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2024 DIGILAW 1445 (ALL)

Master Arjeet Pratap Singh v. State Of U. P. , Through Its Principal Secretary, Department Of Basic Education

2024-05-28

ARUN BHANSALI, VIKAS BUDHWAR

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JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Rajat Aren, learned counsel for appellant-writ petitioner, Shri Ramanand Pandey, learned Standing Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and Shri Abrar Ahmad, counsel for Respondent No. 5. 2. This intra court appeal is against the judgment and order dated 02.04.2024 passed in Writ-C No. 9514 of 2024 (Master Arjeet Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. and 4 Others) whereby though the order dated 26.02.2024 of Block Education Officer, Block-Moradabad, Moradabad denying the admission of the writ petitioner in Pre-Nursery Class in Aryans International School, Plot No. 2 Majholi Road, Budhdhi Vihar, Moradabad for the academic sessions 2024-25 was set aside, however, instead of ordering for admission, a direction was issued to consider the application form of the appellant-writ petitioner in the institution in question after consideration of all the applications of ward no. 16. 3. The case of the appellant-writ petitioner as projected before the learned Single Judge was that the appellant-writ petitioner, Master Arjeet Pratap Singh born on 23.03.2020 is a minor within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 who is the resident of ward no. 15, District-Moradabad. The writ petitioner further claims that he belongs to scheduled caste category and his disabled father’s monthly income is meagre Rs. 6,000/- per month. Armed with the said certificates, the writ petitioner applied for being granted admission in Pre-Nursery in Aryans International School, Moradabad situate at ward no. 16 purported to be under the provisions of the Right to Education (RTE) Act, 2009. A lottery for allotment of the school is stated to have been conducted on 26.02.2024 wherein the request of the writ petitioner was not acceded to and the same was rejected with the following remarks: “Application rejected by DEO: wrong ward.” 4. Questioning the order dated 26.02.2024 passed by the Block Education Officer, Block-Moradabad, Moradabad, the writ petitioner preferred Writ-C No. 9514 of 2024 which on contest came to be decided on 02.04.2024 wherein in para 12 to 16, it was observed as under: “12. I have carefully perused the documents annexed alongwith this writ petition as well as material placed on record during course of argument and of the considered opinion that petitioner has no fundamental right or an absolute right to get admission under RTE Act in a particular School. I have carefully perused the documents annexed alongwith this writ petition as well as material placed on record during course of argument and of the considered opinion that petitioner has no fundamental right or an absolute right to get admission under RTE Act in a particular School. The State Government has power to enact rules under Section 38 of RTE Act for carrying out the provisions of this Act. In the present case petitioner has not challenged any rule or circular issued by State of U.P. though it has been argued that no rule or circular could be enacted or issued contrary to parent Act, i.e., RTE Act. In the case in hand, pleadings are deficient that petitioner has not disclosed other Schools available in his neighbourhood, i.e., Schools situated in same Ward or whether he has applied for admission under RTE Act in those neighbourhood schools or not. 13. In the guidelines dated 25.07.2011 issued by Government of India “neighbourhood school” has been defined as “a school located within the defined limits or area of neighbourhood, as notified by State Government under State RTE Rules”. In said guidelines, it has also been noted that there is no compulsion on the child to seek admission only in the school in his or her neighbourhood, i.e., a child can always apply in other Schools also subject to relevant rules and provisions. 14. The basic concept of “neighbourhood school” is to accommodate maximum children under RTE Act having residence near to School subject to quota prescribed so that it would be convenient for them for to-and-fro journey, but it does not mean that a student residing far away from School cannot apply as it may be a case that he can manage to-and-fro journey by his/her own means. The concept of neighbourhood school also prescribes that maximum students be accommodated in their neighbourhood schools and for that State Government has also enacted rules and issued circulars/ guidelines also. I do not find any specific provision with regard to criteria of admission on basis of “Ward of residence of a student” and “Ward in which neighbourhood school is situated”. The concept of neighbourhood school also prescribes that maximum students be accommodated in their neighbourhood schools and for that State Government has also enacted rules and issued circulars/ guidelines also. I do not find any specific provision with regard to criteria of admission on basis of “Ward of residence of a student” and “Ward in which neighbourhood school is situated”. A reference is made in the amendment of Rule 4 of Rules, 2011 and for sake of repetition, relevant part thereof is again quoted hereinafter: ^^fdlh xzke iapk;r ;k uxj fuxe@uxj ikfydk@uxj iapk;r dh fdlh okMZ ds ikl&iM+ksl esa fo|ky; gksxk] tgka cPps viuh vf/kdkfjrk ds Hkhrj izos'k ys ldsaxsA^^ 15. The above provision provides that the ‘Ward’ would also be a relevant factor. However, there is no clarity on the issue, whether application of a student having residence in another Ward can be rejected at threshold on that ground alone though concerned School is a neighbourhood school. There is no doubt that priority could be given to students of same Ward and applications of students of different Ward could be considered later on subject to availability of seats as per quota prescribed under RTE Act. The word ‘Ward’ mentioned in above referred amendment is in relation to establishment of School in a Ward and not related to a condition to apply only neighbourhood schools situated at same Ward. 16. In aforesaid circumstances, since there is no specific clarity that application form of a student residing in different Ward could be rejected at the threshold, therefore, order impugned in this writ petition cannot survive and the same is hereby set aside. Concerned respondents are directed to consider the application form of petitioner, if in concerned School, after consideration of all applications of said Ward (Ward No. 16) seats are still available before completion of admission process. In case admission process has already been concluded, petitioner will have liberty to try his luck in next academic session.” 