ORDER : Heard Sri Sri Vijay Mathukumilli, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners; Sri L.V.S Nagaraju, learned Government Pleader for School Education; Sri B. Satyendra Mani Kumar, Assistant Government Pleader for School Education for the Official Respondents and Sri Venkateswara Rao Gudapati, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Kilaru Nithin Krishna, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.5. 2. Prayer sought in the Writ Petition is as under: “ ….to issue an appropriate writ more in the nature of Writ of declaring the action of the official Respondents much less the action of the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 in allowing the 5th respondent School to run the classes for the academic year 2022-23 instead of initiating departmental and criminal proceedings against it, on extraneous consideration as being arbitrary, illegal and violative of Articles 14, 19 (1) (g) and 300-A of the Constitution of India and in contravention of Section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh Education Act and the Rules framed there under, Right to Education Act and against the principles of natural justice besides being unwarranted and consequently to direct the Respondent authorities to initiate action against the 5th Respondent Management as contemplated under the provisions of A.P Education Act, 1982 and issue such other writ or order or direction as deemed fit and proper in the circumstances of case” 3. The present Writ Petition is filed by about nine schools against grant of permission to the 5th Respondent Institution in running classes from Ist to VIIth standard for the academic year 2022-2023. 4. It is the case of the Writ Petitioners that the Official Respondents namely Respondent Nos.1 to 4 have granted permission in favour of Respondent No.5 in violation of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Establishment, Recognition, Administration and Control of Schools Under Private Managements) Rules, 1993 (in short Rules, 1993). These Rules were issued under G.O.Ms.No.1, Education dated 01.01.1994. 5. Sri Sri Vijay Mathukumilli, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners has contended, by drawing the attention of this Court to the Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of Rules, 1993, that by 30th October of the preceding academic year, fee of Rs.10,000/- shall be remitted for seeking permission for the following academic year. 5. Sri Sri Vijay Mathukumilli, learned Counsel for the Writ Petitioners has contended, by drawing the attention of this Court to the Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of Rules, 1993, that by 30th October of the preceding academic year, fee of Rs.10,000/- shall be remitted for seeking permission for the following academic year. For example, if a Society is seeking permission for establishment of school for the academic year 2022-2023, fee shall be paid and Application be submitted on or before 30th November of the preceding year i.e., on or before 30.11.2021. Learned Counsel submitted that in the case of grant of permission to the Respondent No.5, the Application was made on 08.07.2022 and the permission was granted on 14.07.2022. He further submits that the Official Respondents have shown undue favour on the Respondent No.5 by giving complete go by to the Rules set out under the then 1993 Rules. It is also submitted that Section 20 of the A.P Education Act has also been given a go-by by the Official Respondents in grant of permission to the Respondent No.5. Version of the Official Respondents: 6. Sri L.V.S Nagaraju, learned Government Pleader for School Education for the Official Respondents has drawn the attention of this Court to Para No.8 of the Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent Nos.1 to 3. Para No.8 is beneficially extracted hereunder: “8. Further it is submitted that the Rule 6 of GO.Ms.No.1 Edn., dated 01.01.1994 "The application seeking permission for establishment of a new school or up-gradation of the existing school shall be submitted to the competent authority on or before the 31st October of the preceding academic year, in triplicate, in form-I". In the present case, the Correspondent of the 5th respondent institution has paid required amount of Rs.20,000/- towards the application fee for establishment of new school before 31st October of the preceding academic year i.e., on 25.10.2019 and not deviated the rule mentioned above.” 7. In the present case, the Correspondent of the 5th respondent institution has paid required amount of Rs.20,000/- towards the application fee for establishment of new school before 31st October of the preceding academic year i.e., on 25.10.2019 and not deviated the rule mentioned above.” 