JUDGMENT : Nitin Jamdar, C. J. The Appellants/Original Petitioners have filed this appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court, 1958, challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 24 October 2024, dismissing W.P.(C) No.41576 of 2023. 2. The Petitioners, by way of the writ petition, had sought nine reliefs, including various declarations primarily concerning the action of the Respondent Bank in proceeding under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act). The main contention of the Appellants is based on the status of the Appellant Enterprise, which they allege is a Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME). 3. The Appellants approached the Respondent Bank for financial assistance. They were granted financial assistance by way of a loan against property and working capital for a sum of Rs.1,25,01,220/-and another loan account of Rs.24,00,000/-. As per the terms and conditions of the loan agreement, the Appellants were liable to repay the loan amounts along with interest. 4. The Bank proceeded against the Appellants since they failed and neglected to pay the dues and became a Non-Performing Asset on 6 Bank issued notice to the Appellants on 4 April 2022 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act calling upon them to make payment of a sum of Rs.1,54,92,422/-with interest, within a period of 60 days failing which the Respondents would proceed under the SARFAESI Act. However, no amount was paid. 5. The Respondent Bank thereafter moved the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam, under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act to seek possession of the secured asset. The learned Magistrate passed an order on 3 March 2023 under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. An Advocate Commissioner was appointed, who issued notice to the Appellants on 24 April 2023 stating that the physical possession of the secured asset would be taken on 6 May 2023 or thereafter. 6. The Petitioners filed W.P.(C) No.15055 of 2023, which was disposed of on 4 September 2023. 7. Thereafter, the Appellants filed another Writ Petition No.31724 of 2023 regarding consideration of their representation for One Time Settlement and the said writ petition was disposed of on 16 October 2023, directing the Bank to consider the representation of the Petitioners and protecting their possession for a week. 8. 7. Thereafter, the Appellants filed another Writ Petition No.31724 of 2023 regarding consideration of their representation for One Time Settlement and the said writ petition was disposed of on 16 October 2023, directing the Bank to consider the representation of the Petitioners and protecting their possession for a week. 8. No amount was paid, and a third petition, present one bearing No.41576 of 2023, came to be filed raising various grounds based on the provisions of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act) and the notification issued thereunder. 9. The learned Single Judge considered the contentions and following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Pro Knits v. The Board of Directors of Canara Bank & Ors. [Civil Appeal No. 8332 of 2024 dated 01 August 2024] that a framework under the notification issued under the MSMED Act also enables the MSME to initiate proceedings voluntarily, and it would be incumbent on the part of MSME, at the stage of identification of incipient stress, to produce an authenticated and verifiable document, observed that the Appellants failed to do so and thereafter they cannot be heard to raise these contentions. The learned Single Judge found that the conduct of the Appellants was nothing but an attempt to postpone and stall the recovery proceedings and dismissed the Petition. Being aggrieved, the Appellants are before us in appeal. 10. We have heard Mr. Mathews J. Nedumpara, the learned counsel for the Appellants and Ms. Anju Mohan, the learned counsel for the Respondent Bank. 11. The contention of the Petitioners briefly are as follows: Though it is correct that the Appellants have not raised the ground of the Enterprise being an MSME at an early stage and in the earlier round of writ petitions, the Appellants cannot be estopped from raising legal contentions which go to the root of the case. There can be no estoppel against a statute. Also, the doctrine of resjudicata can only be applied to the disputed questions of fact and evidence and not to legal position as it is a basic position that there can be no estoppel against law. The Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, in pursuance of the power under Section 9 of the MSMED Act, has issued a notification dated 29 May 2015 laying down the Framework for the revival and rehabilitation of MSME. The Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, in pursuance of the power under Section 9 of the MSMED Act, has issued a notification dated 29 May 2015 laying down the Framework for the revival and rehabilitation of MSME. Under clause (1)(2), the MSME voluntarily may initiate proceedings if it apprehends the failure of its business or its inability. There is no mandate for the MSME, and it is a voluntary action. On the other hand, the Framework mandates banks and creditors to adhere to clause (1) with respect to the identification of incipient stress. Therefore, merely because the MSME did not raise the ground with respect to the