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2024 DIGILAW 147 (HP)

Rajeev Nag v. Ranjeet Singh

2024-03-04

RANJAN SHARMA

body2024
JUDGMENT : Ranjan Sharma, J. The petitioner, a convict, has come up before this Court, in Revision Petition, under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’), against the order dated 09.03.2016 [Annexure P-2] [hereinafter referred to as ‘Impugned Order’] passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge (III) Kangra at Dharamshala, Camp at Palampur, [hereinafter referred to as ‘Appellate Court’] whereby, the appeal filed by the petitioner-convict was dismissed for non-prosecution; resulting in affirming the judgment dated 08.07.2008 [Annexure P-1] passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Palampur, District Kangra, in Criminal Complaint No.182-III/2004. 2. The factual matrix is that the complainant, Ranjeet Singh Rana, filed a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) against the accused (Rajeev Nag) herein, before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class (I), Palampur, District Kangra, vide Criminal Complaint No.182-III/2004, whereby the accused was convicted and sentenced for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class (I), Palampur, District Kangra on 08.07.2008 [Annexure P-1], for rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-. 3. Feeling aggrieved against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 08.07.2008 [Annexure P-1] passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class (I), Palampur, the accused (Rajeev Nag) herein, preferred a Criminal Appeal No.152 of 2013 before the Additional Sessions Judge (III), Kangra at Dharamshala [hereinafter referred to as Appellate Court] on 09.03.2016 [Annexure P-2], which reads as under:- “09.03.2016 Present: None for the appellant. Sh. G.R. Bhardwaj, Ld. APP for the State. Case called thrice, but appellant not present nor any counsel put appearance on his behalf. It is 2.30 P.M., therefore, the present appeal is dismissed in default for want of prosecution on behalf of appellant. Record of the ld. lower Court be sent back along with copy of this order and the remaining file of this Court after its due completion be consigned to the record room.” A perusal of the orders passed by Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra, Dharamshala, Camp at Palampur, District Kangra, reveals that the appeal filed by the accused (Rajeev Nag) was dismissed in default for non-prosecution. 4. Consequent upon the passing of the order dated 09.03.2016 (Annexure P-2), dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution, the accused (Rajeev Nag) filed a Crl. 4. Consequent upon the passing of the order dated 09.03.2016 (Annexure P-2), dismissing the appeal for non-prosecution, the accused (Rajeev Nag) filed a Crl. M.A. No.40-P/2020 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, requesting to alter or review/recall/set-aside the order dated 09.03.2016 passed by his predecessor. This application was disposed of by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, on 22.12.2021 [Annexure P-3], on the ground that once an order has been passed in appeal then, in view of the Section 362 of Cr.P.C., this Court was not competent to alter/recall or review its own order and therefore, the present application was dismissed on 22.12.2021 [Annexure P-3]. 5. It is in this background, that the petitioner has filed the instant revision petition before this Court, assailing the judgment dated 09.03.2016 (Annexure P-2) dismissing the appeal of accused (Rajeev Nag) in default for non-prosecution and the order dated 22.12.2021 (Annexure P-3), dismissing the application seeking alteration/recalling judgment dated 19.03.2016. 6. Heard Mr. Arsh Chauhan, learned vice counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Ravinder Singh Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondent-complainant and have gone through the pleadings and case records. 7. In view of the narration of facts, referred to above, the point for consideration is as under:- “Whether the Appellate Court below could dismiss the criminal appeal preferred by the accused (Rajeev Nag)-convict, in default, for want of prosecution?” 8. In the background of the above facts and circumstances but without adverting to the minutest unwanted details of the matter, at this stage, it is relevant to take note of the fact that the accused (Rajeev Nag) herein was convicted and sentenced under Section 138 of the Act by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class (I), Palampur, on 08.07.2008 [Annexure P-1]. Against the judgment of conviction and sentence the aforesaid accused (Rajeev Nag) preferred an appeal (Criminal Appeal No.152 of 2013) before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Camp at Dharamshala, as per order dated 09.03.2016 [Annexure P-2], which was dismissed in default, for non prosecution by the Appellate Court. After passing of the orders dated 09.03.2016, the accused Rajeev Nag) again filed an application i.e. Crl. After passing of the orders dated 09.03.2016, the accused Rajeev Nag) again filed an application i.e. Crl. M.A. No.40-P/2020 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, wherein the Appellate Court expressed its inability to alter or recall or review the order passed by his predecessor on 09.03.2016, in view of the embargo in Section 362 of Cr.P.C. 9. Notably, the Question formulated by this Court in [Para 7 supra] has been dealt with in the context of pari material provisions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in 1971 (1) Supreme Court Cases 855, titled as Shyam Deo Pandey and Others versus The State of Bihar, which reads as under:- 13. The contention of Mr. S.N. Prasad is that the High Court having admitted the appeal on September 9, 1966 and issued notice to the State, it has no power under Section 423 of the Code to dismiss the appeal summarily as it has done on May 10, 1968. The manner of disposal of the appeal, the counsel pointed out, shows a complete disregard by the High Court of the provisions of Section 423 of the Code enjoining the Appellate Court to look into the entire record and giving reasons for the decision arrived at, Court irrespective of the fact whether the appellant or his pleader or the public prosecutor for the State appears or not. 17. From the scheme of the sections referred above, the following facts emerge: The appellants had a right under Section 410 to file an appeal of the High Court against their conviction. Under Section 418 they were entitled to challenge the correctness of the findings of the Trial Court, both on facts and law, as admittedly their trial was not by the Jury. They were also entitled as a matter of law to urge the severety of the sentence imposed on them. The appellants had filed the appeal in due form as required by Section 419 accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against. Under Section 421 the Appellate Court is bound to peruse the appeal petition and the copy of the judgment or order appealed against. If the Appellate Court, on perusal of the same, considers that there was no sufficient ground for interfering with the judgment and order appealed against, it can dismiss the appeal summarily. Under Section 421 the Appellate Court is bound to peruse the appeal petition and the copy of the judgment or order appealed against. If the Appellate Court, on perusal of the same, considers that there was no sufficient ground for interfering with the judgment and order appealed against, it can dismiss the appeal summarily. Under sub-section (2) of Section 421, it is open to the Appellate Court before dismissing the appeal to call for the record of the case; but it is not mandatory that the Appellate Court should call for the record. The stage under Section 421 is to enable the Appellate Court to decide whether the appeal should be admitted or dismissed summarily. In the case before us on September 9, 1966, when the High Court ordered "this appeal will be heard. Issue notice", it is clear that on perusal of the petition of appeal and the judgment of the Sessions Court, the High Court did not take the view that there was no sufficient ground for interference so as to dismiss the appeal summarily. On the other hand, the order of the High Court, extracted above, clearly indicates that the appeal is to be heard and disposed of on merits and for that purpose it issued notice to the State. In fact the provisions regarding issue of notice as provided under Section 422, has also been followed by the High Court. The procedure under Section 422 has to be followed only when the appeal is not dismissed summarily under Section 421. In this case the stages envisaged by Sections 421 and 422 have passed. The appeal has been admitted and taken on file and notice must have been also issued to the appellants or their counsel, as envisaged in the section. 18. Coming to Section 423, which has already been quoted above, it deals with powers of the Appellate Court in disposing of the appeal on merits. It is obligatory for the Appellate Court to send for the record of the case, if it is not already before the Court. This requirement is necessary to be complied with to enable the Court to adjudicate upon the correctness or otherwise of the order or judgment appealed against not only with reference to the judgment but also with reference to the records which will be the basis on which the judgment is founded. This requirement is necessary to be complied with to enable the Court to adjudicate upon the correctness or otherwise of the order or judgment appealed against not only with reference to the judgment but also with reference to the records which will be the basis on which the judgment is founded. The correctness or other-wise of the findings recorded in the judgment, on the basis of the attack made against the same, cannot be adjudicated upon without reference to the evidence, oral and documentary and other materials relevant for the purpose. The reference to "such record" in "after perusing such record" is to the record of the case sent for by the Appellate Court. 9(i) Likewise the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (1994) 4 Supreme Court Cases 664, titled as Parasuram Patel and Another versus State of Orissa, has held as under:- “Special leave granted. In the present case, the High Court dismissed the criminal appeal of the appellants only on the ground that there was default in appearance of the appellants and their counsel. It is now well settled that no criminal appeal can be dismissed on the ground of default in appearance. The Court has to go through the record of the case even in the absence of the appellants or their counsel and decide the matter on merit. Inasmuch as the High Court dismissed the appeal without going into the merit of the matter, the impugned order dated 078.04.1992 is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded to the High Court for decision on merit. In the circumstances of the case, the High Court should dispose of the matter within two months of the receipt of this order. The appeal is allowed accordingly.” 9 (ii). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 720, titled as Bani Singh and Others versus State of Himachal Pradesh, has observed as under:- 7. The Division Bench of this Court which referred this matter to us was of the view that these decisions, rendered by separate two-Judge Benches of this Court, are in conflict with each other. Before we decide on this issue, we must closely examine the scheme envisaged by the Code in this regard. The relevant portions of Sections 385 and 386 of the Code are extracted as under: "385. Before we decide on this issue, we must closely examine the scheme envisaged by the Code in this regard. The relevant portions of Sections 385 and 386 of the Code are extracted as under: "385. Procedure for hearing appeals not dismissed summarily.-(1) If the appellate court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, it shall cause notice of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard to be given- (i) to the appellant or his pleader; (ii)-(iv) * * * (2) The appellate court shall then send for the record of the case, if such record is not already available in that Court, and hear the parties: Provided that if the appeal is only as to the extent or the legality of the sentence, the Court may dispose of the appeal without sending for the record. (3) * * * 386. Powers of the appellate court. - After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the public prosecutor if he appears, and in case of an appeal under Section 377 or Section 378, the accused, if he appears, the appellate court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may- 8. Section 385 (2) clearly states that if the appellate court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, it 'shall’, after issuing notice as required by sub-section (1), send for the record of the case and hear the parties. The proviso, however, posits that if the appeal is restricted to the extent or legality of the sentence, the court need not call for the record. On a plain reading of the said provision, it seems clear to us that once the appellate court, on an examination of the grounds of appeal and the impugned judgment, decides to admit the appeal for hearing, it must send for the record and then decide the appeal finally, unless the appeal is restricted to the extent and legality of the sentence. Obviously, the requirement to send for the record is provided for to enable the appellate court to peruse the record before finally deciding the appeal. It is not an idle formality but casts an obligation on the court to decide the appeal only after it has perused the record. This is not to say that it cannot be waived even where the parties consent to its waiver. It is not an idle formality but casts an obligation on the court to decide the appeal only after it has perused the record. This is not to say that it cannot be waived even where the parties consent to its waiver. This becomes clear from the opening words of Section 386 which say that "after perusing such record" the court may dispose of the appeal. However, this section imposes a further requirement of hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the public prosecutor, if he appears. This is an extension of the requirement of Section 385(1) which requires the court to cause notice to issue as to the time and place of hearing of the appeal. Once such a notice is issued the accused or his pleader, if he appears, must be heard. 9. The question is, where the accused is the appellant and is represented by a pleader, and the latter fails to appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, is the appellate court empowered to dispose of the appeal after perusing the record on its own or, must it adjourn the appeal to a future date and intimate the accused to be present on the next date of hearing? 14. We have carefully considered the view expressed in the said two decisions of this Court and, we may state that the view taken in Shyam Deo case appears to be sound except for a minor clarification which we consider necessary to mention. The plain language of Section 385 makes it clear that if the appellate court does not consider the appeal fit for summary dismissal, it 'must' call for the record and Section 386 mandates that after the record is received, the appellate court may dispose of the appeal after hearing the accused or his counsel. Therefore, the plain language of Sections 385-386 does not contemplate dismissal of the appeal for non-prosecution simpliciter. On the contrary, the Code envisages disposal of the appeal on merits after perusal and scrutiny of the record. The law clearly expects the appellate court to dispose of the appeal on merits, not merely by perusing the reasoning of the trial court in the judgment, but by cross-checking the reasoning with the evidence on record with a view to satisfying itself that the reasoning and findings recorded by the trial court are consistent with the material on record. The law clearly expects the appellate court to dispose of the appeal on merits, not merely by perusing the reasoning of the trial court in the judgment, but by cross-checking the reasoning with the evidence on record with a view to satisfying itself that the reasoning and findings recorded by the trial court are consistent with the material on record. The law, therefore, does not envisage the dismissal of the appeal for default or non-prosecution but only contemplates disposal on merits after perusal of the record. Therefore, with respect, we find it difficult to agree with the suggestion in Ram Naresh Yadav case that if the appellant or his pleader is not present, the proper course would be to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution. 