JUDGMENT : 1. This criminal appeal under Section 378 (iii) and (i) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant-State laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 17.10.1998, passed by the learned Special Judge, Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Cases, Pratapgarh, District – Chittorgarh in Special Criminal Case No.35/1997, whereby the accused-respondent Ashwani Bhardwaj was acquitted of the offences under Sections 302 or 302/34/149 & 364/201 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and accused-respondents Ravindra Kumar and Dilip Kumar Sharma were acquitted of the offences under Sections 302 or 302/34/149-201 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred on 09.12.1992 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 1999. 3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by Mr. Deepak Choudhary, learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant-State are that on the night of 09.12.1992 the alleged incident occurred. The complainant - Smt. Nirmla (wife of the deceased – Ashok Kumar) submitted a written report (Ex.P/32) on 04.06.1993 before the Superintendent of Police, Chittorgarh, whereupon the Superintendent of Police, Chittorgarh directed the Station House Officer to lodge an FIR under Section 364 of Indian Penal Code and for conducting an investigation in the matter. The investigation was proceeded accordingly. Complainant Nirmla in her written report stated that she was living at House No.15-A at Pratap Nagar, District Chittorgarh with her husband and her husband was working with the employer Ashwani Kumar Bhardwaj who was indulged in trade of drugs. She stated that accused-respondent Ashwani Kumar Bhardwaj and Bheru Singh came to their house and they asked her husband Ashok Kumar (deceased) to go to Neemach due to some official work of the company however due to his illness, deceased - Ashok Kumar denied them to go but they pressurized him whereupon the deceased agreed to go with them. She further stated that the deceased wanted to take his own car but he was persuaded not to take the same and the accused-respondents took the deceased with them in their car. She further stated that the deceased wanted to take his own car but he was persuaded not to take the same and the accused-respondents took the deceased with them in their car. She further stated that on the next day i.e. 10.12.1992, an information was received to her by her brother-in-law Vinod that there was an accident that took place near Sikar and the deceased – Ashok Kumar was seriously injured therein. On 10.12.1992, the deceased was taken to Jhunjunu in serious condition where he passed away. On 11.12.1992 at around 06:00 a.m. dead body of her husband was brought to their house. The cremation took place on 11.12.1992. Smt. Nirmla (wife of deceased) has made allegations of the accident theory to be wrong and alleged that due to an ongoing dispute between her husband and the accused-respondents, the murder of her husband was committed by them. 4. On the basis of the written report submitted by complainant – Nirmala (wife of the deceased), an FIR bearing No.244/1993 was lodged under the directions of the Superintendent of Police, Chittorgarh. After completion of investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet against the accused-respondents Ashwani Kumar Bhardwaj, Ravindra Kumar and Dilip for the offences under Sections 302, 364, 201 & 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and the trial commenced. 5. The learned trial Court framed the charges for the offences under Sections 302 or 302/34/149 & 364/201 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the accused-respondent Ashwani Kumar. The accused- respondents Ravindra Kumar and Dilip Kumar Sharma were charged for the offences under Sections 302 or 302/34/149-201 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 6. During the course of trial, the testimonies of 28 prosecution witnesses were recorded and 36 documents were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution. 1 defence witness was examined and 11 defence documents were exhibited on behalf of the accused-respondents. The accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 7. 1 defence witness was examined and 11 defence documents were exhibited on behalf of the accused-respondents. The accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 7. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as after considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused-respondents, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 17.10.1998, against which the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State. 8. Mr. Deepak Choudhary, learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the appellant-State submits that an exhaustive trial was held after the challan was filed and charges under Section 302 or 302/34, 149, 201, 364 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act were framed against the accused-respondents. The prosecution brought on record the statements of 28 witnesses which included the witnesses for the site plan, the photographer, the Malkhana Incharge and the deposition of complainant-wife also, but the learned Trial Court has faulted in not appreciating the evidence given by these prosecution witnesses. 8.1 Learned Government Advocate-cum-Additional Advocate General further submits that the manner in which the injuries have taken place, particularly the tyre injuries and skull fracture indicates that it was not a normal accident and there could have been a foul play and thus, the Trial Court ought to have construed the allegations for convicting the accused-respondents. 