been noted herein above, the State can certainly prescribe “cut –off” date for extending the benefit of any statute, particularly when the same has financial implications. As has been noted herein above, the State can certainly prescribe “cut –off” date for extending the benefit of any statute, particularly when the same has financial implications. However, having decided on the cut-off date, financial constrain cannot be pressed into service by the State as a ground to discriminate amongst similarly situated persons and/or institutions by creating a different class, without any intelligible differentia and merely on the basis of circumstances as in the present case, which, in our view, are completely fortuitous. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the provisions of Section 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2017 as well as the amended provisions of Section 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2018 are in clear violation of the principles of equality as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As such Section3(1)(i) as amended up-to-date, is liable to be held as ultra vires the Constitution of India. 157. Law is fairly well settled that the rule of reading down provisions of a statute is nothing but harmonious construction of the provisions of the statute. Dealing with the above issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made the following observations in paragraph 35 in the case of Calcutta Gujarati Education Society Vs. Calcutta Municipal Corporation and others reported in (2003) 10 SCC 533 , which is reproduced herein below for ready reference :- “35. The rule of "reading down" a provision of law is now well recognised. It is a rule of harmonious construction in a different name. It is resorted to smoothen the crudities or ironing the creases found in a statute to make it workable. In the garb of `reading down', however, it is not open to read words and expressions not found in it and thus venture into a kind of judicial legislation. The rule of reading down is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. It is to be used keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfill its purposes. See the following observations of this Court in the case of BR Enterprises vs. State of U.P. [ 1999(9) SCC 700 ]. It is to be used keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfill its purposes. See the following observations of this Court in the case of BR Enterprises vs. State of U.P. [ 1999(9) SCC 700 ]. "First attempt should be made by the courts to uphold the charged provisions and not to invalidate it merely because one of the possible interpretation leads to such a result, howsoever attractive it may be. Thus, where there are two possible interpretations, one invalidating the law and the other upholding, the latter should be adopted. For this, the courts have been endeavouring, sometimes to give restrictive or expansive meaning keeping in view the nature of legislation, may be beneficial, penal or fiscal etc. Cumulatively, it is to sub-serve the object of the legislation. Old golden rule is of respecting the wisdom of legislature, that they are aware of the law and would never have intended for an invalid legislation. This also keeps courts within their track and checks individual zeal of going wayward. Yet in spite of this, if the impugned legislation cannot be saved the courts shall not hesitate to strike it down. Similarly, for upholding any provision, if it could be saved by reading it down, it should be done, unless plain words are so clear to be in defiance of the Constitution. These interpretations spring out because of concern of the courts to salvage a legislation to achieve its objective and not to let it fall merely because of a possible ingenious interpretation. The words are not static but dynamic. This infuses fertility in the field of interpretation. This equally helps to save an Act but also the cause of attack on the Act. Here the courts have to play a cautious role of weeding out the wild from the crop, of course, without infringing the Constitution. For doing this, the courts have taken help from the Preamble, Objects, the scheme of the act, its historical background, the purpose for enacting such a provision, the mischief, if any which existed, which is sought to be eliminated. The principle of reading down, however, will not be available where the plain and literal meaning from a bare reading of any impugned provisions clearly shows that it confers arbitrary, uncanalised or unbridled power." [emphasis supplied] 158. In Union of India and others Vs. The principle of reading down, however, will not be available where the plain and literal meaning from a bare reading of any impugned provisions clearly shows that it confers arbitrary, uncanalised or unbridled power." [emphasis supplied] 158. In Union of India and others Vs. IND-SWIFT Laboratories Ltd. reported in (2011) 4 SCC 635 , the Supreme Court has, however, cautioned that while reading down the provision of the statute, it would not be open for the Court to read wards and expressions not found in the provisions/statute and thus, venture into a kind of judicial legislation. Rule of reading down the statute is to be used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. 159. In the case of Indra Das Vs. State of Assam reported in (2011) 3 SCC 380 the Supreme Court had observed that when a particular statute violates the constitutional provision, primary attempt should be to read down the statute so as to make it constitutional as otherwise the statute has to be declared as unconstitutional. 