JUDGMENT : HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J. This writ petition is directed against an order dated 26.04.2023 passed by the Project Director, District Rural Development Agency, Jaunpur, rejecting the petitioner’s claim to treat his age of superannuation as 60 years and extend him all benefits thereof. For the sake of brevity, the District Rural Development Agency shall be hereinafter be referred to as the ‘DRDA’. 2. The petitioner was initially appointed as a Junior Clerk with the DRDA, Mirzapur in the year 1989. The petitioner says that he was retired from service on 31.12.2012 at the age of 58 years, instead of 60. He says that he was entitled to continue in service up to the age of 60 years, which is his age of superannuation and that he should be given all benefits determined on the basis of his age of superannuation being 60 years. The DRDA is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860[‘the Act of 1860’ for short], though entirely under the control of the State Government. According to the petitioner, by a circular dated 29.10.1983, service conditions of employees of the DRDA are to be the same as those of the State Government employees. Earlier, the age of retirement for Government employees was 58 years, and therefore, the same applied for the employees of the DRDA. Subsequently, the Government issued a notification dated 28.11.2001, raising the age of retirement for employees of the State Government to 60 years. An amendment in this regard was made to Fundamental Rule 56. By virtue of the Circular dated 17.03.1994, the employees of the DRDA would also superannuate at the age of 60 years at par with government servants. The petitioner claims parity in the age of retirement with government servants and their enhanced age of superannuation with effect from 28.11.2001. For the purpose, he has relied upon the Government Order dated 29.10.1983, besides the Circular dated 17.03.1994, both issued by the State Government. It is also the petitioner’s case that there are no service rules framed for the employees of the DRDA, and therefore, the executive instructions/circular issued on 17.03.1994 to maintain uniformity in the Establishment of the DRDA would entitle employees of the DRDA to be treated at par with the employees of the State Government in the matter of their age of retirement. 3. 3. The petitioner was served with a notice of retirement with the Project Director, DRDA, Jaunpur, retiring him from the service with effect from 31.12.2012. The petitioner instituted Writ -A No. 122 of 2013 before the Court, challenging the retirement age of 58 years. This Court, by an order dated 13.01.2013, passed an interim order, permitting the petitioner to continue in service and paid salary till he reaches the age of 60 years. Later on, the petitioner’s writ petition, which came up for hearing on 25.07.2013 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The petitioner challenged the order dismissing his writ petition as aforesaid vide Special Appeal Defective No. 965 of 2013. This Special Appeal was disposed of in terms of an earlier order dated 09.09.2013 passed in Special Appeal No. 1266 of 2013, where too, the appellant’s writ petition had been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. The order passed in Special Appeal Defective No. 965 of 2013 reads : Although there is some delay in filing the appeal but learned counsel for the appellant submits that in the similar set of fact this court has disposed of Special Appeal No. 1266 of 2013 by giving direction to the respondent to consider the claim of appellant. Copy of the judgment dated 9.9.2013 given in the special appeal, referred above, was shown to the court during course of argument. Copy of the aforesaid order was also given to the learned Standing Counsel who has also perused the same. On the facts as special appeal touching the same issue has already been disposed of, we also propose to dispose of this appeal in the same terms and directions as given in the order dated 9.9.2013, passed in the Special Appeal, referred above. 4. The order dated 09.09.2013 passed in Special Appeal No. 1266 of 2013, on the foot of which the petitioner’s Special Appeal was decided, reads : Heard Sri A.B.Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Standing Counsel. This appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 25.7.2013 passed in Writ Petition No. 65239 of 2012. The appellant, who was the petitioner in the writ petition is an employee of District Rural Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "DRDA"). This appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 25.7.2013 passed in Writ Petition No. 65239 of 2012. The appellant, who was the petitioner in the writ petition is an employee of District Rural Development Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "DRDA"). The claim of the appellant in the writ petition was that he was entitled to continue in service up to the age of 60 years whereas notice has been served on him to retire on attaining the age of 58 years. The appellant placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case of Kalika Prasad Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others in Writ Petition No. 45 (SS) of 2005 decided on 9.4.2007. The learned Single Judge while hearing the writ petition came to a conclusion that the above judgment of the learned Single Judge has been overruled by Division Bench in the case of Shoeb Ullah Khan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vide