JUDGMENT : (PER : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MRS. JUSTICE SUNITA AGARWAL) 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 07.10.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in allowing the writ petition remanding the matter to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) to decide the Appeal No. 28 of 2019 on merits, which in turn was directed against the order dated 08.01.2019 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) in Securitisation Application No. 27 of 2019, whereby the entire proceeding of recovery initiated under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short 'SARFAESI Act, 2002') by the appellant herein has been quashed with the liberty to the appellant financial institution/ secured creditor to proceed afresh in accordance with law to recover its dues. The appellant financial institution/secured creditor has further been restrained from proceeding with the auction sale, which was subject matter of challenge before the DRT. 2. At the outset, it may be noted that the order passed by the DRT in quashing the entire proceeding of the recovery has been set aside by the DRAT only on one ground, i.e. the challenge to the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by way of the application under Section 17 was beyond the period of 45 days, as prescribed under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It may further be noted that none of the grounds of challenge to the order passed by the DRT had been addressed by the Appellate Tribunal, viz. DRAT while allowing the appeal vide order dated 14.08.2019, which was subjected to challenge before the learned Single Judge. 3. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, setting aside the order passed by the DRAT, has remanded the matter back with the observation that the cause of action to the borrower accrued from the time the notice under Rules 8(1) and 8(2) was issued and the borrower having right to approach the Tribunal (DRT) before the date of auction sale, could not be non-suited by the Appellate Tribunal. The arguments made by the learned advocate appearing for the financial institution/secured creditor that each measure under Section 13(4) gives rise to a separate cause of action and once the first measure was not challenged, the borrower could not subsequently challenge the same, was turned down. The arguments made by the learned advocate appearing for the financial institution/secured creditor that each measure under Section 13(4) gives rise to a separate cause of action and once the first measure was not challenged, the borrower could not subsequently challenge the same, was turned down. It was held that the borrower can challenge the action of the secured creditor within 45 days from the last step of the process, i.e. sale notice, which was issued before the date of auction sale. 4. It was held that on a reading of the provisions of Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 with Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for short 2002 Rules'), and a conjoint reading of the judgment of the Apex Court in Mardia Chemicals Limited and another Vs. Union of India and others [ (2004) 4 SCC 311 ] and M/s Transcore Vs. Union of India and another [ AIR 2007 SC 712 ], it is clear that under the scheme of Section 13(4) read with Rule 8(1), the delivery of possession notice together with the affixation on the property and publication is one of the modes of taking possession. Under the statutory scheme, once the possession is taken under Rule 8(1) and Rule 8(2) read with Section 13(4)(a), Section 17 gets attracted, as this is one of the measures referred to in Section 13(4) that has been taken by the secured creditor under Chapter III. Considering the object of the Act to enable the borrower to approach the quasi judicial forum in case the secured creditor, while taking any of the measures under Section 13(4) does not follow the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 has been provided to the borrower to approach the Tribunal. The moment the possession notices under Rules 8(1) and 8(2) of the 2002 Rules are issued, the borrower gets a right to approach the Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act, which can be before the date of auction sale. 5. It was noted by the learned Single Judge that the case of the petitioner before the DRT was that there was complete non- compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Act and the Rules and, therefore, the entire process of recovery initiated under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 including the auction sale was required to be set aside. 5. It was noted by the learned Single Judge that the case of the petitioner before the DRT was that there was complete non- compliance of the mandatory provisions of the Act and the Rules and, therefore, the entire process of recovery initiated under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 including the auction sale was required to be set aside. Another question which has been dealt with by the learned Single Judge was whether the DRAT was right in holding that the DRT had no power to condone the delay in light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of International Asset Reconstruction Co. Of India Ltd. Vs. Official Liquidator [ (2017) 16 SCC 137 ]. 6. While answering the said question, the learned Single Judge has relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Corporation Bank versus Jayshreeben and Ors. [ 2013(1) GLH 628 ] to hold that the DRT had power to condone the delay in an application filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The Division Bench of this Court therein was right in relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in M/s Transcore (supra), to note that both the Acts, viz. SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Recovery Of Debts And Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (for short 'RDB Act') are complementary to each other and a conjoint reading of the provisions of Section 24 of the RDB Act and Section 36 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 would expressly include the provisions of the Limitation Act into the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The result is that in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the proceedings under Section 17. It was noted that Section 24 of the RDB Act provides that the provision of the Limitation Act would apply to an application under Section 19 of that Act and, therefore, since both the applications under Section 19 of the RDB Act and Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are original proceedings, as held in Mardia Chemicals Limited (supra), Section 24 of the RDB Act would apply to Section 17 and hence, the DRT would have power to decide the applications under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 taking into consideration Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 7. 7. The question framed by the learned Single Judge that whether the DRAT was right in allowing the appeal by holding that the DRT had no power to condone the delay in filing application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 was, thus, decided in negative. 8. The question, therefore, falls for consideration before us is about the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the proceedings conducted under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the power of DRT to invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in approaching it beyond the period of 45 days prescribed under section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. In other words, the question which needs to be answered by us is as to whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) has general power to condone the delay so as to invoke its jurisdiction beyond the period of 45 days prescribed under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on the application moved under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The incidental question, therefore, would be as to whether the Appellate Tribunal, namely the DRAT was right in allowing the appeal, solely on the ground that the DRT had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 17 (1) being beyond the period of 45 days as prescribed under Section 17(1) so as to look to the validity or correctness of the measures taken by the secured creditor as referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The last question would then be as to whether the learned Single Judge has committed any error of law in setting aside the order passed by the DRAT and relegating the matter for fresh decision on the appeal on merits. 9. In order to deal with the question of applicability of the Limitation Act, 1993, we find it apt to first go through the relevant provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, RDB Act and Limitation Act, 1963 as also the decisions of the Apex Court pertaining to the scope and interpretation of the provisions contained therein. 10. 9. In order to deal with the question of applicability of the Limitation Act, 1993, we find it apt to first go through the relevant provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, RDB Act and Limitation Act, 1963 as also the decisions of the Apex Court pertaining to the scope and interpretation of the provisions contained therein. 10. The RDB Act, 1993 has been enacted on 27th August 1993 and the long title of the Act suggests that it was enforced to provide for the establishment of Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. By Amendment Act 31 of 2016, the insolvency resolution and bankruptcy of individuals and partnership firms have also been included therein. Be that as it may, in the instant case, we are concerned with the recovery of debts due to financial institutions, viz. Aditya Birla Finance Co. Ltd., which is appellant before us. Section 3 of the RDB Act provides for establishment of Tribunal known as Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) by notification of the Central Government, composition of which has been provided in Section 4. Section 8 provides for establishment of the Appellant Tribunals known as Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) by notification of the Central Government, composition of which is provided in Section 9. Section 17(1) of the RDB Act confers jurisdiction, power and authority to entertain appeals against any order made by a Tribunal (DRT) under Section 17(2) of the RDB Act. Section 19 provides for making of application before the DRT by a bank or financial institution to recover any debt from any person, within the local limits of its jurisdiction, as provided in clauses (a), (aa), (b) and (c). Section 19 provides for making of application before the DRT by a bank or financial institution to recover any debt from any person, within the local limits of its jurisdiction, as provided in clauses (a), (aa), (b) and (c). The first, second and third provisos to Subsection (1) of Section 19 of the RDB Act, 1993 are relevant for our purposes and hence, for ready reference, are extracted hereinunder :- "Section 19 - (1) x x x x "Provided that the bank or financial institution may, with the permission of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, on an application made by it, withdraw the application, whether made before or after the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 for the purpose of taking action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), if no such action had been taken earlier under that Act: Provided further that any application made under the first proviso for seeking permission from the Debts Recovery Tribunal to withdraw the application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within thirty days from the date of such application: Provided also that in case the Debts Recovery Tribunal refuses to grant permission for withdrawal of the application filed under this sub-section, it shall pass such orders after recording the reasons therefor." 