ORDER : 1. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 08.12.2016 passed by learned Single Judge, whereby writ petition filed by the respondent has been allowed. 2. The submission of learned counsel for the State is that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the correct factual and legal position obtaining on record in allowing the writ petition. First submission of learned counsel for the State is that Rule 36 of the Rajasthan Technical Education (Engineering) Service Rules, 2010 (for short ‘the Rules of 2010’) would not come into play in a case where subsequent appointment is in a different cadre. It is submitted that Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 must be understood as applicable only in those cases where a person gets fresh appointment on a higher post in the same cadre. In the present case, the respondent was working as Instructor (Electric), but later on, he participated in the process of selection conducted by Public Service Commission for recruitment to the post of Lecturer (Electric) and he was appointed as Lecturer (Electric) in Government Polytechnic College, Banswara. 2.1 The second submission is that as the lien of the petitioner was already terminated from the erstwhile post which he was holding i.e. post of Instructor (Electric), Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 could not be pressed into service at all. 2.2 The next submission is that against the order of suspension, the writ petitioner had preferred an appeal and he was heard also before its dismissal, therefore, he cannot complain of violation of principles of natural justice. 2.3 Lastly, it is submitted that it is a case where the respondent was involved in a case of corruption and, therefore, he was liable to be terminated forthwith, as he was continuing on probation. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge and submits that specific averments have been made in the writ petition that before passing the impugned order of termination on 20.06.2014, no opportunity of hearing was afforded. He would further submit that Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 squarely applies in the present case as the writ petitioner was working on a lower post of Instructor (Electric) and upon selection, he was appointed to the post of Lecturer (Electric) on probation. He would further submit that Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 squarely applies in the present case as the writ petitioner was working on a lower post of Instructor (Electric) and upon selection, he was appointed to the post of Lecturer (Electric) on probation. He would further submit that only on the allegation of commission of offence, services of the writ petitioner could not be terminated as there is no such provision contained in the applicable Service Rules. At the most, he could be placed under suspension. It is not a case of conviction leading to termination. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 5. In nutshell, the relevant facts are that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Instructor (Electric) after regular selection vide order dated 08.02.1993 in the Directorate of Board of Technical Education, Jodhpur and he was later on confirmed on 04.12.2006. Later on, he participated in the process of selection for appointment to the post of Lecturer (Electric), on which he was appointed on 20.01.2009 and posted in Government Polytechnic College, Banswara. 6. A criminal case however, came to be registered on 20.05.2010 on the allegations of being involved in corrupt practices and due to which, he remained behind the bars beyond 48 hours, which eventually led to his suspension. 6.1 While the respondent, aggrieved by the order of suspension, had taken remedy of appeal to assail the order of suspension, though unsuccessfully, in another turn of events, the impugned order came to be passed on 20.06.2014, by which his services were terminated on the allegation of being involved in a criminal case. 7. The order being challenged, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition. One of the main grounds for granting relief to the respondent while setting aside the order of termination is that per force Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010, in the event of termination as probationer, the employee has to be reverted back to the lower post on which he was working as a confirmed employee. 7.1 The relationship between the employer-State and its employees is not merely governed by the terms of contract of service. The relationship of master and servant as between the State and its employee has statutory fervor and color. Both are bound by certain statutory rules governing terms and conditions of service. 7.1 The relationship between the employer-State and its employees is not merely governed by the terms of contract of service. The relationship of master and servant as between the State and its employee has statutory fervor and color. Both are bound by certain statutory rules governing terms and conditions of service. The power of the State to terminate the services of an employee is governed, regulated and circumscribed by the provisions contained in the Service Rules and once a person is appointed to service, his services could not be dispensed with, except in accordance with the provisions contained in the applicable Service Rules. 8. The respondent was a confirmed employee working as Instructor (Electric) and this fact is not in dispute. Later on, he was selected and appointed on a higher post of Lecturer (Electric) in 2009. Undisputedly, at the time when he was terminated from service, he was working as probationer. 9. Ordinarily, where the work of a probationer is found to be unsatisfactory, his services may be dispensed with, which cannot be said to be stigmatic in nature if the order is absolutely innocuous and does not say anything, except discharge from service on the ground of unsatisfactory performance. However, in the present case, in the matter of discharge of a probationer, Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 may be attracted in a case where a person who is discharged as probationer was working on a lower post. Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 provides as below:- “36. Unsatisfactory progress during probation.