ORDER : Pranav Trivedi, J. 1. The instant First Appeal has been filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act 1996”) challenging the judgment and order dated 11.09.2023 passed by the learned 4th Additional District Judge, Vadodara, Commercial Court (for short the “Commercial Court”) in Commercial Civil Misc. Application No. 76 of 2022, wherein the Commercial Court, rejected the application preferred by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act. 2. The facts resulting into filing of the First Appeal is that the appellant is a Board constituted under the provisions of the Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board Act, 1978 and is wholly owned and controlled by the State of Gujarat. The appellant issued tender for the work related to ‘Dabhoi Water Supply Scheme’. The respondent participated in the tender issued by the appellant. Pursuant thereto, the parties executed the agreement dated 01.11.2011 being Agreement No. B:2-74-2011/12 and B:2/75-2011/12 for a stipulated period of 12 months. The respondent also submitted bank guarantee of Rs.31,22,150/- as per the terms and conditions of the tender. 2.1. It is the case of the appellant that the respondent failed to carry out the contract works within the stipulated time as well as extended time. Consequently, the respondent issued notice of termination dated 15.07.2013. Therefore, the contract agreement came to be terminated by the appellant on 16.08.2013. Pursuant thereto, the respondent was also black-listed for a period of three years and the bank guarantee was ordered to be invoked. 2.2. Pursuant to the termination of the agreement and order of injunction of bank guarantee, the respondent preferred regular civil suit being Regular Civil Suit No. 455 of 2013 against the appellant, inter alia praying for setting aside the termination notice and permanent injunction restraining the appellant from encashing the bank guarantee. During the pendency of the suit, both the parties filed joint ‘purshis’ before the Commercial Court and on the basis of the joint settlement purshis, judgment and decree dated 23.11.2013 came to be passed. However, the settlement ‘purshis’ was not executable and enforceable, which resulted into the appellant again preferring suit before the Commercial Court being Regular Civil Suit No. 640 of 2014 inter alia praying for declaration and permanent injunction against the implementation of the said judgment and decree dated 23.11.2013. However, the settlement ‘purshis’ was not executable and enforceable, which resulted into the appellant again preferring suit before the Commercial Court being Regular Civil Suit No. 640 of 2014 inter alia praying for declaration and permanent injunction against the implementation of the said judgment and decree dated 23.11.2013. In Regular Civil Suit No. 640 of 2015, Exhibit-5 application was filed for interim injunction which came to be rejected, by way of order dated 30.08.2016. 2.3. Being aggrieved by the rejection of Exhibit-5 application, the appellant preferred appeal being Misc. Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2017 before the learned District Judge, Vadodara. During the course of hearing of the aforesaid appeal, second settlement agreement came to be executed and the court below referred all the issues to the Arbitrator. Upon consent of the parties, on the name of the Arbitrator, Regular Civil Suit No. 640 of 2014 as well as appeal Misc. Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2017 came to be withdrawn by the appellant. 2.4. Pursuant to the withdrawal of the suit as well as the appeal, the dispute was referred to the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator after hearing both the parties at length, passed an award dated 20.03.2018, partly allowing the claim of the respondent by directing the appellant to pay sum of Rs.65,58,939/- along with 8% interest from the date of termination of the contract till the date of payment. Aggrieved by the award dated 20.03.2018, the appellant preferred application under Section 34 of the Act, which came to be numbered as Commercial Civil Misc. Application No. 76 of 2022. The said Commercial Misc. Application came to be rejected by way of order dated 11.09.2023. It is this order dated 11.09.2023 is impugned in the present appeal. 3. The main ground of challenge urged by the learned counsel for the appellant was that there was grave error of the sole Arbitrator in overreaching the understanding reached between the parties in the ‘Joint Settlement Purshis’ in Regular Civil Suit No. 455 of 2013 and, therefore, the award was liable to be set aside. It was further observed that the reliefs which were claimed in the arbitration proceedings were not subject matter of challenge in Regular Civil Suit No. 455 of 2013. It was further observed that the reliefs which were claimed in the arbitration proceedings were not subject matter of challenge in Regular Civil Suit No. 455 of 2013. It was further submitted that the arbitrator had erred in holding that the appellant had not provided right of use for laying the pipe line by obtaining necessary permission from the railway. In the wake of such submission, the learned counsel for the appellant has prayed to allow the present appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996. 3.1. While minutely analyzing the contentions raised by the learned advocate for the appellant, it could be observed that main ground was that the “Joint Settlement Purshis” had envisaged about the settlement issue in the Civil Suit between the parties and the Arbitrator could not have gone beyond the joint settlement in the civil proceedings. This argument of learned advocate for the appellant is misconceived inasmuch as, pursuant to the settlement arrived at between the parties in the suit proceeding, there was decision to refer the proceedings to Arbitral Tribunal. Pursuant to such reference, statement of claim and written statement were filed and on the basis of the pleadings by the parties, the following were the issues to be adjudicated and decided :- “(1) was the respondent responsible to make available right of use of laying pipeline? If so, when the same was made available to the claimant? (2) Was off take point on main canal (from where pipeline was to lay) decide? When the claimant was intimated in this regard by the respondent so as to enable the claimant to procure actual length of pipe? (3) Was the respondent responsible to get all statutory permissions and clearance from concerned authorities? If so, when following permissions were obtained and intimated to the claimant? (a) Crossing of canal at Por branch canal and Miyagam branch canal and railway crossing permission at Bodeli-Dabhoi road. (b) Laying pipe line parallel to railway track between nods 9 to 10? if the same was not obtained, was any alternative route decided and intimated to the claimant? (4) Was it decided to lay 500 mm dia K.I. pipeline on pile foundation across the pond coming on alignment