JUDGMENT : K. RAJASEKAR, J. PRAYER: Writ Appeal filed under Section 15 of Letters Patent Act, praying to set aside the order dated 08.02.2018 of this Court made in W.P.(MD).No. 7459 of 2012 on its file, allowing the said Writ Petition. 1. This intra-Court appeal has been filed against the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(MD).No.7459 of 2012 dated 08.02.2018. 2. The appellant has filed a Writ Petition challenging the official memorandum dated 24.05.2012 issued by the District and Sessions Judge, Kanyakumari District, wherein, applications were called for from the eligible Advocates for appointment of Official Receiver for Kanyakumari District. 3. The appellant was initially appointed as Part-time Official Receiver in October 2008 and his term for Office was three years. On 12.09.2011, he submitted an application for declaration of his probation for a total period of three years and for continuation of a further term of three years from 31.10.2011 to 31.10.2014. This letter was forwarded by the learned District and Sessions Judge to the Registrar (Administration), Madurai Bench of Madras High Court for the purpose of submitting it to the Government of Tamil Nadu. After receiving the application, the Government, instead of accepting his request, has directed the Registrar (Administration), Madurai Bench of Madras High Court to send a fresh panel of Advocates for appointment as Official Receiver in Kanyakumari District. Based on the letter of the Government, the impugned proceedings were initiated by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Kanyakumari. Aggrieved over the impugned proceedings, the appellant sought the relief of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the same and consequently directing the respondents to order continuation of the appellant's term of Office as Official Receiver for three years. 4. The learned Single Judge of this Court after considering the prayer and the submissions of the parties, has observed in paragraph 4 of the order as follows: “4.The rules relating to appointment of Official Receiver also provides that renewal is prerogative of the Government. The renewal shall be granted by the Government on examination of the particular case. Thus, the renewal can never be claimed as a matter of right. Admittedly, the initial appointment of the writ petitioner is part time receiver, thereafter, the period of 3 years also came to an end on 30.10.2011. The renewal shall be granted by the Government on examination of the particular case. Thus, the renewal can never be claimed as a matter of right. Admittedly, the initial appointment of the writ petitioner is part time receiver, thereafter, the period of 3 years also came to an end on 30.10.2011. This apart, the official memorandum inviting applications from the eligible Advocates cannot be questioned, once the term of the petitioner expired. It is left open to the competent authorities to continue the process for selection to the post of Official Receiver in accordance with law. The writ petitioner has not established any legal right so as to interfere with the official memorandum issued by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Kanyakumari District in proceedings dated 24.05.2012. 5. Thus, the writ petitioner has not established any legal right so as to grant the relief as such sought for in this writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. ” 5. Aggrieved over the dismissal of the above Writ Petition, this Writ Appeal has been filed by the appellant. 6. Mr.K.N.Thampi, learned counsel for the appellant submits that as per the scheme of appointment of the Official Receiver, when a person is appointed as Official Receiver, once the probation of three years is completed, he shall be permitted to hold the office till he reaches the age of 60 years. He relied on the Government Order issued in G.O.Ms.No.509 Home (Courts.V) Department dated 01.04.1997, wherein, the Government of Tamil Nadu has issued the Conditions of Service and its Rules, to substantiate his case. According to him, once the probation period of three years is completed, the service of the person appointed could not be terminated unless the Government issues one month prior notice or if the Government is of the view that there is a need for calling for fresh panel for such appointment. But, in the impugned proceedings, no such reasons were stated and the Government letter dated 20.03.2012 is also silent about the requirement of calling fresh panel. Hence, the learned counsel prays to the set aside the impugned proceedings and permit the appellant to continue in service. 7. But, in the impugned proceedings, no such reasons were stated and the Government letter dated 20.03.2012 is also silent about the requirement of calling fresh panel. Hence, the learned counsel prays to the set aside the impugned proceedings and permit the appellant to continue in service. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the appellant has already completed first three years of his period and thereafter, he has sought for extension of another three years and it has not been accepted by the Government. The Government in its discretion has called for fresh panel. As per G.O.Ms.No.509 Home (Courts.V) Department dated 01.04.1997, the Government is empowered to terminate the services of the appellant on administrative grounds without assigning any specific reasons. Since the service is only a part time service, the Government has decided to call for fresh panel to give opportunity to eligible Advocates and by obtaining the interim orders, the appellant is already holding the post from the year 2008 onwards. Hence, there is no merit in this appeal and prays for dismissal of the appeal. 8. We have considered the submissions made on both sides and perused the records. 9. The Conditions of Service of the Part-time Official Receiver is covered by the Rules issued as per G.O.Ms.No.509 Home (Courts.V) Department dated 01.04.1997. The relevant Rules read as follows: “1. Short title and application: These rules may be called the Part-time Official Receiver (Conditions of Service) Rules and these rules shall come into force from the date of issue of order. 