ORDER : Bhargav D. Karia, J. 1. In all these three appeals under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, Appellant – Revenue has proposed the following substantial questions of law arising from the Judgment and Order passed by the Tribunal in ITA No.2387/Ahd/2014, ITA No.2403/Ahd/2016 and ITA No.2755/AHD/2015 respectively. “Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Hon’ble Tribunal was justified in comfirming the deletion of addition made in respect of corpus donations which the assessee trust has collected the fees under the guise of donations and treating it as an exempt u/s.11(1)(d) of the Act?” 2. As the facts are identical in all the cases, the same are not narrated. 3. At the outset, learned advocate Ms.Maithili Mehta appearing for the appellant – revenue and learned senior advocate Mr.M.R. Bhatt with learned advocate Ms.Pancham Jhala appearing for the respondent – assessee submitted that the issue proposed by the Appellant – Revenue and admitted by this Court in all these Tax Appeals is no more res integra in view of the decision in case of the respondent – assessee, as similar issue is decided in favour of the assessee in Tax Appeal No.89 of 2024 as under:- “7. The issue raised in this appeal are no more res-integra in view of the decision of this Court rendered in Tax Appeal No.356 of 2012 in the case of the appellant wherein, after considering similar facts and the provisions of the Sections 11 to 13, this Court has held as under : “22 The concurrent finding of fact, as recorded by the CIT(A) and the Appellate Tribunal, is that the amount paid by the parents of the students admitted to the assessee's – educational institution was towards the corpus donation account and the same was not collected by way of capitation fee. If it is the case of the Revenue that the amounts paid by the parents of the students admitted to the assessee's – educational institution was not towards the corpus donation account, but it was collected only by way of capitation fee and such amount of capitation fee is not exempted in the hands of the assessee institution, then the assessing authority ought to have taken pains to undertake a detailed inquiry in this regard by oral examination of parents, etc. who admitted their children in the school. who admitted their children in the school. There is no doubt and it goes without saying that if the donation is found to have been given for material gain in securing admission, the same cannot be characterised as donation towards charitable purpose and the assessee would not be entitled to have the benefit, but, unfortunately in the case on hand, in the absence of any material on record, we are unable to take such a view. 23. In such circumstances referred to above, we are of the view that we should not disturb the order passed by the Tribunal affirming the order passed by the CIT(A). 24. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something important. 25. The Apex Court in the case of Ms. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (1992) 3 SCC 666 , held that capitation fee was nothing but price of selling education and such "teaching shops" were contrary to the Constitutional scheme and abhorrent to our Indian culture. 26. The Supreme Court's decisions in case of TMA Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka (2002) (8 SCC 481), Islamic Academy of Education Vs. State of Karnataka (2003) (6 SCC 697) and P.A. Inamdar Vs. State of Maharashtra (2005) (6 SCC 537) also supports the fact that the education is not a commercial activity. 27. Education would remain as a charity only in a case where education is imparted systematically for a fee prescribed by Government. A private aided or unaided professional institution or any other educational institution of a State is required to collect fees with regard to infrastructure and benefit of students of that educational institution. Collection of money over and the above fees prescribed by the Committee would amount to collection of capitation fee and such an institution would face the legal consequences for same (Vodithala Education Society Vs. ADIT, [2008] 20 SOT 353 (HYD.)) 28. In the case of SCIENTIFIC EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT SOCIETY v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [2010], 323 ITR 84 (P&H), the High Court held that the Educational institution should exist solely for purposes of education and if it is not, the society is not eligible for exemption u/s 10 (23C)(vi) of the Act. 29. In the cases of the present nature, the Assessing Officer is well advised to undertake recording a detailed inquiry the statements by of the parents. 29. In the cases of the present nature, the Assessing Officer is well advised to undertake recording a detailed inquiry the statements by of the parents. What we are trying to convey is that there should be a meaningful inquiry. 30. In the result, all the three Tax Appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. The substantial questions of law as formulated are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.” 