9. On the other hand Mr. J.S. Choudhary, learned Senior Advocated assisted by Mr. Pradeep Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the accused-respondents while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that the Trial Court was right in arriving at a conclusion of acquittal because there was no evidence supporting/showing any kind of overt act committed by the present accused-respondents which could result into the intentional death of the deceased - Ashok Kumar. 9.1 Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the prosecution for the said accidental death is on record and conviction of the driver for his rash and negligent driving is also on record. He further submits that father of the deceased has also not indicated towards a foul play but on the other hand accepted an accident claim for the accidental death of his son. He further submits that father of the deceased has also not indicated towards a foul play but on the other hand accepted an accident claim for the accidental death of his son. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that an after thought which had come to the wife of the deceased who is also the complainant in the present case, ought not to be believed and the learned Trial Court has rightly arrived at a decision of acquittal of the accused-respondents. 9.2 Learned Senior Counsel further submits that after thorough investigation, a negative final report was filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chittorgarh on 17.06.1995 and thus, any kind of re-investigation or further investigation itself shows that the case at the initiation itself was very weak. 9.3 Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the evidence of last seen would not be relevant in the present case because it is an accepted position that they were all in a single car and were going together to Neemach to sort out some company’s affairs and thereafter, the accident occurred. Further, the complainant – Nirmala could not identify the present accused persons. 9.4 Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the learned Trial Court had rightly arrived at a conclusion that deceased - Ashok Kumar went to Neemach where he met with road accident with a truck on 10.12.1992 for which an FIR No.626/1992 was lodged at P.S. Neemach on 10.12.1992 and thereafter the postmortem was conducted and charge-sheet against the truck driver – Gurudayal Singh for the offence under Section 304-A of IPC was filed in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neemach and the accused-driver Gurudayal Singh was convicted for the offence under Section 304-A IPC and sentenced for a period of six months’ rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.5000/- Thereafter said Gurudayal Singh filed appeal against the order of conviction before the learned Sessions Judge, Neemach and vide order dated 21.05.1994, the learned Appellate Court reduced the sentence from 6 months rigorous imprisonment to 2 months rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length as well as perused the material available on record. 11. This Court after examining the peculiar factual matrix and testimonies of 28 prosecution witnesses; after seeing 36 Exhibits finds that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 12. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length as well as perused the material available on record. 11. This Court after examining the peculiar factual matrix and testimonies of 28 prosecution witnesses; after seeing 36 Exhibits finds that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 12. This Court finds that the learned Trial Court has rightly arrived at the conclusion of acquittal of the accused-respondents. The analogy of the evidence of prosecution witnesses, particularly the factual matrix that the accident happened on 09.12.1992 whereas the FIR was lodged on 04.06.1993 after a delay of about 6 months, itself shows an inordinate delay and cast a shadow over the prosecution story. The criminal trial for the accidental death has already attained conclusion as the truck driver has been punished and the appeal against that judgment has been allowed only to the extent of reducing the sentence. 13. This Court also finds that the final report dated 17.06.1993 filed by the Investigating Officer is also on record. The stand of the wife of the deceased may have arisen out of her own anxiety but the manner in which the whole incident has been reported without including any definite conclusion of the medical evidence or any other conclusion arrived at by the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court though has deprecated the conduct of the prosecution but at the same time did not find any material to find the allegations to be true against the present accused-respondents. 14. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 15. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondent Ashwani Bhardwaj for the offences under Sections 302 or 302/34/149 & 364/201 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and of the accused-respondents Ravindra Kumar and Dilip Kumar Sharma for the offences under Sections 302 or 302/34/149-201 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witness at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 16. 16. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 17. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 18. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 19. However, while keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs.25,000/- each and a surety bond each in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so. 20. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.