160. Having regard to the observations made herein above, we are of the considered opinion that Section 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2017 as amended by the Act of 2018 can be saved only if the same is read down by this Court to hold that such Venture Educational Institutions which were set up prior to 01.01.2006 and which fulfilled the eligibility conditions laid down in the Act of 2011 for provincialisation of those institutions and the services of their teachers and employees and had genuinely submitted their applications, through proper channel, seeking permission, concurrence, recognition from the competent authority prior to the cut off dated of 01.06.2006, their claim(s) for provincialisation cannot be extinguished merely on account of non-receipt of and/or retrospective communication of the order of approval/concurrence/recognition/permission from the competent authority. We accordingly, read down the provision of Section 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2017, as amended by the Amendment Act of 2018, so as to save the said statutory provisions from being declared unconstitutional. 161. For the reason stated above, we, therefore, clarify that the Venture Educational Institutions falling under the above category, which had a live claim for provincialisation under the repealed Act of 2011, would be entitled to pursue their claim, notwithstanding the enactment of the Act of 2017. 161. For the reason stated above, we, therefore, clarify that the Venture Educational Institutions falling under the above category, which had a live claim for provincialisation under the repealed Act of 2011, would be entitled to pursue their claim, notwithstanding the enactment of the Act of 2017. We, however, also make it clear that in case of any doubt or dispute regarding the bonafide of the credentials/claims made by the Venture Educational Institutions seeking provincialisation, the same shall be resolved by referring the matter to the concerned District Scrutiny Committee constituted under Section 13 of the Act of 2017, in a time bound manner. Such an interpretation of the provision of Section 3(1)(i) as amended by the Amendment Act of 2018, in our considered opinion, would not be only be just and reasonable but will also lead to harmonious construction of the provisions of the Statute thus, saving the provision from being struck down on the ground of the same being in contravention of Article 13(2) of the Constitution of India. 162. The next question that arises for consideration in this batch of writ petitions is pertaining to the remuneration of fixed salary paid to the “Tutors” upon provincialisation of their services. It will be pertinent to note herein that the under the Act of 2011 the category of teachers known as Tutor was not included. The expression “Tutor” however, appears in the Act of 2017 which refers to that category of teachers of Venture Educational Institutions who did not fulfill the qualification norms, for being appointed as a Teacher, under section 23 of the Act of 2009. However, in view of the long years of service rendered by this category of teachers and with a view to extend the benefit of the Act of 2017 to them, the term “Tutor” was used in the Act of 2017. 163. Section 2(u) of the Act of 2017 defines “Tutor” so as to mean and include Teachers, Assistant Teachers, Classical Teachers including Lecturers, Assistant Professors, Associate Professors, Professors, Vice Principals and Principals etc. 163. Section 2(u) of the Act of 2017 defines “Tutor” so as to mean and include Teachers, Assistant Teachers, Classical Teachers including Lecturers, Assistant Professors, Associate Professors, Professors, Vice Principals and Principals etc. who were not eligible for provincialisation of their services and whose services cannot be provincialised in the post of teacher under the Act due to lack of educational and professional qualification required under the Act of 2009, National Council of Teachers’ Education Act, 1993 and University Grants Commission Act, 1956 as well as the relevant Rules and Regulations framed there-under. 164. Although the services of “Tutor” were provincialised by giving them a fixed pay which was less than the pay scale offered to the teachers fulfilling the qualification norms, yet, they were given 5 (five) years time to acquire the requisite qualification and thereafter, seek upgradation to the post of Teacher. If, however, they failed to acquire the requisite qualification within the prescribed time, than, as per section 7(2) of the Act of 2017, their cases shall not be considered for upgradation to the post of teacher after the lapse of the period of five years from the date of publication of the provincialisation Order and they shall continue to function as “Tutor”. 165. Section 8(3) of the Act of 2017 lays down the emoluments which will be payable to the Tutors, according to which, they would be entitled to a fixed salary as per the projection made in the schedule to the Act of 2017, which is reproduced herein below, for ready reference :- 166. According to the learned counsel appearing for the group of Tutors, since the Tutors upon provincialisation of their services are also treated as Government servants under the Act of 2017 whereby, all the Rules and notifications applicable to the Government servants, have also been made applicable to them, restricting their emoluments to a fixed salary during the entire period of service, more particularly, when they fail to acquire the requisite qualification as prescribed by section 7(1) &(2) is highly discriminatory, inasmuch as, the Tutors are also entitled to pay scale and regular salary at par with the other Government servants. 