7. It is also submitted by the learned Government Pleader for School Education for the Official Respondents, by placing reliance on Para No.7 of the Counter Affidavit, that basing on the Verification Report of the Mandal Education Officer, Yeleswaram to the effect that there is no Upper Primary School existing within the radius of 2.00 KMs and having only one Primary School namely MPPS School within the radius of 1.00 KM to the proposed 5th Respondent Institution, the Official Respondents have deemed it necessary to accord permission to the Respondent No.5. He has further drawn the attention of this Court to various Proceedings which includes a Challan for Rs.20,000/- paid by the Respondent No.5 on 25.10.2019 to submit that the proposal along with the required Application for starting classes from Ist to Xth has originated in the month of April, 2019 and in consequence of the same, an amount of Rs.20,000/- was paid on 25.10.2019 along with the Application. He has further submitted that pandemic broke-out and National Lock- Down was imposed from the second week of March, 2020. In this view of the matter, proposal of the 5th Respondent was kept in abeyance. Version of Unofficial Respondent No.5: 8. Sri Venkateswara Rao Gudapati, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Kilaru Nithin Krishna, learned Counsel for the Respondent No.5 has drawn the attention of this Court to the Proceedings of the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Kakinada bearing Rc.No.1504/A3/2019 dated 05.11.2019 and the consequential letter of the Secretary & Correspondent of Respondent No.5 to the District Educational Officer, Kakinada dated 27.10.2021. The contents of the said Proceedings dated 05.11.2019 addressed by the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Kakinada to the Deputy Educational Officer, Pithapuram would indicate that the case of Respondent No.5 relating to the proposals for opening of Sri Chaitnaya School, Yeleswaram from Ist Standard to Xth Standard were already in progress by November, 2019. The contents of the said Proceedings dated 05.11.2019 addressed by the Regional Joint Director of School Education, Kakinada to the Deputy Educational Officer, Pithapuram would indicate that the case of Respondent No.5 relating to the proposals for opening of Sri Chaitnaya School, Yeleswaram from Ist Standard to Xth Standard were already in progress by November, 2019. It is further submitted that the Secretary and Correspondent of Respondent No.5 had paid the Challan for a sum of Rs.20,000/- way back on 25.10.2019, but due to pandemic conditions i.e., Covid-19, the management of the School could not proceed for the Academic Year 2020-2021. The Secretary and Correspondent requested the District Educational Officer to permit them for opening the School and for commencing classes from Ist to VIIth standard for the Academic Year 2020-2021. 9. Learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.5 has also drawn the attention of this Court to the contents of the Counter- Affidavit, wherein it has been categorically contended that the petitioners herein have no locus standi and that the present Writ Petition has been filed by about 9 Schools only with an intent to create monopoly in Yelleswaram. He would, therefore, submit that the Writ Petition is not only frivolous, but also mala fide. It is also stated that the Rules and Norms as laid down in G.O.Ms.No.1, Education dated 01.01.1994, have been strictly complied with. Learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.5 has further submitted in paragraph no.11 of the Counter-Affidavit dated 09.12.2022 that about 407 students have taken admission for classes between Ist to VIIth standards and that the School has been running since the academic year 2022-2023. 10. He has also placed reliance on the following judgements:- i) In D.Nagaraj and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others : [(1997) SCC 148], on the proposition that the existence of the right is implicit for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in the above case as under:- “7. The sole question that requires to be determined in these appeals is whether the appellants could maintain the aforesaid writ petitions. It is well settled that though Article 226 of the Constitution in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, the existence of the right is implicit for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court under the said Article. It is well settled that though Article 226 of the Constitution in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, the existence of the right is implicit for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court under the said Article. It is also well established that a person who is not aggrieved by the discrimination complained of cannot maintain a writ petition. The constitutional validity of the Abolition Act abolishing all hereditary village offices including the office of the Shambogue or Village Accountant having been upheld by this Court in B.R. Shankaranarayana v. State of Mysore (supra), and the first preference in the matter of appointment of Village Accountants having been given by Rule 4 of the 1970 Rules to all persons belonging to the category and class of the appellants who had served as Village Officers, the appellants who did not apply for appointment as Village Accountants in response to the aforesaid notification issued by the Recruitment Committee and did not possess the prescribed qualification, could not complain of the un- constitutionality of the 1970 Rules or of the infringement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution which merely forbid improper or invidious distinctions by conferring rights or privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from out of a larger group who are similarly circumstanced but do not exclude the laying down of selective tests nor prevent the Government from laying down general educational qualifications for the post in question. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the appellants have no right to maintain the aforesaid writ petitions. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed but without any order as to costs.” ii) Further reliance has been placed on the Judgment of the Apex Court in Jonnale Narasimharao & Company and Others etc. vs. State of A.P. and others : [ 1971 (2) SCC 163 ], on the proposition that the Writ Petitioner has no locus standi, as he has failed to show that he has suffered any loss or any disadvantage that would entitle him to seek a remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “10. Shri Gupte on behalf of the appellants was unable to tell us that there were among the appellants any principals who had a direct interest in challenging the validity of the provisions on the ground of discrimination. Shri Motilal Sitalvad on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 2126 to 2128 of 1970 strenuously contended that the appellants have an interest and can maintain the writ petitions because they were dealers within the meaning of Section 2(e) and are persons who are aggrieved because of the assessment made or likely to be made and tax recovered from them. He has further contended that this Court has in several cases held that even a notice issued to any person under the provisions of an impugned Act which is likely to cause prejudice will entitle him to challenge the constitutional validity of the law under which the notice is given. If so, where an assessment has been made the assessee has a right to challenge the provisions of the Amendment Act under which the levy and collection of tax have been given retrospective validity. Apart from the question that this argument does not take into account the distinction between an attack under Article 14 and an attack under Article 19 it overlooks the fact that what is sought to be recovered from the appellant is in respect of a tax collected on the past dealings and not with respect to the future transactions. We had pointed out that tax had already been collected, no doubt at first illegally, but due to the Amendment Act that collection has become legal and as a dealer he is liable to pay that amount to the State in respect of the assessments made. As there is nothing to show that what is sought to be recovered from the dealer is more than what he has collected, he has not suffered any loss nor any disadvantage which we would entitle him to seek a remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. Shri P. Ramchandrarao in Civil Appeal No. 2127 of 1970 had nothing new to add to the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the appellants. Shri P. Ramchandrarao in Civil Appeal No. 2127 of 1970 had nothing new to add to the arguments advanced by the learned advocates for the appellants. On this short ground alone we dismiss all the appeals except Civil Appeal No. 33 of 1971 but in the circumstances without costs.” iii) Further reliance has been placed on the Judgment of the Apex Court in State of Orissa vs. Ram Chandra Dev : [ AIR 1964 SC 685 ] on the proposition that before a Writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of the party, it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is legally invaded or threatened. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “8. On the merits, the position is absolutely clear. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court is undoubtedly very wide. Appropriate writs can be issued by the High Court under the said article even for purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights and in that sense, a party who invokes the special jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not confined to cases of illegal invasion of his fundamental rights alone. But though the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is wide in that sense, the concluding words of the article clearly indicate that before a writ or an appropriate order can be issued in favour of a party, it must be established that the party has a right and the said right is illegally invaded or threatened. The existence of a right is thus the foundation of a petition under Article 226. The narrow question which falls for our decision in the present appeals is whether the respondents can be said to have proved any legal right in respect of the properties of which they apprehended they would be dispossessed by the appellant.” iv) Further reliance has been placed on a Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Prince filling station vs. Union of India (Division Bench) : [(2020) SCC online ALL 1562: (2021) 144 ALR 603]. Paragraph Nos.5 and 6 therein would indicate that the said case has been decided on the Principle of Damnum sine Injuria, which is usefully extracted as under:- “5. Paragraph Nos.5 and 6 therein would indicate that the said case has been decided on the Principle of Damnum sine Injuria, which is usefully extracted as under:- “5. The question as to whether a competitor in business can seek to prevent a rival party from exercising its right to carry on business came up for consideration in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T. Gowda. It was a case of a rice mill seeking to oppose the setting up of another rice mill in its vicinity on the ground that its business was likely to be adversely affected, and