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2024 DIGILAW 1448 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Lala Ram, S/o. of Ganesha

2024-10-21

MUNNURI LAXMAN, PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

body2024
ORDER : 1. This criminal appeal under Section 378 (3) & (1) Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant-State claiming the following relief: “It is therefore, most respectfully and humbly prayed that the leave to appeal in the present matter may kindly be granted and the appeal be entertained and accepted. It is further prayed that the order of acquittal dated 21.12.1999 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sirohi may kindly be quashed and set aside and the accused persons be convicted and sentenced for the offences punishable under Sections 148, 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. accordingly.” 2. The appellant-State laid a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 21.12.1999 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, District Sirohi in Sessions Case No. 66/97 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Lala & Ors.), whereby the accused respondents were acquitted of the offences under Sections 148 & 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. 3. Learned Additional Government Advocate has placed on record the status report dated 18.10.2024, which indicates that respondent No.6 Saroopa has expired. 4. Thus, this appeal is dismissed as having been abated to the extent of accused respondent No.6 Saroopa. 5. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 1999 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 2001. 6. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-State, are that on 13.08.1997 at about 3:00 AM one Jabbar Singh gave an oral information at Police Station Paldi, that in his Village Radbar Bhagli at about 8:00 or 9:00 PM, Babra and his wife Pabu came to his house and informed him that father of Babra (Jora) and his brother (Lakhia) are missing, who were beaten by rebaris of village Radbar Bhagli. At about 10:00 AM, dead bodies of Jora and Lakhia were recovered and a written report was lodged by Jabbar Singh, wherein it was stated that on 12.08.1997 in between 9:00 and 10:00 PM, he was informed by Babra and his wife Pabu that when the father of Babra (Jora), brother Lakhiya and his wife Pabu were grazing the cattle, certain persons namely Lala, Virka, Deepa, Motiya & Prabhu belonging to the village Radbar Bhagli attacked Jora and Lakhiya with axe and lathies. 7. 7. On the basis of the aforementioned information, an FIR was registered bearing registration No.114/1997 (Ex.P-85) at Police Station Paldi and the investigation commenced accordingly. After investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet under Sections 147, 148, 149, 120-B, 201 & 302 of IPC against the accused respondents, and the trial commenced accordingly. Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed charges against the accused-respondents for the offences under Sections 148 & 302 read with 149 of IPC. 8. During the course of trial, the evidence of 24 prosecution witnesses were recorded amongst whom PW-4 (Pabu) was the eye-witness (upon whose testimony, the case of the prosecution has been raised); and certain documents were exhibited. Whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which the accused-respondents pleaded innocence and their false implication in the criminal case in question. 9. Thereafter, upon hearing the contentions of both the parties as well as considering the material and evidence placed on record, the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused respondents, as above, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 21.12.1999, against which the present appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant-State. 10. Learned Additional Government Advocate submits that testimony of PW-4 Pabu (eye-witness) is credible as she narrated the whole incident, wherein a particular community of rebaris attacked her father-in-law and brother-in-law due to some land dispute. He also submits that an accurate version has been given by PW-4 as weapons i.e. axe and lathies were also recovered and the same were specifically attributed as that Lala & Prabhu were having the axe and other accused were having the lathies. The specific allegation of hitting father-in-law of PW-4 with axe was upon Lala and Prabhu, who thereafter, also caused injuries along with Virka, Deepa & Motiya upon brother-in-law of PW-4. 10.1. Learned Additional Government Advocate submits that the eye-witness (PW-4) reached her home at 06:00 PM and then reported the matter to Jabbar Singh (PW-6), who gave the oral information to the police, which culminated into the written report, is a chronology which cannot be disbelieved for any reason. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Pradeep Singh Khichi (Amicus Curiae) appearing on behalf of the accused-respondents, while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that PW-1 (Parbat Singh), who was supposed as one of the eye witnesses, turned hostile. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Pradeep Singh Khichi (Amicus Curiae) appearing on behalf of the accused-respondents, while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that PW-1 (Parbat Singh), who was supposed as one of the eye witnesses, turned hostile. He further submits that PW-2 (Joriya) and PW-3 (Gulab Singh), who were supporting the extra judicial confession, have also turned hostile. He submits that PW-4 (Pabu) was the only witness who is supposed to be the eye-witness in the whole case, but testimony of the eye-witness had to be sterling for resting the case of the prosecution, but the cracks that developed in the testimony of PW-4 were beyond repair. 11.1. Learned counsel for the accused-respondents submits that PW-4 in her statement submitted that the incident took place in between 12:00 and 1:00 PM, whereas in the FIR and all other records, time of the incident has been recorded between 4:00 and 5:00 PM. He further submits that the use of axe as a weapon by Lala and Prabhu to hit the Jora, also could not be supported particularly when the wounds in question were lacerated and the version of blunt side of the weapon to be used was also not on record. 