167. Responding to the above arguments, Mr. 167. Responding to the above arguments, Mr. D. Saikia, learned Advocate General, Assam, has submitted that since the Tutors did not fulfill the norms of educational qualification, as laid down under the various Acts including the Act of 2009, there was no obligation on the part of the State Government to provincialise their service at all. However, as an act of benevolence and considering the long years of services rendered by them, the Government has come up with an innovative scheme to provide some recognition to these Tutors by providing them a fixed salary pursuant to their provincialisation in service, which according to Mr. Saikia, cannot be termed as discriminatory. The learned AG, Assam, has further contended that each Tutor would have five years time from the date of issuance of the notification of provincialisation of their service so as to acquire the prescribed qualification and seek up-gradation to the post of Teacher. Therefore, it is only for those Tutors who fail to acquire the prescribed qualification within the aforesaid period of five years that would be paid the fixed salary for the entire period of their service. 168. In order to appreciate the aforesaid arguments, it will be necessary to refer to section 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2017, which provides that for the purpose of provincialisation of services of the teachers and tutors under this Act, the Government shall create and sanction such number of ex-cadre posts that shall be personal to the incumbent. These personal posts shall stand abolished on cessation of services of the teachers for any reason whatsoever including retirement/resignation, death etc. Further, section 4(1) of the Act of 2017 clearly lays down that with effect from the date of publication of the notification of provincialisation in the official gazette such employees including teachers and/or tutors of venture educational institutions, shall become employees of the State Government with effect from such date. 169. Further, section 4(1) of the Act of 2017 clearly lays down that with effect from the date of publication of the notification of provincialisation in the official gazette such employees including teachers and/or tutors of venture educational institutions, shall become employees of the State Government with effect from such date. 169. From the above, it is apparent that whatever may be the consideration for provincialisation of the services of the group of teachers of the Venture Educational Institutions who did not fulfill the qualification norms as prescribed by the Act of 2009, the Act of 1993, the Act of 2012 and the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, pursuant to issuance of the notification of provincialisation of their services as Tutor and publication of the same in the official gazettes, the services of these teachers would stand provincialised and they will be referred to under the nomenclature of “Tutor”. The Tutors would then be treated as Government servant for all intent and purpose. Just like the teachers whose services are provincialised under the Act even the Tutors would serve against the posts created by the Government so as to accommodate them. These posts would, however, be liable to be extinguished on the death, retirement or resignation of the Tutors/Teachers, as the case may be. 170. Being Government servants, the Tutors would also be subjected to all the provisions of the Act, Rules and laws, that are applicable to an employee of the State Government of Assam. Their job would also be a teaching job. The only distinction that would be applicable in their case is that the Tutors will be entitled to a fixed salary as opposed to a regular pay scale enjoyed by all the other category of teachers/employees serving under the Government of Assam. 171. Whether the services of the Tutors should have been provincialised or not, is a matter which would lie exclusively in the domain of the policy decision of the State and this Court would not have any opinion to express in that regard. However, once a decision has been taken to provincialise the services of the Tutors by following the provisions of the Statute, will it be permissible for the State to extend a differential treatment to them as compared to other Government servant who are enjoying a regular pay scale which is normally payable under the law? However, once a decision has been taken to provincialise the services of the Tutors by following the provisions of the Statute, will it be permissible for the State to extend a differential treatment to them as compared to other Government servant who are enjoying a regular pay scale which is normally payable under the law? The answer to the said question has to be in the negative for such a measure would amount to denial of equal treatment to the Tutors under the Law. 172. It is to be noted here-in that the services of the Teachers and Tutors have been provincialised under the same Statute and by following the same procedure. Their nature of duties and responsibilities are similar and both the categories of teachers are involved primarily in teaching job. It may be correct to say that due to difference in their educational qualifications, Teachers and Tutors belong to two different classes and therefore, they cannot claim equal pay. However, the question here is not of equal pay for the work done by the two categories of teachers but of “equal treatment” and “equal protection” under the law. What cannot be denied is that by virtue of their acquired status as employees of the State Government of Assam, the Tutors would be entitled to equal treatment under the law as is extended to the other Government employees. Therefore, since the other employees are enjoying the benefit of a regular pay scale, whatever may be the pay scale extended to them, it will be incumbent upon the Government to extend a regular pay scale to the Tutors also as otherwise same would not only amount to unfair treatment extended to the Tutors but may also have a demoralizing effect on them, which in turn may have an adverse impact on the performance of their duties as Tutors. 