JUDGMENT: Hon’ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari, J. Heard Sri T. V. Jaggi Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Maheswara Rao Kuncheam, learned counsel for the 1st respondent/decree holder in all the civil revision petitions and civil miscellaneous appeals. 2. The petitioner/1st respondent is decree holder in whose favour there are two arbitration awards in AC Nos.50 & 51 of 2010 against the judgment debtors, the petitioners in civil revision petitions/appellants in civil miscellaneous appeals, two in number. The judgment debtors filed their respective separate objections/claim against the attachment of E. P. Schedule properties in E.P.Nos.605 & 606 of 2016. They were dismissed in default on 26.04.2018. The judgment debtors’ applications for setting aside that Order under Order 21 Rule 105 (2) and 106 r/w. Section 151 CPC, were rejected on 07.08.2023, consequent upon rejection of their Section 5 application for condonation of delay in filing application for setting aside the Order dated 26.04.2018. Challenging the orders dated 07.08.2023, aforesaid four civil revision petitions and four civil miscellaneous appeals have been filed by the judgment debtors. 3. The Orders under challenge are common though separate. The common arguments have been advanced. All the civil revision petitions and civil miscellaneous appeals are being decided by this common judgment, referring CRP No.236 of 2024 as the lead case. 4. This Civil Revision Petition No.236 of 2024 under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short ‘CPC’) has been filed challenging the Order dated 07.08.2023 in E.A.No.1657 of 2019 in E.A.No.1077 of 2016 in E.P.No.606 of 2016 in A.C.No.51 of 2010 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Rajamahendravaram, East Godavari. 5. A.C.No.51 of 2010 was decreed in favour of the plaintiff/1st respondent herein/decree holder-M/s.Sakthi Finance Limited, Rajahmundry. The decree holder filed E.P.No.606 of 2016 in which the petitioner’ property was attached. The petitioner filed claim petition E.A.No.1077 of 2016 to raise the attachment. The petitioner’s case was that the 2nd respondent (Judgment Debtor No.2)-Karuturi Srilakshmi sold the schedule properties to the petitioner in terms of the registered Agreement of Sale-cum-General Power of Attorney dated 14.05.2009 and 16.05.2009 and since then the claim petitioner had been in possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule properties. The petitioner’s case was that the 2nd respondent (Judgment Debtor No.2)-Karuturi Srilakshmi sold the schedule properties to the petitioner in terms of the registered Agreement of Sale-cum-General Power of Attorney dated 14.05.2009 and 16.05.2009 and since then the claim petitioner had been in possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule properties. Her case was that on the date fixed to give evidence, she could not appear before the Court to give evidence as her husband was suffering from ill-health and was taking treatment for his vertebra fracture. The doctor advised him to take rest and she was attending him. The main petition E.A.No.1077 of 2016 was dismissed for not adducing evidence, vide Order dated 26.04.2018. 6. The 1st respondent/decree holder filed counter affidavit denying the averments of the petition inter alia contending that the reason of ill-health of the petitioner’s husband was incorrect. The medical certificate disclosed that the husband of the petitioner underwent treatment from 10.04.2018 to 31.12.2018 only. The reason shown was not sufficient to condone the delay. The petitioner was not vigilant in prosecuting the main petition. The sale agreement-cum-general power of attorney did not confer any title and the objection to that effect had already been overruled on 18.02.2016. 7. The learned Executing Court framed the following point for determination: “Whether valid and sufficient grounds are made out by the petitioners, to set aside the default order dated 26.04.2018, passed in E.A.No.1077 of 2016?” 8. The learned Executing Court observed that the 1st respondent/decree holder filed the main execution petition seeking sale of item Nos. 1 to 3 of petition schedule properties of the 2nd respondent/2nd judgment debtor, and initially, the 1st Additional District Judge, Rajamahendravaram had overruled the objections raised by the 2nd respondent/2nd judgment debtor with regard to his salable interest vide Order dated 18.02.2016 and thereafter, the matter was returned, on the point of jurisdiction, vide Order dated 26.04.2016. After such return, when the matter was posted for filing of sale papers, encumbrance certificate and market value certificate, the claim petition in E.A.No.1077 of 2016 was filed by the petitioner. Her husband had also filed another claim petition in E.A.No.1076 of 2016 claiming the petition schedule properties. After such return, when the matter was posted for filing of sale papers, encumbrance certificate and market value certificate, the claim petition in E.A.No.1077 of 2016 was filed by the petitioner. Her husband had also filed another claim petition in E.A.No.1076 of 2016 claiming the petition schedule properties. Initially, the matter was posted for enquiry to 23.01.2017 and after granting adjournment from 27.02.2017 to 11.08.2017, on 11.08.2017 the petitioner filed a memo to club both the claim petitions i.e., E.A.No.1076 of 2016 and E.A.No.1077 of 2016, on which the Executing Court passed Order on 04.01.2018 observing that it was not possible to club both the claim petitions to conduct enquiry as they had to be decided independently and directed the petitioner to adduce evidence and posted the matter to 22.02.2018. The Executing Court further observed that from 22.02.2018 to 23.03.2018 the petitioner did not adduce evidence and finally on 26.04.2018 the petition was dismissed for default. 9. With respect to delay aspect, the learned Executing Court observed that the reason assigned was that the petitioner’s husband sustained fracture injury to L1, L2 Vertebra and took treatment in Dr.Prayaga Nalini Mohan Hospital and the doctor advised him to take bed rest from 10.04.2018 to 31.12.2018 and the petitioner attended to her husband. The petition was filed on 13.08.2019 i.e., after lapse of 443 days. The further cause shown was that the petitioner also suffered back ache from January 2019 and to that effect she filed certificate issued by the doctor. The husband of the petitioner i.e., the petitioner in E.A.No.1077 of 2016 also did not take steps in his petition. The petitioner must show sufficient cause to condone any amount of delay. It observed that in spite of taking several adjournment, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence in the claim petition and there was no representation. Consequently, the Executing Court dismissed the main claim petition. The learned Executing Court observed that the delay could not be explained. Thus, considered. The Executing Court rejected the petition by observing that there was no sufficient cause to condone the delay. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the cause shown was sufficient. The learned Executing Court ought to have considered the cause in correct perspective, and taking a liberal view in the matter of condonation of delay, the delay deserved to be condoned to provide opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the cause shown was sufficient. The learned Executing Court ought to have considered the cause in correct perspective, and taking a liberal view in the matter of condonation of delay, the delay deserved to be condoned to provide opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He further submitted that if the delay was not condoned, the petitioner would be deprived of hearing of the objections on merit. So, at least, one opportunity deserved to be granted to the petitioner. He further submitted that the delay was not such as the respondents could not be compensated in terms of money by imposing reasonable costs. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 . 11. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that there was no illegality in the order of the learned Executing Court. The cause shown was not sufficient. The petitioner was adopting delaying tactics so as to drag on the execution proceedings. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent placed reliance in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513. 12. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material on record. 13. The following point arises for consideration: “Whether the impugned Order deserves to be set aside?” 14. From reading of the impugned judgment, we are of the view that the main ground for rejection of the delay condonation application is that the Court proceeded to decide the same keeping in view that the petitioner’s objection taken earlier with respect to the registered agreement of sale-cum-general power of attorney in favour of the petitioner and her husband by the 2nd respondent/2nd judgment debtor was rejected and also that the execution petition was more than 5 years old, further, that in spite of time granted previously, the petitioner did not adduce evidence. Keeping that view, in consideration, the learned Executing Court proceeded to decide the delay condonation application. Such approach is not correct. 15. So far as the merit of the matter is concerned, objection as to the agreement of sale-cum-general power of attorney, which was previously rejected, that should have been the matter of consideration while deciding the application filed by the petitioner in E.P.No.606 of 2016. Such approach is not correct. 15. So far as the merit of the matter is concerned, objection as to the agreement of sale-cum-general power of attorney, which was previously rejected, that should have been the matter of consideration while deciding the application filed by the petitioner in E.P.No.606 of 2016. That should not have been taken into consideration at the time of condonation of delay so as to reject that application. At the stage of condonatin of delay in filing application for setting aside the ex parte order, the only consideration is whether the cause shown was sufficient or not. The Executing Court instead of confining the consideration to that material aspect, has decided the application of delay condonation keeping in view the other considerations which are not relevant at this stage. 16. With respect to the cause shown, though finding has been recorded that the petitioner failed to show sufficient cause, but the cause shown has not been negatived. There is no finding that the cause shown was not correct or that the said cause could not be proved. The cause shown was that the petitioner’s husband sustained fracture injury and took treatment and was on bed rest up to 31.12.2018 from 10.04.2018. The petitioner was attending to her husband. The petitioner also suffered from back ache from January 2019, and to that effect, the certificate issued by the doctor was also filed. The learned Executing Court observed that from the said certificate it was evident that the petitioner was not advised to take bed rest. 17. We are of the view that in the matters of condonation of delay, when the cause is shown and is also supported by medical certificate and it could not be proved that the petitioner was not unwell or that the petitioner’s husband did not undergo treatment for fracture injury, a lenient view should have been taken in favour of the condonation of delay to provide opportunity of hearing. The view taken by the learned Court is too technical view which tends to deprive right of hearing and of advancing the cause of substantial justice. 18. The view taken by the learned Court is too technical view which tends to deprive right of hearing and of advancing the cause of substantial justice. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. MST Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 observed that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which sub-serves the end of justice that being the life purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. In paragraph-3 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under: “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 [ Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.] of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on ”merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: “1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. 3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so…..” 19. In Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) under paragraph-21, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 20. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph-26 observed and held as under: “26. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 20. In Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph-26 observed and held as under: “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) held that the provisions of the Limitation Act has to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally. The Hon’ble Apex Court Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) held that the provisions of the Limitation Act has to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally. In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court further held that the Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence. It was further observed that condonation of delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay was not a correct approach. 22. In Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Limited, (2021) 7 SCC 313 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that the condition precedent for condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause. Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute “sufficient cause” or not would be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the appellant applicant for the delay in taking steps. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that it is true that a valuable right may accrue to the other party by the law of limitation, which should not lightly be defeated by condoning delay in a routine manner. At the same time, when stakes are high, the explanation should not be rejected by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter, causing thereby irreparable loss and injury to the party against whom the lis terminates. The Courts are required to strike a balance between the legitimate rights and interests of the respective parties. 23. At the same time, when stakes are high, the explanation should not be rejected by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter, causing thereby irreparable loss and injury to the party against whom the lis terminates. The Courts are required to strike a balance between the legitimate rights and interests of the respective parties. 23. Paragraphs-57 to 60 in Sesh Nath Singh (supra) are reproduced as under: “57. It is well settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court as also different High Courts and, in particular, the judgment of this Court in B.K. Educational Services (P) Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 528 NCLT/NCLAT has the discretion to entertain an application/appeal after the prescribed period of limitation. The condition precedent for exercise of such discretion is the existence of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal and/or the application within the period prescribed by limitation. 58. In Ramlal, Motilal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 this Court affirmed the view taken by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, 1889 SCC OnLine Mad 1 : ILR (1890) 13 Mad 269 and held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives the courts a discretion, which is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised, upon principles which are well understood. The expression “sufficient cause” should be construed liberally to advance substantial justice, as held by this Court, inter alia, in Shakuntla Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 ] and in State of W.B. v. Howrah Municipality, (1972) 1 SCC 366 ]. 59. The condition precedent for condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause. Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute “sufficient cause” or not would be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the appellant applicant for the delay in taking steps. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. 60. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished by the appellant applicant for the delay in taking steps. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. 60. It is true that a valuable right may accrue to the other party by the law of limitation, which should not lightly be defeated by condoning delay in a routine manner. At the same time, when stakes are high, the explanation should not be rejected by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter, causing thereby irreparable loss and injury to the party against whom the lis terminates. The courts are required to strike a balance between the legitimate rights and interests of the respective parties.” 24. In the present case, however, we find that there was sufficient cause shown by the petitioner for condonation of delay. That cause had not been negatived by the learned Executing Court. We have already observed that the medical ground of the petitioner and her husband were supported by the medical certificate. Those medical certificates were not disputed, but it was observed by the Executing Court that the doctor did not advise bed rest to the petitioners (both), which view is hyper technical. In our view, in the present case, sufficient cause for condonation of delay has been made out. The expression ‘sufficient cause’, as held in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), under section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, in order to advance substantial justice, the learned Executing Court has not held that there was negligence, mala fide, or want of bona fides in filing the application. 25. We are of the view that in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the learned Executing Court has acted illegally and with material irregularity in rejecting I.A and passing the impugned order. 26. 25. We are of the view that in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the learned Executing Court has acted illegally and with material irregularity in rejecting I.A and passing the impugned order. 26. We are of the further view that considering the reason assigned and taking a lenient view, to provide opportunity of hearing to the petitioner following the principle as in Sesh Nath Singh (supra) that the acceptance of the explanation should be rule and refusal an exception, in the absence of any finding of negligence or want of bona fides, and also finding that exercise of discretion, for the reason assigned in this judgment is not judicious by the Executing Court, we interfere with the order of the learned Executing Court. 27. We allow the civil revision petition, setting aside the Order dated 07.08.2023 but with the following directions: i. The delay in filing the application to set aside the default order dated 26.04.2018 is condoned on payment of costs of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) payable by the petitioner to the 1st respondent/decree holder. The application is allowed. ii. No order as to costs in this revision. 28. Resultantly, i. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.213 of 2024 is also allowed. The application for setting aside the Order dated 26.04.2018 is allowed. The Order of dismissal in default, dated 26.04.2018 is set aside. ii. The Executing Court shall now fix a date on receipt of a copy of this Order, preferably a short date, on which date, or on the next date, if for some justifiable reason, it is not so possible on the first date fixed, the petitioner shall lead evidence in the petition. The execution petition shall be decided, as expeditiously as possible, by the learned Executing Court without granting unnecessary adjournments, preferably, within a period of 6 (six) months from the date of production of copy of this order. 29. All other Civil Revision Petitions and Civil Miscellaneous Appeals are also allowed in the aforesaid terms. It is however clarified that the payment of costs as per paragraph – 27 (i) shall be made once, only, by each judgment debtors. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.