ORDER : Per, Shree Chandrashekhar J. This writ petition has been filed to challenge the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench in Original Application No.251 of 2007 not to interfere with the penalty of dismissal dated 27th September 2006. The writ petitioner is also aggrieved by the order dated 21st December 2023 by which the petition seeking review of the order dated 16th March 2011 has been dismissed. 2. In the order dated 16th March 2011, the Tribunal considered the judgments in “Prabhu Lal Agarwal vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.” (1993) LAB I.C. 1000, “Gadadhar Rambin vs. Food Corporation of India & Ors.” (1989) 4 SLR 724 and, “Har Govind Sharma vs. Union of India & Ors.” in O.A. No.148 of 1994 relied upon by the petitioner. The Tribunal also referred to the judgments in “Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Ors. vs. T.K. Raju” (2006) 3 SCC 143 and “Syndicate Bank & Ors. vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati” (2006) 3 SCC 150 cited on behalf of the employer-Heavy Water Board. 3. The Tribunal after having considered the rival contentions came to a conclusion that it has no power to re-appreciate the evidence or to interfere with the punishment awarded to the delinquent government employee and, accordingly, dismissed the Original Application No.251 of 2007. 4. Mr. Sharvan Kumar Malik, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even taking the findings recorded by the departmental authority to be correct, the punishment of dismissal from service is grossly disproportionate to the charge of unauthorized absence from duty and, that too, for one month only. To lay support to this submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner refers to “Ranjeet Thakur vs. Union of India” (1987) 4 SCC 611 and “B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India” (1995) 6 SCC 749 . 5. Briefly stated, the petitioner who was appointed on the post of Fireman was holding the post of Leading Fireman-B at the relevant time. He was served a memo of charge on 10th February 2005 on the allegation that he had misrepresented the grounds of his absence from duty by furnishing false reasons and he suppressed vital information about his arrest and police/judicial custody in connection to a criminal case. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report vide letter dated 29th April 2006 and held as under: “10. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report vide letter dated 29th April 2006 and held as under: “10. FINDINGS ON EACH CHARGE: a. The Charged Official is not guilty of remaining unauthorisedly absent from duty from 11.07.2004 to 10.08.2004. b. The Charged Official is guilty of misrepresenting the grounds of his absence by furnishing false reasons. c. The Charged Official is guilty of suppressing the vital information about his arrest and Police/judicial custody in connection with the criminal case. d. Because of the absence of the Charged Official, the work in Fire Services Section was adversely affected. e. There is no proof that the image of the Department is tarnished because of the act of the Charged Official.” 6. The Disciplinary Authority after having considered the stand taken by the delinquent government employee and the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer passed the order of dismissal from service on 27th September 2006. 7. This is too well settled a law that the writ Court shall not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the departmental authority in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless it is demonstrated before the Court that the findings of fact recorded by the departmental authority are perverse. This shall also be a ground for the writ Court to interfere in the matter if the departmental authority had ignored a vital evidence or taken into consideration some irrelevant material. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Syed Yakoob vs K.S. Radhakrishnan & Ors.” 1964 AIR 477 held that an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by the writ Court but an error of fact howsoever grave it may appear to be cannot be interfered with in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution, except where a finding of fact has been recorded by the inferior Tribunal by erroneously admitting inadmissible evidence or some admissible evidence has been improperly refused. 8. This is not the case pleaded by the petitioner that he was not afforded sufficient opportunity to defend himself in the departmental inquiry against him. This is also not the case pleaded by the petitioner that the order of punishment has been passed in breach of the extant disciplinary Rules. 8. This is not the case pleaded by the petitioner that he was not afforded sufficient opportunity to defend himself in the departmental inquiry against him. This is also not the case pleaded by the petitioner that the order of punishment has been passed in breach of the extant disciplinary Rules. Quite apparently, in such a situation a certiorari shall not lie unless the petitioner points out some vital error in law in the order under challenge. The Inquiry Officer clearly recorded that the delinquent government employee had compromised his integrity and behaved in a manner unbecoming of a government servant and thereby contravened the provisions of Rule 3(1)(i) & 3(1)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964. This is also a matter of record that the petitioner was implicated in a criminal case vide NDPS Case No.8 of 2005 and he had faced the trial on the charge under Sections 8/15, 8/29 and 8/25 of the NDPS Act. In the said case, the petitioner was acquitted of aforesaid charges framed against him, but then, a glance at the judgment dated 2nd August 2013 in NDPS Case No.8 of 2005 would reveal that most of the prosecution witnesses turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case when they came in the dock to tender evidence. 9. This is also not within the jurisdiction of the writ Court to see whether the punishment imposed upon by the delinquent government employee is proportionate or disproportionate to the charge framed against him unless the punishment so imposed is such that shocks the conscience of the Court. [refer, “Union of India Vs. Ranjeet Thakur” reported in 1987 (4) SCC 611 ]. Mr. Sharvan Kumar Malik, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on “B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India” wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : (1964) 1 LLJ 38 ] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. 14. 14. In Union of India v. S.L. Abbas [ (1993) 4 SCC 357 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 230 : (1993) 25 ATC 844] when the order of transfer was interfered with by the Tribunal, this Court held that the Tribunal was not an appellate authority which could substitute its own judgment to that bona fide order of transfer. The Tribunal could not, in such circumstances, interfere with orders of transfer of a government servant. In Administrator of Dadra & Nagar Haveli v. H.P. Vora [1993 Supp (1) SCC 551 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 281 : (1993) 23 ATC 672] it was held that the Administrative Tribunal was not an appellate authority and it could not substitute the role of authorities to clear the efficiency bar of a public servant. Recently, in State Bank of India v. Samarendra Kishore Endow [ (1994) 2 SCC 537 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 687 : (1994) 27 ATC 149 : JT (1994) 1 SC 217] a Bench of this Court of which two of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy and B.L. Hansaria, JJ.) were members, considered the order of the Tribunal, which quashed the charges as based on no evidence, went in detail into the question as to whether the Tribunal had power to appreciate the evidence while exercising power of judicial review and held that a tribunal could not appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion to that of the disciplinary authority. It would, therefore, be clear that the Tribunal cannot embark upon appreciation of evidence to substitute its own findings of fact to that of a disciplinary/appellate authority.” 10. In our opinion, the decision in “B.C. Chaturvedi” does not help the petitioner to wriggle out from the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of the facts and, that, adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be agitated in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Keeping in mind the nature of misconduct committed by the petitioner in connection to his absence from duty, we hold that the punishment of dismissal from service was the only appropriate penalty to be imposed on the delinquent government employee. 11. While so, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10549 of 2024 is dismissed.