173. While deliberating on the concept of equality, as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in the case of Ashutosh Gupta Vs. State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2002) 4 SCC 34 , that the concept of equality before law does not involve the idea of absolute equality amongst all which may be physically impossible. All that Article 14 guarantees is similarity of treatment and not identical treatment. State of Rajasthan and others reported in (2002) 4 SCC 34 , that the concept of equality before law does not involve the idea of absolute equality amongst all which may be physically impossible. All that Article 14 guarantees is similarity of treatment and not identical treatment. Equality before law means that among all equals, the law should be equal and should be equally administered and the likes should be treated alike. 174. In the case of Amita Vs. Union of India and others reported in (2005) 13 SCC 721 the Supreme Court has observed that the first expression “equality before the law” which is taken from the English Common Law, is a declaration of equality of all persons within the territory of India implying thereby absence of any special privilege in favour of any individual. It also means that amongst the equals, the law should be equal and should be equally administered and that the likes should be treated alike. Thus, what Article 14 forbids is discrimination between persons who are substantially in similar circumstances or condition. 175. As noted above the provincialised Teachers and Tutors are similarly situated in so far as their status as Government Employees is concerned. To that extent, they are entitled to be treated alike. Whether the quantum of fixed salary paid to the Tutors, is just, reasonable or adequate is neither a question raised before this Court, nor are we inclined to enter into the said aspect of the matter. However, by following the equality clause envisaged under Article 14, if any pay scale is extended to the Tutors considered fit and proper by the Government, the same would, in our opinion, meet the ends of justice. 176. We have noticed that section 20 of the Act of 2017 lays down a provision for removal of difficulty by the State Government and also for framing Rules, wherever it appears necessary and expedients for the purpose of removing the difficulty. Moreover, under section 23, the Government has the power to frame Rules prescribing the service conditions, scope of work, emoluments etc. of the Teachers and Tutors. Section 23(1)(2) & (3) are quoted herein below for ready reference :- “23. The State Government shall create a special pool of fund to facilitate implementation of the provisions of this Act in consultation with the Finance Department of the Government of Assam in due course of time. of the Teachers and Tutors. Section 23(1)(2) & (3) are quoted herein below for ready reference :- “23. The State Government shall create a special pool of fund to facilitate implementation of the provisions of this Act in consultation with the Finance Department of the Government of Assam in due course of time. (1) The State Government may, by notification published in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:- (i) prescribing service conditions and specifying the duties and responsibilities of all teachers whose services have been provincialised under this Act; (ii) preparation and maintenance of service records of the teachers whose services have been provincialised; (iii) for management of the educational institutions; (iv) specifying the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Managing Committee or Governing Body of the educational institutions; (v) prescribing the scope of work, emoluments and remuneration, and other terms and condition of service of tutors provincialised under this Act . (3) All rules made by the State Government under this Act shall, as soon as may be after they are made, be laid before the Assam Legislative Assembly while it is in session, for a total period of not less than fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or two or more successive sessions and shall, unless some later date is appointed, take effect from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette subject to such modifications or annulments as the Legislative Assembly may, during the said period agree to make, so however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder.” 177. Section 23(2)(v) contains a provision for framing Rules for the prescribing the remuneration/emoluments of the Tutors. Therefore, the power to frame Rules have been delegated by the Legislature to the Government. The Rules so framed by the Government would, however, have to be laid before the State Legislative Assembly, which shall have the power to prescribe modification and/or annulment of the Rules so framed. Such Rules are required to be framed under section 23 of the Act so as to give effect to the provisions of the Statute. The Rules so framed by the Government would, however, have to be laid before the State Legislative Assembly, which shall have the power to prescribe modification and/or annulment of the Rules so framed. Such Rules are required to be framed under section 23 of the Act so as to give effect to the provisions of the Statute. However, the Rules so framed would be open to judicial review if the same contravenes the provisions of the Statute or offends the provisions of the Constitution of India. 178. In the case of Kunj Bihari Lal Butail Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in (2000) 3 SCC 40 , the Supreme Court has observed that it is common for the Legislature to provide general rule making power to carry out the purposes of the Act. When such a power is given, it may be permissible to find out the object of the enactment and then see if the Rules framed thereunder satisfy the test of functionality. While framing the Rules the Government will have to be guided by the prescription of the parent Act. 179. It is true that the courts cannot direct the legislature to enact law in a particular manner. However, in discharge of its statutory obligation the Government, in exercise of its Rule making power, will have a duty to frame Rules for proper implementation of the provisions of the Statute. While framing the Rules, the State will also be under a bounden duty to, not only to act in terms of the scheme of the Act but also to unflinchingly adhere to the Constitutional norms of equality. It will, therefore, be in the fitness of things that the State Government itself, in exercise of its Rule making power under section 23 of the Act, takes necessary steps to provide for a regular pay scale to the Tutors, which can even be commensurate to the pay structure indicated in the Schedule of the Governing Act. Such a measure, in our view, will restore the equality of treatment to this category of Teachers with the other Government employees and at the same time will not become burdensome to the exchequer. We, therefore, direct the respondents to initiate necessary steps in the matter, in the light of the observations made here-in-above, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of 6 (six) months from today. 180. We, therefore, direct the respondents to initiate necessary steps in the matter, in the light of the observations made here-in-above, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of 6 (six) months from today. 180. In so far as the challenge to sections 2(u), (j), (x), (xb), (za), (t) of the Act of 2017 are concerned, we find that these provisions merely lay down the definition of various expressions used in the Statute. The purpose of providing definition in a statute is generally aimed at avoiding repetition of these expression in the body of the statute. Some of these provisions have also been assailed primarily due to the cut- off date of 01/01/2006 used there-in. After a careful examination of these provisions of the Statute we are of the view that, save and except the cut-off dates prescribed in some of the provisions, in so far as their retrospective application is concerned, they do not offend any provision of the Constitution making them vulnerable. Read individually, in the context of the Statute, we also find that these provisions do not suffer from any illegality, requiring interference by this court. In so far as the application of the cut-off date is concerned, in view of the determination made here-in above on the said issue, no further discussion in the matter is deemed necessary at this stage. 181. In so far as the challenge made to Sections 3(1)(vi), 3(1)(viii), 3(1)(ix), 3(1)(xi) and 3(2) are concerned, we find that these are operative provisions of the Statute which deal with the various criteria laid down under the Act for provincialisation of Teachers/Tutors of these educational institutions and, therefore, in our opinion, the plea raised by the writ petitioners, assailing the validity of these provisions do not require any independent consideration over and above the consideration extended to the plea of validity of section 3(1)(i). In the above context it will be pertinent to mention herein that the criteria for having a consistent academic performance, the requirement of minimum number of Teacher/Tutor in certain subjects including core subjects, laying down the requirement of at least one Teacher/Tutor for the subjects of Mathematics, Social Studies and Languages, not only appear to be just and reasonable but such criteria, in our view, would lie in the realm of policy decision of the State. Moreover, these criteria also appear to be wholly consistent with the Act of 2009 as well as the provisions of the Act of 1974, Act of 1977 as well as the Rules of 1979, which provisions were never put under challenge. 182. That apart, contrary to the argument advanced by Mr. Das, learned senior counsel for some of the writ petitioners, we find that Section 3 (1)(xi) of the Act of 2017 does not completely take away the rights of his client to be provincialized but it imposes a limit in respect thereof while permitting consideration of additional posts for provincialisation, subject to adherence to the schedule framed under sections 19 and 25 of the Act of 2009. We find that the various sub-sections of section 3 of the Act including those under challenge in these writ petitions largely lay down the policy decisions of the State which are in consonance with various Central Government Acts such as the Act of 2009. Even the requirement of DISE Code under section 3(1) (xii), which prima-facie aims at ensuring physical verification of students and records of attendance, is in accord with the existing Governments schemes. These provisions of the statute merely lays down the decision of the State to implement the provisions of the Act by adhering to certain criteria and therefore, subject to the observations made here-in-above, we find that there is no good ground for this court to declare any of them as unconstitutional. 