5. Assailing the order dated 02.04.2024 passed by in Writ-C No. 9514 of 2024, the appellant-writ petitioner has preferred the present appeal. 6. In case admission process has already been concluded, petitioner will have liberty to try his luck in next academic session.” 5. Assailing the order dated 02.04.2024 passed by in Writ-C No. 9514 of 2024, the appellant-writ petitioner has preferred the present appeal. 6. Shri Rajat Aren, learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner has sought to argue that though the learned Single Judge while holding that there is no clarity that the application form of the students residing in different ward is to be rejected at the very threshold while setting aside the rejection order dated 26.02.2024, fell in error in not directing the Block Education Officer, District Moradabad to accord admission to the appellant-writ petitioner in the said institution. 7. Submission is that once the order which denied the benefits came to be be set aside then the natural consequences would follow as if the order impugned was never passed, hence the writ petitioner had an iron cast case for a direction for being allotted the institution of his own choice. It is further submitted that in view of provisions contained under Section 12 read with Section 15 of the RTE Act an obligation was cast upon the schools fixing responsibility for providing, free and compulsory education to the extent of 25% of the students in Class-I for the children’s belonging weaker and disadvantaged group in neighbourhood. While relying Section 15, it is sought to be contended that a child shall not be denied admission if the admission is sought subsequent to the extended period as provided therein and, in case, admission is made after the extended period then it is the obligation of the school to complete the studies in such manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. In nutshell, the argument is that the writ petitioner could not have been denied admission merely on the pretext that he belongs to a different ward i.e. ward no. 15 whereas the institution is situated in ward no. 16. 8. In nutshell, the argument is that the writ petitioner could not have been denied admission merely on the pretext that he belongs to a different ward i.e. ward no. 15 whereas the institution is situated in ward no. 16. 8. Reliance has also been placed upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Patel v. State of U.P. and another reported in 2016 (4) ADJ 662 and the judgment in Writ-C No. 1568 of 2017 (Sudheer Kumar v. State of U.P. and 3 Others) so as to contend that the respondents cannot shrink their liability as they have to admit at least 25% of the strength of the children’s belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged group and further the obstacle that session has commenced and in mid sessions, admission cannot be granted, would not be a valid ground to take away the legal right, particularly, when Section 15 of the RTE Act, 2009 itself provides that if any admission is taken after extended period then the institution shall complete the studies in such manner as may be prescribed by the Government. 9. Aid has also been taken to the judgment in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras (1992) 3 SCC 1 so as to further contend that once an order is stayed and ultimately set aside then the position which existed prior to the passing of the order stands revived. Further reference has been made to the judgment in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sankla & Ors. v. Vikram Cement & Ors. (2008) 14 SCC 58 in order to substantiate the fact that Court has the ample power to pass appropriate orders in order to restore equity once injustice has meted out and illegal order have been passed. 10. Lastly, it has been contended that pursuant to the order passed in the present appeal on 15.04.2024 the appellant-writ petitioner had approached the respondents for grant of admission, however, the same has been denied. Thus, it is prayed that a direction be issued to the respondents to accord admissions to the appellant-writ petitioner in the Pre-Nursery Class of Aryans International School, Moradabad for the academic year 2024-25. 11. Thus, it is prayed that a direction be issued to the respondents to accord admissions to the appellant-writ petitioner in the Pre-Nursery Class of Aryans International School, Moradabad for the academic year 2024-25. 11. Countering the said submission, Shri Ramanand Pandey as well as Shri Abrar Ahmad who appears for the Union of India have submitted that the appeal suffers from a fundamental defect inasmuch as the challenge raised in the memo of appeal is to the entire order of the learned Single Judge dated 02.04.2024 passed in Writ-C No. 9514 of 2024 and in case the special appeal is allowed then the order dated 26.02.2024 which was set aside by the learned Single Judge would stand restored. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that the appellant-writ petitioner cannot claim as a matter of right to be admitted to particular institution of his choice as even otherwise the right guaranteed under Article 21-A of the Constitution or under the RTE Act, 2009 is only for free and compulsory education till the age of fourteen. In other words, it is submitted that the appellant-writ petitioner cannot dictate the terms, as the grant of admission is subject to the provisions of the Act, and the Rules and Regulations framed therein under. It has been further argued that since the appellant-writ petitioner is resident of ward no. 15 and the choice institution is in ward no. 16, thus, in view of the provisions contained under Rule 4 of the RTE Rules, 2011, the ward is one of the relevant criteria for grant of admission. According to them the learned Single Judge has safeguarded the interest of the appellant-writ petitioner while providing that the consideration of the claim of the writ petitioner for admission shall be made once there is any seat available after consideration of the students of Ward No. 16. Accordingly, it has been prayed, thus, the appeal be dismissed. 