in that context it was held that a competitor in business cannot seek to prevent a rival from exercising its right to carry on business. The observations made in the judgment in this regard are as follows:- "8. The Parliament has by the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958, prescribed limitations that an existing rice mill shall carry on business only after obtaining a licence and if the rice mill is to be shifted from its existing location, previous permission of the Central Government shall be obtained. Permission for shifting their rice mill was obtained by the appellants from the Director of Food and Civil Supplies. The appellants had not started rice milling operations before the sanction of the Director of Food and Civil Supplies was obtained. Even if it be assumed that the previous sanction has to be obtained from the authorities before the machinery is moved from its existing site, we fail to appreciate what grievance the respondents may raise against the grant of permission by the authority permitting the installation of machinery on a new site. The right to carry on business being a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, its exercise is subject only to the restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the general public under Article 19(6)(i). 9. Section 8(3) (c) is merely regulatory, if it is not complied with the appellants may probably be exposed to a penalty, but a competitor in the business cannot seek to prevent the appellants from exercising their right to carry on business, because of the default, nor can the rice mill of the appellants be regarded as a new rice mill. Section 8(3) (c) is merely regulatory, if it is not complied with the appellants may probably be exposed to a penalty, but a competitor in the business cannot seek to prevent the appellants from exercising their right to carry on business, because of the default, nor can the rice mill of the appellants be regarded as a new rice mill. Competition in the trade or business may be subject to such restrictions as are permissible and are imposed by the State by a law enacted in the interests of the general public under Article 19(6) but a person cannot claim independently of such restriction that another person shall not carry on business or trade so as to affect his trade or business adversely. The appellants complied with the statutory requirements for carrying on rice milling operations in the building on the new site. Even assuming that no previous permission was obtained, the respondents would have no locus standi for challenging the grant of the permission, because no right vested in the respondents was infringed." 6. The requirement of a person being "an aggrieved person" in order to maintain a writ of certiorari fell for consideration in Jas Bhai Moti Bhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, and after discussing various authorities, it was held that in order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be "an aggrieved person", and if he does not fulfil that character, the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy. The stand taken by the appellant therein that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town would adversely affect his commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition was held to be not affecting his legally protected interest so as to give him justiciable claim and it was held that issuance of a writ of certiorari at his instance would eliminate healthy competition in business.” 11. The Official Respondents have also filed Counter-Affidavit, wherein they have also placed the Challan receipt dated 25.10.2015 on record indicating that the Writ Petitioner has already paid a sum of Rs.20,000/- way back on 25.10.2019. The Official Respondents have also filed Counter-Affidavit, wherein they have also placed the Challan receipt dated 25.10.2015 on record indicating that the Writ Petitioner has already paid a sum of Rs.20,000/- way back on 25.10.2019. Sri L.V.S.Nagaraju, learned Government Pleader for School Education, has also drawn the attention of this Court to the material documents filed along with the Counter-Affidavit, particularly the proceedings of the Mandal Education Officer, recommending the grant of permission for opening the School for the Academic year 2022-2023, after being satisfied during his personal visit to the premises of the School and after verifying the credentials produced by the Management. He has also drawn the attention of this Court to the permission granted to Respondent No.5 by the District Educational Officer vide order dated 13.07.2022. Sri L.V.S.Nagaraju, Learned Government Pleader for School Education, has therefore submitted that the official respondents have not violated any of the Rules. DISCUSSION:- 12. Respondent No.5 has commenced the proceedings for starting of a school in October, 2019. Respondent No.5 has remitted the required fee of Rs.20,000/- way back on 25.10.2019 (material document). Thereafter, COVID-19 pandemic has broken out from 2020 onwards and the nation was subject to complete lockdown from March, 2020. After the pandemic situation has eased-out, Respondent No.5/Management has again addressed a letter to the District Educational Officer on 27.10.2021 to grant permission for commencement of classes for the Academic Year, 2020-2021 onwards from Ist standard to VIIth standard. The Mandal Educational Officer, personally inspected the premises and submitted a report on 12.07.2022. By placing a reliance on the report submitted by the Mandal Educational Officer, the District Educational Officer has accorded permission for starting the Educational Institution (Respondent No.5) with classes Ist to VIIth during the year 2022 to 2023. It is also mentioned in the Counter Affidavit that there is no good school within the radius of 2 KM from the School of Respondent No.5. 