2. Appointment: The District Judge shall send the entire panel of Advocates who were considered by him for appointment to the High Court. The High Court shall in turn forward the entire panel to the Government with its recommendation. Government will take a final decision on merits. 4. Age limit for recruitment: The minimum age will be 35 years and the maximum age of 50 years. 5. Probation and continuance of term of Office: Every person appointed as Part-time Official Receiver shall be initially appointed for a period of three years and the continuance of the term of Office for a further period of three years shall be ordered by the Government on the recommendation of the Judges of the High Court in consultation with the District Judges concerned. The continuance of the term shall not normally be ordered beyond the date on which a Part-time Official Receiver attains the age of sixty years, and his services will unless the Government specifically order otherwise, terminate authomatically on his attaining the age of sixty years. Provided that Government may terminate any Part-time Official Receiver on administrative grounds without assigning specific reasons therefor at any time with one month's notice and the incumbent may also resign his post after giving one month's notice to Government. Provided that the Government may call for fresh panel from the High Court for such appointment if need be and appoint one from such panel received from the High Court.” 10. On plain reading of Rule 5, even though it is titled as 'Probation and continuance of term of Office', it makes it clear that every person appointed as Official Receiver is initially appointed for a period of three years. The continuation of term of Office for further period of three years shall also be ordered by the Government on the recommendation of the High Court in consultation with the District Judges concerned. This continuation of the additional period of three years shall not normally be ordered beyond the date on which the Part-time Official Receiver attains the age of 60 years. His services will unless the Government specifically order otherwise, will terminate automatically at the age of 60 years. Apart from Rule 5, no other rules deal with continuation of term of Office beyond the second term of three years. The construction of Rule 5 shall be workable and further the purpose for which the rule is instituted. 11. There are two provisos to Rule 5. (i) The first proviso entitles the Government to terminate any Part-time Official Receiver on administrative grounds without assigning any specific reasons at any time with one month notice and the incumbent may also resign his post after giving one month notice to the Government. (ii) The second proviso empowers the Government to call for fresh panel from the High Court for such appointment if need be and appoint one from such panel. These provisos could not be read in isolation. While constructing the proviso, it is well settled principle of interpretation that the Court should give the proviso a restricted meaning so as to protect it within the ambit of the rule itself. 12. These provisos could not be read in isolation. While constructing the proviso, it is well settled principle of interpretation that the Court should give the proviso a restricted meaning so as to protect it within the ambit of the rule itself. 12. The rule reiterating to interpretation of the proviso was considered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dwarka Prasad Vs. Dwarka Das Saraf reported in (1976) 1 SCC 128 , in paragraph 18, which reads as follows: ''18. We may mention in fairness to Counsel that the following, among other decisions, were cited at the Bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes: CIT v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd, [ AIR 1959 SC 713 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 256, 266 : (1959) 36 ITR 1 ] ; Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. CST [ AIR 1955 SC 765 : (1955) 2 SCR 483 , 493 : (1955) 6 STC 627 ] ; Thompson v. Dibdin [(1912) AC 533, 541 : 81 LJKB 918 : 28 TLR 490] ; Rex v. Dibdin [1910 Pro Div 57, 119, 125] and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1959 SC 1012 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 875, 893 : 1959 Cri LJ 1231] . The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject-matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. “Words are dependent on the principal enacting words to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context” (Thompson v. Dibdin, 1912 AC 533). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject-matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction. “The proper course is to apply the broad general Rule of construction which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light if need be on the rest. The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpretation and meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause, saving clause, and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail. (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 162)” '' 13. The three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India v. National Federation of the Blind, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 772 , has considered the law of interpretation of “Headings” of Section or Rule and held as follows: ''44. It is settled law that while interpreting any provision of a statute the plain meaning has to be given effect and if the language therein is simple and unambiguous, there is no need to traverse beyond the same. Likewise, if the language of the relevant section gives a simple meaning and message, it should be interpreted in such a way and there is no need to give any weightage to headings of those paragraphs. This aspect has been clarified in Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT [ (2004) 9 SCC 686 ]. Para 13 of the said judgment is relevant which reads as under : “13. It is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. ‘Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid’, Judge Learned Hand said, ‘but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.” 45. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. ‘Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid’, Judge Learned Hand said, ‘but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.” 45. It is clear that when the provision is plainly worded and unambiguous, it has to be interpreted in such a way that the court must avoid the danger of a prior determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somehow fitted. While interpreting the provisions, the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. It is the function of the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary.'' 14. The heading of the Rule 5 reads as 'Probation and Continuance of term of Office'. Nowhere in the Rule 5 or later part of the Rules, as stated earlier, the retiring age of the Official Receiver has been given. The learned counsel for the appellant attempted to convince this Court to accept his contention that since Rule 5 contains the clause that the services of the Official Receiver shall be terminated automatically on his attaining the age of 60 years, it would only mean that the Official Receiver once appointed, he can continue his term of Office till the age of 60 years. 15. We are unable to accept this contention since Rule 5 only reads about the appointment. The proviso to appointment empowers the Government under what circumstances, the person can be removed from service and the power of the Government to call for fresh panel for appointment if need be. The words contained in Rule 5 that the 'continuance of the term' only mean that the extension of the term of Office for the second term. It does not mean the continuation of term of Office indefinitely till the Official Receiver attains the age of 60 years. 16. This Court has also observed in the Writ Petition filed by the appellant that he has only sought for additional term of three years after declaring his first term of three years as a successful probation period. It does not mean the continuation of term of Office indefinitely till the Official Receiver attains the age of 60 years. 16. This Court has also observed in the Writ Petition filed by the appellant that he has only sought for additional term of three years after declaring his first term of three years as a successful probation period. He has not asked for continuation of the term of Office till the age of 60 years, even if he applied, there is no Rule permitting the Government to continue the term of Office beyond the term of three years at the time of extension of the first time. Hence, the claim of the appellant is based on misconceived interpretation of Rule 5. 17. The purposeful interpretation of Rule without ambiguity makes it clear that the person who is eligible to be appointed as Official Receiver shall be initially appointed for the first term of three years and it shall be treated as a probation period and if he has succeeded the same with satisfaction of the Government/appointing authority, he shall be entitled for another term of three years. If the appointee, while holding another term of Office for three years, attains the age of 60 years, his services automatically shall be terminated. Apart from the Rule, the proviso empowers the Government to terminate the services of the appointee at any time without assigning reasons, but by serving one month notice and it also empowers the appointee to resign the Office by giving one month notice. The second proviso empowers the Government to call for fresh panel for appointment if need be. Such being the case, the appellant can only claim for second term of Office for another three years, for which, he has already made application and that period is over in the interregnum period, that too, before the Writ Petition was taken up for final hearing. 18. It is also submitted by the appellant that some of the former Official Receivers, who have been appointed prior to the appellant, were allowed to continue their term of Office till the age of 60 years. 18. It is also submitted by the appellant that some of the former Official Receivers, who have been appointed prior to the appellant, were allowed to continue their term of Office till the age of 60 years. A careful perusal of the above orders clearly reveals that the term of Office of the former Official Receiver, namely, Kanagasabai was extended for only three years period and he shall not continue to hold Office, if he attains the age of 60 years within that period. Hence, this contention is also liable to be rejected. 19. Further, on careful scrutiny of the pleadings and the prayer made in the Writ Petition, it only shows that the appellant herein has sought for quashing the official memorandum calling for fresh panel for selection of the Official Receiver by the learned District and Sessions Judge and also the letter of the Government and consequently prayed for continuation of the appellant's term of Office as Official Receiver for three years from the date of order in the Writ Petition. Nowhere, he prayed for continuation of the term of Office till he attains the age of 60 years. After filing the Writ Petition, the appellant was able to continue in service till the disposal of the Writ Petition on 08.02.2018. After dismissal of the Writ Petition, he filed an appeal and even during the pendency of this appeal, he still continues to hold Office as Official Receiver, whereby, from the year 2008 till today, the appellant continues his term of Office, which, in our considered view, is not valid and the appellant has no locus to continue in service after completion of the first term and even if his prayer in the Writ Petition is allowed, his continuation of the term of Office would have been completed as early as 2021. By filing this proceedings, he was successfully able to continue without any prayer to that effect. Hence, we are of the view that the appellant's continuation in service is to be terminated immediately. 20. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal stands dismissed and the learned District and Sessions Judge, Kanyakumari is directed to take steps to call for fresh panel and to appoint an eligible person in this post. There shall be no order as to costs.