of pipe line? Was it in the scope of the claimant? If not, when the approval of extra item was accorded and intimated to the claimant? (4) Was it decided to lay 500 mm dia K.I. pipeline on pile foundation across the pond coming on alignment of pipe line? Was it in the scope of the claimant? If not, when the approval of extra item was accorded and intimated to the claimant? (5) (a) Were the above permissions/approvals required to execute tender item 1.1. i.e. completed item of providing, supplying, lowering and jointing pipeline? (b) In absence of above approvals, could the claimant execute the item in all respect? (c) If not and supplied pipes remained unlaid, up to what extent the claimant would have received payment against that item? Was the claimant informed in this regard at any time? (6) (a) Was the weightage of supply of pipe while deriving estimated rate of tender item? (b) Was the claimant informed at any time to make payment as per the weightage of supply of pipe if the same remains unlaid due to reasons attributable tot he respondents? (7) Whether the respondent has made a breach of conditions of the Contract? (8) Can the claimant terminate the contract under clause 16.2 (c)? (9) Is the respondent acted upon for making payment as per clause 16.4 on termination by the claimant?” 4. Therefore, pursuant to two round of litigation of filing suits, a settlement was arrived at between the parties. Subsequently, settlement by the joint purshis, the dispute was referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal had framed the issues to be adjudicated. When the issues were framed there was no objection from any of the parties with regard to any of the 9 issues that were framed. In such context, none of the parties had claim in First Appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act, 1996 and those issues were beyond the issue of earlier civil suit which was filed between the parties. The said aspect is thoroughly misconceived and required to be rejected at the threshold. Resultantly, we do not accept the submissions of the learned advocate for the appellant that the issues framed in the Arbitral Tribunal were beyond the scope of suit proceedings. 5. Another issue which has been raised by the learned advocate for the appellant is that the Tribunal had erred in holding that the appellant had not provided right of use of laying pipeline and necessary permission was not obtained for the same. 5. Another issue which has been raised by the learned advocate for the appellant is that the Tribunal had erred in holding that the appellant had not provided right of use of laying pipeline and necessary permission was not obtained for the same. Hence, Issue No. 5 was framed, which is reproduced hereunder : “(5) [a] Were the above permissions/approvals required to execute tender item 1.1. i.e. completed item of providing, supplying, lowering and jointing pipeline? [b] In absence of above approvals, could the claimant execute the item in all respect? [c] If not and supplied pipes remained unlaid, up to what extent the claimant would have received payment against that item? Was the claimant informed in this regard at any time? 6. In view of the above, the Tribunal had categorically observed that in absence of any permission, if the claimant could have procured D.I. pipes, the pipeline would have remained unlaid against item no. 1. for completed items, for which the respondent would have paid 75% payment of item rates as per the tender conditions. Resultantly, the Tribunal came to the finding on Issue no. 5 which is reads as under : “Issue No. 5 – In absence of above permissions, if the claimant could have procured the D.I. pipes, the pipe line would have remained unlaid against the item no. 1 for completed items, for which respondent would have paid 75% item rates as per tender condition.” 7. The Arbitral Tribunal had proceeded to examine the issue on merits and decided that the claimant could not work till the completion of the time limit and compelled to issue notice for termination as per clause 16.2 of the Contract. Therefore, time was essence of the contract and in view of want of necessary permission by the appellant, the respondent was unable to complete the work in time limit. Resultantly, we do not find any patent error in the conclusion drawn by the Arbitrator on the claim as envisaged by the learned advocate for the appellant or any other claims that were before the Arbitral Tribunal. As noted herein-above, no error, much less patent error could be pointed out in the findings returned by the Arbitral Tribunal. 8. Resultantly, we do not find any patent error in the conclusion drawn by the Arbitrator on the claim as envisaged by the learned advocate for the appellant or any other claims that were before the Arbitral Tribunal. As noted herein-above, no error, much less patent error could be pointed out in the findings returned by the Arbitral Tribunal. 8. Having gone through the order passed the Commercial Court, the reasons given therein and on appreciation of the findings led by the parties, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the award noticing the scope of interference under Section 37 of the Act. 9. We may note the decision of the Apex Court in UHL Power Company Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in [ (2022) 4 SCC 116 ], wherein the Apex Court has held that the jurisdiction conferred on the Courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrower, when it comes to the scope of exercise of powers under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. Noticing its earlier decision in MMTC Ltd. vs. Vedanta Ltd., reported in [ (2019) 4 SCC 163 ], it was noticed that the reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction on the Courts in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, have been explained therein in para ‘11’ as under :- “11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2) (b) (ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury reasonableness. Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.” 28. By referring to various decisions of the Apex Court, it was noticed from para Nos. ‘18’ to ‘21’in UHL Power Company Limited (supra) that it has been held time and again by the Apex Court that if there are two plausible interpretations of the terms and conditions of the contract, then no fault can be found, if the Arbitrator proceeds to accept one interpretation as against the others. The construction of the terms of contract is primarily is for an Arbitrator to decide unless the Arbitrator construes the contract in such a way that it could be said to be something that no fair-minded or reasonable person could do. It was further noted that when the Court is applying “ ’public policy test’ to the arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequentially, errors on facts cannot be corrected”. A possible view by the learned Arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass muster as the Arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quality and quantity of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. Thus, the award based on little evidence or on evidence which does not measure up in quantity to a trained legal, would not be held to be involved on this score. 