12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record carefully. 13. Undisputedly, the appellant-writ petitioner belongs to weaker section and disadvantaged group. It is not in dispute that the appellant-writ petitioner is the resident of ward no. 15 and the institution whereat he seeks admission in Class Pre-Nursery in Aryans International School, Moradabad is situated in Ward no. 16. 13. Undisputedly, the appellant-writ petitioner belongs to weaker section and disadvantaged group. It is not in dispute that the appellant-writ petitioner is the resident of ward no. 15 and the institution whereat he seeks admission in Class Pre-Nursery in Aryans International School, Moradabad is situated in Ward no. 16. The procedure, manner and modality according to which, admission is to be granted stands stipulated in RTE Act, 2009. Chapter VI provides for responsibility of schools and teachers and Section 12 further provides for extent of school responsibility for provide free and compulsory education. Sub-section 1(c) of Section 12 stipulates that the school shall have the responsibility to admit a child in Class-I to the extent of at least 25% of the strength of the class, children’s belonging to weaker sections and disadvantaged group in neighbourhood while providing free and compulsory elementary education till the completion of fourteen years. Section 15 of the RTE Act, 2009 further provides that there shall be no denial of admission if the admission is sought to be made after the extended period and in the eventuality of admission being granted after extended period then the child being admitted after the extended period shall complete his study in such manner as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government. The learned Single Judge while quashing of the order dated 26.02.2024 of the Block Education Officer, District Moradabad observed that though in Rule 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Right to Children to Free and Compulsory Rules, 2011, the word ‘ward’ has been used and it has been made a relevant criteria for grant of admission, but since there was no ambiguity thus it was observed that the State of Uttar Pradesh should clarify the said ambiguity. 14. The bone of contention between the parties is whether admission can be denied to a child who belongs to a different ward where the institution is situated. Though the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner has argued that the classification sought to be made by the respondents based upon the ward is violative of Article 21-A of the Constitution but from the pleadings set-forth in the writ petition and the relief claimed, we find that there is no challenge to the validity of the said rules. Though the learned counsel for the appellant-writ petitioner has argued that the classification sought to be made by the respondents based upon the ward is violative of Article 21-A of the Constitution but from the pleadings set-forth in the writ petition and the relief claimed, we find that there is no challenge to the validity of the said rules. In absence of any challenge being raised to the validity of the Rules, it would not be appropriate for this Court to delve into the said issues. Apart from the same, we further find that the pleadings are completely lacking as there is no factual foundation of the break up of total number of seats, students admitted and number of seats lying vacant. In absence of the said factual foundation, it would not be appropriate, we are not required to go into the said issues. There is no quarrel to the legal preposition that once the order impugned denying benefits is set aside then the position is to be restored which existed prior to the passing of the order in the light of the Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. (supra) but the said principles cannot be applied in abstract as the same is dependent upon the facts of the case. Since there is no factual pleading in this regard thus in the opinion of the Court, the order of the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be suffering from any infirmity. Moreover, the right guaranteed to every child under Article 21-A of the Constitution or under the RTE Act, 2009 is only for free and compulsory education till the age of fourteen. The State is only to ensure that every child receives education free of charge. In other words, the writ petitioner cannot claim as a matter of right, a particular institution as per his own choice. The learned Single was oblivious of the said situation that is why a direction had been issued to the Block Education Officer, District Moradabad to consider the application of the appellant-writ petitioner in the Pre-Nursery Class of Aryans International School, Moradabad against the available seats before completion of the admission process. The learned Single Judge noticing the said ambiguity further observed that the State of Uttar Pradesh may clarify the said ambiguity. 15. So far as the judgment in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sankla & Ors. The learned Single Judge noticing the said ambiguity further observed that the State of Uttar Pradesh may clarify the said ambiguity. 15. So far as the judgment in the case of Ramesh Chandra Sankla & Ors. (supra) is not applicable as this Court would not issue a direction requiring the respondents to accord admission once there is no factual foundation that there is any room to accommodate the appellant-writ petitioner. 16. Accordingly, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge, thus, the appeal stands devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 17. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed.