JUDGMENT : (Hon'ble Nalin Kumar Srivastava, J.) 1. Heard the appellant in person, learned A.G.A. for the State as well as learned counsel for the respondent no.2 and perused the material available on record. 2. This criminal appeal under Section 14-A (2) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act has been preferred by the appellant -Subash Chandra Srivastava (In person) with the prayer to cancel/quash the bail granted to the respondent no.2 vide order dated 1.1.2020 passed by the Special Judge, S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, Padrauna, Kushinagar in Special Trial No.492 of 2019 (State Vs. Raju @ Sunil Kumar Srivastava) arising out of case crime no.436 of 2019 under sections 323, 504, 352, 427 IPC and 3 (1) (r) S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, Police Station Kotwali Padrauna, District Kushinagar. 3. The factual aspect of the matter, as revealed from the perusal of the F.I.R. of this case, is that 3 named accused persons along with 3 -4 other unknown associates were present on the place of occurrence and co-accused Sunil @ Raju was making a puncture in the vehicle of the informant. When it was protested by the informant and his friend Ram Narain Mushar, they were threatened and abused by all the aforesaid accused persons and Ram Narain Mushar was also abused by his caste name on a public place in the public view. The incident occurred due to a land dispute between the parties whereupon the accused persons had already made an assault upon the house of the informant on 25.5.2019. The incident happened on 30.8.2019 at about 11:00 A.M. and the F.I.R. was lodged on the same day at 22:15 hours. Subsequently, after submission of the charge-sheet, cognizance was taken on 7.12.2019 and at this stage a bail application was moved by respondent no.2 Raju @ Sunil Kumar Srivastava and he was granted interim bail by the Special Judge, S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, Kushinagar till 1.1.2020 and an order was also passed to issue notice to the informant of this case. Thereafter, on 1.1.2020, the impugned bail order was passed whereby the accused/respondent no.2 was granted regular bail by the trial court. 4. Thereafter, on 1.1.2020, the impugned bail order was passed whereby the accused/respondent no.2 was granted regular bail by the trial court. 4. Albeit several instances have been mentioned in the present appeal relating to misuse of bail on the part of respondent no.2, which was granted to him by the impugned order dated 1.1.2020 but at the time of argument the learned counsel for the appellant concised his argument on the sole issue that Section 15A (3), (5) of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act mandates that prior to the hearing of the bail application under the provisions of S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, notice must be sent to the informant of the case. In the present matter, no notice was served upon the informant and without notice, the bail application of the accused respondent no.2 was heard and allowed and the informant was provided no opportunity of hearing on bail application before the Special Judge, S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, Kushinagar at Padrauna. Since the mandatory provisions of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act have not been complied with by the learned Special Court, the bail granted to the accused respondent no.2 vide order dated 1.1.2020 is liable to be cancelled. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 opposed the present appeal and it has been vehemently argued that due notice was given to the informant of this case prior to the disposal of the bail application no.2119 of 2019 by the Special Court under S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, Kushinagar at Padrauna. It is further argued that the factum of notice to the informant finds place in paragraph 5 of the impugned order dated 1.1.2020 itself which says that a notice has been issued to the informant, but neither the informant nor any counsel on his behalf was present before the Court which led the Court to hear the prosecution and the accused on bail application and bail was granted by the learned Special Court to the present respondent no.2 after hearing. It is further submitted that present is not a case of misuse of bail granted to the accused respondent no.2 by the learned Special Court and prayer has been made to dismiss the present appeal. 6. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the entire record including the impugned order carefully. 7. 6. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the entire record including the impugned order carefully. 7. Before dealing with the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and the learned State Counsel, I deem it proper to have a glance over the relevant provisions embodied in Section 14A, Sub-sections (1) and (2) and Section 15A, Sub-sections (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, which are extracted below - “14A. Appeals.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail.” “15A. Rights of victims and witnesses.