ORDER : 1. This Petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing the validity and correctness of the order dated 5.10.2011 passed in Mercy Appeal by the Director General of Police, (Annexure-P/1); the appellate order dated 17.5.2010 passed by the DIG, Rajnandgaon and the final order passed by the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure-P/3) dated 13.1.2010 whereby the order of penalty of removal from service passed by the Disciplinary Authority was affirmed. The petitioner has also challenged the enquiry report dated 30th December, 2009 (Annexure-R/1) and has also sought direction to the respondents to reinstate him in service with all consequential benefits. 2. The quintessential facts for adjudication of the controversy in the petition are that during the period 6.2.2009, the petitioner, while posted as a Constable at Police Station Gendatola, District Rajnandgaon, committed certain misconduct. Therefore, on the following allegations, charge sheet was issued against the petitioner: “(i) That on 06/02/2009, unauthorisedly the petitioner visited the village Khoratola, where he threatened the applicant Deolal that he will frame the applicant for having illegally kept illegal forest wood. The delinquent petitioner also threatened the applicant by abusing him and threatening him to lock him up in a room and demanded Rs.5,000/- illegal gratitude (bribe) from the applicant in exchange for not taking the above action against the applicant and thus exhibited corrupt conduct. (ii) That on 06/02/2009, the delinquent constant no.386/petitioner was absent from “stunt to”, which was held at P.S. Gendatola and thus exhibited gross dereliction of his duties (in a heavy naxalite affected areas “stunt to” means that the police force and the constables are required to remain at a “stunt to” position so as to proceed upon immediate attack against naxalites).” 3. The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge sheet, which was not found to be satisfactory and thus the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to appoint enquiry officer. During the departmental proceeding, Gurjeet Singh, Revenue Inspector, Rajnandgaon was appointed as Presenting Officer. Vide order cated 16.6.2009, Ramgopal Garg, Additional Superintendent of Police, Reserve Force, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. As the said officer proceeded on training, vide order dated 25.10.2009, Smt. Bhavna Pandey, Deputy SP, Rajnandgaon, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. 4. During the enquiry, the Department has produced as many as 7 prosecution witnesses and exhibited 9 documents. Vide order cated 16.6.2009, Ramgopal Garg, Additional Superintendent of Police, Reserve Force, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. As the said officer proceeded on training, vide order dated 25.10.2009, Smt. Bhavna Pandey, Deputy SP, Rajnandgaon, was appointed as Enquiry Officer. 4. During the enquiry, the Department has produced as many as 7 prosecution witnesses and exhibited 9 documents. The petitioner was also granted an opportunity to lead defence wherein he has categorically chosen not to examine any defence evidence at question No.14. The petitioner exhibited 3 documents in his defence. 5. The Enquiry Officer upon conclusion of the proceeding prepared enquiry report (Annexure-R/1) dated 30th December, 2009, in which he concluded that all the charges were found proved against the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority agreeing with the enquiry report afforded an opportunity to show cause by sending copy of the enquiry report. The petitioner/delinquent officer submitted his reply on 22.1.2010. Considering the enquiry report, the documents available on record and the reply filed by the delinquent officer, the Disciplinary Authority was of the opinion that the delinquent officer has not brought any new facts to mitigate the serious nature of charges and imposed penalty of removal from service vide Annexure-P/3, dated 30.1.2010. Against which the petitioner has preferred Departmental Appeal, which was also dismissed vide order dated 17.5.2010 (Annexure-P/2). Thereafter the petitioner has preferred Mercy Appeal which too has been dismissed vide order Annexure-P/1, dated 5.10.2011. Hence this petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that though in the instant matter, the Presenting Officer has been appointed, but the Enquiry Officer himself cross-examined not only the petitioner but also the departmental witnesses and performed the role of the prosecutor and thereby, the Enquiry Officer was prejudiced right from the beginning of the enquiry proceeding. Reliance is placed in the matter of Anita Thakur Vs. State Government of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2019 LAB. I.C. (NOC) 106 (CHH) and paras-12 & 13 were referred. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that even the superior officer, while acting as Appellate Authority or Revisional Authority, has not assigned any reason for agreeing or confirming the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. He submits that the Enquiry Officer and the Superior Officer while acting as Appellate Authority or Revisional Authority, performs a quasi judicial function. Reliance is placed in the matter of M.V. Bijlani Vs. He submits that the Enquiry Officer and the Superior Officer while acting as Appellate Authority or Revisional Authority, performs a quasi judicial function. Reliance is placed in the matter of M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 88 . 7. Placing reliance in the matter of Kranti Associates Private Limited and Another Vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and Others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 it is submitted that it is mandatory for the said authority to assign reason and assess the evidence in exercise of their powers and such recording of reasons is required as the Courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review, as the reason is the soul of justice. He would refer to para-46 & 47 of the said judgment. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Enquiry Officer has also not complied with the procedure prescribed under the CG Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short ‘the Rules, 1966’). Learned counsel would refer to Rule 14 (8) of the Rules, 1966 to submit that though in the present case, a Presenting Officer has been appointed, but the delinquent employee has also a right to take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case on his behalf and this right has not been informed by the Enquiry Officer during the course of enquiry to the delinquent employee. For the same, he has placed reliance in the matter of Bhagat Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, (1983) 2 SCC 442 and referred para-5 in which it has been observed that justice and fairplay demand that where in a disciplinary proceeding the department is represented by a Presenting Officer, it would be incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority while making appointment of a Presenting Officer to appear on his behalf simultaneously to inform the delinquent of the fact of appointment and the right of the delinquent to take help of another government servant before the commencement of enquiry. At any rate the Enquiry Officer at least must enquire from the delinquent officer whether he would like to engage anyone from the Department to defend him and when the delinquent is a government servant belonging to the lower echelons of service, he would further be informed that he is entitled under the relevant Rules to seek assistance of another government servant belonging to Department to represent him. If after this information is conveyed to the delinquent government servant, he still chooses to proceed with the enquiry without obtaining assistance, one can say there is substantial compliance with the Rules. But in the absence of such information being conveyed, if the enquiry proceeds, certainly a very vital question would arise whether the delinquent government servant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. In such circumstances, the Court has to assess whether enquiry is vitiated. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that the Enquiry Officer has also not prepared the report in terms of Rule 14(23) of the Rules, 1966, particularly sub-rule (c) which provides for assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge. Further, sub-rule (d) thereof requires the finding on each article of charge and the reasons there for. However, the Enquiry Officer has only narrated the evidence and has not made any comparison in respect of one witness i.e. PW-4 who has not supported the case of the Department. Therefore, the enquiry report itself is bad in law. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner further refers to Rule 14 (18) of the Rules, 1966 to submit that it is mandatory requirement that examination of the delinquent employee has to be done to enable him (government servant) to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence against him. Rule 14 (19) of the Rules, 1966 lays down that after conclusion of the enquiry, an opportunity for submission of written brief should be provided to both the sides. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that even the appellate authority has not passed the order in terms of requirement of Rule 27 (2) of the Rules, 1966, particularly the clauses (a), (b) & (c) provided therein, as for consideration of appeal, it is to be taken into consideration whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record and whether the penalty imposed is adequate or not. But in the instant case, the appellate authority has not considered the same. 12. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioner would refer to the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.1213/2002 (MV Rao Vs. Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India, Raipur & Ors), decided on 12.7.2016, which was subsequently affirmed in WA No.403/2016, which was decided on 9.4.2019. In the said matter, appeal preferred by the legal heir of the original petitioner namely, M. Padmavati was allowed, the order passed by the learned Single Judge on merits was affirmed and 100% back wages was granted. 13. In view of the above submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner prays that the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority, as also the order passed in mercy appeal and the enquiry report be quashed, being contrary to the procedure and in violation of principles of natural justice and the petitioner may be reinstated in service. 14. Per contra, learned State Counsel would submit that the procedure for conducting departmental enquiry relating to the employees in the Police Department is governed by the Police Manual and the MP Police Regulation No.228 prescribes the procedure as to when and how it is to be conducted which reads thus:- “228. D.E. - When and how held.- In every case of removal, compulsory retirement from service, reduction in rank, grade or pay or withholding of increment for a period in excess of one year a formal proceeding must be recorded by the Superintendent in the prescribed form,- setting forth, (a) The charge; (b) The evidence on which the charge is based; (c) The defense of the accused; (d) The statements of his witnesses (if any); (e) The finding of the Superintendent, with the reasons on which it is based; (f) The Superintendent’s final order or recommendation, as the case may be: Provided that it shall not be necessary to record a formal proceeding, if due to exigencies of service and not by reason of any misconduct or fault on his part, a police officer is transferred from a post carrying a special or specialist pay in the special Armed Force. Motor Transport or Radio Telegraphy sections to a post not carrying such pay and reduction in his pay is caused by reason of such transfer. Motor Transport or Radio Telegraphy sections to a post not carrying such pay and reduction in his pay is caused by reason of such transfer. Note (1) – If a written defence is tendered, it should be accepted and attached to the record. Note (2) – Reasonable time should, however, be given to the accused person to submit his written defense after the charge sheet is handed over to him. Note (3) – The travelling allowance of the defence witnesses shall be borne by the department. In Order to facilitate the production of defence witnesses, the Inquiry Officer on the application of the accused should issue a notice to the defense witnesses to present themselves on the date so fixed. If the witnesses do not turn up after such notices, it shall be the responsibility of the accused to produce his own witnesses.” 