-If it appears to the Appointing Authority, at any time, during or at the end of the period of probation, that service of a probationer trainee is not found to be satisfactory, the Appointing Authority may revert him/her to the post on which he/she is regularly selected immediately preceding his/her appointment as probationer trainee or in other cases may discharge or terminate him/her from service. The appointing authority shall accord appropriate opportunity to the probationer trainee before final orders are passed in this respect; Provided that the Appointing Authority may, if it so thinks fit in any case or class of cases, extend the period of probation of any probationer trainee by a specified period not exceeding one year.” 10. The appointing authority shall accord appropriate opportunity to the probationer trainee before final orders are passed in this respect; Provided that the Appointing Authority may, if it so thinks fit in any case or class of cases, extend the period of probation of any probationer trainee by a specified period not exceeding one year.” 10. A fair, rational and logical interpretation of the Rule leads to conclusion that in a case where the services of a probationer-trainee are not found to be satisfactory, instead of terminating his services, he may be reverted back to the post on which he/she is regularly selected immediately preceding his/her appointment as probationer-trainee. Rule further ordains that in other cases, his services may be discharged or terminated. That means, in those cases where a probationer was not working on any other post prior to his selection, his services may be discharged, or he may be terminated from service. However, in a case where he was working on another post, the authority is obliged under the law to revert him to the post earlier held and there is no discretion left with the authority whether or not to revert. The expression “or terminate him/her from service” is applicable only in the circumstances when it is not a case of the probationer having been a regular employee on any other post prior to his selection and appointment on higher post on which he is continuing on probation. In such cases, the obligation cast is to revert him to the post on which he was regularly selected immediately preceding his appointment as probationer-trainee. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the State that the discretion to revert or not to revert is applicable in all cases, cannot be accepted and is rejected. 11. Furthermore, we find that Rule 36 of the Rule of 2010 protects the probationer in the manner that it casts an obligation on the appointing authority to accord appropriate opportunity of hearing to the probationer-trainee before final orders are passed in the matter. 11.1 Ordinarily, in most of the Service Rules, such a provision of affording opportunity of hearing before terminating the probationer is not there, however, in the case in hand, specific provision has been made in Rule 36 of the Rule of 2010, therefore, it obligates, without any exception, the authority to afford an opportunity of hearing. 12. 11.1 Ordinarily, in most of the Service Rules, such a provision of affording opportunity of hearing before terminating the probationer is not there, however, in the case in hand, specific provision has been made in Rule 36 of the Rule of 2010, therefore, it obligates, without any exception, the authority to afford an opportunity of hearing. 12. To our mind, such a provision is made because the Rule itself provides for different contingencies i.e. discharge of a probationer when he is otherwise working on any other post and discharge of a probationer when he was working on a lower post. Therefore, the opportunity of hearing is a must. In the petition, it has been very categorically stated that opportunity of hearing was not afforded before passing impugned order of termination on 20.06.2014. The burden was, therefore, on the State to satisfy the Court that before passing the order impugned, an opportunity of hearing was afforded. We do not find any such document, much less any averment made by the respondent that before terminating the services, the respondent was afforded an opportunity of hearing. Apparently, the order of termination of service is void-ab-initio. 13. One of the submissions of learned State Counsel that Rule 36 of the Rules of 2010 would be attracted only in a case where the person is appointed in the same cadre, even if accepted for argument’s sake in the present case, does not hold water. There is nothing in Rule 36 of the Rule of 2010 which mandates that in order to attract the provision, the person should be working in the same cadre. In fact, rule says nothing. However, it has to be rationally understood and construed as a case where a person was working under the same employer i.e. State. If that is there, rule is attracted. 14. Last but not the least, an extreme proposition, propounded by learned State Counsel, is that in cases where persons are alleged to be involved in cases of corruption, their services could be straightway terminated. As a proposition of law, we are unable to accept the same. In a given case, termination of a probationer could be justified. However, if the order of termination itself contains stigma, it is well settled by the Apex Court in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. As a proposition of law, we are unable to accept the same. In a given case, termination of a probationer could be justified. However, if the order of termination itself contains stigma, it is well settled by the Apex Court in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Ors., reported in AIR 1999 SC 983 , that if the order of termination would be stigmatic, then it could not be saved as discharge of a probationer by simpliciter or innocuous order of termination. Even if, we accept the argument that discharge from the post of Lecturer (Electric) was just and proper only on the basis that he was found to be involved in a corruption case, in any case, what comes to aid of the respondent is mandate of Rule 36 of the Rule of 2010, which required the appellant-State to revert him to the post on which he was working just before his appointment as probationer. If ultimately, corruption charges are found proved in criminal trial, termination based on conviction could always be resorted to, irrespective of the post he was occupying. 15. Viewed from any angle, the impugned order of termination is unsustainable in law. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by learned Single Judge, though for the reasons in addition to those which have already been stated by learned Single Judge. 16. The appeal fails and the same is hereby, dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands dismissed.