11.2. Learned counsel for the accused-respondents submits that the delay in lodging the FIR and difference of time of the incident in the FIR and statement of the eye-witness (PW-4), creates doubt in the story of the prosecution. He further submits that statement of PW-5 (Jamna) is of no consequence because she has only narrated the story which was told to her by PW-4 (Pabu). He has further taken this Court to the statement of PW-6 (Jabbar Singh), who was the FIR lodger but could not have said anything much to support the prosecution in proving the crime. He has also taken this Court to the testimony of PW-7 (Babriya), who also could not say anything about the incident, but merely narrated what he was told by PW-4. 11.3. He has also taken this Court to the testimony of PW-7 (Babriya), who also could not say anything about the incident, but merely narrated what he was told by PW-4. 11.3. Learned counsel further submits that PW-8 Jalam Singh, PW-9 Pappuraj, PW-10 Devi Singh, PW-11 Moti Singh, PW-12 Dalpat Singh, PW-13 Sawai Singh (turned hostile), PW-14 Mahendra Singh, PW-15 Bhim Singh (recovery witness), PW-16 Hukumchand (doctor), PW-17 Vishal Dave, PW-18 Arjun Singh (Police Official), PW-19 Dharam Singh (Police Official), PW-20 Karan Singh (Police Official), PW-21 Subtaram (Photographer), PW-22 Chandrashekhar (S.H.O.), PW-23 Amar Singh (Police Official), PW-24 Bhawar Singh (I.O.), could not have given any independent testimony, which could prove the case of the prosecution. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length as well as perused the record of the case. 13. This Court observes that while passing the order of acquittal, learned Trial Court has categorically observed that timing of the incident has become bone of contention as the star witness PW-4 (Pabu) has submitted the timing of the incident to be of at about 01:00 PM, whereas in the FIR as well as other versions which are on record, the timing of the incident is about 04:30 PM. The delay in lodging of the FIR and the victim’s family reaching out to the FIR lodger at about 8:00 to 9:00 PM, and the oral report being filed at 3:00 AM, which resulted into lodging of the final written FIR at 10:30 AM on the next day, also creates a doubt in the prosecution’s story. The incident which seems to have happened due to the grazing of cattle and some animosity between the parties belonging to the same community could have been sustained, only if there was an eye-witness, who could have been fully believed. However, in the present case, the eye-witness is not only the close relative of the deceased but also the version given by her casts a shadow upon the so called truth narrated by her due to the difference in time of the incident. The nature of the injuries which have not supported the prosecution’s story, if at all were caused by an axe, then the doctor’s statement that the cause of death was the lacerated injury, does not get supported by the statement of PW-4. 13.1. The nature of the injuries which have not supported the prosecution’s story, if at all were caused by an axe, then the doctor’s statement that the cause of death was the lacerated injury, does not get supported by the statement of PW-4. 13.1. Normally, this Court interferes in the order of acquittal only if there is some grave irregularity, which could be pointed out for an incident which happened 27 years ago. The learned Trial Court has given a well reasoned order while discussing every exhibit and all the witnesses and arrived at a conclusion that the star witness could not sustain the burden of the prosecution and the discrepancies involved regarding the type of injury were sufficient to cast it out that once the star eye-witness was undermined, all other credible witnesses could not sustain the theory on there own. 14. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 15. This Court observes that there has been discrepancies regarding the time at which the incident took place as according to the statement of PW-4, the incident took place between 12:00 and 1:00 PM, however, the time of incident in the FIR has been recorded between 4:00 and 5:00 PM, which casts doubt upon prosecution’s story. 15.1. This Court further observes that use of axe as a weapon by Lala and Prabhu to hit the Jora, also could not be supported particularly when the wounds in question were lacerated and the version of blunt side of the weapon to be used was also not on record. 15.2. This Court also observes that the story narrated by PW-5 is merely a hearsay evidence and therefore, cannot be relied upon. Further, the testimonies of PW-6 to PW-24 are merely reiteration of the story narrated by PW-4 and they could not give any independent testimony, which could prove the case of the prosecution. 16. 15.2. This Court also observes that the story narrated by PW-5 is merely a hearsay evidence and therefore, cannot be relied upon. Further, the testimonies of PW-6 to PW-24 are merely reiteration of the story narrated by PW-4 and they could not give any independent testimony, which could prove the case of the prosecution. 16. This Court, therefore, observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondents under Sections 148 & 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 17. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 18. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 19. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 19.1. However, while keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 19. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 19.1. However, while keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- each and a surety bond each in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as and when called upon to do so. 19.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith. 20. This Court is thankful Mr. Pradeep Singh Khichi, who has rendered his assistance as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of the accused-respondents in the present adjudication.