JUDGMENT : RAVI NATH TILHARI, J. 1. Heard Sri Darsi Bala Raju, learned Counsel for the appellant and Sri V. Ch. Naidu, learned Counsel for the respondents. 2. This appeal under Section 82(2) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (in short ESI Act) has been filed by M/s. Sai Raghavendra Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd., challenging the order dated 23.01.2007 passed in ESI.No.20 of 1999 by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Guntur (in short 'PO'). 3. By the order dated 23.01.2007 the petition of the appellant was dismissed and the notices issued by the respondents dated 28.06.1997 and 01.09.1997 were held legal and valid. The appellant was held liable to pay ESI Contribution for 11 workers. 4. The appellant filed ESI No.20 of 1999, under Section 75 of ESI Act, seeking declaration that the letters of intimation of coverage dated 28.06.1997 and 01.09.1997 were illegal and invalid and prayed to set aside those letters/notices. 5. The case of the appellant was that the appellant's unit started functioning from March, 1997. It was registered under the provisions of the Factories Act. The appellant was doing business in storage of chillies and other commodities in cold storage. He always employed less than 5 workers. Consequently the appellant's unit was not liable for coverage under the Provisions of ESI Act and the demand of contributions made under the notices was not valid in the eye of law. 6. The respondents filed counter-affidavit and inter-alia submitted that the appellant employed 14 persons since 01.03.1997. He was also using power, which was generated mechanically, running with electrical connection. The appellant was amenable for coverage under Section 2(12) of ESI Act with effect from 01.03.1997. Consequently, after following the due process, coverage was intimated calling upon the appellant to pay ESI contribution. 7. The Labour Court framed the following issues : "1. Whether the petitioner employed less than 5 workers or 14 workers in his unit? 2. Whether the petitioner is liable to pay ESI contributions?" 8. The Labour Court recorded the finding on Issue No.1 that the appellant employed 11 workers for wages observing that if 3 mutta coolies were excluded from the number 14 referred in Registration Form-01, the number of workers working for wages would come to 11. The unit was being run with the aid of power. The Labour Court recorded the finding on Issue No.1 that the appellant employed 11 workers for wages observing that if 3 mutta coolies were excluded from the number 14 referred in Registration Form-01, the number of workers working for wages would come to 11. The unit was being run with the aid of power. On Issue No.2 the Labour Court held that the notices issued to the appellant were legal and valid. He was liable to pay contribution for 11 workers. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant raised the following submissions : (i) The appellant is a cold storage. It is not manufacturing but only preserving chillies and other items. The ESI Act is not applicable. (ii) The appellant's case was that he employed not more than 5 employees. Consequently, the ESI Act will not apply. The finding of Labour Court that there were 11 employees on wage is based on no evidence and is perverse. He submitted that the particulars i.e., the names, the amount of wages if any etc., of the workers was not mentioned in the report. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance in M/s. Natraj Cinema v. The Deputy Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, 2017 LLR 854, in support of his contentions. 11. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant is covered under Section 2(12) of ESI Act. He submitted that the finding that there were 11 workers on wages is based on evidence Ex.R2. He further submitted that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance in Royal Talkies v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1978) 4 SCC 204 and Rajakamal Transport v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1996) 9 SCC 644 , in support of his contentions. 13. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 14. The appeal was admitted on 28.09.2007. Interim stay was granted in appeal on the condition of depositing half of the awarded amount. 15. 13. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 14. The appeal was admitted on 28.09.2007. Interim stay was granted in appeal on the condition of depositing half of the awarded amount. 15. The substantial question of law as framed in Para No.9 of the memo of appeal, are as under : (i) Whether the Visit Note (Ex.R2) of Inspector of the 1st respondent without containing details like name, father's name, designation, length of service and signature/thumb impression of such employees and signatures of witnesses is having more evidentiary value over the Attendance Registers and Wage Registers (Exs.P3 to P4) which were maintained under the provisions of Minimum Wages Act and certified by the Authorities under the said Act? (ii) whether the appellant is liable to pay ESI contributions though the Mutta Coolies were engaged by the Agents/Farmers and not under the control of the appellant? (iii) Whether the Court below justified in coming to a conclusion that the order passed under Section 45-A of ESI Act is valid even without service of said order on the appellant? 16. The submissions as advanced, are with respect to substantial question of law - (i) above. No submission was advanced on ii & iii. Consequently, we shall consider the substantial question of law - (i) in the light of the submissions advanced. 17. We would however also consider the argument raised that ESI Act was not applicable, the appellant being 'cold storage' to decide if any such substantial question of law is also involved or not. 18. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that there is no manufacturing process in the cold storage which only preserves the chillies and is not covered under the expression 'factory' under Section 2(21) of ESI Act. 19. Section 1 of ESI Act provides for the applicability of the Act. Sub-section (4), provides that it shall apply, in the first instance, to all factories (including factories belonging to the Government) other than seasonal factories. Section 1(4) of ESI Act reads as under : "1. 19. Section 1 of ESI Act provides for the applicability of the Act. Sub-section (4), provides that it shall apply, in the first instance, to all factories (including factories belonging to the Government) other than seasonal factories. Section 1(4) of ESI Act reads as under : "1. Short Title, Extent, Commencement and Application.-(4) It shall apply, in the first instance, to all factories (including factories belonging to the Government) other than seasonal factories : [Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to a factory or establishment belonging to or under the control of the Government whose employees are otherwise in receipt of benefits substantially similar or superior to the benefits provided under this Act.]" 20. The expression 'Factory' has been defined in Section 2(12) of ESI Act as under : "(12). "factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof whereon ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952) or a railway running shed". 21. The factory as defined under Section 2(12) uses the expression 'manufacturing process', upon which much emphasis was laid to argue that there was no manufacturing process in the cold storage but there was only preservation of chillies. 22. 'Manufacturing process' has also been defined under Section 2(14-AA) of E.S.I. Act as under : "14-AA. Manufacturing process shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948)" 23. The 'manufacturing process' thus has been defined to mean the same meaning as assigned in the Factories Act. 24. 22. 'Manufacturing process' has also been defined under Section 2(14-AA) of E.S.I. Act as under : "14-AA. Manufacturing process shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948)" 23. The 'manufacturing process' thus has been defined to mean the same meaning as assigned in the Factories Act. 24. The Factories Act, 1948 defines 'manufacturing process' under Section 2(K) which reads as under : "2(K) manufacturing process" means any process for- (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal; or (ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or (iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding; or (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; or (vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage." 25. A joint reading of Sections 1(4), 2(12) and 2(14-AA) of ESI Act and Section 2(K) of the Factories Act, makes it evident that the 'cold storages' are covered under the expression 'manufacturing process', and so would be covered under the expansion 'factory'. On the ground that the cold storages only preserve or store, it cannot be said that in cold storages there is no manufacturing process in view of the above definitions. 26. In Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Jalandhar Gymkhana Club, 1992 SCC OnLine P&H 363, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has observed that, "(6) The sole test to decide whether any premises is a factory under the Act, therefore, depends on the finding whether any manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on in the premises including the precincts thereof whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months. Admittedly, the Club is having a kitchen from which place the catering services are rendered to its members. From this kitchen, drinks hot and cold and certain items of food are prepared which are served by it to its members or their guests. The question then arises as to whether any manufacturing process is being carried out in the kitchen. Admittedly, the Club is having a kitchen from which place the catering services are rendered to its members. From this kitchen, drinks hot and cold and certain items of food are prepared which are served by it to its members or their guests. The question then arises as to whether any manufacturing process is being carried out in the kitchen. Sub-clauses (i) and (vi) of Section 2(k) of the Factories Act defines manufacturing process, which has been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment. A perusal of these two sub-clauses would make it clear that preparation of the items which are prepared in the kitchen and the preservation and storing of any articles in the cold storage would be a manufacturing process..." 27. The aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant does not raise any substantial question of law. 28. Coming to the 2nd submission, the Labour Court on consideration of the evidence on record, recorded finding that, there were 11 workers on wages. It considered Form-01. Form-01 was submitted by the appellant through its Manager and it showed that there were 14 workers employed for wages. This document is signed by the appellant. Therefore, there was an admission of the appellant with respect to the number of the workers working with the appellant. The admission is the best evidence is well settled in law. 29. In Raja Gounder and others v. M. Sengodan and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 55, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that, "17. Admission is a conscious and deliberate act and not something that could be inferred. An admission could be a positive act of acknowledgement or confession. To constitute an admission, one of the requirements is a voluntary acknowledgement through a statement of the existence of certain facts during the judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, which conclude as true or valid the allegations made in the proceedings or in the notice. The formal act of acknowledgement during the proceedings waives or dispenses with the production of evidence by the contesting party. The admission concedes, for the purpose of litigation, the proposition of fact claimed by the opponents as true. An admission is also the best evidence the opposite party can rely upon, and though inconclusive, is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous by the other side." 30. The admission concedes, for the purpose of litigation, the proposition of fact claimed by the opponents as true. An admission is also the best evidence the opposite party can rely upon, and though inconclusive, is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous by the other side." 30. In N. Prateep Kumar v. M. Jagadeesh Chandra Prasad, 2022 SCC OnLine AP 1019, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed that : "28. Admissions are of two types, one is judicial admission and another is evidentiary admission. Admissions are not conclusive proof, but the admissions estop the person who made such admission to contend otherwise. When a judicial admission is made in the pleadings or in any document regarding a particular fact in issue, such fact need not be proved by adducing evidence in view of Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is settled law that admission is the best piece of evidence. The Supreme Court, in Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramachandra Nago Patil, (1977) 2 SCC 49 , held : "Admission is the best piece of substantive evidence that an opposite party can rely upon, though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. Admission may in certain circumstances, operate as an estoppel. The question which is needed to be considered is what weight is to be attached to an admission and for that purpose it is necessary to find out as to whether it is