Writ Petition Nos. 51679 of 2009 and 29195 of 2011 and accordingly did not interfere with the notice indicating retirement of the appellant on completion of 58 years of age. In Special Appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has drawn attention of the Court to a decision taken by the State Government in Annexure-II. From the said decision of the State Government, dated 1.8.2013, it appears that the age of superannuation has been enhanced from 58 years to 60 years. It is stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that even after attaining the age of 58 years by virtue of interim order, the appellant continued in service and therefore should be extended the benefit of decision taken by the State Government on 1.8.2013 and he should be permitted to continue till he attains the age of 60 years. The learned counsel for the State submits that though such decision has been taken by the Department, it is also provided that it shall be given effect from the date it is intimated to the concerned authorities. From Annexure-II dated 1.8.2013, we find that the State Government has taken a decision to enhance the age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years in respect of the employees of DRDA. From Annexure-II dated 1.8.2013, we find that the State Government has taken a decision to enhance the age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years in respect of the employees of DRDA. In view of the such a decision, the claim of the appellant is required to be considered for extension of age of superannuation by the concerned authorities, even though, the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment held that the age of superannuation should be 58 years of age. This judgment was delivered on 25th July, 2013 whereas the policy decision has been taken on 1.8.2013. Accordingly the above policy decision could not be taken note of by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. We, therefore, dispose of the appeal on consideration of the subsequent development that has taken place and direct respondent No. 4 in consultation with respondent Nos. 1 and 2, may consider the claim of the appellant for continuance in service up to the age of 60 years and this exercise shall be completed within two months from the date of communication of this order and a decision be taken in that regard. 5. There are some further developments which happened pursuant to the order passed by the Division Bench, but there is no mention of these in the petitioner’s writ petition. It appears that in compliance with the order dated 29.09.2013 passed in Special Appeal No. 965 of 2013, the petitioner’s claim was considered and rejected vide order dated 24.02.2014 passed by the Chief Development Officer, Jaunpur and the Project Director, DRDA, Jaunpur, acting together. It further appears that this order rejecting the petitioner’s claim was never challenged by the petitioner. Later on, a Cabinet decision was taken on 01.08.2013 as a policy measure to enhance the age of employees of the Department of Fisheries, DRDA and other self-governed institutions from 58 to 60 years. About details of how this bore on the rights of the employees of the DRDA regarding their age of retirement would be shortly gone into. The decision led to a judgment of this Court in Jagmohan and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2017 (5) ADJ 188 which granted relief to employees of the DRDA to continue up to the age of 60 years and directed that benefit of the judgment would be extended according to Paragraphs Nos. The decision led to a judgment of this Court in Jagmohan and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2017 (5) ADJ 188 which granted relief to employees of the DRDA to continue up to the age of 60 years and directed that benefit of the judgment would be extended according to Paragraphs Nos. 49, 49.1, 49.2 and 49.3 of the report of the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dayanand Chakrawarty and others, (2013) 7 SCC 595 . How the judgment in Jagmohan (supra)would bear on the rights of the petitioner would also be alluded to a little later in this judgment. 6. It appears that inspired by a Government Order dated 22.12.2022 directing release of salary of employees who had attained the age of superannuation at 58 years up to their 60th year and sanction of funds for the purpose of payment of salaries to such employees for two years, the petitioner preferred Writ -A No. 3112 of 2023 before this Court, claiming parity of treatment with other employees and the payment of salary up to the age of 60 years, including the working out of his post-retiral benefits on that basis. Writ -A No. 3112 of 2023 filed by the petitioner was disposed of on 20.03.2023, in terms of the following orders : In view thereof, petitioner is permitted to make a fresh detailed representation to respondent no.4 Pariyojna Nideshak (Project Director) Zila Gramya Vikas Abhikaran, Jaunpur District Jaunpur, raising all his grievance, annexing therewith a copy of this writ petition along with annexures and all the documents in support of his claim within a period of one week from today along with a certified copy of this order. In case such a representation is moved by petitioner, respondent no.4 shall consider and decide the same in accordance with law by a reasoned and speaking order within a period of six weeks from the date a certified copy of this order along with representation is placed before him. It is made clear that this court has not applied itself on the merits of the case and all questions are left open to be considered and decided by the competent authority in accordance with law. With the aforesaid directions, the writ petition is disposed of. 7. It is made clear that this court has not applied itself on the merits of the case and all questions are left open to be considered and decided by the competent authority in accordance with law. With the aforesaid directions, the writ petition is disposed of. 7. The petitioner submitted a representation in compliance with the said order dated 22.03.2023 to the Project Director, DRDA, Jaunpur on the same date, that is to say, 22.03.2023. The Project Director, by the order impugned dated 26.04.2023, has rejected the petitioner’s representation. 8. Aggrieved, this writ petition has been instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. A notice of motion was issued on 21.11.2023, in response whereto, a counter affidavit was filed by the Project Director, DRDA, Jaunpur on 13.12.2023. A rejoinder too was filed on the same day. The parties having exchanged affidavits, the petition was admitted to hearing, which proceeded forthwith. Judgment was reserved. 10. Heard Mr. Shree Prakash Giri, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Monika Arya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the State. 11. Upon hearing learned Counsel for parties, this Court finds that in compliance with the directions issued in Special Appeal Defective No. 965 of 2013 vide order dated 25.09.2013, the Project Director, DRDA, Jaunpur, considered the petitioner’s claim seeking retirement at the age of 60 years and rejected it by an order dated 22.02.2014 passed together with the Chief Development Officer[‘CDO’ for short] of the District. This order dated 24.02.2014 was never challenged by the petitioner. In the present writ petition also, the order dated 24.02.2014 was never challenged or disclosed. Rather, suppressing this order dated 24.02.2014, the petitioner, inspired by the changes in the government polity and ultimately, the rules relating to the age of retirement for the DRDA employees, instituted a fresh writ petition, without disclosing at all, as it appears, the fact that he had earlier litigated his rights vide Writ -A No. 122 of 2013, where his writ petition was initially entertained, but ultimately dismissed vide judgment and order dated 25.07.2013. He also did not disclose that he appealed the decision to the Division Bench, which granted him succour and relegated him to the respondents. He also did not disclose that he appealed the decision to the Division Bench, which granted him succour and relegated him to the respondents. As already mentioned, the petitioner also did not disclose the fact that in compliance with the orders of the Division Bench passed on the petitioner’s Special Appeal Defective No. 965 of 2013, the Project Director, DRDA and the CDO, Jaunpur together had rejected his claim to retire at the age of 60 years vide order dated 22.02.2014. 12. The petition which the petitioner moved, being Writ -A No. 3112 of 2023, represented a state of facts before this Court, as if he had come up for the first time, agitating his rights in terms of the changed rules, to retire at the age of 60 years as an employee of the DRDA. Of course, the petitioner could and did only claim monetary benefits at that point of time, based on the enhanced age of retirement. Oblivious of the earlier writ petition, the order passed therein, the orders of the Division Bench in Special Appeal, this Court disposed of Writ -A No. 3112 of 2023, directing the Project Director, DRDA to consider the petitioner’s claim in accordance with law and decide it by a speaking order. Not only that the fact of rejection of the present claim way back on 24.02.2014 was suppressed, when Writ -A No. 3112 of 2023 was filed, there is no mention of it in the present writ petition, which has been filed on the supposition as if the impugned order was the first one to be passed, rejecting the petitioner’s claim. 13. Apart from other things, on this short ground of gross suppression by the petitioner of the fact that he had much earlier litigated his rights subject matter of the present petition, the petition is fit to be dismissed. Nevertheless, this Court proceeds to examine the petitioner’s claim on merits, since there is a lot of issue about discrimination between various employees of the DRDA, who have been extended the benefit of retirement at the age of 60 years, whereas the petitioner has been retired at the lesser age of 58 years. Much reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the authority of this Court in Jagmohan. Much reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner upon the authority of this Court in Jagmohan. Jagmohan was a case which came to be decided by a learned Single Judge, before whom, there were two categories of cases. One were by the employees of the Fish Farmers Development Agency[‘FFDA’ for short] and the other was by the employees of the DRDA. The issue that arose for consideration in Jagmohan is set out in paragraph No. 7 of the report, which reads : 7. The controversy now remain confined to the second category of petitions regarding employees of DRDA to the extent that as to whether 30.9.2014 fixed as cut-off-date in case of DRDA employees vide Government order dated 10.10.2014 is arbitrary, illegal and irrational and suffers from malice in law or not, as the claim of the petitioners is that their case is also covered by the same Cabinet decision dated 1.8.2013 pursuant whereof the employees of other Corporations including FFDA have already been granted relief. For this purpose, in this category Writ Petition No. 38101 of 2014 (Ram Babu Kushwaha v. State of U.P and others) is taken as a leading case with the consent of parties. 