29. The requirement is that the Arbitral Tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if the test is that arbitral tribunal must decide in accordance with the terms of the contract, but if term of the contract is construed in reasonable manner within the award ought not to be set aside on the ground of unreasonableness only. It was further noticed in paragraph Nos. 20 and 21 as under :- “20. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. (supra), the view taken above has been reiterated in the following words: “25. It was further noticed in paragraph Nos. 20 and 21 as under :- “20. In Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. (supra), the view taken above has been reiterated in the following words: “25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the courts should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.” 21. An identical line of reasoning has been adopted in South East Asia Marine Engg. & Constructions Ltd.[SEAMAC Limited] V. Oil India Ltd. and it has been held as follows: “12. It is a settled position that a court can set aside the award only on the grounds as provided in the Arbitration Act as interpreted by the courts. Recently, this Court in Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1656 laid down the scope of such interference. This Court observed as follows : (SCC pp. 11-12, para 24) 24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various Courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the Court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the Courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.” 13. It is also settled law that where two views are possible, the Court cannot interfere in the plausible view taken by the arbitrator supported by reasoning. If the Courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated.” 13. It is also settled law that where two views are possible, the Court cannot interfere in the plausible view taken by the arbitrator supported by reasoning. This Court in Dyna Technologies (2019) 20 SCC 1 : 2019 observed as under : “25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the Court should not interfere with an award merely because an alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The Courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.” [emphasis supplied]” 10. In MMTC Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court on the scope of interference with an order made under Section 34, as per section 37, has held that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. The relevant para 14 in MMTC Ltd. (supra) be noted :- “As far as interference with an order made under Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In other words, the Court cannot undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the Court under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the Court under Section 34 and by the Court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.” 11. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the Court under Section 34 and by the Court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such concurrent findings.” 11. In Project Director, National Highways No. 45E and 220 National Highways Authority of India vs. M. Hakeem and Another reported in [ (2021) 9 SCC 1 ], the Apex Court while considering the question of scope of the powers of the Courts under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 to set aside the award of the Arbitrator including the power to modify such award, considered its earlier decision in MMTC (supra) to record that it is settled that the Section 34 proceedings does not contain any challenge on the merits of the award. It was held that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 vary from being in the nature of appellate provisions. It provides only for setting aside the awards only on very limited grounds, as contained in Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 34. The recourse to the Court against arbitral award may be made only by application for setting aside such award in accordance with Sub-sections (2) and (3). It was observed that Section 34 of the Act, 1996 is modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985, under which no power to modify the award is given to the Court hearing a challenge to an award. Statutory scheme under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 is in keeping with the UNCITRAL Model Law and legislative policy of minimal judicial interference in arbitral awards. Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in McDermott International Inc. vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. reported in [ (2006) 11 SCC 181 ], it was noticed that 1996 Act makes provisions for supervisory role of the Courts in the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness. Interference of the Courts is envisaged in few circumstances only, like in case of fraud or bias of the Arbitrator, violation of principles of natural justice etc.. The Courts cannot correct the terms of the Arbitrator. It can only quash the awards leaving the parties to begin with the arbitration again, if it so desires. Interference of the Courts is envisaged in few circumstances only, like in case of fraud or bias of the Arbitrator, violation of principles of natural justice etc.. The Courts cannot correct the terms of the Arbitrator. It can only quash the awards leaving the parties to begin with the arbitration again, if it so desires. The scheme of the provisions, namely Sections 34 and 37 of the Act, 1996, thus, aims at keeping supervising role of the Courts at minimum level and this can be justified, as the parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer expeditious and finality over by it. It was, thus, held that there can be no doubt that given the law laid down by the Apex Court, Section 34 of the 1996 Act cannot be held to include within it a power to modify the award. 12. Considering the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of scope of interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Act, 1996, as noted herein-before, it is not possible for us to draw alternative view to interfere in the award passed by the learned Arbitrator on the arguments made by the learned counsel for the appellant. There is hardly any ground for us to interfere with the arbitral award in the given facts and circumstances of the instant case. 13. In the aforesaid view, the challenge to the arbitral award as also to the orders passed by the Court under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 is found devoid of merits. The appeal stands, accordingly, dismissed. Consequently, the connected Civil Application for stay also stands disposed of.