183. In so far as the challenge made to the provisions of sections 4(2)(ii), (iii) and (iv) of the Act are concerned, these provisions also deal with the terms and conditions for provincialisation of service of Teachers/Tutors of the venture educational institutions. Section 4(2)(ii) deals with minimum educational qualification and professional experience required for the purpose, clause (iii) deals with length of continuous service from the date of joining which must be fulfilled by the concerned candidate and (iv) lays down the teachers –student ratio for engaging teachers in subjects, such as Sanskrit, Arabic, Hindi, Craft teacher, Music teacher and other classical teachers. These provisions prescribing the criteria for provincialisation of Teachers, in our opinion, are also policy matters and hence, it will be permissible for the State to prescribe criteria in respect thereof. These provisions prescribing the criteria for provincialisation of Teachers, in our opinion, are also policy matters and hence, it will be permissible for the State to prescribe criteria in respect thereof. Therefore, the State legislature would be competent to lay down specific criteria for provincialisation of services of those teachers by enacting a Statute. After considering the arguments made by learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that none of these provisions , in any manner, offend the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In such view of the matter, we do not find any justifiable ground to interfere with the said provisions as well. 184. The next provision under challenge is Section 6 of the Act which deals with educational and professional qualification of Teachers. Section 6(1)(ii) & (iii) lay down that the teachers in venture educational institutions from the primary level up to the degree level shall be considered for provincialisation in the post of teachers or relevant teaching faculty in appropriate nomenclature, subject to fulfillment of eligibility criteria relating to educational and professional qualifications, as laid down under (a) The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and its Rules; (b) The National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1992 and its Regulations in force at the time of provincialisation of services; (c) The Assam Secondary Education (Provincialised) Services Rules, 2003, as amended in 2012 and (d) The University Grant Commission Act, 1956. After a careful examination of these provisions of the Acts and Rules, we do not find any inconsistency or repugnancy in these provisions, warranting interference by this Court. Rather, we are of the opinion that, Entry- 25 of the Concurrent List under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the Parliament as well as the State Legislature are both empowered to bring in enactments, laying down norms, criteria and regulations for upgrading the standard of education in the respective States keeping in mind a National Education Policy. These provisions, in our opinion, do not curtail the right of any eligible candidate from being provincialised in a manner which can be termed as arbitrary or discriminatory. Rather, we find that the criteria laid down in this provision makes a clear distinction between different sets of teachers based on their educational qualification and expertise, which is permissible under the law. Rather, we find that the criteria laid down in this provision makes a clear distinction between different sets of teachers based on their educational qualification and expertise, which is permissible under the law. Therefore, we do not find any justifiable ground to interfere with the said provision. 185. Section 7 of the Act deals with educational and professional qualification of Tutors. Here also, we find that as per the prescription of the Act of 2009, unless the teachers fulfill the norms of educational qualification or acquire the qualification within a prescribed period of time, their services cannot be provincialised as teachers. Under such circumstances, section 7 permits provincialisation of service of that category of teachers, who do not fulfill the educational norms, as prescribed by the Act of 2009 as Tutor. Even after provincialisation of their services, the Tutors have been given the liberty to acquire the educational qualification within a period of five years and seek up-gradation. On a careful reading of the provisions of Section 7, we do not find any justifiable ground for this Court to interfere with the said provision of the statute. 186. We now turn to the challenge made to section 8(6) of the Act of 2017 whereby, it has been laid down that the Tutors shall hold personal posts, to be created for provincialisation of their services and these posts shall be outside the cadre, which would stand abolished on cessation of their services by the concerned teachers or Tutors, as the case may be, due to retirement, death, resignation or any other reason, whatsoever. Having regard to the provisions of the statute, we are of the opinion that it was well within the competence and jurisdiction of the State Legislature to enact section 8(6), permitting creation of personal posts so as to provincialise the services of teachers and Tutors. Creation or abolishing any post is the prerogative of the State Government and therefore, the writ petitioner cannot have any grievance against creation of such post since such an act does not in any way violate any of their rights. As such, we are of the considered opinion that no case, whatsoever, is made out for interference with the said provision of the Statute as well. 187. As such, we are of the considered opinion that no case, whatsoever, is made out for interference with the said provision of the Statute as well. 187. In so far as the challenge made to section 24 of the Act is concerned, the same being a repealing provision of the Act of 2011 and considering the fact that the Teachers and employees of the venture educational institutions, whose services had already been provincialised under the Act of 2011, have been protected under the repeal and saving provision, in view of the determination here-in-above, we do not find any good ground for this Court to declare section 24 as un-constitutional. 