13. In view of the fact that Respondent No.5 has paid the challan for a sum of Rs.20,000/- way back on 25.10.2019, it cannot be said that Respondent No.5 has made an application and paid the necessary fee after the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, it appears that the Writ Petitioners have misconceived the very factual aspects. 14. 13. In view of the fact that Respondent No.5 has paid the challan for a sum of Rs.20,000/- way back on 25.10.2019, it cannot be said that Respondent No.5 has made an application and paid the necessary fee after the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, it appears that the Writ Petitioners have misconceived the very factual aspects. 14. This Court has also tumbled upon some Judgements of relevance, which are as under:- i) In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others [ (1976) 1 SCC 671 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “47. Thus, in substance, the appellant's stand is that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition. Such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. 37 The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large. 48. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a 'person aggrieved' and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the no-objection certificate. 51. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a 'person aggrieved' and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the no-objection certificate. 51. The instant case falls well-nigh within the ratio of this Court's decision in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N. T. Gowda ( (1970) 3 SCR 846 : (1970) 1 SCC 575 ), wherein it was held that a ricemill owner has no locus standi to challenge under Article 226, the setting up of a new ricemill by another even if such setting up be in contravention of Section 8(3) (c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958 - because no right vested in such an applicant is infringed.” ii) In Ravi Yashwant Bhoir vs. District Collector, Raigad and Others [ (2012) 4 SCC 407 ], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, ex-President was the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status of an adversarial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eye of the law because it may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria. 59. The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a stat pro ratione voluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons.” Both the above judgments are decided on the basis of the Doctrine of damnum sine injuria. 15. In the above premise, this Court is of the opinion that there is no legal infringement of any statutory or constitutional right of any of the Petitioners in granting permission to Respondent No.5 to start the School with classes from Ist to VIIth standard inasmuch as the fee was paid way back on 25.10.2019, of a sum of Rs.20,000/-. The delay that is caused during the pandemic situation cannot be attributed to Respondent No.5, as the same was not within the control of Respondent No.5. The diligence on the part of Respondent No.5 in addressing a letter after the pandemic situation has eased-out i.e., on 27.10.2021, would indicate that Respondent No.5 was diligent in once again approaching the authorities after the pandemic situation has eased-out. This Court is in complete agreement with the legal contentions raised by the learned Counsel for Respondent No.5 in so far as the locus standi is concerned. This Court is of the opinion that no legal right of any of the Writ Petitioners have been infringed by either the official Respondent Nos.1 to 4 herein or by the unofficial Respondent No.5 herein. It is also noticed that there is no other better institution within the radius of 2 KM from the School (Respondent No.5). 16. At this stage, this Court would take note of the contentions raised by Respondent No.5 in Para No.6 of the Counter-Affidavit dated 09.12.2022, which was filed on 12.12.2022, to the effect that the Writ Petitioners have no locus standi and that the Writ Petition has been filed by some of the Schools in the locality with an intent to create monopoly in the area. Therefore, the Writ Petition is not only devoid of merit but is also frivolous. 17. Therefore, the Writ Petition is not only devoid of merit but is also frivolous. 17. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court would hold that the Writ Petition is devoid of any merit, as the Writ Petitioners have failed to establish any cause of action. It is also held that the Writ Petitioners have no locus standi in filing the present Writ Petition, inasmuch as the legally recognized right has not been infringed. 18. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 19. Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of in terms of this Order.