11. Section 20 providing for procedure of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and Section 24 of the RDB Act are also relevant to be noted hereinunder :- "20. Appeal to the Appellate Tribunal.- (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. (2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from an order made by a Tribunal with the consent of the parties. (2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from an order made by a Tribunal with the consent of the parties. (3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within a period of forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order made, or deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is received by him and it shall be in such form and be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period. (4) On receipt of an appeal under sub-section (1), or under sub-section (1) of section 181 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or setting aside the order appealed against. (5) The Appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to the concerned Tribunal. (6) The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally within six months from the date of receipt of the appeal." "24. Limitation. - The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal." 12. Section 22 providing procedure and powers of DRT and DRAT (Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal) and Section 24 of the RDB Act, 1993 are extracted hereinunder :- "22. Procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal.- (1) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings. (2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging their functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (e) reviewing its decisions; (f) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte; (g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte; (h) any other matter which may be prescribed. (3) Any proceeding before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (4) For the purpose of proof of any entry in the 'bankers books', the provisions of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 shall apply to all the proceedings before the Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal." "24. Limitation. - The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a Tribunal." 13. Coming to the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Act was enforced on 17th December, 2002 to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Coming to the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the Act was enforced on 17th December, 2002 to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The definition of word "securitisation" under Section 2(z) and "security interest" under Section 2(zf) means that :- "2(z) - 'securitisation' means acquisition of financial assets by any asset reconstruction company from any originator, whether by raising of funds by such asset reconstruction company from qualified buyers by issue of security receipts representing undivided interest in such financial assets or otherwise;" "2(zf) - 'security interest' means right, title or interest of any kind, other than those specified in section 31, upon property created in favour of any secured creditor and includes- (i) any mortgage, charge, hypothecation, assignment or any right, title or interest of any kind, on tangible asset, retained by the secured creditor as an owner of the property, given on hire or financial lease or conditional sale or under any other contract which secures the obligation to pay any unpaid portion of the purchase price of the asset or an obligation incurred or credit provided to enable the borrower to acquire the tangible asset; or (ii) such right, title or interest in any intangible asset or assignment or licence of such intangible asset which secures the obligation to pay any unpaid portion of the purchase price of the intangible asset or the obligation incurred or any credit provided to enable the borrower to acquire the intangible asset or licence of intangible asset;" 14. The Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal as defined in Sections 2(i) and 2(1)(a) would mean the Tribunals established under Section 3(1) and Section 8(1) of the RDB Act, 1993, as noted hereinbefore. 15. Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, providing for enforcement of security interest is further to be looked into. Section 13(1) confers power on the creditor, viz. secured creditor defined in Section 2(zd) to enforce any security interest created in its favour, without intervention of the Court or Tribunal, in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 69 or 69-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Sections 13(2) to 13(13) provide the manner in which any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced. Sections 13(2) to 13(13) provide the manner in which any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced. The first step in the process is the Notice of Demand issued under Section 13(2) after classification of secured debt by the secured creditor as non-performing asset, on the default in the repayment of its liability by the borrower under a security agreement. Sub-section (2) of Section 13 puts an obligation on the borrower to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within 60 days from the date of notice, failing which, the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under Sub-section (4). 16. On receipt of notice under Sub-section (2), the borrower has a right to make a representation or raise any objection as per Sub-section (3A) of Section 13 upon which the secured creditor is under an obligation to take a decision on such representation or objection and communicates its decision with reasons within 15 days of the receipt thereof. Proviso to Sub-section (3A) clarifies that any decision on the representation or objection of the borrower under Sub-section 3A would not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an application to the DRT under Section 17. 17. Proviso to Sub-section (3A) clarifies that any decision on the representation or objection of the borrower under Sub-section 3A would not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an application to the DRT under Section 17. 17. Section 13(4) provides measures which can be resorted by the secured creditor to recover his secured debt, and reads that :- "13(4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely: (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; (b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset: Provided that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the debt: Provided further that where the management of whole, of the business or part of the business is severable, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security for the debt; (c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt. 18. Sub-section (8) of Section 13 provides another window to the borrower to pay his debt by tendering the amount due to the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him at any time before the date of publication of notice for public auction or inviting quotations or tender from public or private treaty for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of the secured assets. In such eventuality, the secured creditor shall be prohibited from transferring the secured assets by way of lease, assignment or sale and further from taking any further steps in that process. 19. Section 13(13) further prohibits a borrower to transfer any of the secured asset referred to in the notice under Subsection (2) of Section 13, by way of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the ordinary course of his business) without prior written consent of the secured creditor. Sub-section (12) of Section 13 provides that the rights of a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 may be exercised by one or more of his officers authorised in this behalf in the manner prescribed therein. 20. Section 14 confers power on the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction any such secured asset, etc. may be situated or found, to take possession thereof, in order to assist the secured creditor in taking possession of the secured asset. An application in accordance with the first proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, accompanied by an affidavit duly affirmed by the authorised officer of the secured creditor has to be made to invoke the provisions of Section 14. Section 17 provides remedy to the borrower or any other person aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under Chapter III by making an application before the DRT. Section 17 reads as under :- "17. Application against measures to recover secured debts.- (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed, to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation. Explanation. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section (1) of section 17.] (1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction- (a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises; (b) where the secured asset is located; or (c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order,- (a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and (b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and (c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13. (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt. (4A) Where- (i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy,- (a) has expired or stood determined; or (b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882; or (c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or (d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act; and (ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application: Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1). (6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5), any party to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder." 21. Section 18 providing for appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, reads that :- "18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.- (1) Any person aggrieved, by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under section 17, may prefer an appeal alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to an Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other than the borrower: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less: Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to not less than twenty-five per cent. of debt referred to in the second proviso. (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder." 22. Sections 35, 36 and 37 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, are also relevant to be noted hereinunder:- "36. Limitation. Sections 35, 36 and 37 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, are also relevant to be noted hereinunder:- "36. Limitation. - No secured creditor shall be entitled to take all or any of the measures under sub-section (4) of section 13, unless his claim in respect of the financial asset is made within the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963). 37. Application of other laws not barred. - The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (42 of 1956), the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992), the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) or any other law for the time being in force. 38. Power of Central Government to make rules.- (1) The Central Government may, by notification and in the Electronic Gazette as defined in clause (s) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000), make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: - (a) other business or commercial rights of similar nature under clause (t) of section 2; (aa) the form and manner in which an application may be filed under sub-section (10) of section 13; (b) the manner in which the rights of a secured creditor may be exercised by one or more of his officers under sub-section (12) of section 13; (ba) the fee for making an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 17; (bb) the form of making an application to the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (6) of section 17; (bc) the fee for preferring an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (1) of section 18; (bca) the manner of integration of records of various registration systems with the records of Central Registry under sub-section (1) of section 20A; (bcb) the terms and conditions of delegation of powers by the Central Government to the Reserve Bank under section 20B. (c) the safeguards subject to which the records may be kept under sub-section (2) of section 22; (d) the manner in which the particulars of every transaction of securitisation shall be filed under section 23 and fee for filing such transaction; (da) the form for registration of different types of security interests and fee thereof under sub-section (3) of section 23; (e) the fee for inspecting the particulars of transactions kept under section 22 and entered in the Central Register under sub-section (1) of section 26; (f) the fee for inspecting the Central Register maintained in electronic form under sub-section (2) of section 26; (fa) the form and the manner for filing particulars of transactions under sub-section (2) of section 26B; (fb) the form and manner of filing attachment orders with the Central Registry and the date under sub-section (4) of section 26B; (fc) the form and manner of filing particulars of attachment order with the Central Registry and the fee under sub-section (5) of section 26B. (g) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed, in respect of which provision is to be, or may be, made by rules. (3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule." 23. The Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 have been notified on 20th September, 2002 in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section(1) and clause (b) of Subsection (2) of Section 38 read with Sub-sections (4), (10) and (12) of Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, providing the procedure for exercise of power under the Act. 24. Rule 8 of the Rules 2002 prescribes detailed procedure for sale of immovable secured assets as under:- "8. 24. Rule 8 of the Rules 2002 prescribes detailed procedure for sale of immovable secured assets as under:- "8. Sale of immovable secured assets.- (1) Where the secured asset is an immovable property, the authorized officer shall take or cause to be taken possession, by delivering a possession notice prepared as nearly as possible in Appendix IV to these rules, to the borrower and by affixing the possession notice on the outer door or at such conspicuous place of the property. (2) The possession notice as referred to in sub-rule (1) shall also be published in two leading newspaper, one in vernacular language having sufficient circulation in that locality, by the authorized officer. (2A) All notices under these rules may also be served upon the borrower through electronic mode of service, in addition to the modes prescribed under sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2) of rule 8. (3) In the event of possession of immovable property is actually taken by the authorized officer, such property shall be kept in his own custody or in the custody of any person authorized or appointed by him, who shall take as much care of the property in his custody as a owner of ordinary prudence would, under the similar circumstances, take of such property. (4) The authorized officer shall take steps for preservation and protection of secured assets and insure them, if necessary, till they are sold or otherwise disposed of. (5) Before effecting sale of the immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 9, the authorized officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor, fix the reserve price of the property and may sell the whole or any part of such immovable secured asset by any of the following methods:- (a) by obtaining quotations from the persons dealing with similar secured assets or otherwise interested in buying the such assets; or (b) by inviting tenders from the public; (c) by holding public auction including through eauction mode; or] (d) by private treaty. (6) The authorized officer shall serve to the borrower a notice of thirty days for sale of the immovable secured assets, under sub-rule (5): Provided that if the sale of such secured asset is being effected by either inviting tenders from the public or by holding public auction, the secured creditor shall cause a public notice in the Form given in Appendix IV-A to be published in two leading newspapers including one in vernacular language having wide circulation in the locality. (7) Every notice of sale shall be affixed on the conspicuous part of the immovable property and the authorised officer shall upload the detailed terms and conditions of the sale, on the web- site of the secured creditor, which shall include; (a) the description of the immovable property to be sold, including the details of the encumbrances known to the secured creditor; (b) the secured debt for recovery of which the property is to be sold; (c) reserve price of the immovable secured assets below which the property may not be sold; (d) time and place of public auction or the time after which sale by any other mode shall be completed; (e) deposit of earnest money as may be stipulated by the secured creditor; (f) any other terms and conditions, which the authorized officer considers it necessary for a purchaser to know the nature and value of the property. (8) Sale by any methods other than public auction or public tender, shall be on such terms as may be settled between the secured creditors and the proposed purchaser in writing." 25. Sections 3, 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would also be relevant for our purposes. They read that:- "3. Bar of limitation.— (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. They read that:- "3. Bar of limitation.— (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. (2) For the purposes of this Act — (a) a suit is instituted — (i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer; (ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and (iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator; (b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted — (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court; (c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court." "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.— Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." "29. Explanation.— The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." "29. Savings - (1) xxx (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." 26. Mr.Shalin N. Mehta, learned senior advocate appearing for the appellant on the question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would argue that the Debts Recovery Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the delay, inasmuch, as the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, are in the nature of original proceedings like a civil suit. Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies only to appeal or application and not to the original suit proceedings for the clear language employed therein. The contention is that the SARFAESI Act, 2002 is a self-contained code. No provision of any other Act can be imported to relax the time limit of 45 days prescribed in Sub-section (1) of Section 17 to challenge any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or its authorised officer. The submission is that though the application under Section 17(1) had been filed by the borrower in the instant case, within a period of 30 days from the date of auction sale notice, but while challenging the auction notice, the borrower cannot be permitted to challenge the notices issued under Sections 13(2) and 13(4) of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the order of taking possession passed under Section 14 of the Act, which proceedings were conducted in the years 2017 and 2018. The Notice of Demand under Section 13(2) was issued on 25.04.2017, the Notice under Section 13(4) is dated 11.07.2017 and the order under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 had been passed on 17.07.2018. None of these notices were challenged by the borrower till the date of auction sale notice, which was issued on 30.11.2018. Even panchnama for obtaining physical possession has been prepared on 03.11.2018. 27. In the Securitisation Application filed under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the borrower cannot be permitted to challenge the proceedings initiated from the date of issuance of section 13(2) Notice till the date of taking physical possession by preparation of panchnama on 03.11.2018, subsequent to Section 14 order passed by the competent authority. The contention is that the DRT had completely erred in law in staying the auction and later setting aside all the previous proceedings while allowing the Securitization Application. The Appellate Tribunal cannot be said to have erred in upturning the order passed by the DRT on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the Securitisation Application under Section 17(1) beyond the period of 45 days so as to challenge the measures taken by the secured creditor such as initiation of the proceedings under Section 13(4) by the notice dated 11.07.2017 and taking of physical possession of the secured asset by preparation of the panchnama on 03.11.2018. 28. It was vehemently argued by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the Securitisation Application under Section 17(1) was not accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and from the statement made in the application itself, it is clear that the applicant- borrower had computed limitation from the date of issuance of the sale notice, i.e. 30.11.2018 and the possession notice dated 03.11.2018 under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, to assert that the application under Section 17(1) was well within the prescribed period of limitation under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The submission, thus, is that there was no question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, so as to condone the delay in challenging the measures taken by the bank after issuance of the Notice under Section 13(4) dated 11.07.2017. The submission, thus, is that there was no question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, so as to condone the delay in challenging the measures taken by the bank after issuance of the Notice under Section 13(4) dated 11.07.2017. The order under Section 14 dated 17.07.2018 had not been challenged within a period of 45 days, it was, thus, not permitted for the DRT to take any exception to the proceedings conducted by the secured creditors with the issuance of Notice under Section 13(2) raising a demand for payment of the defaulted amount. 29. Referring to the averments made in the application under Section 17(1) filed by the borrower, it was agitated that though the borrower had indicated in the application that he was ready and willing to pay the dues without prejudice to rights available under law, but nothing has been paid till date. Much emphasis has been laid on the conduct of the borrower in keeping mum over the proceedings at the stage of previous proceedings uptil passing of the order under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It was further argued that the words "aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Section 13(4) taken by the secured creditor" and "the DRT having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date on which such measures had been taken" have to be read in conjunction so as to make a correct interpretation of the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act, which means that the period of 45 days prescribed therein would run from the date of the particular step taken by the secured creditor in enforcement of the security interest created in its favour. 30. 30. It was argued that even if it is accepted for a moment that the application under Section 17 (1) filed by the borrower in the instant case was well within the time period of 45 days from the date of the auction sale notice or the date of the possession notice under Rule 8(1) and Rule 8(2) of the Rules, 2002, the measures taken prior to the issuance of said notices such as demand notice under section 13(2), notice under Section 13 (4) for initiation of measures to recover its debt by the secured creditor and Section 14 Order for delivery of possession passed by the competent authority at the instance of the secured creditor, cannot be assailed by the borrower. 31. With regard to the applicability of the Limitation Act, specifically Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it was argued that apart from providing the period of limitation, in filing application under Section 17(1), the Act' 2002 does not prescribe a provision with regard to the applicability of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under the Act. The period of 45 days prescribed in Section 17(1) foreclosed the right of the borrower to challenge any action of the secured creditor beyond the said period. 32. The SARFAESI Act, 2002 has been enacted with an object to facilitate securitisation of financial assets of banks and financial institutions keeping in view of the slow pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of nonperforming assets of banks and financial institutions on the recommendation of Narasimham Committee I and II and Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government for the purpose of examining banking sector reforms. The SARFAESI Act, 2002 has been promulgated to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest so as to enable banks and financial institutions to realise long term assets and improve recovery by exercising powers to take possession of securities, sell them and reduce non-performing assets by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction. The timeline provided in Section 17(1) giving right to the borrower to challenge any of the measures referred to in Section 13(4) taken by the secured creditor in Chapter III of the Act, 2002, is with the idea to expedite the process of recovery of long term assets. The timeline provided in Section 17(1) giving right to the borrower to challenge any of the measures referred to in Section 13(4) taken by the secured creditor in Chapter III of the Act, 2002, is with the idea to expedite the process of recovery of long term assets. If the borrower is permitted to take the plea of seeking extension of limitation by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, though the said provision has not been imported in the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the whole object and purpose of enforcement of the Act, which is a complete code in itself, would be frustrated. 33. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of M/s. Velar Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Authorised Officer/Chief Manager, Indian Bank & Ors. in Writ Petition No. 31251 of 2018, decided on 05.09.2019 to argue that it has been held therein that the Securitisation Application being filed under Section 17(1) of the Act being like a Civil Suit, and not an appellate proceeding, and the DRT exercising original jurisdiction while entertaining the application under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable for condoning the delay in filing application under Section 17. It was placed before us that the judgement of the Madras High Court has not been interfered by the Apex Court as the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).7023/2020 challenging the same has been dismissed on 09.07.2020. We may note at this moment that the order of dismissal of the Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).7023/2020 dated 09.07.2020 indicates that it was dismissed summarily. 34. A further reliance is placed on the decision of the Kerala High Court dated 02.11.2020 in The Authorised Officer, Indian Bank vs. K.J. George & Ors. to substantiate the aforesaid submission that the DRT has no power to condone the delay while exercising powers under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It was held therein by relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal v. Bank of India [ (2016) 1 SCC 444 ] and International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd. vs. Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Ors. It was held therein by relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal v. Bank of India [ (2016) 1 SCC 444 ] and International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Ltd. vs. Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Ors. [ (2017) 16 SCC 137 ] that there is no provision in the SARFAESI Act authorising the DRT to condone the delay caused beyond 45 days from the date on which the impugned measures had been taken. It was held therein that from reading of the above noted two decisions of the Apex Court, it is clear that in a Special law, when the statute does not prescribe for condonation of delay, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not arise. In absence of any provision in the statute itself for enlarging the time, no Court, even the High Court, can extend the period of limitation as in the SARFAESI Act, there is no provision for extension of the period of limitation of 45 days prescribed by Section 17 of the Act by condoning the delay. The contention is that the learned Single Judge has erred in reading and interpretation of the above noted two decisions while holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be attracted in the proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 35. In support of the above noted submissions, apart from placing reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Limited (supra) and Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra), reference has also been made to the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Smt Rehana Kuhusheed vs Authorised Officer Dena Bank in Review Petition No. 1058 of 2017 to assert that Section 36 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 speaks for limited application of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under the Act only in respect of the claim raised by the secured creditor and there being no such provision pertaining to the proceedings initiated by the borrower under Section 17 of the Act, the other provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable in respect of such proceedings. 36. The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, by resorting to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, therefore, does not arise. 37. 36. The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, by resorting to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, therefore, does not arise. 37. Learned counsel for the respondent-original petitioner however, refers to the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge and relies upon the judgment of this Court in Union Bank of India vs. Chairperson, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [( 2010 1 GLH 443 ] and Corporation Bank vs. Jayshreeben [ (2013) 1 GLH 628 ] to assert that the Division Bench on consideration of all relevant aspects of the matter, including the judgement relied by the learned senior counsel for the appellant has reached at the conclusion that the provisions of the Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable in the proceedings drawn by the borrower under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Tribunal had power to condone the delay. The order passed by the Tribunal for condoning the delay cannot be said to be without jurisdiction more so when the owner of the property had no knowledge of the proceedings initiated by the secured creditor for enforcement of the security interest. 38. Having exhaustively gone through the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the RDB Act, 1993 and the Limitation Act, 1963 and the decisions of the Apex Court in International Asset Reconstruction Co. Of India Ltd. (supra) and Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra), heavily relied by learned senior counsel for the appellant, as also the decision of the Kerala High Court based on the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court and the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Corporation Bank (supra), we may note, at the outset that, we are convinced with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the proceedings under Section 17 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, relying upon exhaustive reasoning given by the Division Bench of this Court in Corporation Bank (supra). We find ourselves in full agreement with the decision of the Division Bench of this court on the first question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for the reasons given hereinafter. 39. We find ourselves in full agreement with the decision of the Division Bench of this court on the first question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for the reasons given hereinafter. 39. We may note, at the outset, that we are conscious of the fact that the SARFARESI Act, 2002 has been enacted in order to provide legal provision for facilitating securitisation of financial assets of banks and financial institutions, that too, without the intervention of the Court or Tribunal. Section 13 contained in Chapter III of SARFAESI Act, 2002 prescribes an extensive procedure as to how the banks or financial institutions would enforce security interest created in their favour as secured creditor, in the case of default of borrower. As noted hereinbefore, Section 13(2) provides that the demand notice would be served upon the borrower requiring him to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor within 60 days from the date of notice. Sub-section (3A) of Section 13 gives right to the borrower to raise objection to such notice. Section 13(4), however, provides that, in case, the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in the notice under Section 13(2), the secured creditor will be free to take recourse to any of the measures to recover his secured debt. Remedy of challenging the action taken by the secured creditor or any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer has been provided to the borrower under Section 17(1). Section 17(1) provides a timeline within which the borrower can file an application before the DRT to challenge any of the measures taken by the secured creditor as referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13. We may further note that there is no outer time limit provided in Sub-section (1) of Section 17 or the provision attached to it, restricting the DRT not to entertain any application made under Section 17(1) beyond the period of 45 days. Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 further provides a remedy of appeal against the order passed by the DRT under Section 17, within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the order, as per Sub-section (1) thereof. Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 further provides a remedy of appeal against the order passed by the DRT under Section 17, within a period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the order, as per Sub-section (1) thereof. It is further relevant to note that there is no outer time limit prescribed in Section 18(1) or the proviso attached thereto, to restrain the Appellate Tribunal from entertaining an appeal beyond the period of 30 days provided in Sub-section (1) of Section 18. 40. As noted by the Division Bench in Corporation Bank (supra), Section 35 though gives overriding effect to the provisions of the Securitisation Act, 2002 against any other law, which is inconsistent with its provision, Section 36 which prescribes limitation restrains the secured creditor not to take all or any of the measures under Sub-section (4) of Section 13, unless his claim in respect of the financial asset is made within the period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act. Section 37 further states that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are in addition to other regulations such as Companies Act, etc. which include RDB Act, 1993. 41. It is noted by the Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra) that in M/s Transcore vs Union Of India [ 2008 (1) SCC 125 ], the Apex Court has observed that the RDB Act and the SARFAESI Act are complementary to each other. The question before the Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra) was with regard to the power of the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay after the expiry of the period of 30 days prescribed in filing appeal under Section 20 of the RDB Act. The Apex Court has held that the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act has power to condone the delay in view of Section 20(3) of the RDB Act read with Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 42. We may note that the language of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 and Sub-section (7) of Section 17 are the same, as they read as under : "17. 42. We may note that the language of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 and Sub-section (7) of Section 17 are the same, as they read as under : "17. Application against measures to recover secured debts.- (1) xxx (2) xxx (3) xxx (4) xxx (5) xxx (6) xxx (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder." "18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.- (1) xxx (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and rules made thereunder." 43. It is further pertinent to note that the RDB Act, 1993 and SARFAESI Act, 2002 though provide different procedures of recovery of the debts due to banks and financial institutions, however, the fundamental object and aim of both the statutory provisions is to ensure speedy and expeditious recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. The RDB Act enacted in the year 1993 provides for establishment of Tribunal named as "Debts Recovery Tribunal" and Appellate Tribunal named as "Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal" to provide a forum to bank and financial institutions to recover any debt from any person by making an application to the DRT under Section 19, which in essence is a suit or original proceeding for recovery of debts filed by the bank or financial institution. Section 24 of the RDB Act makes the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19, as it says that the provisions of the Limitation Act shall apply to an application made to the Tribunal, which means an "application made under Section 19". 44. As noted hereinbefore, Section 20(3) of the RDB Act confers power on the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay in the limitation provided for filing an appeal under Subsection (1) of Section 20, if there was a sufficient cause for doing so. 45. 44. As noted hereinbefore, Section 20(3) of the RDB Act confers power on the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay in the limitation provided for filing an appeal under Subsection (1) of Section 20, if there was a sufficient cause for doing so. 45. From a careful reading of the aforesaid provisions, it can be discerned that there is no bar or restraint with the Tribunal not to entertain any application under Section 17(1) beyond the period of 45 days. Insofar as the power of DRAT to condone the delay in filing appeal under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the controversy has been set at rest by the Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra), as noted hereinbefore. The only issue remains is that of applicability of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 46. The Division Bench of this Court in Corporation Bank (supra), after taking note of the above referred provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and RDB Act, 1993, has observed that it cannot be disputed that filing of application and the procedure so provided for disposal of the application is by the Act (SARFAESI Act, 2002), which is a Special law. It was noted that it is also true that there is no express provision made by the Parliament in the Act for applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act. 47. Therefore, the Division Bench further proceeded to consider the provisions of the Limitation Act, to answer the question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the Special law, i.e. SARFAESI Act, 2002, whether the Limitation Act may also include the proceedings under Section 17 of the Act. By reading the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which is a saving clause, pertaining to the applicability of the Limitation Act to any Special law, it was observed in paragraph 12' as under :- "12. By reading the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which is a saving clause, pertaining to the applicability of the Limitation Act to any Special law, it was observed in paragraph 12' as under :- "12. The aforesaid provisions show that applicability of the Limitation Act if provided under the special law for the different period than that provided under the schedule of the Limitation Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply as if section 3 of the Limitation Act provides for the prescribed period of limitation for such purpose, but it further provides for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application under any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply unless they are expressly not excluded by any such special or local law. The pertinent aspect is that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act for applicability of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to the period prescribed under any special law, no distinction is made to the proceedings of any suit or appeal or application. It considers all the proceedings of any suit or appeal or application alike if provided by any special or local law for the purpose of applicability of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. To say in other words, sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are made applicable to all the matters specified in special or local law for any suit or appeal or application unless they are expressly excluded by such special or local law." 48. Noticing a previous decision in Union Bank of India (supra), passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, the Division Bench has observed that on a plain reading of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, it appears that if there is an express provision in Special law or in local law, prescribing the limitation for any suit or appeal or application, such shall apply for prescription of such period. However, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 would apply to the extent unless they are expressly excluded by such Special law. However, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 would apply to the extent unless they are expressly excluded by such Special law. That means that if the Limitation Act provided for a particular period during which the application has to be made to any Tribunal or any authority, such period would not apply in view of express provision under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act providing for preferring an application within a period of 45 days. However, so far as further application of the Limitation Act is concerned and more particularly from Sections 4 to 24, which includes Section 5 for condonation of delay, such would apply, inasmuch, as there is no express exclusion of the said provisions by the Special law, i.e. SARFAESI Act, 2002. It was further noted that Section 17(1) is silent on the aspect of providing outer period of limitation for filing of the application or for exercise of the discretion for entertainment of the application after expiry of period of 45 days. The result is that the Legislature has not expressed its intention to curtail further exercise of power by the Tribunal for entertaining of the application after expiry of the period of 45 days. Under such circumstances, the provisions of Section 5 would apply to the discretion to be exercised by the Tribunal for entertainment of the application after the period of 45 days, but such discretion has to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances on the aspect of sufficient cause to condone the delay or not. 49. On the applicability of Section 29(2) to the period of limitation provided by any special or local laws in any proceedings such as suit, appeal or application, different from the period prescribed by the Schedule under the Limitation Act, it has further been noticed therein that Section 29(2) does not make any distinction between the proceedings before a Court or Tribunal for the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. What is required to be found out is whether any special or local law prescribes different period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application. Once the Special law provides a different period of limitation, the consequences laid down by Section 29(2) must follow. 50. What is required to be found out is whether any special or local law prescribes different period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application. Once the Special law provides a different period of limitation, the consequences laid down by Section 29(2) must follow. 50. The Division Bench has further relied upon the decision of this Court in Mahesh Harilal Khamar vs. B.N. Narasimhan [ 1982 GLH 700 ], wherein the question of applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was discussed with reference to the limitation provided in a Special law, viz. Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1963. It was held therein that where Special law provides for period of limitation different from that provided by the Limitation Act and once Section 3 of the Limitation Act gets attracted by virtue of Section 29(2) to the proceedings before the concerned authority acting under the Special law which has to enforce the period of limitation, said authority will have to apply the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings presented before it under the provisions of the concerned Special law or the local law, as the case may be. The result is that if the proceeding is initiated beyond the period of limitation provided in the Special law, the concerned authority has to apply Section 3 of the Limitation Act to dismiss the concerned application or appeal, if it is found to be barred by time prescribed in the statute. It was thus held in Mahesh Harilal Khamar (supra), that if the injunction prescribed by Section 3(1) has to operate by virtue of Section 29(2), the said injunction must necessarily bring in its wake all the rest of the provisions of the said Sub-section (1) of Section 3. A further reading of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act shows that the operation of Section 3 is subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive). 51. Consequently, if the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 are made applicable, they would necessarily override and superimpose themselves upon the operation of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act. A further reading of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act shows that the operation of Section 3 is subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive). 