15. Secondly, the law expects the appellate court to give a hearing to the appellant or his counsel, if he is present, and to the public prosecutor, if he is present, before disposal of the appeal on merits. Section 385 posits that if the appeal is not dismissed summarily, the appellate court shall cause notice of the time and place at which the appeal will be heard to be given to the appellant or his pleader. Section 386 then provides that the appellate court shall, after perusing the record, hear the appellant or his pleader, if he appears. It will be noticed that Section 385 provides for a notice of the time and place of hearing of the appeal to be given to either the appellant or his pleader and not to both presumably because notice to the pleader was also considered sufficient since he was representing the appellant. So also Section 386 provides for a hearing to be given to the appellant or his lawyer, if he is present, and both need not be heard. It is the duty of the appellant and his lawyer to remain present on the appointed day, time and place when the appeal is posted for hearing. This is the requirement of the Code on a plain reading of Sections 385-386 of the Code. The law does not enjoin that the court shall adjourn the case if both the appellant and his lawyer are absent. If the court does so as a matter of prudence or indulgence, it is a different matter, but it is not bound to adjourn the matter. The law does not enjoin that the court shall adjourn the case if both the appellant and his lawyer are absent. If the court does so as a matter of prudence or indulgence, it is a different matter, but it is not bound to adjourn the matter. It can dispose of the appeal after perusing the record and the judgment of the trial court. We would, however, hasten to add that if the accused is in jail and cannot, on his own, come to court, it would be advisable to adjourn the case and fix another date to facilitate the appearance of the accused/appellant if his lawyer is not present. If the lawyer is absent, and the court deems it appropriate to appoint a lawyer at State expense to assist it, there is nothing in the law to preclude it from doing so. We are, therefore, of the opinion and we say so with respect, that the Division Bench which decided Ram Naresh Yadav case did not apply the provisions of Sections 385-386 of the Code correctly when it indicated that the appellate court was under an obligation to adjourn the case to another date if the appellant or his lawyer remained absent. 16. Such a view can bring about a stalemate situation. The appellant and his lawyer can remain absent with impunity, not once but again and again till the court issues a warrant for the appellant's presence. A complaint to the Bar Council against the lawyer for non-appearance cannot result in the progress of the appeal. If another lawyer is appointed at State cost, he too would need the presence of the appellant for instructions and that would place the court in the same situation. Such a procedure can, therefore, prove cumbersome and can promote indiscipline. Even if a case is decided on merits in the absence of the appellant, the higher court can remedy the situation if there has been a failure of justice. This would apply equally if the accused is the respondent for the obvious reason that if the appeal cannot be disposed of without hearing the respondent or his lawyer, the progress of the appeal would be halted.” 9 (iii). This would apply equally if the accused is the respondent for the obvious reason that if the appeal cannot be disposed of without hearing the respondent or his lawyer, the progress of the appeal would be halted.” 9 (iii). Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.803 of 2017, titled as Dhananjay Rai @ Guddu Rai versus State of Bihar, decided on 14.07.2022, has held that the Appellate Court cannot dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution simplicitor. It has been held that the Appellate Court is bound to hear the counsel or the accused and to go through the records, instead of dismissing the convict’s appeal, in default or for want of prosecution, which is not recognized in law, in the background of Sections 385 & 386 of Cr.P.C., which reads as under:- “3. By the impugned judgment and order dated 25th August 2015, a Division Bench of the High Court of Patna dismissed the appeal without adverting to the merits of the appeal on the ground that the appellant was absconding. 4. The Division Bench held that though the remedy of an appeal is a valuable right, the appellant forfeited his right to prefer an appeal the moment he escaped from the custody and flagrantly abused the process of law. The learned Judges held that such deliberate act on the part of the appellant amounts to defiance of the criminal administration of justice. The Division Bench referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Shyam Deo Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar. The Division Bench referred to another decision of this Court in the case of Surya Baksh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh as well as a decision of the same High Court in the case of Daya Shankar Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar. After adverting to another decision of this Court in the case of K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka, the Division Bench held that the circumstances of the case before it were exceptional and, therefore, the Court was required to deviate from the settled principle of law that once the appellate court has refused to dismiss the appeal summarily, the same must be heard on merits. 