15. Learned State Counsel would further submit that whenever the regulation is silent on the aspect of punishment, Regulation 213 specifically enables to take assistance from the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules to regulate the punishment of and appeal from the officers belonging to the Indian Police Service and the State Police Service respectively. He further submits that the procedure has been substantially complied with and there is no violation of the natural justice in the departmental enquiry. Before initiating the departmental enquiry, after framing of the charges, defence has been provided to the delinquent officer and when his reply was found unsatisfactory, enquiry was initiated and the delinquent officer has denied the charges and wanted enquiry. He further submits that in the Police Regulations, there is no provision to provide assistance of any other Government servant to the delinquent officer, but the delinquent officer may request for any assistance in terms of Rule 14 (8) of the Rules, 1966. However, during the enquiry proceeding, the delinquent officer has not made any such request before the enquiry officer and, therefore, he could not claim lacunae in the departmental proceeding on such aspect. Even the said ground has not been taken in the Appeal and the Mercy Petition, and no specific ground has been raised in the writ petition. 16. However, during the enquiry proceeding, the delinquent officer has not made any such request before the enquiry officer and, therefore, he could not claim lacunae in the departmental proceeding on such aspect. Even the said ground has not been taken in the Appeal and the Mercy Petition, and no specific ground has been raised in the writ petition. 16. Learned State Counsel further submits that the petitioner is a trained police personnel and he has put cross-examination to various witnesses and also not availed opportunity to examine defence evidence when the Enquiry Officer has put specific questions to him and further exhibited 3 documents in his defence. The Enquiry Officer in a fair manner assessed the evidence on record. He further submits that there is no bar to the Enquiry Officer in a domestic enquiry to put questions to the witnesses for clarification. Even Section 165 of the Evidence Act enables the Judges to elicit the truth. He would submit that the Enquiry Officer cannot be treated as trained Law Graduates and only the term ‘cross-examination’ has been used by the Enquiry Officer during the enquiry proceeding and it does not mean that the Enquiry Officer has put the question like cross-examination. 17. Learned State Counsel has drawn attention of the Court to the enquiry report and all the statements recorded during the course of enquiry to submit that no leading question has been put to any of the witnesses and the petitioner was examined in terms of Rule 14(18) i.e. in the form of examination of the delinquent officer, though erroneously the Enquiry Officer has mentioned as cross- examination in respect of the petitioner. He further submits that when the delinquent officer has not desired to lead any defence evidence and did not want to file any written brief, there is no violation of Rule 14 (19) of the Rules, 1966. He further submits that every infraction of statutory provision, rule and regulation cannot be termed as prejudice to the delinquent officer unless the the same are fundamental in nature. In the instant case, there is ample evidence against the petitioner/delinquent officer to the effect that the delinquent officer, who is the police person, visited to village and demanded bribe which was proved by the complainant and other witnesses in their statements. Learned State Counsel has drawn attention of the Court towards statements of the witnesses. In the instant case, there is ample evidence against the petitioner/delinquent officer to the effect that the delinquent officer, who is the police person, visited to village and demanded bribe which was proved by the complainant and other witnesses in their statements. Learned State Counsel has drawn attention of the Court towards statements of the witnesses. He further submits that only in case of no evidence this Court can interfere and when there is some evidence and the supporting finding in the departmental enquiry, the Court cannot doubt or reassess as to the adequacy or reliability of the evidence invoking writ jurisdiction. Considering the misconduct committed by the petitioner, punishment of removal from service is just and proper and the same cannot be termed as disproportionate to the misconduct found proved and shocks the conscience of the Court. Therefore, the Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed. 18. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents annexed with the writ petition as also the documents filed by the parties and the original record of the enquiry proceeding. 19. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached. It is also well settled that whenever infraction of any statutory provision, rule and regulation is highlighted and the same is not fundamental in nature, the applicability of test of prejudice can be applied. In the matter of State of U.P. Vs. Harendra Arora and Another, (2001) 6 SCC 392 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has examined the said issue and relevant para-13 is reproduced hereunder:- “13. The matter may be examined from another view point. There may be cases where there are infractions of statutory provisions, rules and regulations. Can it be said that every such infraction would make the consequent action void and/or invalid? The matter may be examined from another view point. There may be cases where there are infractions of statutory provisions, rules and regulations. Can it be said that every such infraction would make the consequent action void and/or invalid? The statute may contain certain substantive provisions, e.g., who is the competent authority to impose a particular punishment on a particular employee. Such provision must be strictly complied with as in these cases the theory of substantial compliance may not be available. For example, where a rule specifically provides that the delinquent officer shall be given an opportunity to produce evidence in support of his case after the close of the evidence of the other side and if no such opportunity is given, it would not be possible to say that the inquiry was not vitiated. But in respect of many procedural provisions, it would be possible to apply the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice, as the case may be. Even amongst procedural provisions, there may be some provisions of a fundamental nature which have to be complied with and in whose case the theory of substantial compliance may not be available, but the question of prejudice may be material. In respect of procedural provisions other than of a fundamental nature, the theory of substantial compliance would be available and in such cases objections on this score have to be judged on the touchstone of prejudice. The test would be, whether the delinquent officer had or did not have a fair hearing. In the case of Russel vs. Duke of Norfolk & Ors., 1949 (1) All E.R. 109, it was laid down by the Court of Appeal that the principle of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae and the same cannot be put in a straitjacket as its applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case.” 20. It is also well settled that in the enquiry proceeding, the Enquiry Officer can put questions to the witnesses for clarification whenever necessary. In the matter of Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd. Vs. Workmen, (1975) 4 SCC 731 (3 Judges), the following observation was made at para-5 :- “5………………………………….It was reasonable and also necessary to look for some explanation for the contradictory statements. In the matter of Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd. Vs. Workmen, (1975) 4 SCC 731 (3 Judges), the following observation was made at para-5 :- “5………………………………….It was reasonable and also necessary to look for some explanation for the contradictory statements. If, therefore, the Enquiry Officer had put certain questions to these two witnesses by way of clarification, it could not be said that he had done something that was not fair or proper. The witnesses were allowed to be cross- examined on behalf of the union after they had answered the questions asked by the Enquiry Officer. In our opinion the note made by the Enquiry Officer stating that the witnesses had turned hostile meant only that they had stated before him something that was inconsistent with what appeared in the memorandum signed by them. We do not think that the enquiry was vitiated because the Enquiry Officer put some questions to the said witnesses by way of clarification in the circumstances stated above. This Court in Workmen v. Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras, held that the Enquiry Officer in a domestic enquiry can put questions to the witnesses for clarification wherever necessary and if he allows the witnesses to be cross-examined thereafter, the enquiry proceedings cannot be impeached as unfair. We are therefore unable to accept that the enquiry in this case had not been conducted in a fair and proper manner.” 21. In the matter of Pravin Kumar Vs. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 , same argument was canvassed before a Three Judge Bench that the Enquiry Officer could not have put his own questions to the prosecution witnesses and could also not have cross-examined the witnesses. In the said case, it was argued that the same would amount to making the prosecutor the Judge. The said argument was negatived by the Court by observing in para-31 as under:- “31. Significant emphasis has been placed by the appellant on the fact that the enquiry officer put his own questions to the prosecution witness and that he cross-examined the witnesses brought forth by the defence. This, it is claimed, amounts to making the prosecutor the Judge, in violation of the natural justice principle of “nemo judex in sua causa”. However, such a plea is misplaced. This, it is claimed, amounts to making the prosecutor the Judge, in violation of the natural justice principle of “nemo judex in sua causa”. However, such a plea is misplaced. It must be recognised that, under Section 165, Evidence Act, Judges have the power to ask any question to any witness or party about any fact, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts. While strict rules of evidence are inapplicable to disciplinary proceedings, enquiry officers often put questions to witnesses in such proceedings in order to discover the truth. Indeed, it may be necessary to do such direct questioning in certain circumstances. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant, except for making a bald allegation that the enquiry officer has questioned the witnesses, did not point to any specific question put by the officer that would indicate that he had exceeded his jurisdiction. No specific malice or bias has been alleged against the enquiry officer, and even during the enquiry no request had been made to seek a replacement, thus, evidencing how these objections are nothing but an afterthought.” 