notification at the time of identification cannot result in estoppel. In fact, it is a failure of duty of the banks and creditors to adhere to the notification and considering the beneficial objective of the notifications, the MSME should be permitted to raise the ground at any time of the proceedings. A Committee constituted under the notification performs judicial functions as seen from the nature of its power. Therefore, an elaborate methodology has been laid down. The Reserve Bank of India has also issued certain guidelines for the revival of MSME; therefore, these guidelines should have been adhered to. Though the Appellants are educated, they were not aware of these intrinsic positions of law, and therefore, merely because the Appellants failed to point out the status of MSME, it cannot be held against the Appellants. Even assuming that the Appellants have not repaid the amount and equitable considerations may be against them, the statutory protection available to the Appellants cannot be taken away. Therefore, the impugned judgment and the action taken by the Respondent Bank under the SARFAESI Act ought to be set aside. 12. The learned counsel for the Respondent Bank, on the other hand, submitted that nothing stopped the Appellant Enterprise from advancing an argument based on its alleged status as MSME at the inception and in the two writ petitions filed by the Appellants. In fact, the Appellants had sought repayment by way of installments, and now this is the third attempt on some grounds to stall the recovery proceedings. The learned counsel submitted that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s.ProKnitsis clear, and the learned Single Judge was not in error in following the same. 13. In fact, the Appellants had sought repayment by way of installments, and now this is the third attempt on some grounds to stall the recovery proceedings. The learned counsel submitted that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s.ProKnitsis clear, and the learned Single Judge was not in error in following the same. 13. We have considered the rival contentions. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s.ProKnits had examined the scheme of MSMED Act in conjunction with the SARFAESI Act and had accepted the contention of the MSMEs that they could have a special status as regards recovery of loans. However, after concluding so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: “16. We may hasten to add that under the "Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs", the banks or creditors are required to identify the incipient stress in the account of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, before their accounts turn into nonperforming assets, by creating three sub-categories under the "Special Mention Account" Category, however, while creating such sub-categories, the Banks must have some authenticated and verifiable material with them as produced by the concerned MSME to show that loan account is of a Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise, classified and registered as such under the MSMED Act. The said Framework also enables the Micro, Small or Medium Enterprise to voluntarily initiate the proceedings under the said Framework, by filing an application along with the affidavit of an authorised person. Therefore, the stage of identification of incipient stress in the loan account of MSMEs and categorisation under the Special Mention Account category, before the loan account of MSME turns into NPA is a very crucial stage, and therefore it would be incumbent on the part of the concerned MSME also to produce authenticated and verifiable documents/ material for substantiating its claim of being MSME, before its account is classified as NPA. If that is not done, and once the account is classified as NPA, the banks i.e. secured creditors would be entitled to take the recourse to Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act for the enforcement of the security interest. 17. It is also pertinent to note that sufficient safeguards have been provided under the said Chapter for safeguarding the interest of the Defaulters-Borrowers for giving them opportunities to discharge their debt. 17. It is also pertinent to note that sufficient safeguards have been provided under the said Chapter for safeguarding the interest of the Defaulters-Borrowers for giving them opportunities to discharge their debt. However, if at the stage of classification of the loan account of the borrower as NPA, the borrower does not bring to the notice of the concerned bank/creditor that it is a Micro, Small or Medium Enterprise under the MSMED Act and if such an Enterprise allows the entire process for enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI Act to be over, or it having challenged such action of the concerned bank/creditor in the court of law/tribunal and having failed, such an Enterprise could not be permitted to misuse the process of law for thwarting the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act by raising the plea of being an MSME at a belated stage. Suffice it to say, when it is mandatory or obligatory on the part of the Banks to follow the Instructions/ Directions issued by the Central Government and the Reserve Bank of India with regard to the Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs, it would be equally incumbent on the part of the concerned MSMEs to be vigilant enough to follow the process laid down under the said Framework, and bring to the notice of the concerned Banks, by producing authenticated and verifiable documents/material to show its eligibility to get the benefit of the said Framework.” (emphasis supplied) The Hon'ble Supreme Court, therefore, has laid down the position of law that if, at the stage of classification of the loan account, the borrower does not bring to the notice of the Bank that it is an MSME and allow the entire process to go through, then it will be precluded from raising it at the belated stage. This dicta is very clear and is binding. 