8. In the present case, the CIT (Appeals) while deleting the addition, has followed the decision of the Tribunal in earlier years and has observed as under : “6.2 I have carefully considered rival contentions and the observations made by the A.O. in the assessment order. Appellant submitted that this issue is decided in favour of the appellant by Hon'ble ITAT, Ahmedabad in ITA No. 279,280 & 281/Ahd/2013 for A. Y.2004-05, 2005-06 & 2009-10 and ITA No. 1321/Ahd/2011(D) & ITA No. 1420/Ahd/2011 dtd. 03-02-2012 for A.Y. 2008-09. CIT(A)-XXI allowed the appeal of the appellant in the earlier A.Y. 2010-11, following the order of Hon'ble ITAT in ITA Nos.279,280 & 281/Ahd/2013, by holding as under:- "7.2 I have considered the assessment order and the submissions made by the appellant. The Hon'ble ITAT in appellant's own case for Asst. Years 2004-05, 2005-06 & 2009-10 in ITA no.279,280 & 281/Ahd/2013 on identical facts, has held that contribution towards different corpus funds were in the nature of corpus fund and as such exempt u/s.12 of the I.T. Act. The relevant observation is reproduced as under:- "Taking into account all the facts as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs in holding that contribution towards different corpus funds aggregating to Rs. 1.9 crores as current income of the assessee liable to be taxed whereas the CIT(A) was justified in her finding that the said contributions were in the nature of corpus funds and as such exempt u/s. 12 of the Act. Therefore, the order of Id. CIT(A) is confirmed with respect to this Issue. 7.3 Respectfully following the order of the Hon'ble ITAT, the addition made by the Assessing Officer on this account is deleted. Since the facts are identical for A.Y: 2012-13 respectfully following the order of Hon'ble ITAT, Ahmedabad and order of CIT(A)-XXI, I am of the considered opinion that the A.O. was not justified in making addition of Rs.5,00,60,184/- on account of corpus donations. Since the facts are identical for A.Y: 2012-13 respectfully following the order of Hon'ble ITAT, Ahmedabad and order of CIT(A)-XXI, I am of the considered opinion that the A.O. was not justified in making addition of Rs.5,00,60,184/- on account of corpus donations. The A.O. is hereby directed to delete the addition of Rs. 5,00,60,184/-. Thus this ground of appeal is allowed. 7. Ground no.4.1 is regarding not allowing the deduction of 15% towards accumulation u/s. 11(1)(a). This alternate ground taken by the appellant becomes infructuous as the ground no.3 has been allowed as discussed above. The same is therefore, dismissed.” 9. However, the Tribunal without considering the decision of the Co- ordinate Bench in similar facts has held as under : “7. We have heard the rival contentions and perused the material on record. On going to the facts of the instant case, we observe that on perusal of the receipts issued to the students for one- time admission fee, it is evident that the aforesaid admission-fees cannot be treated as 'corpus donation' and the same is not eligible for grant of exemption under section 11(1)(d) of the Act. From the facts placed on record, neither is the aforesaid admission-fee charged from the students qualify as a "voluntary donation" nor is there a specific direction that the same may be used only for purpose of "corpus" of the trust. Accordingly, we are in agreement with the arguments of the Ld. DR that the aforesaid amount cannot be treated as corpus donation and accordingly, the assessee is not eligible for benefit of exemption under section 11(1)(d) of the Act. However, we are also of the considered view, that in case the aforesaid amount is treated as income of the assessee trust, then the assessee is eligible for deduction/allowance of expenses incurred against the aforesaid receipts, towards objects of the trust. Accordingly, looking into the facts of the case, the issue is set aside to the file of the assessing officer to treat the aforesaid amount as taxable income of the assessee trust and further, the assessee may also be granted deduction of amount spent towards utilization of the aforesaid amount, towards the objects of the trust, after carrying out the necessary verification. ” 10. ” 10. In view of decision of this Court in case of the appellant, the amount paid by the parents of the students admitted to the education institution run by the appellant is required to be held as a payment towards corpus donation and same was not collected by way of capitation fee. 11. As observed by this Court while considering such issue in Tax Appeal No.356 of 2012, the Assessing Authority has not taken any inquiry with regard to examination of parents who admitted the students in School as to whether the payment is made towards corpus fund or capitation fee. It is true that the donation is bound to have been given for material gain in securing admission, the same cannot be characterised as donation towards charitable purpose and the appellant would not be entitled to have the benefit but in the facts of the case, in absence of any material on record, such view cannot be taken in the circumstances, the Tribunal has committed an error by treating the admission fee charged from the students as not forming part of the corpus of the Trust. Therefore, in this case, following the decision in Tax Appeal No.356 of 2012, this appeal is also allowed. The substantial questions of law as formulated are answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.” 4. In view of the above decision rendered by this Court in Tax Appeal No.89 of 2024, we are of the opinion that no question of law much less any substantial question of law can be said to have been arisen from the impugned order of the Tribunal. 5. All the three Appeals are accordingly dismissed.