clear, unambiguous and a relevant piece of evidence, and further it is proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act. It would be appropriate that an opportunity is given to the person under cross-examination to tender his explanation and clear the point on the question of admission." In view of the above, the law on the admissions can be summarised to the effect that admission made by a party though not conclusive, is a decisive factor in a case unless the other party successfully withdraws the same or proves it to be erroneous. Even if the admission is not conclusive it may operate as an estoppel. Law requires that an opportunity be given to the person who has made admission under cross-examination to tender his explanation and clarify, the point on the question of admission. Even if the admission is not conclusive it may operate as an estoppel. Law requires that an opportunity be given to the person who has made admission under cross-examination to tender his explanation and clarify, the point on the question of admission. Failure of a party to prove its defence does not amount to admission, nor it can reverse or discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff." 29. In another decision Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 , the Supreme Court held : "Admission made by a party is admissible and best evidence, unless it is proved that it had been made under a mistaken belief. While deciding the said case reliance has been placed upon the judgment in Slatterie v. Pooley, (1840) 6 M&W 664, wherein it had been observed "What a party himself admits to be true, may reasonably be presumed to be so." 30. In Union of India (UOI) v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148 , the Supreme Court observed that admission are the best piece of evidence and can be relied on by the Courts in deciding any issue. In Amba Lal v. Union of Indias, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that for a decision to be based on admission, it must be in writing; and the admission is more satisfactory if a body entrusted with statutory functions takes necessary precautions when its decision is mainly to depend upon such admission." 31. The appellant did not produce the attendance register and the wage register before the Labour Court, which were inspected by the ESI Inspector, at the time of his visit and he had signed the same. The appellant, failed to prove that the admission made in Form-01 was erroneous. Such an admission was clear, unambiguous and relevant piece of evidence and has been rightly relied upon. 32. Further, the finding is that there were 11 workers for wages. The Labour Court already excluded 3 Mutta Coolies from total number (14). 33. In M/s. Natraj Cinema's case (supra), it was held that the employment of 2 persons on the establishment could not be proved and there was no basis in the report of the Inspector that those 2 employees were paid monthly wages. That was a case where there was no evidence to prove the number of employees being more than 20. In M/s. Natraj Cinema's case (supra), it was held that the employment of 2 persons on the establishment could not be proved and there was no basis in the report of the Inspector that those 2 employees were paid monthly wages. That was a case where there was no evidence to prove the number of employees being more than 20. In the present case there was evidence as discussed in the order of the Labour Court, including the best evidence, the admission of the appellant. It is not a case of no evidence to prove number of employees. M/s. Natraj Cinema's case (supra), is therefore of no help to the appellant. 34. In Rajakamal Transport's case (supra), upon which the learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the loading and unloading of the work was done under the directions and control of the establishment. What was important was that hamalis worked in connection with the work of the establishment. In the present case, the respondents have not challenged the order of the Labour Court. The Labour Court already excluded 3 hamalis from the total number of employees/workers. Even after the exclusion of 3 hamalis, there are 11 workers. Consequently, even after the hamalis are excluded. The ESI Act is applicable. 35. In Royal Talkies's case (supra), upon which learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance, it has been held that a cinema theatre is an 'establishment' and that the theatre owners, are principal employers, being persons responsible for the supervision and control of the establishment. Admittedly, the canteens and cycle stands were within the theatre premises. We have already held that ESI Act is applicable for the reasons assigned in this judgment. 36. The finding of number of workers on wages in the factory is a finding on fact which is based on evidence. It cannot be said that the finding suffers from any perversity. Matter is concluded by finding of fact. 37. The appeal under Section 82 of ESI Act lies on substantial question of law, only. 38. Section 82(2) of the E.S.I. Act, reads as under : 82. Appeal.-(1) Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court. Matter is concluded by finding of fact. 37. The appeal under Section 82 of ESI Act lies on substantial question of law, only. 38. Section 82(2) of the E.S.I. Act, reads as under : 82. Appeal.-(1) Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court. (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law. (3) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (4) The provisions of Sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall apply to appeals under this section. 39. Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) which provides for the second appeal, also uses 'expression' 'Substantial question of law'. This expression has recently been considered in Chandrabhan (Deceased) through LRs. and others v. Saraswati and others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1273. In the context of a finding of fact, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under : "33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus : (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognised exceptions are where (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no evidence", it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding." 40. In the present case the finding of the Lower Court on fact does not suffer from any of the infirmities that can be covered under the Exceptions (i) to (iii) in Para 33(iii) of Chandrabhan's case (supra). Therefore, it is not open to be interfered in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 82 of the ESI Act. 41. The civil miscellaneous appeal is devoid of merits and is dismissed. 42. No order as to costs. 43. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall also stand dismissed.