51. Consequently, if the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 are made applicable, they would necessarily override and superimpose themselves upon the operation of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act. It was, thus, held in Mahesh Harilal Khamar (supra) that :- "It is trite to say that if section 3 applies to the first respondent acting under Section 27 (5) of the Act then it must follow as a necessary corollary that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would equally apply by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act. It cannot be urged for a moment that Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act would apply but Section 5 thereof would not apply to the first respondent's proceedings because he is not a court. While Section 29(2) is attracted the entire machinery of Sections 3 to 24 of the Limitation Act gets imported and would automatically apply to the proceedings before the concerned authority under the given special or local law has to enforce the period of limitation for any appeal or application before such authority, implicit in the power would be the power to condone the delay which would get imported as part and parcel of the entire machinery of Sections 3 to 24 of the Limitation Act that would apply by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to such proceedings before the concerned authorities acting under the special or local law. This is the logical effect of the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and hence the question whether the concerned authority is a court within the strict meaning of the term as envisaged by the Limitation itself, would necessarily pale into insignificance.” 52. With the above discussion, the contention made by the petitioner (therein) in the Corporation Bank (supra), that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply only to the Court and not to the Tribunal or any proceedings before the authority other than the Tribunal, has been turned down by the Division Bench. It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also apply to the statutory authority under the Special law when it is not expressly barred or prohibited. 53. It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also apply to the statutory authority under the Special law when it is not expressly barred or prohibited. 53. We do not find any justification to form contradictory opinion to the said reasoning of the Division Bench with regard to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by reading of Section 29(2), which applies to the proceedings before any Tribunal or any authority under Special law or in local law. 54. Further discussion of the Division Bench in Corporation Bank (supra), are on the aspects of the provisions of Securitisation Act read with the provisions of Non Performing Assets Act and the Limitation Act. While holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the proceedings before the DRT under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, though original in nature, the Division Bench has referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in UCO Bank Vs. M/s. Kanji Manji Kothari [2008 SCC Online (Bom) 170]. The observations therein in paragraph 37' are relevant to be extracted hereinunder :- "37. Section 17 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, prescribes a period of limitation of just 45 days for filing an application, challenging any of the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13 (4) of the Act. The remedy under Section 17 (1) is virtually a remedy in respect of a right of redemption. Therefore, to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, will not apply to an application under Section 17 (1) would virtually defeat the valuable right of redemption available to a mortgagor. This right of redemption normally gets extinguished after the sale of the property. Therefore the apprehension expressed by the learned counsel for the Bank that the parties may come up with applications after a huge delay and defeat the object of the Act for speedy recovery of dues, may not be well founded for the simple reason that after losing possession of the property under Section 13 (4), a debtor cannot afford to wait for long. If he waits for long, the property may get sold and his rights may get extinguished. If he waits for long, the property may get sold and his rights may get extinguished. Hence the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, to proceedings under Section 17 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, would neither defeat the rights of the secured creditor nor cause irreparable hardship to the secured creditor." 55. It has further noted the observations of the Apex Court in Karnataka State Financial Corporation vs. N. Narasimahaiah [ (2008) 5 SCC 176 ] in paragraph 39', as under: - "39. Viewed in the context of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court extracted above, it could be seen that the right conferred upon the secured creditor under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act, is a right of recovery. The right conferred upon the debtor or the surety under Section 17 is a right to save one's own property. To hold that the fate of a debtor or surety will be sealed in a period of 45 days from the date of initiation of the measures under Section 13 (4) and that he would be left remediless after the said period on account of non-availability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would defeat the right to property. Therefore the Court has to choose an interpretation which would lean in favour of the right to property. If so done, the conclusion is irresistible that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would apply to applications filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.” 56. The observations in paragraph 14' are further relevant to be extracted herein under :- "14. As observed earlier, even if the contention of the learned counsel is considered and accepted that it is a Tribunal and not the Court as per the view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. (supra), then also in view of the observations made hereinabove, it cannot be accepted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to the proceedings under Section 17 of the Securitisation Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra) is ill-founded inasmuch the observations of the Apex Court are to be considered and applied to the facts of that case. The reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra) is ill-founded inasmuch the observations of the Apex Court are to be considered and applied to the facts of that case. If such observation are considered, what is being held by the Apex Court that if there is express period prescribed in the special law, such would apply and not the prescription as provided under the Limitation Act, but the same cannot be read in absolute so as to excluded the applicability of other provisions of the Limitation Act which may apply, more particularly in view of the no express bar provided under the special law. Therefore, such a decision is of no help to the learned counsel for the petitioner." "14. As observed earlier, section 29 of the Limitation Act makes no distinction for any suit or appeal or application provided by the special or local law. It is true that as observed by the Apex Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals Limited and another Vs. Union of India and others, reported at (2004) 4 SCC 311 = AIR 2004 SC 2371 read with the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/s Transcore Vs. Union of India and another reported at AIR 2007 SC 712 , the proceedings under section 17 of the Act are not the appellate proceedings and may be termed as the original proceedings, but then also when the special law uses the language of the word “appeal”, it cannot be said that the proceedings under section 17 of the Act can be termed as “suit” for the purpose of applicability of the Limitation Act if one goes by the plain and literal meaning of the language used by the Parliament in the Act. Even, if it is considered that literal meaning cannot be accepted and in view of the above referred decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals Limited (supra)and M/s Transcore (supra), the proceedings under section 17 of the Act may be termed as analogous to the proceedings of any suit, then also in our view, as per the language of section 29(2) read with the language used under the special law i.e. the Act in the present case, the distinction as considered by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Akshat Commercial Private Limited (supra) cannot be emphasized. At this stage, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum Vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma reported at AIR 1977 SC 282 wherein the Apex Court had an occasion to consider applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act in light of the provisions of section 16(3) of the Indian Telegraph Act enabling the owner or occupier of the property to demand compensation by preferring the petition to the District Judge. The Apex Court, in the said decision did observe, inter alia, at paragraph 18 as under. “....But it has to be an application to a court for the reason that Sections 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of expiry of prescribed period when Court is closed and extension of prescribed period if applicant or the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application during such period.” 15. Therefore, even in case where the proceedings were provided by the special law for a petition which may be termed as original in nature rather at par with the suit, the Apex Court did observe for application of sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act in respect of the special law i.e. Indian Telegraph Act read with the Indian Electricity Act. Hence, in our view, applicability of the Limitation Act by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would not be different merely because if under any special law, the proceedings by way of an appeal or application has been provided which are in the nature of original proceedings." 57. Hence, in our view, applicability of the Limitation Act by virtue of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act would not be different merely because if under any special law, the proceedings by way of an appeal or application has been provided which are in the nature of original proceedings." 57. It is further noted that under the RDB Act, whenever any application is made to the Tribunal by the bank or financial institution for recovery of the amount under Section 19, it is to be termed as original proceedings and Section 24 of the RDB Act expressly provides for application of the provisions of the Limitation Act. It was held that by virtue of the provisions of Section 17(7) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, Section 24 of the RDB Act is imported under the SARFAESI Act. The Parliament while applying the provisions of the Limitation Act to the RDB Act, or to the SARFAESI Act, 2002 for the purposes of original proceedings, may be at par with the suit proceedings, made no distinction for applicability of any of the provisions of the Limitation Act. Rather, it has consciously applied the provisions of the Limitation Act by express provisions of Section 24 of the RDB Act, which as per the Division Bench are to apply to the proceedings under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, by virtue of the provisions of Section 17(7) of the said Act. It was, thus, finally concluded on consideration of the above aspects of the matter that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as are applicable, confers power on the DRT to condone the delay in the proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act. In other words, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the proceedings under Section 17(1) of the Act for the purpose of condonation of delay in making the application by a borrower. 