188. We also find that the Act of 2017, which replaces the Act of 2011, lays down certain duties and functions to be carried out by the appropriate Government and local authorities. Appropriate Government in this case would mean the State Government of Assam. There can be no doubt about the fact that enactment of the Act of 2017, is an effective steps initiated by the State of Assam with a view to realize the constitutional goal enshrined under Article 21-A of the Constitution as well as for realization of the object of the Act of 2009 by further streamlining the educational system in the State of Assam. Therefore, unless the State Government agencies are ad-idem with the Central Government Agencies operating in the field of education, it would be well neigh impossible for the State to achieve the desired objective as set out under section 21-A of the Constitution. As has been noted above, the requirement of educational qualification, pupil – teacher ratio etc. are laid down not only in the Act of 2009 itself but also in several previous enactment of the State and the Act of 2017 merely seeks to implement such criteria while provincialising the service of the employees of the Venture Educational Institutions. It may be correct to say that the criteria of pupil-teacher ratio, minimum student criteria etc. may curtail the number of teacher whose services could be provincialised under the Act of 2017 but these criteria can neither be termed as irrational nor can it be said that such criteria would permanently restricts the avenue of provincialisation of any particular class of teacher even though the same many restrict their opportunity to some extent. may curtail the number of teacher whose services could be provincialised under the Act of 2017 but these criteria can neither be termed as irrational nor can it be said that such criteria would permanently restricts the avenue of provincialisation of any particular class of teacher even though the same many restrict their opportunity to some extent. The pupil-teacher ratio concept as envisaged under Act of 2009 has received the approval of the Hon’ble Supreme Court [see; Rajneesh Kumar Pandey & others vs. Union of India and others reported in (2021) 17 SCC 1 ]. Whether the student– teacher ratio prescribed under Act of 2017 is proportionate or not cannot be an issue that can be agitated before this Court in the present proceedings. 189. In the case of State of A.P. Vs. Medowell & Co. Ltd. reported in (1996) 3 SCC 709 , the Supreme Court has observed that doctrine of proportionality would not be applicable while interpreting the legislation for it is doubtful if the doctrine would be applicable even in the field of administrative law. 190. It is trite that a Statutory enactment cannot be struck down by the court on the plea that it is unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted. Discrimination is no doubt a well established ground for striking out legislation on account of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. However, mere allegation of discrimination will not be sufficient for the Court to declare a statute unconstitutional. Such allegations will have to be established by the party complaining so as to enable the Court to act. 191. It is to be borne in mind that provincialisation of services of the Venture Educational Institutions would be permissible only under the Act of 2017 (as well as under the repealed Act of 2011).The finances required for paying the salary of the teachers and other expenses is to be borne by the State. Therefore, it will always be permissible for the State Government to lay down reasonable pre-conditions for provincialisation of services of the employees of the Venture Educational Institutions. As long as these conditions do not offend the provisions of the Constitution including Article 14 they would not be vulnerable. 192. Therefore, it will always be permissible for the State Government to lay down reasonable pre-conditions for provincialisation of services of the employees of the Venture Educational Institutions. As long as these conditions do not offend the provisions of the Constitution including Article 14 they would not be vulnerable. 192. It is no doubt correct that some of the provisions incorporated in the Act of 2017 as pre-condition for provincialisation of service of a particular class of employees may seem onerous, work to the disadvantage of one group of teacher or other and may even appear to be wholly unreasonable and irrational to some. However, while interpreting the provisions of the Statute, the courts have to bear in mind that a plenary statute cannot be struck down on the grounds of unreasonableness, irrationality, illegality of procedural impropriety or even on account of violation of principles of natural justice. Although these grounds may very well be the legitimate grounds for judicial review of an administrative action of the state, the same cannot be pressed into service so as to assail a plenary legislation enacted by the Legislature. Therefore, while examining the constitutional validity of a Statute, the Courts must be sapient and conscious of the context in which the legislation has been brought about. Conclusion :- 193. For the reasons stated here-in-before, we do not find any justifiable ground either to strike down the Act of 2017 or any provisions contained there-in. However, section 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2017 as well as the amended provisions of 3(1)(i) of the Act of 2018 are hereby read down in the manner indicated here-in-above. Subject to the determination, observation and directions made here-in-above, the validity of Act of 2017 as well as the Amendment Act of 2018 are hereby up-held. 194. We have already noted here-in-above indicating that we are not entering into adjudication in respect of any question of fact involved in the individual writ petitions in this batch of petitions leading to passing of separate order(s) granting or rejecting the prayers made there-in. Therefore, in the light of the determination made herein above, it would now be open for the respective petitioners to seek appropriate legal remedy, before the appropriate forum, as may be permissible under the law, if so advised. 195. All the writ petitions stand disposed of accordingly. Parties to bear their own costs.