JUDGMENT : The present appeal is filed under Section 30 of the Employees Compensation Act, questioning the order dated 16.03.2009 in WC No.119 of 2005 passed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Kadapa. 2. The parties are referred to as per their nomenclature before the Commissioner. 3. The facts leading to this appeal are as under : The claimants are the father and mother of deceased driver by name Savidi Ramanjaneyulu. The deceased was working as a driver in the mini-lorry Bearing No.AP04-U-2986 which was owned by opposite party No.1 and insured with opposite party No.2 vide Policy No.50160/31/03/13570. While the deceased along with cleaner Ramanath Reddy @ Chinna were travelling with a load of banana fruits, at about 03.50 a.m., on 19.02.2005 near Chandur Cross Road on NH-7, the mini lorry dashed the rear side of lorry Bearing No.AP 22 T 5571 as the driver of the said lorry applied sudden brakes and stopped the vehicle. In the accident, the deceased and cleaner sustained severe injuries and the deceased driver succumbed to the injuries. A case was registered by Bagepali P.S. as Crime No.32 of 2005 under Sections 279, 337 and 304 of I.P.C. Since, the accident occurred in the course of employment and as the deceased was aged about 31 years and was being paid monthly wages of Rs.5,000/- per month, the claim was filed by the claimants the deceased for Rs.5,00,000/-. 4. Opposite Party No.1 employer remained ex parte and the Insurance Company i.e., opposite party No.2 filed its counter denying the coverage of insurance as no extra premium was paid by the opposite party No.1 to cover the risk of the driver. 5. The claimants got marked Exs.A1 to A11 while the insurance company got marked Ex.B1. The father of the deceased examined as AW1, while an employee of the insurance company had examined as RW1. 6. The Commissioner after taking into consideration the respective contentions and evidence on record held that the respondents therein are jointly and severally responsible and awarded compensation of Rs.3,48,944/-. Hence, the present appeal is filed. 7. Heard Smt. A. Jayanthi, learned Counsel for the appellant and there was no representation for the respondents. 8. The only contention urged in the grounds of appeal was that the policy would not apply to cover the risk of the deceased driver. Hence, the present appeal is filed. 7. Heard Smt. A. Jayanthi, learned Counsel for the appellant and there was no representation for the respondents. 8. The only contention urged in the grounds of appeal was that the policy would not apply to cover the risk of the deceased driver. In elaboration, it was contended that the driver being an employee cannot be termed to be third party for claiming compensation in an act only policy. 9. The term third party is defined under Section 145 coming under Chapter-XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the Act"). Vide Amending Act No.32 of 2019, certain amendments were brought to the Act. The amended definition of Section 145(i) of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 which came into effect from 09.08.2019 reads as under : (i) "Third party" includes the Government, the driver and any other co-worker on a transport vehicle. 10. Pursuant to the amendment, for the purpose of compensation, it is clarified that driver and any other co-worker on a transport vehicle is considered as a third party and are entitled for compensation. 11. Prior to amendment, Section 145(g) of the Act reads as under : "(g) "third party" includes the Government". 12. The definition of third party prior to amendment was not elaborate and this led to controversy whether the drivers and others come within the definition of third party for the purpose of claiming compensation under the Act. The amendment to Section 145(i) is clarificatory in nature and apparently to redress the controversy, and is therefore applicable for accidents that happened prior to the 2019 amendment also. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in BDA v. Sudhakar Hegde, (2020) 15 SCC 63 , while considering a similar clarification to the definition of "Expressways" in Para 7(f) of the Schedule to the 2006 Notification which was issued under Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 read with Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 held that clarificatory amendments are applicable retrospectively. The Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon SBI v. V. Ramakrishanan, (2018) 15 SCC 63 and Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh in support of its conclusion. The Paragraphs 32, 34 and 35 thereof read as under: "32. Where an amendment is clarificatory in nature, such amendment is deemed to be retrospective in its application." "34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon SBI v. V. Ramakrishanan, (2018) 15 SCC 63 and Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh in support of its conclusion. The Paragraphs 32, 34 and 35 thereof read as under: "32. Where an amendment is clarificatory in nature, such amendment is deemed to be retrospective in its application." "34. The Court in SBI v. V. Ramakrishanan, (2018) 15 SCC 63, noted that the Committee clarified that it was never intended that the moratorium under Section 14 applied to personal guarantors of corporate debtors. Accordingly, an amendment was enacted to Section 14. The Court then proceeded to hold, relying on consistent precedent of this Court, that a clarificatory amendment has retrospective application. A similar position is expounded by G.P. Singh in his seminal work Principles of Statutory Interpretation. He states : "... An amending Act may be purely clarificatory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and, therefore, if the principal Act was existing law when the amendment came into force, the amending Act also will be part of the existing law." 35. An amending provision which clarifies the position of law which was considered to be implicit, is construed to have retrospective effect. The position of the retrospective application of clarificatory amendments to notifications is analogous to the position under statutory enactments." 14. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that drivers cannot seek for compensation cannot be sustained in view of the clarificatory amendment to Section 145(i) of the Act and is rejected. 15. The civil miscellaneous appeal is therefore dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions if any pending shall stand closed.