14. In Jagmohan, it was noticed that the State Government had taken a policy decision to increase the age of retirement of employees of self-governed institutions like the DRDA. In a meeting of the Cabinet held on 01.08.2013, the age was decided to be increased to 60 years. Pursuant to the decision of the Cabinet, a Government Order dated 12.08.2013 was issued by the Secretary, proposing to enhance age from 58 to 60 years, with certain conditions about completing formalities enumerated in the Government Order dated 12.08.2013. The Secretary then issued a further order dated 19.09.2013, addressed to the Commissioner, Rural Development Department, U.P, Lucknow to obtain reports from various DRDAs and other departments. These reports were invited about sharing the financial burden that would be involved in increasing the age of retirement. The Commissioner, Rural Development Department, after securing necessary reports from the various DRDAs, made a recommendation on 25.03.2020 that age may be enhanced from 58 to 60 years. There was a time lag on the part of the State Government in acting upon the recommendations to increase the age from 58 to 60 years for the employees of the DRDA. The Commissioner, Rural Development Department, after securing necessary reports from the various DRDAs, made a recommendation on 25.03.2020 that age may be enhanced from 58 to 60 years. There was a time lag on the part of the State Government in acting upon the recommendations to increase the age from 58 to 60 years for the employees of the DRDA. The matter was placed before the Cabinet again on 30.09.2014, when a formal decision was taken to extend the age from 58 to 60 years. This decision was implemented in terms of the Government Order dated 10.10.2014, enhancing the age of superannuation for employees of the DRDA, amongst others, from 58 to 60 years, with effect from 30.09.2014. The date on which the Government enhanced the age notified vide order dated 10.10.2014, that is to say, 30.09.2014 or the “cut-off date”, as it is called, was the subject matter of issue in Jagmohan. This Court in Jagmohan held the cut-off date to be unreasonable and arbitrary. In holding the cut-off date to be arbitrary, it was observed in Jagmohan : 21. First of all it is necessary to take note of the fact that all the local self Government bodies that have been referred to above, including the employees of DRDA, are undisputedly covered by the decision of the cabinet dated 1.8.2013. It is also not in dispute that vide letter dated 25.11.2013 the Commissioner, Gram Vikas has submitted his recommendation for extension of age of DRDA employees from 58 to 60 years but no decision was admittedly taken. 22. I have also carefully perused the various documents placed on record. A compliance affidavit dated 29.4.2015 passed in Writ Petition No. 50351 of 2013 (Jagmohan and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others) (relating to employees of Fish Farmer Development Agency) was filed, annexure 2 whereof is an order dated 16.4.2015 passed in Contempt Petition No. 149 of 2015 (Bhola Nath Pal v. Rajnish Gupta, Principal Secy. Deptt. Of Fishieries Lucknow and another) clearly reflects that for non compliance of the order of the Writ Court a contempt notice was issued to the Secretary and it is only thereafter various individual Government orders of different dates were passed extending the benefit to such employees of Fish Farmer Development Agency pursuant to the cabinet decision dated 1.8.2013. Deptt. Of Fishieries Lucknow and another) clearly reflects that for non compliance of the order of the Writ Court a contempt notice was issued to the Secretary and it is only thereafter various individual Government orders of different dates were passed extending the benefit to such employees of Fish Farmer Development Agency pursuant to the cabinet decision dated 1.8.2013. Such orders are on record in the shape of supplementary counter-affidavit dated 31.11.2015 in the case of Jagmohan (supra) as referred above. 23. In the present case also after passing of the direction to take decision within eight weeks on the letter of the Commissioner, Gram Vikas dated 25.11.2013 as directed by this Court vide order dated 8.4.2014 the decision was taken on 30.9.2014 by the cabinet and thereafter Government order dated 10.10.2014 was issued fixing 30.9.2014 as the cut-off-date. It is very much pertinent to note that it is only in this Government order a cut-off- date has been fixed by the State of Government, whereas employees of other self governed local bodies plainly benefit has been extended pursuant to the cabinet decision dated 1.8.2013 and they have also been paid arrears of salary. 