5. 5. After having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State, for the reasons which are recording, we have no option but to set aside the impugned judgment and remand the appeal for fresh consideration of the High Court. 6. In the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the Patna High Court has itself recorded that it is deviating from the settled position of law. Such an approach cannot be countenanced. The well settled law can be found in the decision of this Court of a Bench consisting of three Hon'ble Judges in the case of Bani Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. The issue before this Court in the said case was whether the High Court was justified in dismissing an appeal against conviction for non-prosecution. This Court noted the conflict in the views expressed by two co-ordinate Benches of this Court in the case of Shyam Deol and Ram NareshYadav v. State of Bihar. Paragraphs 13 to 15 of the said decision are relevant, which read thus: “13.What then is the area of conflict between the two decisions of this Court? In Shyam Deo case [ (1971) 1 SCC 855 : 1971 (Cri) 353 : AIR 1971 SC 1606 ], this Court ruled that once the appellate court has admitted the appeal to be heard on merits, it cannot dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution for non-appearance of the appellant or his counsel, but must dispose of the appeal on merits after examining the record of the case. It next held that if the appellant or his counsel is absent, the appellate court is not bound to adjourn the appeal but it can dispose it of on merits after perusing the record. In Ram Naresh Yadav case [ AIR 1987 SC 1500 : 1987 Cri LJ 1856], the Court did not analyse the relevant provisions of the Code nor did it notice the view taken in Shyam Deo case [ (1971) 1 SCC 855 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 353: AIR 1971 SC 1606 ] but held that if the appellant's counsel is absent, the proper course would be to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution but not on merits; it can be disposed of on merits only after hearing the appellant or his counsel or after appointing another counsel at State cost to argue the case on behalf of the accused. 14. We have carefully considered the view expressed in the said two decisions of this Court and, we may state that the view taken in Shyam Deo case [ (1971) 1 SCC 855 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 353: AIR 1971 SC 1606 ] appears to be sound except for a minor clarification which we consider necessary to mention. The plain language of Section 385 makes it clear that if the appellate court does not consider the appeal fit for summary dismissal, it 'must' call for the record and Section 386 mandates that after the record is received, the appellate court may dispose of the appeal after hearing the accused or his counsel. Therefore, the plain language of Sections 385-386 does not contemplate dismissal of the appeal for non-prosecution simplicitor. On the contrary, the Code envisages disposal of the appeal on merits after perusal and scrutiny of the record. The law clearly expects the appellate court to dispose of the appeal on merits, not merely by perusing the reasoning of the trial court in the judgment, but by cross-checking the reasoning with the evidence on record with a view to satisfying itself that the reasoning and findings recorded by the trial court are consistent with the material on record. The law, therefore, does not envisage the dismissal of the appeal for default or non-prosecution but only contemplates disposal on merits after perusal of the record. Therefore, with respect, we find it difficult to agree with the suggestion in Ram Naresh Yadav case [ AIR 1987 SC 1500 1987 Cri LJ 1856] that if the appellant or his pleader is not present, the proper course would be to dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution. 15. Secondly, the law expects the appellate court to give a hearing to the appellant or his counsel, if he is present, and to the public prosecutor, if he is present, before disposal of the appeal on merits. Section 385 posits that if the appeal is not dismissed summarily, the appellate court shall cause notice of the time and place at which the appeal will be heard to be given to the appellant or his pleader. Section 386 then provides that the appellate court shall, after perusing the record, hear the appellant or his pleader, if he appears. Section 385 posits that if the appeal is not dismissed summarily, the appellate court shall cause notice of the time and place at which the appeal will be heard to be given to the appellant or his pleader. Section 386 then provides that the appellate court shall, after perusing the record, hear the appellant or his pleader, if he appears. It will be noticed that Section 385 provides for a notice of the time and place of hearing of the appeal to be given to either the appellant or his pleader and not to both presumably because notice to the pleader was also considered sufficient since he was representing the appellant. So also Section 386 provides for a hearing to be given to the appellant or his lawyer, if he is present, and both need not be heard. It is the duty of the appellant and his lawyer to remain present on the appointed day, time and place when the appeal is posted for hearing. This is the requirement of the Code on a plain reading of Sections 385- 386 of the Code. The law does not enjoin that the court shall adjourn the case if both the appellant and his lawyer