58. We do not find any good ground in the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the appellant to assail the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge based on the above discussed decision of the Division Bench with regard to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. However, it goes without saying that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay, the DRT has to be conscious of the scheme of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It must bear in mind the object and purpose of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, enacted to expedite the recovery of secured debt by the banks and financial institutions and should not allow any person to procrastinate the proceedings by making frivolous application for condonation of delay. 59. Coming to the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant on the decision of the Apex Court in International Asset Reconstruction Co. Of India Ltd. (supra), and the observations in the case of Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra), we may note that in Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra), the specific question was about the power of the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay in filing appeal under Section 18(1) of the Act. The Apex Court while answering the said question in affirmative has compared the provisions of the RDB Act and SARFAESI Act, 2002 and by reading Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, it was held that by virtue of Section 18(2), the provisions of RDB Act stand incorporated into the SARFAESI Act. It was observed that the RDB Act and SARFAESI are complementary to each other and the proviso to Section 20 (3) of the RDB Act is applicable to the proceedings before the appellate tribunal under Section 18 by virtue of Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. While saying so, though there is an observation that even if the power of condonation of delay by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act were held to be inapplicable, unless the scheme of the statute expressly excludes the power of condonation, there is no reason to deny such power to an appellate tribunal when the statutory scheme so warrants. 60. This observation of the Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra) cannot be read to hold that the Apex Court has decided the question of applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The further observations made by the Apex Court on the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act are not to be taken as a binding precedent for the observations made in paragraph 13', as under:- "13........ The further observations made by the Apex Court on the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act are not to be taken as a binding precedent for the observations made in paragraph 13', as under:- "13........ We are of the view that for purposes of decision of these appeals, it is not necessary to decide the question whether the Tribunal under the Banking statutes in question was court for purposes of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act." 61. The observations in paragraph 14' therein [Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra)] that "the provisions of the Limitation Act having been expressly incorporated under the special statutes in question, Section 29(2) stands impliedly excluded" is with reference to the power of condonation of delay with the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18(2) of the SARFAESI Act, which was decided in a different context by reading of the proviso to Section 20(3) of the RDB Act. 62. In view of the above detailed discussion with regard to the applicability of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, in the proceedings before the statutory authority under a Special law or local law, we are of the considered opinion that the observations made by the Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra) with regard to the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act do not hold any contrary view on the specific question about the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by virtue of Section 29(2) thereof, in the proceedings under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 63. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Shalin Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant with regard to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act based on the aforesaid observations. 64. As regards International Asset Reconstruction Co. Of India Ltd. (supra), the question, in the said case, was with regard to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal before the Tribunal against the order of the recovery officer. While dealing with the said question, the Apex Court has considered the definition of "application" under Section 2(b) of the RDB Act and held that such application can only mean an application filed under Section 19 of the RDB Act. While dealing with the said question, the Apex Court has considered the definition of "application" under Section 2(b) of the RDB Act and held that such application can only mean an application filed under Section 19 of the RDB Act. Chapter IV which deals with the institution of original recovery proceedings before the Tribunal, contains a provision under Section 20 providing remedy of appeal against the order of the Tribunal under Section 19 before the Appellate Tribunal within 45 days, which may be condoned for sufficient cause as per the provision to Section 20(3) of the Act. It has further noted that the Tribunal issues a recovery certificate under Section 19(22) to the Recovery officer who then proceeds under Chapter V for recovery of the certificate amount in the manner prescribed. A person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery officer can prefer an appeal before the Tribunal under Section 30(1), the procedure whereof has been provided under the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 1993. Rule 2(c) defines appeal "to include an appeal made to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 20 or Section 30 of the RDB Act". 65. With reference to this provision, the Apex Court in International Asset Reconstruction Co. Of India Ltd. (supra), has held that the definition of appeal under Rule 2(c) cannot be extended to read it in conjunction with Section 2(b) of the RDB Act, which defines "application" which means an application made to a Tribunal under Section 19. In that context, on a comparative reading of Section 30 of the RDB Act, pre and post amendment, the Apex Court has held in paragraphs 13' as under :- "13. The RDB Act is a special law. The proceedings are before a statutory Tribunal. The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the Legislature has provided for application of the Limitation Act to original proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19 only. The appellate tribunal has been conferred the power to condone delay beyond 45 days under Section 20(3) of the Act. The proceedings before the Recovery officer are not before a Tribunal. Section 24 is limited in its application to proceedings before the Tribunal originating under Section 19 only. The exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that the legislative intent for exclusion was express. Section 24 is limited in its application to proceedings before the Tribunal originating under Section 19 only. The exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that the legislative intent for exclusion was express. The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 therefore does not arise. The prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery officer therefore cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." 66. The reasoning given by the Apex Court with regard to non-applicability of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under Section 30 of the RDB Act against the order passed by the Recovery Officer under Section 30(1) of the said Act, therefore, was with the observation that the proceedings before the Recovery Officer under Section 30 are not before a Tribunal. Section 24 of the RDB Act providing for applicability of the Limitation Act is confined to the proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19. The observation that exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that the legislative intent for exclusion was express, with the above perspective. The further observation that the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, therefore, does not arise, was thus, confined to the specific question dealt with by the Apex Court. 67. The Kerala High Court while relying on paragraph 4.3 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaishwal (supra) has ignored that the said paragraph contains the contentions of the Bank before the Apex Court and it could not be noted or relied upon as observations of the Apex Court with regard to the exclusion of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act from the scheme of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 68. We may record that none of the above noted two decisions had delved on the issues discussed by this Court in Corporation Bank (supra) nor the issue raised before us was subject matter of consideration therein. 68. We may record that none of the above noted two decisions had delved on the issues discussed by this Court in Corporation Bank (supra) nor the issue raised before us was subject matter of consideration therein. The analogy drawn by the Kerala High Court (a judgment relied by the learned senior counsel for the appellant) to hold otherwise has no persuasive value. 69. Now coming to the facts of the instant case, we may record that there is no dispute about the fact that the application under Section 17 of the Limitation Act has been preferred by the borrower against the sale notice dated 30.11.2018 and the possession notice dated 03.11.2018, within the period of 45 days thereof. The application under Section 17(1), therefore, could not have been rejected being barred by limitation, provided under Section 17(1) of 45 days from the date of taking of such measures. At this stage, we may note a judgment of the Apex Court in Indian Overseas Bank & Anr vs M/s.Ashok Saw Mill [ (2009) 8 SCC 366 ] wherein the Apex Court has held that the jurisdiction of the DRT is not confined to the stages contemplated under Section 13(4), rather all actions taken by the secured creditor in terms of Section 13(4) are open to scrutiny by the DRT and it cannot only set aside the same, but even restore the status quo ante. 70. The arguments pressed before us by the learned senior counsel for the appellant are that though the DRT was entitled to look into the correctness of the possession notice dated 03.11.2018 and sale notice dated 30.11.2018, but since the borrower did not challenge the previous actions taken by the secured creditor such as issuance of notices under section 13(2), 13(4) and resorting to Section 14 for taking physical possession within 45 days from the date of such measures taken by the Bank, the DRT will have no jurisdiction to examine the validity of such measures and the application under Section 17(1) would be barred by limitation of 45 days prescribed in Section 17(1) with respect to such previous steps taken by the secured creditor. The contention is that it is not permissible for the petitioner to postpone his challenge. The contention is that it is not permissible for the petitioner to postpone his challenge. Any such indulgence granted by the DRT to examine the validity of the actions or measures taken by the Bank prior to the issuance of the possession notice or the sale notice, would not only be in flagrant violation of the procedure under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but also frustrates the object of the Act for ensuring recovery of secured debt within a time bound manner. 