24. A perusal of the Government order dated 10.10.2014 nowhere indicates the reason for fixing such cut-off-date. A perusal of the instruction dated 23.2.2017 that has already been quoted above also clearly nowhere indicates the reason why this cut-off-date 30.9.2014 is being fixed except to note on that since the State has taken decision on that dates, therefore, from this date the Government order shall become effective, whereas admittedly the Commissioner, Gram Vikas made his recommendations vide letter dated 25.11.2013. It is, therefore, quite obvious that it is only because of the order dated 4.8.2014, wherein strict view was taken by this Court to take decision in the matter in the light of the letter of the Commissioner, Gram Vikas dated 25.11.2013, failing which Secretary, Gram Vikas, Lucknow shall appear in person alongwith record to assist the Court, the aforesaid decision was taken. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, I am forced to make observation that it is only pursuant to the contempt proceedings pending before the Lucknow Bench of this Court as noticed above and the direction to appear in person has only persuaded the State authorities to come into action and pass Government orders. 25. … 26. … 27. 25. … 26. … 27. In the above noted case, it has been laid down that as a rule, interference is not called for in cut-off-date except that the decision should not be arbitrary or unreasonable. In the present case, I find that even the instructions that have been received by the Sri Ravi Shankar Prasad, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, do not reflect any such rational beyond fixing such cut-off-date as 30.9.2014 whereas, even by the subsequent individual Government orders of the year 2015 the benefit of extended age was granted to the employees of FFDA with retrospective effect, authority in that case also vide Government Order dated 26.5.2015 decision to extend age was taken. These Government Orders were issued subsequent to the Government Order dated 10.10.2014 issued in the case of DRDA. ............ 28. In such view of the matter, I find that the cut-off-date so fixed in the present case as 30.9.2014 has no relevance with the objective to be achieved pursuant to cabinet decision and after no reason on rational as to why inspite of the recommendation of the Commissioner, Gram Vikas dated 25.11.2013 no swift decision was taken and I find that the same is unreasonable and arbitrary insofar as the petitioners are concerned. In the present case, the sole object to give a subsequent cut-off-date appears to be to avoid financial liability in colourable exercise of powers. 29. … 30. In such view of the matter, the petitioners are entitled for the benefit of the cabinet decision dated 1.8.2013 in pursuance where of a Government order dated 12.8.2013 was issued and it is provided that they shall be entitled benefits in view of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Dayanand Chakrawarty (supra) as while disposing of earlier petitions, this Court has already observed that in case decision is taken to extent the age, benefit of such extension shall be granted to the petitioners also. Therefore, the petitioners shall be entitled to benefits as per judgment in Dayanand Chakrawarty (supra). Relevant paragraph Nos. 49, 49.1, 49.2 and 49.3 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under : 49. Therefore, the petitioners shall be entitled to benefits as per judgment in Dayanand Chakrawarty (supra). Relevant paragraph Nos. 49, 49.1, 49.2 and 49.3 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under : 49. In these cases as we have already held that Regulation 31 shall be applicable and the age of superannuation of employees of the Nigam shall be 60 years; we are of the view that following consequential and pecuniary benefits should be allowed to different sets of employees who were ordered to retire at the age of 58 years: 49.1. The employees including respondents who moved before a Court of law irrespective of fact whether interim order was passed in their favour or not, shall be entitled for full salary up to the age of 60 years. The arrears of salary shall be paid to them after adjusting the amount if any paid. 49.2. The employees, who never moved before any Court of law and had to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, they shall not be entitled for arrears of salary. However, in view of Regulation 31 they will deem to have continued in service up to the age of 60 years. In their case, the appellants shall treat the age of superannuation at 60 years, fix the pay accordingly and re-fix the retirement benefits like pension, gratuity etc. On such calculation, they shall be entitled for arrears of retirement benefits after adjusting the amount already paid. 49.3. The arrears of salary and arrears of retirement benefits should be paid to such employees within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.'' 31. … 32. Second category of petitions are allowed. The petitioners shall be entitled for payment as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dayanand Chakrawarty (supra). 