are absent. If the court does so as a matter of prudence or indulgence, it is a different matter, but it is not bound to adjourn the matter. It can dispose of the appeal after perusing the record and the judgment of the trial court. We would, however, hasten to add that if the accused is in jail and cannot, on his own, come to court, it would be advisable to adjourn the case and fix another date to facilitate the appearance of the accused/appellant if his lawyer is not present. If the lawyer is absent, and the court deems it appropriate to appoint a lawyer at State expense to assist it, there is nothing in the law to preclude it from doing so. We are, therefore, of the opinion and we say so with respect, that the Division Bench which decided Ram Naresh Yadav case ( AIR 1987 SC 1500 : 1987 Cri LJ 1856] did not apply the provisions of Sections 385-386 of the Code correctly when it indicated that the appellate court was under an obligation to adjourn the case to another date if the appellant or his lawyer remained absent.” 7. We may note here that the High Court relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Daya Shankar Singh which was based on Rule 8 of Chapter XII of the Patna High Court Rules which predicates that no appeal against conviction shall be heard for admission unless the accused has surrendered to the order of the Court below convicting him to a sentence of imprisonment except in a case where the appellant has been released on bail by the trial court after convicting him. In the case in hand, the appeal was already admitted on 29th October 2009. Therefore, the said rule, which applies to the pre-admission stage, was not applicable in this case.” 8. The anguish expressed by the Division Bench about the brazen action of the appellant of absconding and defeating the administration of justice can be well understood. However, that is no ground to dismiss an appeal against conviction, which was already admitted for final hearing, for non-prosecution without adverting to merits. Therefore, the impugned judgment will have to be set aside and the appeal will have to be remanded to the High Court for consideration on merits. 9. We may note that subsequently, the appellant was taken into custody and in fact an application for bail made in this appeal was heard and rejected on 14th May 2018. 10. Since the appeal before the High Court is of the year 2009, the same will have to be heard expeditiously. If the appeal could not be heard within a reasonable time, in that event, the appellant will have to be granted a liberty to apply for suspension of sentence. 11. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated 25th August 2015 is hereby set aside. Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.936 of 2009 is remanded to the High Court of Judicature at Patna for hearing in accordance with the law. 12. Considering the fact that the appeal against conviction under Section 302 of IPC is of the year 2009, necessary priority deserves to be given to the disposal of the appeal. We, therefore, request the High Court to ensure that appeal is disposed of as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from today.” 10. 12. Considering the fact that the appeal against conviction under Section 302 of IPC is of the year 2009, necessary priority deserves to be given to the disposal of the appeal. We, therefore, request the High Court to ensure that appeal is disposed of as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from today.” 10. In the background of the mandate of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in cases of Shyam Deo Pandey, Parasuram Patel, Bani Singh and Dhananjay Rai (supra), and the facts of instant case, this Court is of the considered view that the impugned order/judgment dated 09.03.2016 (Annexure P-2), passed by the ‘Appellate Court’ dismissing the appeal of the petitioner-appellant-convict, in default for want of prosecution without adverting to merits, despite the fact that the records of the learned Trial Court being available is unknown in law, due to which the petitioner has certainly been prejudiced and condemned unheard. In these circumstances, the Impugned Order certainly amounts to defeating the administration of justice, which needs to be interdicted by this Court. Accordingly, the Impugned Order dated 09.03.2016 [Annexure P-2], passed by the Appellate Court i.e. Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala is quashed and set-aside. However, the orders dated 22.12.2021 (Annexure P-3) passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, showing its inability to alter or recall or review, its order in view of Section 362 of Cr.P.C. needs no interference, at this stage, in view of the quashing of the Impugned Order dated 09.03.2016 (Annexure P-2), referred to above. 11. As a sequel to the quashing of order dated 09.03.2016 (Annexure P-2), this Court, remands the matter back to the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra [at Palampur] to proceed further in the matter, in accordance with law, expeditiously. 12. At this stage, learned counsels for the parties also submit that the parties are making efforts of amicable settlement. In case, the parties agree for amicable settlement, the Appellate Court below is requested to explore the possibility and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law within three months from today. 13. With the above observations, the petition stands disposed of. Let the parties appear before the First Appellate Court [Learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kangra, at Palampur, H.P.] on 26.03.2024.