22. In the instant matter, during the enquiry proceeding, the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority has not informed the rights of the delinquent about engaging the defence assistant, though in the Police Regulations, there is no specific provision and specific proceeding has been prescribed under the Regulation 228, though the said provision specifically does not prohibit for providing the defence assistant, however, when the delinquent officer makes such demand and the Enquiry Officer refuses such demand, then certainly Rule 14 (8) of the Rules, 1966 comes into operation in this behalf and the Enquiry Officer is duty bound to make available the defence assistant to delinquent. But looking to the manner in which the petitioner, who is a trained police officer, cross-examined the witnesses at length and also exhibited 3 documents in his defence, and the petitioner has also not sought any defence assistant from the Department in his defence in terms of Rule 14 (8) of the Rules, 1966, neither any such prayer was made before the Enquiry Officer nor the appellate authority nor during mercy petition, and for the first time, the said ground was raised before this Court, it can safely be held that the said ground was raised only to search the lacuane to find fault in the enquiry proceeding. Though this Court has already observed in the preceding paragraph that normally such right should be informed to the delinquent officer prior to the commencement of the departmental enquiry, but considering the fact that in the present case, the petitioner is a trained police personnel and further considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the record of the proceeding, this Court is of the view that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner on such aspect. 23. This Court has also examined the questions put forth by the Enquiry Officer during the course of enquiry to the witnesses as well as the petitioner, though learned counsel for the petitioner specifically points out the Question Nos.11, 12 & 13 put by the Enquiry Officer to the delinquent employee, and this Court is of the view that the said examination is in terms of Rule 14 (18) of the Rules, 1966 inasmuch as after examination of the witnesses, an opportunity was afforded to the delinquent officer to explain the circumstances against him, wherein he has categorically stated that he did not want to adduce any defence evidence and only exhibited 3 documents. Only because the said examination was titled as cross- examination, it has no significance, as the said examination squarely in compliance of Rule 14 (18) of the Rules, 1966. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn attention of the Court towards the cross-examination of Witness No.4 namely, Pritam Das, son of Mohan Das and after examination-in-chief, after declaring the said witness hostile, the Enquiry Officer has examined in the form of cross-examination. The manner in which the questions were put would only show that the Enquiry Officer wanted to elicit truth and he has not put any leading question with intention to inculpate the delinquent officer unnecessarily. Even the Judges may ask any question to any witness or party in order to discover or to obtain proof of relevant facts. Therefore, it is observed that the Enquiry Officer has put certain questions to this witness only to discover truth and it cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer has acted like Prosecutor, and the ratio laid down in the matters of Pravin Kumar and Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd (Supra) squarely attracts. Therefore, it is observed that the Enquiry Officer has put certain questions to this witness only to discover truth and it cannot be said that the Enquiry Officer has acted like Prosecutor, and the ratio laid down in the matters of Pravin Kumar and Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd (Supra) squarely attracts. In the circumstances, this Court holds that the Enquiry Officer was not biased and he has acted in a fair and proper manner. 25. This Court has gone through the evidence of the complainant – Deolal (PW-1), which is duly corroborated by the evidence of other witness namely, Dayaram and the petitioner has been identified as a person who raised demand of bribe and also threatened the complainant to implicate in a false case, and this Court is of the opinion that it is not a case of no evidence and this Court is not entitled to re-assess as to the adequacy or reliability of the evidence, which is not permissible while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The principle of no evidence in service jurisprudence has recently been enunciated in the matter of Union of India v. Dilip Paul, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1423 (3 Judges) wherein the true meaning of ‘no evidence’ has been explained. The Rule has been adopted in India from England and at para-86, observation of Diplock was referred, which is reproduced hereunder:- “86. Diplock L.J. made the following pertinent observations reproduced below: “Where, as in the present case, a personal bias or mala fides on the part of the deputy commissioner is not in question, the rules of natural justice which he must observe can, in my view, be reduced to two. First, he must base decision on evidence, whether a hearing is requested or not. Secondly, if a hearing is requested, he must fairly listen to the contentions of all persons who are entitled to be represented at the hearing. “In the context of the first rule, “evidence” is not restricted to evidence which would be admissible in a court of law…. Secondly, if a hearing is requested, he must fairly listen to the contentions of all persons who are entitled to be represented at the hearing. “In the context of the first rule, “evidence” is not restricted to evidence which would be admissible in a court of law…. “… The requirement that a person exercising quasi- judicial functions must base his decision on evidence means no more than it must be based upon material which tends logically to show the existence or none- existence of facts relevant to the issue to be determined, or to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of some future event the occurrence of which would be relevant. It means that he must not spin a coin or consult an astrologer, but he may take into account any material which, as a matter of reason, has some probative value in the sense mentioned above. If it is capable of having any probative value, the weight to be attached to it is a matter for the person to whom Parliament has entrusted the responsibility of deciding the issue. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court does not entitle it to usurp this responsibility and to substitute its own view for his.”” 26. At para-88 of the said judgment, it was further observed that the English Courts have not construed the words “no evidence” narrowly. The rule of “no evidence” is there attracted not only in cases where there is complete lack of evidence, that is to say, where there is not a shred of evidence, but also in cases where the evidence, if any, is not capable of having any probative value, or on the basis of which no Tribunal could reasonably and logically come to the conclusion about the existence or nonexistence of facts relevant to the determination. According to the English decisions, although a domestic tribunal may act on evidence not admissible according to the legal rules in a court of law, yet unless such evidence has some probative value in the sense mentioned above, it would be a breach of natural justice and/or an error of law to base any adverse decision thereon. 27. In the aforesaid judgment, the scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge to the disciplinary action taken by the employers was discussed at paras-89 to 92 which read thus:- “89. 27. In the aforesaid judgment, the scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge to the disciplinary action taken by the employers was discussed at paras-89 to 92 which read thus:- “89. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , it was held at page 1726 that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him the rule followed in criminal trials with regard to the establishment of charge by evidence beyond reasonable doubt was not applicable. In a proceeding under Art. 226, the High Court, not being a court of appeal over the decision of the domestic tribunal, was concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice were not violated. Then follow the following important observations:— “Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence… if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied) 90. This decision was approvingly referred to and relied upon in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557 . 91. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 , the question as to the amplitude and width of the judicial review under Art. 226, fell for consideration in the context of the disciplinary proceedings against Government servants. 91. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 , the question as to the amplitude and width of the judicial review under Art. 226, fell for consideration in the context of the disciplinary proceedings against Government servants. It was observed that “the High Court under Art. 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all” and that there was little doubt that a writ of Certiorari can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceeding is based on no evidence. A conclusion on a question of fact, it was held, would be assailable if it is manifest that there is no evidence to support it even assuming bona fides of the disciplinary authority. The following observations made at page 369 are material from the point of view of the aspect under consideration: “… In exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion follows or not. …” (Emphasis supplied) 92. In R. Mahalingam v. Chairman, Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission, (2013) 14 SCC 379 , this Court laid down the scope of judicial review as regards the findings of the disciplinary proceedings with the following relevant observations being reproduced below:— “11. … The scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge to the disciplinary action taken by the employers is very limited. … The scope of judicial review in matters involving challenge to the disciplinary action taken by the employers is very limited. The courts are primarily concerned with the question whether the enquiry has been held by the competent authority in accordance with the prescribed procedure and whether the rules of natural justice have been followed. The court can also consider whether there was some tangible evidence for proving the charge against the delinquent and such evidence reasonably supports the conclusions recorded by the competent authority. If the court comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was held in consonance with the prescribed procedure and the rules of natural justice and the conclusion recorded by the disciplinary authority is supported by some tangible evidence, then there is no scope for interference with the discretion exercised by the disciplinary authority to impose the particular punishment except when the same is found to be wholly disproportionate to the misconduct found proved or shocks the conscience of the court.” (Emphasis supplied)” 28. In view of the aforesaid settled principles, this Court is of the view that the procedure has been substantially complied with in the present case and no prejudice was caused to the delinquent officer. The appellate authority while dismissing the mercy petition has rightly recorded a finding that there is some evidence to prove the said charges, the charges were rightly proved and the punishment awarded is just and proper. This Court is not inclined to disturb the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the appellate authority. 29. In the result, the Writ Petition being bereft of any substance deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.