--(1) It shall be the duty and responsibility of the State to make arrangements for the protection of victims, their dependents, and witnesses against any kind of intimidation or coercion or inducement or violence or threats of violence. (2) A victim shall be treated with fairness, respect and dignity and with due regard to any special need that arises because of the victims age or gender or educational disadvantage or poverty. (3) A victim or his dependent shall have the right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any Court proceeding including any bail proceeding and the Special Public Prosecutor or the State Government shall inform the victim about any proceedings under this Act. (4) A victim or his dependent shall have the right to apply to the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court, as the case may be, to summon parties for production of any documents or material, witnesses or examine the persons present. (5) A victim or his dependent shall be entitled to be heard at any proceeding under this Act in respect of bail, discharge, release, parole, conviction or sentence of an accused or any connected proceedings or arguments and file written submission on conviction, acquittal or sentencing.” 8. (5) A victim or his dependent shall be entitled to be heard at any proceeding under this Act in respect of bail, discharge, release, parole, conviction or sentence of an accused or any connected proceedings or arguments and file written submission on conviction, acquittal or sentencing.” 8. It appears from the perusal of the record that a report was called for from the concerned Special Court as to whether any notice was given to the informant of this case prior to the disposal of the bail application or not. A report dated 14th May, 2024 sent by Sri Gagan Kumar Bharti, Addl. District & Session Judge/Special Judge, S.C./S.T. (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Sant Kabir Nagar is available on record. The learned Special Judge has submitted his report quoting the report of the Session Clerk which reads like this - 9. The said report reveals this fact that no notice was sent to the informant of this case and it also reveals that no police report was available on record to show that any notice was served upon the informant. So far as the averment made in the impugned order dated 1.1.2020 is concerned, it has been mentioned in paragraph 5 of the said order that 10. It is explicitly clear from the perusal of the impugned order that although a notice was sent to the informant as per the impugned order, but it is nowhere mentioned in the said order that the said notice was ever served upon the informant. It is also not mentioned in the impugned order that the notice was returned back to the Court by the police at any stage prior to the disposal of the bail application of the accused after service. Contrary to that the report sent by Sri Gagan Kumar Bharti, Additional District & Session Judge/Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Sant Kabir Nagar reveals that no such notice as required by law was ever sent to the informant. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that no notice was served upon the informant and, therefore, it is a case wherein without affording the opportunity of hearing on the bail application to the informant the said application was heard and bail was granted to the accused/respondent no.2. 11. At this stage, this Court takes notice of the fact that the appellant before this Court does not belong to S.C./S.T. community. 11. At this stage, this Court takes notice of the fact that the appellant before this Court does not belong to S.C./S.T. community. Undoubtedly, he is the informant of this case, but the notice which is required to be given essentially is a notice sent to the victim or his dependent as mentioned in Sub-section (3) and (5) to Section 15A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act. It is noteworthy that nowhere the word ‘informant’ has been used in the aforesaid provision. Apart from this, the affidavit in the appeal in hand has also been filed by the informant/appellant Subash Chandra Srivastava, who is not a member of S.C./S.T. community admittedly. 12. Now two issues emerge out from the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand. Firstly, whether apart from victim or dependent, the informant is the person who is also required to be served notice prior to the disposal of a bail application under the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act and secondly, in the present appeal, whether affidavit along with the memo of appeal could be filed by the informant himself who is not a member of S.C./S.T. community. 13. The F.I.R. discloses the fact that the appellant/informant is the eyewitness of the case and he was also abused and threatened along with his associate Ram Narain Mushar, who happened to be a member of S.C./S.T. community and the whole occurrence happened before him. The said Ram Narain Mushar belonged to the marginal section of the society and was a member of the S.C./S.T. community and he was abused and threatened by his caste name at a public place in the public view as well. The bail by the impugned order was granted to the respondent no.2/accused by the Special Court, S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act. Hence, an appeal under Section 14-A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act was maintainable. The conclusion which can easily be arrived at on basis of the aforesaid provisions is that if any final judgment and order or sentence is passed by a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, the appeal shall lie to the High Court both on facts and on law. In other words, it is promulgated in the aforesaid provisions that if the order appealed against is passed by a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail, the appeal shall lie to the High Court against such order. In other words, it is promulgated in the aforesaid