15. Furthermore, the Appellants are mixing up several issues which have different connotations, such as res judicata, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. The waiver and acquiescence will stand on a completely different footing than an estoppel. If a party knowingly permits a certain comes into play. 16. This dicta is very clear and is binding. 15. Furthermore, the Appellants are mixing up several issues which have different connotations, such as res judicata, estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. The waiver and acquiescence will stand on a completely different footing than an estoppel. If a party knowingly permits a certain comes into play. 16. In this case, the Appellants permitted the state of affairs to prevail, including that of seeking repayment by installments, and therefore, clearly benefited from the delay, which has enured to their benefit, whereby the Appellants have been able to retain the amount instead of repaying the same. 17. The observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph (17) in the case of M/s.Pro Knitslays down the principle that the borrowers have to be diligent, and if they knowingly permit the state of affairs to continue, they will be precluded from raising the challenge. The case is not only of estoppel as argued but acquiescence and waiver as well. The Appellants have sidestepped this aspect of the matter and have focused entirely on the principle of estoppel. Even otherwise, the clear dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s.Pro Knits leaves no room to accept the contention raised by the Appellants. 18. In the earlier two writ petitions, there is not even a whisper of the Appellant Enterprise being MSME. The argument that the Appellants were not aware of the status of the Enterprise as MSME is too far-fetched to believe when they had filed two writ petitions through legal counsels. In this case, a lame explanation is given that the Appellants were unaware of their rights, which we find entirely unacceptable. It is nowhere stated that the Appellants are illiterate. Therefore, all we see before us is an attempt to raise repeated challenges in the Court to stall the repayment. The learned counsel for the Respondent Bank submitted that the Appellants paid not a single paisa, and the entire loan amount has been defalcated. 19. The Appellants’ argument that the High Court must intervene, no matter how they conducted themselves, proceeds on a complete misunderstanding of the nature of writ jurisdiction. There are two separate issues. One, whether the Bank lacked the authority to proceed. Second, whether the Appellants’ conduct disqualifies or disentitles them from invoking equity jurisdiction. 19. The Appellants’ argument that the High Court must intervene, no matter how they conducted themselves, proceeds on a complete misunderstanding of the nature of writ jurisdiction. There are two separate issues. One, whether the Bank lacked the authority to proceed. Second, whether the Appellants’ conduct disqualifies or disentitles them from invoking equity jurisdiction. In cases where a borrower who qualifies as MSME does not initially raise its status to challenge a bank's recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act but instead participates fully in the process without objection, cannot later use their MSME status to argue that the proceedings were without jurisdiction. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary based on the principles of fairness and justice, which include examining the conduct of the parties involved. When the Appellants, by their actions, accepted the Bank's authority without objection, the High Court will refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction to assist such Appellants, even if there are questions about the jurisdiction of the Bank. This is because the Appellants’ own conduct disqualifies them from claiming such relief. When the High Court declines to interfere in such circumstances, it does not mean that the Appellants’ waiver vested the Bank with jurisdiction, assuming it is inherently lacking; it means that the borrower is not entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction irrespective of whether the Bank's actions are without jurisdiction or not. These two concepts are distinct, and the distinction is emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Pro Knit. 20. We, therefore, find no error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, which is following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 21. We find no merit in the appeal. Appeal is dismissed. 22. The learned counsel for the Appellants prays for stay of the judgment and grant of leave. In view of our observations in this judgment, the request is refused.