71. Dealing with this submission, we may reiterate the observations made by the Apex Court in Indian Overseas Bank (supra) that the DRT had jurisdiction to deal with all measures taken by the secured creditor under section 17, pre and post Section 13(4), for securing recovery of secured debt. The Apex Court has observed therein that though while enacting the SARFAESI Act, the Legislature was concerned with measures to regulate securitisation and reconstruction of financial assets and enforcement of security interest, the power have been given to the banks and financial institutions to realise its debt by adopting measures for recovery or reconstruction without the intervention of the Court or the Tribunal. But simultaneously, in order to prevent misuse of such wide powers and prevent prejudice being caused to a borrower on account of an error of bank or financial institution, certain checks and balances has been introduced in Section 17 which allow any person including the borrower aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor to make an application to the DRT having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date of such measures having taken, for the reliefs indicated in Sub-section (3) thereof. It was, thus, held in paragraphs 36 to 39', as under :- "36. The intention of the legislature is, therefore, clear that while the Banks and Financial Institutions have been vested with stringent powers for recovery of their dues, safeguards have also been provided for rectifying any error or wrongful use of such powers by vesting the DRT with authority after conducting an adjudication into the matter to declare any such action invalid and also to restore possession even though possession may have been made over to the transferee. 37. 37. The consequences of the authority vested in DRT under Sub-Section (3) of Section 17 necessarily implies that the DRT is entitled to question the action taken by the secured creditor and the transactions entered into by virtue of Section 13(4) of the Act. The Legislature by including Sub-Section (3) in Section 17 has gone to the extent of vesting the DRT with authority to even set aside a transaction including sale and to restore possession to the borrower in appropriate cases. Resultantly, the submissions advanced by Mr. Gopalan and Mr. Altaf Ahmed that the DRT has no jurisdiction to deal with a post 13(4) situation, cannot be accepted. 38. The dichotomy in the views expressed by the Bombay High Court and the Madras high Court has, in fact, been resolved to some extent in the Mardia Chemicals Ltd.'s case (supra) itself and also by virtue of the amendments effected to Sections 13 and 17 of the principal Act. The liberty given by the learned Single Judge to the appellants to resist S.A.No.104 of 2007 preferred by the respondents before the DRT on all aspects was duly upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court and there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the same. 39. We are unable to agree with or accept the submissions made on behalf of the appellants that the DRT had no jurisdiction to interfere with the action taken by the secured creditor after the stage contemplated under Section 13(4) of the Act. On the other hand, the law is otherwise and it contemplates that the action taken by a secured creditor in terms of Section 13(4) is open to scrutiny and cannot only be set aside but even the status quo ante can be restored by the DRT." 72. As noted by the Apex Court, on perusal of Section 17(3), the DRT on examination of the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, if comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in Subsection (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, require restoration of the secured assets to the borrower or the aggrieved person in accordance with law. The Legislature has, thus, gone to the extent of vesting the DRT with the authority to not even set aside the transaction including sale effected by the secured creditor, but to restore possession to the borrower in an appropriate case. When Section 17(3) talks of restoration of status quo ante, holding that though the challenge to the sale notice may be entertained even within the time period of 45 days, the borrower restrained to maintain the application under Section 17(1) challenging the steps taken by the bank prior to issuance of sale notice or possession notice being faulty or illegal, would defeat the very purpose of providing remedy to the borrower to complain against the misuse of such wide powers given to the secured creditor to enforce security interest without intervention of the Court or the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. The SARFAESI Act being a Special law, having stringent measures for recovery of debts, its provisions are to be strictly construed and on any challenge made by the borrower under Section 17 of the Act, correctness of all or any of the steps/measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) may be enquired into, in the facts of a particular case. It is difficult for us to hold that the prescribed period of 45 days is to be computed for each measure taken under Section 13(4) separately, and the application under Section 17(1) be dismissed being beyond limitation with respect to that particular measure, if not challenged within 45 days of the prescribed period under Section 17(1). Such a selective dismissal of the application under Section 17(1) filed by the borrower is impermissible. 73. There is another aspect of the matter, as noted by the Madras High Court in Ponnusamy and Anr. vs. The Debt Recovery Tribunal [ 2009 (1) LW 954 ], relied by the learned counsel for the respondent. It has been held therein that the right of a person to challenge the measures taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act is neither a weak right (as a right of preemption) nor a statutory right newly created. The right of a person to challenge any of the measures taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act is akin to a right to redemption, which a mortgagor always had. The right of a person to challenge any of the measures taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act is akin to a right to redemption, which a mortgagor always had. As a matter of fact, the SARFAESI Act created a new right only in favour of the bank to take possession of the mortgaged asset and to bring it to sale de hors the provisions of Section 69 and 69A of the Transfer of Property Act. Prior to the enforcement Act, 2002, such a right to bring the mortgaged property to sale, without the intervention of the Court was available to the mortgagee only if the conditions prescribed under Section 69 or Section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act were satisfied. While Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act created new rights in favour of the mortgagee (Banks/secured creditor) de hors Section 69 and 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, Section 13(8) recognised the right of redemption available to the borrower, at any time, before the date of publication of notice for transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale of the secured assets by public auction or private treaty. The remedy under Section 17(1) is virtually the remedy in respect of a right of redemption, which otherwise, normally gets extinguished after the sale of the property. 74. It is, thus, difficult to hold that the borrower will be denuded of his right to seek redemption of mortgage prior to the stage contemplated under Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The cause of action to file an application under Section 17(1) arises as and when one or other such measures to recover the secured debt is taken by the secured creditor. Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act enables the secured creditor to take recourse to one or more (any) of the measures to recover the secured debt as per clauses (a) to (c) of Section 13(4). The cause of action which commenced with the notice under Section 13(4) continues uptil the measures taken by the bank to recover its debt are brought to their logical conclusion with the sale of the secured assets in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The cause of action which commenced with the notice under Section 13(4) continues uptil the measures taken by the bank to recover its debt are brought to their logical conclusion with the sale of the secured assets in accordance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. It cannot be said that the cause of action to challenge the notice under Section 13(2) or Section 13(4) on the ground that they were not issued in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules made thereunder or no notice at all has been served has been extinguished once the possession notice or sale notice has been issued in furtherance of such notices, as per Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 75. The contention made by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the borrower cannot be permitted to postpone his challenge and any such permission granted to the borrower would result in huge delay and defeat the object of the Act for speedy recovery of the dues, are not found convincing, inasmuch as, the right of redemption is available to the borrower only till the publication of notice for transfer of the secured asset as per Section 13(8). After loosing possession of the property under Section 13(4), the borrower cannot afford to wait for long, for the reason that if the property may gets sold, his rights may get extinguished. However, if the sale is effected by the illegal procedure adopted by the secured creditor, the borrower will be well within his right to seek for setting aside of the sale and even restoration of possession of the secured asset, in view of Section 17(3) of the Act. 76. In all eventualities, the checks and balances provided under the SARFAESI Act, while balancing the competing interests of the secured creditor and the borrower/debtor have to be kept in mind by the DRT, while dealing with the particular case, in the facts and circumstances before it. In any case, any frivolous challenge or any effort of the borrower to stall the process of speedy recovery has to be dealt with, with firm hands. 77. In any case, any frivolous challenge or any effort of the borrower to stall the process of speedy recovery has to be dealt with, with firm hands. 77. In view of the above discussion, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the challenge to Sections 13(2), 13(4) Notices and Order under Section 14 cannot be sustained as the same cannot be looked into by the DRT, being made beyond the period of 45 days of limitation under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, is liable to be turned down. 78. For the reasoning given above and the discussion made by the learned Single Judge in setting aside the order passed by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, we are of the considered opinion that the DRAT has erred in setting aside the order passed by the DRT, only on the ground of limitation, holding that DRT had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 17(1). We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the Appellate Tribunal has to decide the appeal by examining the merits of the order passed by the DRT for allowing the application under Section 17(1). 79. However, on the other issues agitated by the learned senior counsel for the appellant on the merits of the case of the borrower in sustaining the challenge, we do not find any reason to enter into the same, for the fact that the matter has been relegated to the DRAT for examination on merits. 80. For the above, the appeal stands dismissed being devoid of merits. Connected Civil Applications would not survive in view of the disposal of the main Appeal itself.