provisions that if the order appealed against is passed by a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail, the appeal shall lie to the High Court against such order. Since the impugned order in this matter was passed by the Special Court, S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, the appeal in all circumstances was maintainable before the High Court under Section 14-A of the said S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act. It is notable that nowhere it is mentioned under Sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14-A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act as to who may file the appeal. Since on the competency of the appellant to file the appeal the provisions are silent, a natural and logical inference may be inferred that this is the victim or his dependent who, in any circumstances, is competent to file an appeal against the order granting bail to the accused under the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act for the simple reason of his entitlement of a reasonable, accurate and timely notice to any Court proceeding including any bail proceeding. Undoubtedly, he is not the sole competent person to prefer the appeal but the informant may also file such appeal under Section 14-A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act. 14. Since the appellant in this case, being the informant, is a person competent to file the present appeal, it is connotative that he may file the memo of appeal supported with his own affidavit. At the cost of the repeatation, it should be reminded that in the matter in hand the present appellant is not the mere informant but also an aggrieved person. Hence his competency to depose by way of affidavit cannot be questioned in the appeal in hand. 15. The aforesaid proposition of law finds its root in the law promulgated by the Hon’ble Apex Court. A three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagjeet Singh and others vs. Ashish Mishra Alias Monu, (2022) 9 SCC 321 got an occasion to deal with the subject as to whether notice to be sent to the informant prior to the disposal of the bail application under S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act is required or not, which can certainly be taken note of. The said decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was quoted and followed by the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bench at Aurangabad) in Criminal Appeal No.293 of 2023 (Raees Hanif Sayyed Versus The State of Maharashtra and another) dated 10.4.2023 and their Lordships while referring to the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that - "In fact in this case there was no question of offences under the Atrocities Act, yet, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the rights of the victim to be heard and to participate in the proceedings before the Courts. Note has been taken in respect of the provisions under the Atrocities Act which make the legal obligation to hear the victim and then it has been reiterated that the rights of the victim are totally independent, incomparable, and not accessory or auxiliary to those of the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, the presence of 'State' in the proceedings, would not tantamount to according a hearing to a victim of the crime. Under such circumstance, when such wide rights are given to the informant/victim and those are acknowledged, it is mandatory on the part of the Special Judges to issue notice to the victims/informants, as the case may be in view of Section 15-A(3) of the Atrocities Act and then to proceed to hear them under Section 15-A(5) of the Atrocities Act." 16. This Court feels that in a matter like the present one to insist upon the phenomenon that notice to the informant was not required on the ground that nowhere the word ‘informant’ has been used in Sub-section (3) and (5) of Section 15-A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act particularly in the peculiar circumstances of this case where the impugned order dated 1.1.2020 nowhere shows and not even a whisper may be found in the said order on the point that any notice was ever sent to the victim or his dependent and since in fact no notice was sent to the victim or his dependent, all the proceedings relating to the grant of bail to the accused/respondent no.2 were bad in law and vitiated as well. The Special Court even did not bother to ascertain whether any notice was actually sent to the informant/victim or his dependent of the case and if such notice was sent, whether it was served upon him or not is another loophole in the impugned order. It is found on its face that the impugned order does not speak even a single word whether the notice sent to the informant/victim or his dependent was served upon him or not while making hearing on the bail application. With a vigilant eye it may be seen in paragraph 5 of the impugned bail order that the learned Special Judge writes upon issuance of notice to the informant and also of the absence of the informant and his counsel but nowhere he mentions anything regarding the service of notice upon the informant and this omission denies the opportunity of hearing which is a valuable legal right of any victim/informant in the matter of hearing of bail application under the provisions of S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act, which is also associated with the constitutional belief of a fair trial. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.1278 of 2021 (Hariram Bhambhi Versus Satyanarayan & Anr.) decided on 29.10.2021 made significant observations particularly in the context of Section 15-A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act and it has been recognized that Sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 15-A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act specifically make the victim or his dependent an active stakeholder in the criminal proceedings. These provisions enable a member of the marginalized caste to effectively pursue a case and counteract the effects of defective investigation. It was also highlighted that the purpose of Section 15-A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act was to protect the rights of victims and witnesses whose rights as equal beneficiaries of the criminal justice system are often overlooked due to their weak social position. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment and order referred to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sunita Gandharva Versus State of MP & Anr., 2020 SCC OnLine MP 2193 and while highlighting the purpose of the amendment inserting Section 15A observed that : "21. With the years of experience, it was found that due to some vagueness in the definitions and some procedural inertia, the purpose of Act lacked fulfilment, therefore, to make it more victim oriented, the Amendment Act was introduced. With the years of experience, it was found that due to some vagueness in the definitions and some procedural inertia, the purpose of Act lacked fulfilment, therefore, to make it more victim oriented, the Amendment Act was introduced. 22. With the legislative intent reiterated in the letter, no iota of doubt exists that intention of the Amendment Act was for Speedy Trial and Protection of Victims' Rights. By way of Section 2 (ec) Victim has been defined and beside Section 14-A, Section 15-A, "Rights of victim and witnesses" was introduced to take care of them for the first time. Definition of Victim includes-relatives, legal guardian and legal heirs and this definition is much wider than the definition of Victim provided in Section 2 (wa) of Cr.P.C. which includes guardian or legal heir, not the relatives. Similarly, Section 15A of Atrocities Act provides an extensive mechanism for protection of Victims/Witnesses. Even the victim has been given a chance to appear before the Court at the time of hearing of bail application. Right of the Court to cancel or revoke the bail is one of the measures by which protection of Victims/Witnesses can be ensured…" 18. The same dictum of law echoes in various decisions given by different High Courts such as High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bench at Aurangabad) in Criminal Appeal No.293 of 2023 (Raees Hanif Sayyed Versus The State of Maharashtra and another) dated 10.4.2023, High Court of Karnataka (Kalaburagi Bench) in Criminal Petition No.200315/2020 C/W Criminal Petition No.200318/2020 (Marenna @ Mareppa Versus The State) and (Sahebreddy @ Sabreddy Versus The State of Karnataka) dated 21.7.2020 and High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in R/Special Civil Application No. 6369 of 2020 (Hemal Ashwin Jain (Sheth) Versus Union of Indian) dated 6.8.2020 wherein the right of the informant to be heard prior to the hearing of the bail application moved under the provisions of S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act and a proper service of notice to him has been expounded and a cumulative reading of the aforesaid decisions draws a definite conclusion that the first informant/complainant/victim or dependent shall be made as a party in the Court proceedings and it is the duty of the Court to issue necessary notice to the first informant or complainant or victim/his dependent to hear them in any proceedings as envisaged under Sub-section (5) of the Section 15A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act. 19. 19. It is also important to note here that the plea that since the accused has made out a case for bail in his favour, to issue notice to the informant/victim or his dependent of the case was not necessary at all, may be termed as a bogus plea which is a complete denial of the legal principle of opportunity of hearing. Suffice it to say that prior to the hearing of the bail application, the initial step after the filing of the application for bail in the matter in hand to be taken by the Court was to pass an effective order to issue notice to the informant/victim or his dependent. Only after due notice, an order on such bail application in either way should had been passed, but as a matter of regret, in the case in hand, the learned Special Judge did not bother to comply with the mandatory provisions under the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act as mentioned and discussed here-in-above. 20. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the case laws cited above, the Court is of the opinion that the court concerned erred in granting bail to the accused respondent no.2 without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 15A of the S.C./S.T. (P.A.) Act. The impugned order was passed by the court concerned without issuing notice to the informant/victim or his dependent and without affording a reasonable and sufficient opportunity of hearing to him which is patently illegal and suffers from infirmity and illegality and the same is liable to be set-aside and the appeal is liable to be allowed. 21. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 1.1.2020 allowing the bail application of the accused respondent no.2 is hereby set-aside.