15. In Jagmohan, the second category of writ petitions that related to the DRDA were allowed and the petitioners held entitled to payment of benefits, as per directions of the Supreme Court in the case of Dayanand Chakrawarty (supra). It may briefly be remarked that the judgment in Jagmohan passed by this Court was affirmed in Special Appeal and also by the Supreme Court in a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, that was summarily dismissed. It may briefly be remarked that the judgment in Jagmohan passed by this Court was affirmed in Special Appeal and also by the Supreme Court in a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, that was summarily dismissed. The details of those appellate approvals need not be spelt out, because those are neither in issue nor anything turns on Jagmohan in the present case. What this Court finds is that on 01.08.2013, the Cabinet took a decision in principle to enhance the age for employees of self-governed institutions like the DRDA to 60 years. This was perhaps in keeping with a similar enhancement of age granted to government servants long ago. Whatever it was, it was a policy decision of the Cabinet. At that stage, however, it was a decision in principle that was yet not concluded and workable. No rights could be founded on it. Much had to be done to give effect to the Cabinet’s resolve of 01.08.2013. The Government Order that was issued on 12.08.2013 spoke about modalities to be ascertained from the DRDAs through the Commissioner, Rural Development about implementing the said decision. Particularly, it was to work out the financial implications that would ensue upon enhancement of retirement age for a number of employees of DRDA and similar bodies. It was after the necessary recommendations had come in through the Commissioner, Rural Development, based on responses that he had received from the various DRDAs that the matter was placed again before the Cabinet on 03.09.2014, when a final decision was taken to enhance the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years. The Government Order dated 10.10.2014 was a formal expression of the Cabinet’s decision and it was made effective from 30.09.2014, the cut-off date. 16. No doubt, in Jagmohan, this Court held the cut-off date to be arbitrary, but it remains a moot point as to how much back in time for employees who have retired from the DRDA, the benefit of enhanced age can be taken. The cut-off date fixed by the Government Order dated 10.10.2014 was adjudged arbitrary by this Court, and that decision has attained finality. Does this mean that every employee who has retired from DRDA decades ago is to be deemed resurrected for a period of two years and given benefit of a tenure enhanced by two years duration? The cut-off date fixed by the Government Order dated 10.10.2014 was adjudged arbitrary by this Court, and that decision has attained finality. Does this mean that every employee who has retired from DRDA decades ago is to be deemed resurrected for a period of two years and given benefit of a tenure enhanced by two years duration? An employee who has retired away, say in June, 2008 would then also have to be called back and extended the benefit of enhanced age, paid for two years more beyond his retirement in salary and his post-retiral benefits revised accordingly. This certainly is neither the intent of the Government Order dated 10.10.2014 nor this Court’s decision in Jagmohan, holding the cut-off date of 30.09.2014 to be arbitrary. The application of the directions in Dayanand Chakrawarty, which have been adopted by this Court in Jagmohan to deal with such claims, in the opinion of this Court, cannot be applied to cases of employees who have retired long ago, or so to speak, retired much before the Cabinet thought on principle that the age of retirement ought to be enhanced from 58 to 60. The Cabinet thought about it in terms of a decision in principle for the first time on 01.08.2013; not earlier. It is for this reason that in the impugned order passed by the Project Director, DRDA there is a reference to Memo No. 1840 dated 20.01.2023 issued by the Commissioner, Rural Development, U.P., Lucknow, saying that the benefit of the enhanced age would be admissible to employees of the DRDA retiring between 01.08.2013 and 31.08.2014. This is not to say that the said letter means that beyond 31.08.2014, the employees would retire at 58. What is meant to be said is that those employees who have retired from the services of the DRDA at the age of superannuation being 58 years, between 01.08.2013 to 31.08.2014, would be entitled to the benefit of enhancement in age. This Court does not have the benefit of a copy of the Commissioner of Rural Development’s letter dated 02.01.2023 being placed before us, but what appears is that a rational cut-off for application for the enhanced age has now been devised, pegging it to 01.08.2013, when the Cabinet, for the first time, took a decision in principle to increase the age of retirement for employees of the DRDA from 58 to 60 years. The aforesaid cut-off has a reasonable basis to it and it would be very unreasonable rather to extend it behind in time, even before the Cabinet thought about enhancing the age and giving some expression to their decision. It must be remembered that in matters that have financial implications and are pure policy decisions, judicial interference with the primary decision maker’s prerogative must not be such that it transgresses the constitutional purpose of ensuring non-arbitrariness in State action or eschewing discrimination, but treads into a revision of the policy itself by the Court. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and another v. Bhagwan and others, (2022) 4 SCC 193 , where it has been observed in the context of entitlement of pensionary benefits to employees of an autonomous entity, registered under the Act of 1860, at par with the State Government employees : 26. As per the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, the employees of the autonomous bodies cannot claim, as a matter of right, the same service benefits on a par with the government employees. Merely because such autonomous bodies might have adopted the Government Service Rules and/or in the Governing Council there may be a representative of the Government and/or merely because such institution is funded by the State/Central Government, employees of such autonomous bodies cannot, as a matter of right, claim parity with the State/Central Government employees. This is more particularly, when the employees of such autonomous bodies are governed by their own Service Rules and service conditions. The State Government and the autonomous Board/body cannot be put on a par. 27. In Punjab State Coop. Milk Producers Federation Ltd. v. Balbir Kumar Walia, (2021) 8 SCC 784 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 838, in para 32, it is observed as under : (SCC p. 805) “32. The Central or State Government is empowered to levy taxes to meet out the expenses of the State. It is always a conscious decision of the Government as to how much taxes have to be levied so as to not cause excessive burden on the citizens. But the Boards and Corporations have to depend on either their own resources or seek grant from the Central/State Government, as the case may be, for their expenditures. It is always a conscious decision of the Government as to how much taxes have to be levied so as to not cause excessive burden on the citizens. But the Boards and Corporations have to depend on either their own resources or seek grant from the Central/State Government, as the case may be, for their expenditures. Therefore, the grant of benefits of higher pay scale to the Central/State Government employees stand on different footing than grant of pay scale by an instrumentality of the State.” 28. As per the settled proposition of law, the Court should refrain from interfering with the policy decision, which might have a cascading effect and having financial implications. Whether to grant certain benefits to the employees or not should be left to the expert body and undertakings and the court cannot interfere lightly. Granting of certain benefits may result in a cascading effect having adverse financial consequences. 29. In the present case, WALMI being an autonomous body, registered under the Societies Registration Act, the employees of WALMI are governed by their own Service Rules and conditions, which specifically do not provide for any pensionary benefits; the Governing Council of WALMI has adopted the Maharashtra Civil Services Rules except the Pension Rules. Therefore, as such a conscious policy decision has been taken not to adopt the Pension Rules applicable to the State Government employees; that the State Government has taken such a policy decision in the year 2005 not to extend the pensionary benefits to the employees of the aided institutes, boards, corporations, etc.; and the proposal of the then Director of WALMI to extend the pensionary benefits to the employees of WALMI has been specifically turned down by the State Government. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the High Court is not justified in directing the State to extend the pensionary benefits to the employees of WALMI, which is an independent autonomous entity. 30. The observations made by the High Court that as the salary and allowances payable to the employees of WALMI are being paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the State and/or that the WALMI is getting grant from the Government are all irrelevant considerations, so far as extending the pensionary benefits to its employees is concerned. WALMI has to run its administration from its own financial resources. WALMI has to run its administration from its own financial resources. WALMI has no financial powers of imposing any tax like a State and/or the Central Government and WALMI has to depend upon the grants to be made by the State Government. 31. Now, so far as the observations made by the High Court that the amount available with WALMI and deposited with EPF towards the employee's contribution itself is sufficient to meet the financial liability of the pensionary benefits to the employees and, therefore, there is no justification and/or reasonable basis for the State Government to refuse to extend the benefit of pension to the retired employees of WALMI is concerned, it is to be noted that merely because WALMI has a fund with itself, it cannot be a ground to extend the pensionary benefits. Grant of pensionary benefits is not a one-time payment. Grant of pensionary benefits is a recurring monthly expenditure and there is a continuous liability in future towards the pensionary benefits. Therefore, merely because at one point of time, WALMI might have certain funds does not mean that for all times to come, it can bear such burden of paying pension to all its employees. In any case, it is ultimately for the State Government and the Society (WALMI) to take their own policy decision whether to extend the pensionary benefits to its employees or not. The interference by the judiciary in such a policy decision having financial implications and/or having a cascading effect is not at all warranted and justified. (emphasis by Court) 17. In view of what has been said above, this Court holds that the petitioner here having reached the age of superannuation much before 01.08.2013, that is to say, on 31.12.2012 reckoned with reference to the prescribed age of superannuation then in force, that is to say, 58 years, the benefit of the enhanced age cannot be taken back in time to the petitioner to grant him the relief that he seeks. 18. In the result, this petition fails and stands dismissed. 19. There shall be no order as to costs.